18 APRIL EVENING
Dear Colleagues,
The IESM Governing Body met from 1000 to 1230 hours today. CK Sharma, Aditya Jaini, Rajan Sriniwas, Chander Kamboj, Harwant, Sharan Ahuja, Vinod Gandhi, Rakesh Chaturvedi and self attended. The members were updated on continuing efforts for OROP and the upcoming rallies – in Ghamar (UP) on 25 April and in Hisar (Haryana) on 06 May 2010. The minutes of the meeting will be circulated as per SOP.
In the afternoon session we were also joined by our esteemed colleagues; Colonel Nair (Kerala), Sqn Ldr Dhiman (HP), Colonel Raina (J&K) and Colonel Sidharth Bose (Chhattisgarh). We are grateful to them that they came all the way to participate in the interactive session. They made useful suggestions that would be deliberated in the appropriate fora.
Regular telephonic contact with the ESM across the country continues – Gurmel from Gurdaspur, Hari Singh from Hisar, Ahmatullah from Kupwara, DR Singh from Lucknow and several others. The ESM are aware that we have been shortchanged again and OROP has not been given, notwithstanding the information spread to the contrary. There is infectious eagerness in the environment to follow whatever the Movement plans and decides to do.
To maintain pressure on the government, a letter has again been written by me to the President on 12 April 2010. It is reproduced below:
Quote
This letter may kindly be put up to the Supreme Commander
Hon’ble Supreme Commander,
I draw your kind attention to our letter dated 8th March, 2010. May I again request the Supreme Commander to intimate the date and time of her convenience where she could receive the medals from the Ex-Servicemen, who have been long pursuing their demand of `One Rank One Pension’. The silence on part of the authorities can not unfortunately, make the problem disappear. On the contrary, it could only further strengthen the resolve of the Ex Servicemen to seek justice.
I may also mention that I have received a reply to my earlier letter to you dated 11th January 2010. This has come from the Army Headquarters vide their letter No. B/39027/29(5)/MOD/AG/PS-5 dated 19th March 2010 (copy attached). It is merely a routine reply that does not address the issue raised. It is a well-known fact that the committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary did not address the issue of One Rank One Pension. It only addressed the enhancement of pensions under `related issues’. It is submitted that there is no relation between pension enhancement and the just demand One Rank One Pension that is based on principle of equity.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
Smt. Pratibha Devisingh Patil
Hon’ble President of India
& Supreme Commander of Armed Forces
Rashtrapati Bhawan
New Delhi – 110 004
Copy to:
Hon’ble Prime Minister
Hon’ble Defence Minister
Unquote
Best regards,
Lt Gen (Emeritus) Raj Kadyan, PVSM, AVSM, VSM
Chairman IESM
Monday, April 19, 2010
Criminal Charges Against IAS/ IPS Officers to restore Public Confidence
A LETTER TO THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF THE TRIBUNE
To: The Editor-in-Chief, The Tribune
Sir,
In a written reply to Rajya Sabha, Minister of State in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions Prithviraj Chavan said 84 IAS officers and 33 IPS officers are "facing trial on criminal charges in CBI cases as on March 31, 2010".
While much is made of acts of alleged wrong-doing on the part of military personnel with certain sections of the media indulging in witch-hunting and going overboard in reporting them in blazing headlines, we hardly come across any follow-up coverage of cases against other culpable elements of society.
Why it need be so? Are there two different norms set by the media- one for the Armed Forces personnel and another for the remaining citizens of the country- to highlight blameworthiness of individuals?
Warm regards.
Sincerely,
Wg Cdr S.C. KAPOOR (retd)
(Member IESM Veterans Groups)
CBI Criminal Charges Bureaucrats
The number of IAS and IPS officers facing trial on the Criminal charges in CBI cases as on 31.3.2010 are as under:
IAS: 84
IPS: 33
AS on 31.3.2010, the number of cases being investigated against IAS and IPS officers by CBI are as under:
IAS: 21
IPS: 6
As on 31.3.2010 the number of IAS & IPS officers against whom cases under PC at are being investigated by CBI are as under:
IAS: 15
IPS: 1
Government have taken several steps to restore the public confidence in the IAS & IPS. These inter-alia, include, speedy trial of corruption cases through setting up of Special CBI Courts, conducting disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent officers in a time bound manner, inculcating appropriate values, introducing mid-career mandatory training programme for IAS officers, recognizing and rewarding the good performers by instituting the PM’s awards of excellence etc.
This information was given by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions, Shri Prithviraj Chavan in written reply to a question in Rajya Sabha. *** RS/SR
OVER 110 IAS, IPS OFFICERS FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES
To: The Editor-in-Chief, The Tribune
Sir,
In a written reply to Rajya Sabha, Minister of State in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions Prithviraj Chavan said 84 IAS officers and 33 IPS officers are "facing trial on criminal charges in CBI cases as on March 31, 2010".
While much is made of acts of alleged wrong-doing on the part of military personnel with certain sections of the media indulging in witch-hunting and going overboard in reporting them in blazing headlines, we hardly come across any follow-up coverage of cases against other culpable elements of society.
Why it need be so? Are there two different norms set by the media- one for the Armed Forces personnel and another for the remaining citizens of the country- to highlight blameworthiness of individuals?
Warm regards.
Sincerely,
Wg Cdr S.C. KAPOOR (retd)
(Member IESM Veterans Groups)
CBI Criminal Charges Bureaucrats
The number of IAS and IPS officers facing trial on the Criminal charges in CBI cases as on 31.3.2010 are as under:
IAS: 84
IPS: 33
AS on 31.3.2010, the number of cases being investigated against IAS and IPS officers by CBI are as under:
IAS: 21
IPS: 6
As on 31.3.2010 the number of IAS & IPS officers against whom cases under PC at are being investigated by CBI are as under:
IAS: 15
IPS: 1
Government have taken several steps to restore the public confidence in the IAS & IPS. These inter-alia, include, speedy trial of corruption cases through setting up of Special CBI Courts, conducting disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent officers in a time bound manner, inculcating appropriate values, introducing mid-career mandatory training programme for IAS officers, recognizing and rewarding the good performers by instituting the PM’s awards of excellence etc.
This information was given by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions, Shri Prithviraj Chavan in written reply to a question in Rajya Sabha. *** RS/SR
OVER 110 IAS, IPS OFFICERS FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES
Dantewada Massacre: Remedial measures to mute Maoists
Dear Sir,
I am enclosing an article on 'Dantewada Massacre: What next'. I have tried to analyse what is wrong with the CRPF`s training, equipment and leadership. As well as what the state and Union Govt must to resolve the Maoist menace, to the extent of setting up a commission to resolve the above issues, providing free food to the tribals till they have the purchasing power to buy food. Finally, establishing an unified command to conduct the fight against the Maoist.
Lt Gen Kamaljit Singh (Retd)
Dantewade Massacre: What Next
The CRPF massacre in Dantewade in Chhatisgarh cannot be attributed to the Union Home Minister, he must stay as he is doing good job as Home minister, with out doubt. The fault lies with the successive State Govts who have totally neglected the tribal areas, sans development. Allowing the outsiders and the state administration to milk the simple tribal people and providing no semblance of governance and development. Poverty of the area is shocking, no civilized society can condone the state of the tribals/locals. Now,that we have to deal with the Maoist threat as a National threat, which has been created due to lack of development and maladministration by the State Govts. The additional reason being, that the Maoists having established themselves in the tribal and in accessible areas now have a pipe dream to take control of the country, which of course is far fetched and will not succeed. The Maoist are getting both arms and financial support from foreign countries and our neighbours.
With this background, both the Central and State Govts of all the effected states will have to proceed to work out their strategy. Which could be based on the basic premise of gaining control of the areas in a deliberate manner, while building up a strong intelligence network, which is the sin qua non for effective counter insurgency operations. The danger of initially spreading all forces too thinly in the entire area must be guarded against. while regaining administrative control and development in the area by constructing schools , hospitals and roads in a deliberate manner. A caring administration will certainly gain the confidence of the locals. The tribals must perceive tangible improvement in their lives, with the implementation of the various govt schemes for employment ( NREGA), National Rural Health Mission for Health and provision of free food for a year or two, till (NREGA) is properly implemented in the area. So that people are in position to pay for the subsidized food under the BPL scheme . This may seem to be weird, but is the way out, as the tribals do not have the buying capacity. This is the minimum price that the country will have to pay to eliminate the Maoist threat, after long years of total neglect.
While all this is going on to win the heart and minds of the locals and the tribals. The state police and CRPF must create an effective intelligence step up to gain information of the Maoists, which is vital for Conduct of operations to eliminate the Maoist from amongst the people and in of the area. Having broadly analysed the methodology to fight the Maoists. The question arises, are the Govt forces namely the local police and the CRPF suitable for the task required of them?. This in my opinion is where the main problem lies with the CRPF. The top leadership of the CRPF has basically being drawn from the IPS with it`s police ethos. Being a paramilitary force, it has been used for election duties, road protection, dealing with communal violence and protection of installations etc. It has never been a fighting force like the Army. The subordinate leadership is trained as a police force to help the state police force, when requested by the State Govt from the Union Govt.
The leadership of the CRPF does not lead from the front, which is an essential requirement for counter-insurgency operations (CI ops). This ethos will have to be developed as most operation are at company or platoon level (ie small groups). The second short coming is in the training of the force, it should have undergone jungle warfare and counter insurgency operations (CI Ops) training as a sub- unit and unit level. The man who is going to lead his men into action must be trained with them and lead them in operations. A short training in counter insurgency by CRPF or the Army will Not fully qualify them to carry out the task, it takes time to train raw units to conduct CI Ops. The third shortcoming, is units must be adequately equipped by way of proper small arms, radio set, light transport, bullet proof vests and night vision devices to give greater mobility and quick reaction capability to reinforce forces in contact with the Maoists. Contact once established. It must lead to elimination of the Maoist. It is therefore essential to have a radio network. This will allow all units and subunits to remain in communication and know what is happening in the area, so as to take immediate action to prevent the Maoist from slipping away in a relentless battle or chase. This method proved most effective in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir counter Insurgency operations. The fourth short is coming, is by way of administration of the CRPF. The CRPF units are responsible for their own administration, in that the Commanding officer has to make all arrangement for the accommodation, rations, water and fuel, as well as there defence stores for setting up defended camps. There is no system of the superior headquarter being responsible for supply of these items including ammunition. This difficulty will get accentuated in the underdeveloped area, where the Maoist threat exist, as there are no facilities or commodities available for their requirements. There would be possibly more issues that need to be resolved before the CRPF will be able to take on the Maoist. It would be in National interest, if a commission consisting of an Army, CRPF, Rashtra Rifles(RR), Counter Insurgency Warfare School and state police representatives of the minimum rank of Maj Gen and equivalent are tasked to recommend, what all needs to be done to make the CRPF capable of taking on the task of defeating the Maoist. There is bound to cause consternation and rejection of the idea, but the Home Minister must view this dispassionately of the CRPF learning from good practices.
All over the world, multinationals and smaller companies are always on the lookout to emulate good practices of successful companies to improve their performance. Why can`t the CRPF learn from the Indian Army and RR success model to fight insurgency, when other countries armies are learning from us. The Home Minister and his Ministry must not see this as a turf war, but a necessity to rid the country of the Maoist menace. At the National Level or the strategic level, the Union Govt will have to impress on the State Govts, that the creation of an unified command for intelligence gathering and operations is a vital necessity, if the country has to eliminate the Maoist. As it is, the writ of the State Govts does not run in the 80 districts of the various states, where the Maoist rules the roost. They are therefore not really surrendering any real authority of the state. All that is required is that the intelligence gathering and anti-Maoist operations in these 80 districts be conducted under the Unified Command Authority. Should it come to the crunch issue, the Army will bail out the countries chestnuts out of the Maoist fire as a last resort. All agree that the Maoist have to be eliminated and have given their considered views. However, it is the mindset, training, equipment and small details and deficiencies at the unit level of the CRPF which need to be resolved, so as to create the capability of the CRPF to eventually eliminate the Maoists in due course, but this may not be possible as quickly as we would like them to achieve it. The CRPF has to be rejuvenated to carry out the task that the national policy envisages for it, that is the responsibility of internal policing of the country with State Police Force, including counter insurgency operations. While, the BSF guards the frontiers of the country, and the Armed Forces are responsible to defend the country from external aggression.
Lt Gen Kamaljit Singh (Retd)
I am enclosing an article on 'Dantewada Massacre: What next'. I have tried to analyse what is wrong with the CRPF`s training, equipment and leadership. As well as what the state and Union Govt must to resolve the Maoist menace, to the extent of setting up a commission to resolve the above issues, providing free food to the tribals till they have the purchasing power to buy food. Finally, establishing an unified command to conduct the fight against the Maoist.
Lt Gen Kamaljit Singh (Retd)
Dantewade Massacre: What Next
The CRPF massacre in Dantewade in Chhatisgarh cannot be attributed to the Union Home Minister, he must stay as he is doing good job as Home minister, with out doubt. The fault lies with the successive State Govts who have totally neglected the tribal areas, sans development. Allowing the outsiders and the state administration to milk the simple tribal people and providing no semblance of governance and development. Poverty of the area is shocking, no civilized society can condone the state of the tribals/locals. Now,that we have to deal with the Maoist threat as a National threat, which has been created due to lack of development and maladministration by the State Govts. The additional reason being, that the Maoists having established themselves in the tribal and in accessible areas now have a pipe dream to take control of the country, which of course is far fetched and will not succeed. The Maoist are getting both arms and financial support from foreign countries and our neighbours.
With this background, both the Central and State Govts of all the effected states will have to proceed to work out their strategy. Which could be based on the basic premise of gaining control of the areas in a deliberate manner, while building up a strong intelligence network, which is the sin qua non for effective counter insurgency operations. The danger of initially spreading all forces too thinly in the entire area must be guarded against. while regaining administrative control and development in the area by constructing schools , hospitals and roads in a deliberate manner. A caring administration will certainly gain the confidence of the locals. The tribals must perceive tangible improvement in their lives, with the implementation of the various govt schemes for employment ( NREGA), National Rural Health Mission for Health and provision of free food for a year or two, till (NREGA) is properly implemented in the area. So that people are in position to pay for the subsidized food under the BPL scheme . This may seem to be weird, but is the way out, as the tribals do not have the buying capacity. This is the minimum price that the country will have to pay to eliminate the Maoist threat, after long years of total neglect.
While all this is going on to win the heart and minds of the locals and the tribals. The state police and CRPF must create an effective intelligence step up to gain information of the Maoists, which is vital for Conduct of operations to eliminate the Maoist from amongst the people and in of the area. Having broadly analysed the methodology to fight the Maoists. The question arises, are the Govt forces namely the local police and the CRPF suitable for the task required of them?. This in my opinion is where the main problem lies with the CRPF. The top leadership of the CRPF has basically being drawn from the IPS with it`s police ethos. Being a paramilitary force, it has been used for election duties, road protection, dealing with communal violence and protection of installations etc. It has never been a fighting force like the Army. The subordinate leadership is trained as a police force to help the state police force, when requested by the State Govt from the Union Govt.
The leadership of the CRPF does not lead from the front, which is an essential requirement for counter-insurgency operations (CI ops). This ethos will have to be developed as most operation are at company or platoon level (ie small groups). The second short coming is in the training of the force, it should have undergone jungle warfare and counter insurgency operations (CI Ops) training as a sub- unit and unit level. The man who is going to lead his men into action must be trained with them and lead them in operations. A short training in counter insurgency by CRPF or the Army will Not fully qualify them to carry out the task, it takes time to train raw units to conduct CI Ops. The third shortcoming, is units must be adequately equipped by way of proper small arms, radio set, light transport, bullet proof vests and night vision devices to give greater mobility and quick reaction capability to reinforce forces in contact with the Maoists. Contact once established. It must lead to elimination of the Maoist. It is therefore essential to have a radio network. This will allow all units and subunits to remain in communication and know what is happening in the area, so as to take immediate action to prevent the Maoist from slipping away in a relentless battle or chase. This method proved most effective in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir counter Insurgency operations. The fourth short is coming, is by way of administration of the CRPF. The CRPF units are responsible for their own administration, in that the Commanding officer has to make all arrangement for the accommodation, rations, water and fuel, as well as there defence stores for setting up defended camps. There is no system of the superior headquarter being responsible for supply of these items including ammunition. This difficulty will get accentuated in the underdeveloped area, where the Maoist threat exist, as there are no facilities or commodities available for their requirements. There would be possibly more issues that need to be resolved before the CRPF will be able to take on the Maoist. It would be in National interest, if a commission consisting of an Army, CRPF, Rashtra Rifles(RR), Counter Insurgency Warfare School and state police representatives of the minimum rank of Maj Gen and equivalent are tasked to recommend, what all needs to be done to make the CRPF capable of taking on the task of defeating the Maoist. There is bound to cause consternation and rejection of the idea, but the Home Minister must view this dispassionately of the CRPF learning from good practices.
All over the world, multinationals and smaller companies are always on the lookout to emulate good practices of successful companies to improve their performance. Why can`t the CRPF learn from the Indian Army and RR success model to fight insurgency, when other countries armies are learning from us. The Home Minister and his Ministry must not see this as a turf war, but a necessity to rid the country of the Maoist menace. At the National Level or the strategic level, the Union Govt will have to impress on the State Govts, that the creation of an unified command for intelligence gathering and operations is a vital necessity, if the country has to eliminate the Maoist. As it is, the writ of the State Govts does not run in the 80 districts of the various states, where the Maoist rules the roost. They are therefore not really surrendering any real authority of the state. All that is required is that the intelligence gathering and anti-Maoist operations in these 80 districts be conducted under the Unified Command Authority. Should it come to the crunch issue, the Army will bail out the countries chestnuts out of the Maoist fire as a last resort. All agree that the Maoist have to be eliminated and have given their considered views. However, it is the mindset, training, equipment and small details and deficiencies at the unit level of the CRPF which need to be resolved, so as to create the capability of the CRPF to eventually eliminate the Maoists in due course, but this may not be possible as quickly as we would like them to achieve it. The CRPF has to be rejuvenated to carry out the task that the national policy envisages for it, that is the responsibility of internal policing of the country with State Police Force, including counter insurgency operations. While, the BSF guards the frontiers of the country, and the Armed Forces are responsible to defend the country from external aggression.
Lt Gen Kamaljit Singh (Retd)
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