CWG: Sports Structures in Shambles

Learning from CWG
Business standard Sunday, Oct 17, 2010
Instead of learning from the forces, are we doing to defence what we did to sports
Suresh Bangara / October 15, 2010, 0:20 IST
If India can organise a Republic Day parade every year with great efficiency, and could recently host successfully World Military Games, why did it mess up the organisation of the Commonwealth Games (CWG)?

What is common to successful mass events is an empowered structure with clear demarcation of responsibility and accountability. The CWG failed due to an absence of a centralised command structure. Responsibilities were not demarcated, there were too many “Indians” and no chiefs, and, what is more, everyone had an excuse not to own up responsibility.

November 13, 2003 was the date on which the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) resolved to hand over the Games to Delhi. In accordance with article 10A, the host city contract was inked by the Government of India (GoI), the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi(GNCTD), the IOA and the CGF. The organisation of the entire event was allotted to the Organising Committee (OC) of the CWG.

The key delivery partners listed on the website are the CGF, the IOA, the OC CWG, the GNCTD and the GoI in that order. It also states that several ministries of the GoI and several organisations under the GNCTD and others would be involved in execution.

Even a prima facie analysis of this structure would point to the fact that the coordination of such a complex body cannot be vested with a committee which has no authority over the key delivery partners. In the Indian context, hierarchy and individual egos play a vital role in the smooth functioning of the organisation. At times, collective organisational goals are sacrificed to appease individual aspirations. Presumably, these considerations caused undue delays of about two years before the OC came into existence on February 10, 2005 — a faulty and toothless structure from day one.

Although representatives of all the delivery partners were constituted on the committee, raising alarms at the CWG meetings, when deadline after deadline failed to be met by their parent organisation, is not a practical proposition. Having taken full responsibility for staging the best ever Games, as outlined on the website, the OC perhaps continued at best as a mute spectator to inter-ministerial red tape and embarrassing delays in execution.

What is needed in the globalised, highly competitive and demanding environment is to professionalise our decision-making structures to include experts in negotiations, project management and other niche areas.

A look at the ministry which manages the armed forces of India in the above context would be instructive. The defence ministry has the responsibility to handle the rapidly increasing defence budget, which is more than twice the amount allotted to the CWG, but on a yearly basis. Is it structured to meet all the requirements of the armed forces of India?

First, since 1952, the three chiefs along with their headquarters were removed from the decision-making structure of the GoI. They were designated as the “attached offices” of the ministry. In effect, all communications from the armed forces were to be addressed only to the ministry and no decision-making power and executive power was to reside with the chiefs, save those related to operations. Not even the revenue budget could be operated by the chief to merely run the service as it existed. The chiefs could send their recommendations and plans for modernisation, which effectively rested at the table of some functionary without even an acknowledgement. The ministry continued to be manned by generalists — civil servants who often learnt about the armed forces after they were placed in the chair.

While the authority to take decisions with the concurrence of the minister was vested with the ministry, there were no provisions for accountability. Having been removed from the chain, the chiefs could only make proposals and could not be held accountable. The procurement of Advanced Jet Trainers(AJTs) for the Air Force took over two decades, by which time costs had escalated by 500 per cent. The decision to induct Gorshkov took over a decade, by which time the deteriorating cables of the ship warranted doubling of the original cost. Many thousand crores are surrendered unspent year after year despite the urgent operational needs of the Army. There are no clear-cut penalties for procrastination and opportunity costs incurred thereof. Are these not the ills of the CWG as well?

Second, integration of the ministry with the armed forces by placing uniformed professionals at appropriate desks of the ministry is a successful model practised by other democracies. Similar structures were recommended by the Committee on Defence Management after the Kargil war. Cosmetic changes in nomenclature with no corresponding powers were the only action taken to show compliance.

Thirdly, the Kargil Review Committee did recommend the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as a single-point adviser to the defence minister on all matters of planning, acquisition etc. This has been stalled by status quo-ists within and without the armed forces. The result is the continuation of a toothless Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was first recommended in 1924 and which is still in existence only in India. Almost all armed forces of countries that matter have opted for a fully integrated structure with accountability, while we continue to live in denial of a serious structural infirmity.

The CWG 2010 has brought disrepute to the country due to delays in implementation despite seven years to prepare. We can live with it, for soon it will be forgotten. However, continued denial of structural weaknesses in the defence department has the potential to lay our country in the dust. Until then, incapability to modernise, lack of timely decision coupled with conflicting demands of the three services can only be offset by the ability of our officers and soldiers to lay down their lives — even if it is to achieve a pyrrhic victory.

The author is a retired admiral of the Indian Navy
Learning from CWG

Rivalry between IB, RAW, MI costing India dear

"Rivalry between the three major intelligence agencies, RAW, IB and MI, has done a lot of damage not only to the agencies but also to the nation."

India is paying a heavy price for differences among its intelligence agencies as they rarely exchange inputs among themselves, say insiders. The Mumbai terror attack is a case in point.

The country has three main intelligence agencies - the Intelligence Bureau (IB) for collection of internal and counter intelligence, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for external intelligence, and Military Intelligence (MI) that collects military-related inputs.

"Rivalry between the three major intelligence agencies, RAW, IB and MI, has done a lot of damage not only to the agencies but also to the nation. The reluctance to share intelligence is the bane of all agencies, at least in India," Major General (retd) V.K. Singh, who has retired from RAW and has seen the intelligence agencies from close quarters, said.

"The proclivity to take the credit has given rise to the unpardonable trend in every agency of keeping vital intelligence close to its chest until it is disclosed to someone important enough in the political hierarchy, sometimes even the prime minister," Singh said.

Singh in his book, "India's External Intelligence - Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing", noted that rivalry between IB and RAW was perhaps unavoidable in view of their past history and functions.

"An Indian recruited by a foreign militant group is definitely the concern of the IB. When he is taken across the border for training he becomes the interest of RAW. When he re-enters India and carries out strikes against the military installations in Jammu and Kashmir, it becomes the worry of MI.

"Should he be handed over from one agency to the other every time he crosses a border, or should all keep a watch on him together? Should the army and IB be allowed to monitor trans-border radio and satellite links, which strictly fall within the purview of RAW?

"These are the questions that have no clear answers and only add to the blame game between the intelligence agencies," Singh said.
Rivalry between IB, RAW, MI costing India dear: Deccan Herald
Rivalry between IB, RAW, MI costing India dear: Economic Times
Rivalry between IB, RAW, MI costing India dear: Manoramaonline

RAW Scuttles RTI Act
Give details of probe into complaints by ex-official: CIC to RAW
The Central Information Commission has directed the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to reveal details of any inquiry into complaints by a former official, who has alleged harassment, corruption and other irregularities in the intelligence agency's functioning. The CIC order comes at a time when the agency is facing flak for its lack of action in alerting relevant authorities about the Mumbai attack. Hearing a plea by former RAW official Major General V K Singh, the Commission said, "From the perusal of the documents, we were unable to find what action has been taken." Singh is facing a probe by CBI for allegedly revealing vital details about RAW's working in his book, `India's External Intelligence -- Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)', in violation of the Officials Secrets Act.
Give details of probe into complaints by ex-official: CIC to RAW: RTI Blog

Mumbai Standoff Never Again

Indian Express Posted: Dec 02, 2008 at 0229 hrs IST

This terrorist attack was the worst the country has faced. The worst in terms of locations targeted; of the audacity of the terrorists; the highly coordinated nature of the terrorist operation; the sophistication of the weapons used; the number of casualties; the destruction caused; and of the time taken for resolving the issue. We have learnt little after being targets of terrorist actions over relentless decades. There was a major attack in Delhi just this September; another soon after in Guwahati; and yet, we have again been found napping. Why is it that we seem so helpless? The reason is that we have been unable to get our act together and continue to deal with this major menace in a fractured and uncoordinated manner.

Unfortunately, all that our leadership — not just the political leadership but also the emergency core group of officials — have to offer are platitudes and exhortations to maintain communal harmony and remain calm. These are, of course, vital; but they are not a comprehensive plan that could work to counter such activities. Till date, there is apparently no attempt at planning, although we are, today, the biggest victims of terrorism.

After 9/11, the US administration took many measures to ensure that such attacks did not recur. They set up a structured organisation in the form of the department of homeland security, which served as the nodal agency for command and control, with other agencies reporting to it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating: not one terrorist incident has taken place in mainland America after instituting these measures.

Compare that to India, which has no terrorism strategy. All we have is crisis management, which is indeed the very antithesis of strategy, and thus meaningless. There are too many sources of this strategic confusion: our agencies, clueless as ever; various police forces, activated only when an incident occurs; Centre and states blaming each other, as security is a state subject; a political leadership focussed unwaveringly on the next elections; core officials easily reverting to their earlier dispensations and routine.

As someone who spent a life in the military, the most striking thing about the Mumbai standoff was the chaos visible outside all the venues. No one was apparently in command or co-ordinating the various operations. No communication arrangements were visible: everyone seemed to be communicating only by their mobiles! This is a major threat, akin to war: it is unthinkable that we can expect to succeed in our objective if we proceed in such a lackadaisical manner.

Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (Retd)
Never Again