Republic Day in New Delhi

India's 59th Republic Day Parade

When: 26 Jan 2008 (annual)

Where: Delhi

Route: Raisina Hill, along the Rajpath, past India Gate and on to the historic Red Fort.

Chief Guest: Sarkozy

Every year on 26 January the founding of the independent Republic is remembered throughout India. In New Delhi the spectacular celebrations include the march past of the three armed forces, massive parades and traditional folk dances, music from all over India and an Air Force fly-by. The President of India who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Armed Forces, takes the salute.

Although independence from British rule was actually gained on 15 August 1947 - an occasion marked by the Independence Day celebrations every year - the establishment of the Republic actually has its roots in the Lahore Session of the Indian National Congress at midnight of 31 December 1929 & 01 January 1930. During the session the tri-colour flag was unfurled by the nationalists and a pledge taken that every year, on 26 January, Independence Day would be celebrated. This declaration of the spirit of independence became reality when the Constitution of India framed by the Constituent Assembly of India came into force on 26 January 1950.

Celebrations, though on a much smaller scale, are also held in state capitals, where the governor of the state unfurls the national flag. If the Governor of the state is unavailable for some reason, the Chief Minister of the state assumes the honor of unfurling the National Flag of India.

Note: Photograph taken on 26 Jan 2007

War in Ancient India

The Mahabharata War
Dharmayuddha is war carried on the principles of Dharma, meaning here the Ksatradharma or the law of Kings and Warriors. The Hindu laws of war are very chivalrous and humane, and prohibit the slaying of the unarmed, of women, of the old, and of the conquered. Megasthenes noticed a peculiar trait of Indian warfare they never ravage an enemy's land with fire, nor cut down its trees. (Artwork courtesy of The Bhaktivedanta Book Trust International, Inc. http://www.krishna.com/).

The Bhagavad Gita has influenced great Americans from Thoreau to Oppenheimer. Its message of letting go of the fruits of one’s actions is just as relevant today as it was when it was first written more than two millennia ago. The history of ancient India is largely a history of Hindu culture and progress. Hindu culture has a distinct claim to a higher antiquity than Assyrian schools would claim for Sargon I and as much or even higher antiquity than Egyptian scholars would claim for the commencement of the first dynasty of Kings. One aspect of this culture consists in India's political institutions which were almost modern.

Modern warfare has developed on mechanical lines, giving less scope for the qualities of courage and individual leadership. The value and importance of the army were realized very early in the history of India, and this led to the maintenance of a permanent militia to put down dissent within and arrest aggression from without. This gave rise to the Ksatriya warrior caste, and the ksatram dharmam came to mean the primary duty of war. To serve the country by participating in war became the svadharma of this warrior community.

Indian Military Science recognizes two kinds of warfare - the dharmayuddha and the kutayuddha. Dharmayuddha is war carried on the principles of dharma, meaning here the Ksatradharma or the law of Kings and Warriors. In other words, it was a just and righteous war which had the approval of society. On the other hand, kuttayuddha was unrighteous war. It was a crafty fight carried on in secret. The Hindu science of warfare values both niti and saurya i.e. ethical principles and valor. It was therefore realized that the waging of war without regard to moral standards degraded the institution into mere animal ferocity. A monarch desirous of dharma vijaya should conform to the code of ethics enjoined upon warriors.

The principles regulating the two kinds of warfare are elaborately described in the Dharmasutras and Dharmasastras, the epics (Ramayana and Mahabharata), the Arthasastra treatises of Kautalya, Kamandaka, and Sukra. Hindu India possessed the classical fourfold force of chariots, elephants, horsemen, and infantry, collectively known as the Caturangabala. Students also know that the old game of chess also goes by the name of Caturanga. From the references to this game in the Rig Veda and the Atharva Veda and in the Buddhists and Jaina books, it must have been very popular in ancient India. The Persian term Chatrang and the Arabic Shatrang are forms of the Sanskrit Caturanga.

When a conqueror felt that he was in a position to invade the foreigner's country, he sent an ambassador with the message: 'Fight or submit.' More than 5000 years ago India recognized that the person of the ambassador was inviolable. This was a great service that ancient Hinduism rendered to the cause of international law.

Credit: http://www.hinduwisdom.info/War_in_Ancient_India.htm

Queen's Gurkha Signals History

The Origins

The Gurkha Signals Holding and Training Wing

British Army signalling can find it origins in the Royal Corps of Engineers in 1870, when the first Telegraph Battalion was formed. Signalling remained the prerogative of the Engineers for 58 years until the formation of the Corps of Signals in 1921. It is hardly surprising therefore that the initial employment of Gurkha signallers be in the three Indian Corps of Sappers and Miners (Bombay, Bengal, and Madras) in 1911. This development was rather haphazard and it wasn't until the First World War that whole companies of Gurkha signallers existed within these three Corps.

In 1920 these companies were formed into the Indian Signal Service and each 'Line and Wireless' companies within the service were given a letter designation. In 1921 'G' Divisional Signals, which was approximately regimental size, was based in Rawalpindi and included British and Gurkha soldiers. 'G' Divisional Signals had a small Regimental Headquarters (RHQ), No 1 Company and No 2 Company, the latter incorporating three Infantry Brigade Signal Sections and three Royal Artillery Brigade Signal Sections. It was this No 2 Company which was totally Gurkha in composition and which grew to such a size that by necessity it had to be eventually split into two. These Gurkha signallers distinguished themselves in the Waziristan troubles in 1923 and during the state visit to Nepal in 1921 of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales on a hunting trip. But it was eventually decided in 1928 that there was an insufficient trained reserve of Gurkha signallers and that they should be allowed to waste out of the army.

When India gained independence from Britain in 1947 only 4 Regiments of Gurkhas, each of two battalions, were transferred from the Indian Army to the British Army. The 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 10th Gurkha Rifle Regiments moved to Malaya and Hong Kong in 1948. The impending Malayan Emergency provided the impetus in June 1948 for the formation of the 17th Gurkha Infantry Division and it was decided that the signals units for this new division should be Gurkha in composition. In July 1948 the training cadre, from which this new division's brigade signals units would eventually be drawn, was formed and initially consisted only of a handful of British Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) and other ranks. An establishment was created at the Command Headquarters site, in Kuala Lumpur, called X Brigade Signal Squadron and it was to this Squadron that Major A G C Cox MBE R SIGNALS was posted in October 1948. The X was used because no-one knew quite what to call them, but it was intended that this would be the first instalment towards a Gurkha Division Signal Regiment. The remainder of 1948 was used in forming the training cadre from experienced British and Gurkha instructors, and with gaining the approval of establishments for a Training wing and an Independent Brigade Signal Squadron from General Headquarters (GHQ) Far East Land Forces (FARELF). Although it had been envisaged that the first group of 110 trainees would arrive on 1 Jan 1949 the approval for the establishments was not given until May 1950.

Credit: http://www.army.mod.uk/royalsignals/qgs/index.html

IC-25067 2/Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal, PVC, Posthumous

Date: 16 December 1971

Place of Action: Jarpal, Shakargarh Sector

Commissioned: 13 June 1971 (six months before the action)

Unit: 17th Poona Horse

Date and Place of Birth: 14 October 1950, Pune, Maharashtra

Son of Brig M L Khetrapal (Retd)

Full Story of his heroic deeds visit:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arun_Khetarpal

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/HEROISM/Khetarpal.html

http://faculty.winthrop.edu/haynese/india/medals/PVC/PVC13.html

http://www.sanawar.com/defence.htm

http://forums.sulekha.com/forums/coffeehouse/Valour-has-no-borders-2nd-LtArun-Khetrapal-PVC.htm

Indian Military Academy

Here are some facts about the history of the IMA. These are taken from Sam Manekshaw's biography, which is part of my book LEADERSHIP IN THE INDIAN ARMY - BIOGRAPHIES OF TWELVE SOLDIERS.

VK Singh
Maj Gen (Retd)

The Skeen Committee, set up in 1925, had recommended the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst by 1933. To work out details of the proposed military training college, the Government had appointed the Indian Military College Committee, in early 1931. The Committee was chaired by Sir Philip Chetwode, and had a large number of service and civilian members. After detailed deliberation, the Committee submitted its report on 15 July 1931. It recommended establishment of a college to train Indians for commissions in the Indian Army, after an examination to be conducted by the Public Service Commission. The course was to be of three years duration, with the age of entry between 18 and 20 years. On graduation, officers would be granted Indian Commissions, which would be signed by the Viceroy. (The Commissions of officers graduating from Sandhurst were signed by the King). The total fee would be Rupees 4,600, which would cover tuition, board, lodging, uniforms, books and pocket money. Indian Army cadets would be exempted from the fees, and given a stipend of 60 rupees per month. After getting their commissions, the officers would be given the rank of Second Lieutenants, with a monthly salary of 300 rupees.

One of the important points which the Committee considered was the location of the proposed college.It had to be centrally located, easily accessible, with a temperate climate all the year round, and adequate accommodation as well as space for future expansion. The presence of a military garrison in the vicinity was also desirable. After considering over a dozen locations, the Committee short listed three - Dehradun, Mhow and Satara. Finally Dehradun was selected, because of its central location, climate, proximity to the PWRIMC, and the fact that the Railway Staff College was closing down, and its accommodation was readily available.

Early in 1932, it was announced that an examination for entrance to the Indian Military Academy (IMA) would be conducted in June or July. Sam took some money from his mother, went to Delhi and appeared in the entrance examination on 14 July 1932. There were a total of 40 vacancies - 15 selected through open competition, 15 from the Army and 10 from the Indian State Forces. Only 15 cadets were selected and Sam was sixth in order of merit. The first Commandant was Brigadier L.P. Collins, DSO, and the staff was carefully selected to ensure that the standards were kept at par with those at Sandhurst. Training commenced on 1 October 1932, though the Academy was formally inaugurated on 10 December 1932 by the C-in-C, Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Bart, GCB, GCSI, KCMG, DSO. The first batch, called 'The Pioneers', had three future Chiefs - Manekshaw rose to head the Army in India, Smith Dun in Burma and Mohd Musa in Pakistan.

The 1971 war: Izzat and lessons unlearnt

General J F R Jacob played a pivotal role in planning, logistics and the conduct of the 1971 liberation of Bangladesh. It was he who negotiated with Pakistan’s General A A K Niazi to turn a ceasefire into an unconditional surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops. Thirty six years later, he examines the lessons of that war, and laments the steady and deliberate erosion of izzat, or honour, in our proud fighting forces.On December 16, 1971, the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered formally to the Indian Army, and Bangladesh was born. Thirty six years later, we should remember all those gallant soldiers, sailors, airmen and para-military who laid down their lives in the service of our nation, not only in 1971, but also in the wars of 1948, 1962, 1965 and the incursions in Kargil.

In 1971 the pattern of operations was defensive-offensive in the West and a lightning offensive in the East. The thirteen days of operations in the East resulted in the unconditional surrender of Pakistan’s Eastern Command. The ceasefire proposed by Pakistan under the auspices of the United Nations was converted into an unconditional surrender of some 93,000 officers and men.
Pakistan’s General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi had some 30,000 troops in Dacca as opposed to the mere 3,000 Indian soldiers outside the city. He had the capacity to fight on for weeks. And if he had, a Polish resolution being debated at the United Nations for a ceasefire and withdrawal under the auspices of the United Nations could have come into force. But instead, he agreed to surrender. Asked why he agreed to the humiliation of an unconditional public surrender, the only one in history, General Niazi told the Commission of Enquiry in Pakistan that he was blackmailed by General Jacob, the author, into surrendering. He repeated this in his book Betrayal of East Pakistan.

The officers and men of our Army, Navy and Air Force are the finest in the world. But they need to have the wherewithal to execute their duties, namely state-of-the-art weaponry and equipment. They also require suitable emoluments and facilities commensurate with the difficult tasks they have to perform. Most importantly, they need to have the izzat, or honour, they deserve. Time was when the status equations of service officers with their IAS and IPS counterparts were commensurate with their respective responsibilities. Sadly, after every war, this equation has been downgraded.

Some in the IAS are interpreting civil control of the Armed Forces as civil service control. The IAS officers are government servants, and not the Government, as some of them would like to believe. This deliberate erosion of status can be seen in the way our Service Chiefs had to suffer the ignominy of frisking at our airports. Though they were subsequently exempted following a public outcry, today’s civil servants obviously feel that the Mont Blanc pens they wield are more powerful than the swords of their Service counterparts.

The Armed Forces are responsible for the defence of the country. They have not only to wage big wars but also the small wars of counter-insurgency. They need the state-of-the-art weaponry and equipment. The weapon systems held by our armed forces today have progressed little from those used in World War II. Modernisation and upgradation of weapon systems is being retarded by archaic bureaucratic procedures. Modern weapon systems are complex and take a long time to master and absorb.

There has been an inordinate delay is the acquisition of the 155mm Howitzers. We are desperately short of this weapon system. For Instance, the 155mm Bofors was the main battle winning weapon system at Kargil. Yet, the further induction of 155mm Howitzers is a very very long way off. The Army too needs to rethink and upgrade its tactics and standing operating procedures. Unfortunately, a Maginot Complex is prevalent among many decision makers. There has been far too much reliance on linear defence based on the Ditch-cum- Bund.

Due to our very long borders, these linear defences lack depth. Fixed defences are not impenetrable. Both the Maginot Line of Sergeant Maginot and the Sigfried Line of Adolf Hitler were breached. Fixed defences can, at best, only delay in order to determine the quantum and direction of the enemy thrust. Once this is established, it has to be countered by mobile reserves. Ground should be used for manoeuvre to destroy the enemy. The Mobility Factor is of paramount importance.

To ensure mobility by land, air and sea, formations should be structured accordingly.Presently, our units and formations are man-power intensive, rather than being Fire-power intensive. Tactical doctrines should be reassessed. For example, the current Army doctrine states that defence is the basic operation of war. Surely, the offensive is! If this is accepted, then our organisations should be structured to reflect this.

The author took part in several operations in World War II. Invariably, the Infantry battalion assaulted with one Company up. Very exceptionally, with two Companies up in the assault. The author never saw an attack with two Companies up in any assault. The Commanding Officer of the battalion cannot handle more than three companies in the assault. If it is accepted that the offence is a basic operation of war, then the organisations should be structured accordingly.

Incidentally, the Russians, Americans and most other armies have a three Company organisation. The man-power saved in such restructuring can be used to raise more battalions. Similarly, we should re-examine the organisation of the tank squadron. The present squadron consists of four troops of three tanks each, and two in squadron headquarters. A total of 14 tanks.

The Russians used armour most effectively through out World War II, from Kursk, all the way to Berlin. Their squadron consists of three troops of three tanks plus one for the commander. A total of ten tanks. As with the infantry, we should re-examine these organizations. The savings in tanks and man-power, if adopted, could be used to raise further units.

Incidentally, the Artillery was the only arm after World War-II to re-organise. The eight-gun battery of two troops of four guns each, was re-structured as a six-gun battery. But we need smaller and lighter formations that are more mobile and can be transported more readily.
Today, the Division is the smallest formation that can work independently. There is a need to make the Brigade group as the smallest formation that can operate independently. At least, one Brigade group in the Army should be capable of being air-transportable and able to deploy rapidly in distant areas.

Regarding armour, the role of armour and the Armoured Division needs to be clarified. The Armoured Division’s role is to break out, once a breach in the enemy defences has been made. The Division then pours through the breach, and then devastates the logistics and infrastructure of the enemy in the rear areas. In the military environment that obtains today, it is necessary to re-examine the requirement for the number of armoured divisions. Independent Armoured Brigade Groups are more flexible and appropriate. A similar restructuring is being undertaken in many foreign armies. As for the Navy, considering the many islands off the East and West coast, it is necessary for the to enhance its amphibious capabilities. We have come a long way since the fiasco of the landings near Cox’s Bazaar in 1971 (Ukhia).

With the acquisition of a greater amphibious capability, the Armed Forces should aim at being able to assault beaches with at least a Brigade Group. There should also be a “lift” capability to land the remaining elements of the Division.

In 1971, we were only capable of dropping a battalion group at Tangail in Bangladesh. There is a urgent requirement to be able to lift and transport a complete Brigade group by air, using helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. This capability is essential to move a brigade rapidly over large distances.

There’s a pressing requirement to re-examine the quantum of Teeth versus Tail as also the proliferation of staff manning the various headquarters, particularly at New Delhi. Staff procedures at Service Headquarters need to be streamlined. The bureaucracy in Olive Green at Service Headquarters today is more Whitehall than Whitehall in London itself.

The Armed Forces today are serving the nation with dedication. They are fighting small scale wars in Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East. They are manning the heights overlooking the Siachen Glacier under the most extreme climatic conditions.

The Armed Forces not only need the wherewithal to fight but also commensurate emoluments and facilities such as housing, schools etc. Today, we are short of over 12,000 officers. Fewer people want commissions in the Army, preferring to opt for more lucrative careers in civil life.
And finally, there is the question of izzat. The motto of the Regiment of Artillery is Izzat o Iqbal. Unfortunately, today’s soldier does not get the izzat he deserves. He is forgotten in peace and only remembered in times of war, and forgotten again shortly after that. The izzat of the Armed Forces is being steadily eroded. The glory obtained on the battle-fields quickly fades into oblivion.

The politicians make wars and the soldiers, sailors and airmen fight them. Politicians then make peace, and the soldier is quickly forgotten!

Julian Grenfell wrote in World War I:
“The thundering line of battle stands
And in the air death moans and sings,
But day shall clasp him in strong hands
And night shall fold him in soft wings.”

Eternal night has fallen on our martyrs but has also folded them in its soft wings. Lest we forget, lest we forget, let us remember them – they gave their tomorrow for our today.

Credit: http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=14576053