Five steps to fix the Naxals

General J F R Jacob | 2010-07-06 14:01:07
The anti-Naxal operations currently being conducted have achieved little, with the Maoists now openly challenging the government to do its worst. This is mostly due to the lack of understanding on the part of those in command of the methodology and conduct of counter insurgency operations.

The author had taken part in counter insurgency operations in Sumatra in 1945-46. Our columns were ambushed numerous times, but we were trained to react. We moved in a balanced tactical formation, by bounds - scouts, advanced guard and main body. Once we hit an ambush, we were able to deploy, encircle and break it.

Unfortunately this pattern of operation does not obtain with our paramilitary forces like the CRPF.

In 1970, I oversaw the establishment of the counter insurgency school in Mizoram. We ensured that before being inducted for counter-insurgency operations in the northeast, every battalion was put through intensive counter insurgency training for two whole months.

I have worked with Central Reserve Police [CRP] battalions, and they are good, solid units.

In 1965, when I was commanding the brigade at Samba we had 16 CRP with us. They looked after an unfenced and un-demarcated border with competence. There were several shootouts, and their performance was commendable.

Later in 1971 in East Pakistan, 16 CRP and other CRP battalions operated in border areas against the Pakistanis with courage and determination.

There is an old army saying: 'There are no bad units, only bad officers.’

The army, on the orders of then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi, was employed to break the Naxal revolt in West Bengal in 1969-71. Mrs Gandhi was pragmatic and took hard decisions, like she did in 1971.

Was Mrs Gandhi wrong? I think not. The Naxals were driven out of West Bengal by mid 1971.

Incidentally Toofani (the Dassault MD-450) and Hunter aircraft of the Indian Air Force bombed Aizwal town on March 4-5, 1966, to evict the Mizo rebels who had literally captured the town.

I do not recommend such offensive action. The air force should be used only for surveillance and logistics.

There are two factors required to keep an insurgency going - firm bases and lines of supply for money, arms and ammunition. As long as these factors obtain, the insurgency will continue.

In the present Naxal insurgency, their firm bases are in the jungles and villages, though they have started moving into the towns. The money they get is from taxes and forcible contributions. The arms they use are captured from the CRP and police. They also buy weapons from Nepal and Myanmar.

Since these two parameters still obtain and remain unbroken, the Naxals are therefore well equipped to fight on and they will do so until they achieve their aims.

There should be a review of the tactics employed by the paramilitary in counter insurgency operations. It is of little use just sending columns into the jungle to take on the elusive and highly mobile Naxal gangs. They are mobile, far more mobile than our paramilitary troops. Mobility is comparative, but it is also a key factor. Our CRP units must strive to be more mobile than the Naxals if they hope to have any effect. So far, these columns have achieved little.

The following method used by the author in1974-75 in intercepting two Naga gangs going to China to collect weapons should be employed. The second gang of some three hundred was surrounded and captured.

In a nutshell, this was the doctrine used by the author in those days, and they still have relevance today.

Find (By surveillance, local intelligence etc),

Fix (Ensure contact is maintained),

Surround (This is imperative, otherwise they will melt away),

Close in and finally,

Apprehend.

The Indian army still puts whole battalions into counter insurgency training for two months at the counter insurgency school in Mizoram before deploying them for counter insurgency operations. The CRP too should have a fully fledged counter insurgency school based on the army model.

If appropriate corrective measures are implemented, I am confident that that the CRP battalions will overcome the Naxals. I wish them all success.
Editor's note:
- Lt Gen Jacob is not an armchair warrior. He has dealt with terrorism and insurgency over a period of many years.
- As a young major, he took part in intensive counter insurgency operations in Sumatra 1945/1946.
- In 1970, he was responsible for setting up the army counter insurgency school in Mizoram.
- He was in charge of anti-Naxal operations in West Bengal in 1969-1971. The then chief minister Siddharta Shankar Ray used to say: 'Jake and I, we broke the Naxals.'
- In 1974/1975 the army intercepted two Naga gangs going to China [Jacob camped at Mokochong to conduct operations]. The army attacked their bases and finally forced the insurgents to sign the Shillong Accord in 1975. To recap tactics; interrupted their lines of supply for arms and ammunition from China and destroyed their bases within Nagaland. Twelve years of peace followed.
- He oversaw operations in Mizoram and got the hostiles to the negotiating table in Calcutta. [Calcutta Conference] (1978).
- On the other side of the coin, he was responsible in setting up the Bangladesh Mukti Bahini in April 1971, and oversaw their operations.
- In October 2007, He was invited to speak to the American military, State Department and CIA at Capitol Hill. The lecture was broadcast live. The US Marine Corps subsequently requested permission to incorporate parts of the talk in their counterinsurgency doctrine.
By the same author:
Hamlet and the Naxals
The truth behind the Navy's 'sinking' of Ghazi
The Af-Pak boundary is not a border
Gen JFR Jacob on the Afghan war
The rocky road to Kargil
A Himalayan Blunder: How our maps ceded land to China
1971 War: Izzat and lessons unlearnt
An Indian Homeland Act
Time to protect the Thunder Dragon
What the Dragon won't forget

Internal Security: CRPF sees Red, to withdraw from Bastar

05/07/2010
Raipur: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) has expressed a desire to withdraw from all interior locations of the worst-hit Naxal area of Bastar in Chattisgarh, a move opposed by the state police.

Official sources, who referred to this wish by CRPF, said the para-military force has also approached Chhattisgarh Police to provide security to its camps at Narayanpur where 27 security personnel were killed in a Naxal ambush recently.

Immediately after the attack, senior CRPF officials were up in arms and said they would be abandoning the post at Durai road if the state police did not guard the two camps in the area, about 300 km from here.

Around 50 police personnel each were rushed to these two camps, a move which was seen as "strengthening of the camps." At least 26 CRPF personnel and one state policeman were killed by Maoists on June 29 when they were returning from road opening duties.

The CRPF has also listed four places in Narayanpur and Dantewada from where they would be shifting their base, the sources said, adding initially the para-military forces wanted to shift their camps closer to the National Highways, which was, however, objected to by the state police.

The CRPF has demanded presence of one-third of district police in every operation and for road opening party. A meeting between the state authorities and the CRPF witnessed heated arguments over the issue and it was decided that road opening duty was exclusively of CRPF domain and there would be no local presence, the sources said.

Union Home Minister P Chidambaram has also indicated that the CRPF in Chattishargh needs to be relocated and reconfigured. Taking a cue from this, the CRPF has decided to keep a minimum strength of 200 personnel in each camp.

About the rescue and relief on the June 29 killings, the sources said the state authorities pointed out that no help was received from the two camps which were located within five kilometres of the area. The first rescue team came from a CRPF camp located nine kilometres away.

No need to deploy army in Naxal-hit areas: Pillai
The government on Monday said there was no immediate need to deploy army in Maoist-hit regions and it could take nearly seven years to get rid of the menace.

Union Home Secretary G K Pillai, who is on a visit to review the situation in Chhattisgarh, said there was no need to deploy army personnel at present in the Maoist-hit regions. He, however, did not elaborate.

Speaking to reporters at the district headquarters at Kanker, Pillai said that it could take between three and seven years to get rid of the Naxal menace in the country.

Referring to the casualties suffered by paramilitary forces recently, he said the Naxals were taking advantage of situation whereby jawans enter into their territory to fight them. Pillai denied that there was any difference between the state police and the CRPF, saying both the forces were coordinating and working together.

He said the government was speeding up development work in the Naxal-hit regions and the Planning Commission was preparing an integrated development plan for these areas. Pillai reviewed the state's situation at a meeting with top officials.
Source: PTI
CRPF sees Red, to withdraw from Bastar
Rs 14000cr Maoist balm
It is the basic and prima responsibility of the officer commandiing to ensure that their troops are properly motivated and fed during the operation. It is sad to note that the Inspector General who is the supreme authority himself is complaining of his inability, which spells the sad state of affairs. The CRPF recruitment scam too is instrumental in the poor quality and morale of troops inducted. It is time the IPS Officers are made accountabile and not be indulging in the blame game like the Politicians! The weapons lost by CRPF to Naxals are being used to inflict needless casualities!
CRPF troops fighting Naxals face lack of food, water

Can CRPF manage Inter State Insurgency seamlessly?

The Tribune Monday, May 31, 2010, Chandigarh, India
The state armed police and the CPOs on counter-insurgency/guerrilla operational tasks and missions require different rules of engagement, training, equipment, leadership and man management.

People who have worked alongside the CRPF are aware of the constant moves of their companies at short notice, non-existent command and control at the battalion level, their inhuman living conditions, poor physical fitness, and lack of the basic equipment like bullet-proof jackets, radio sets, bullet-proof and mine-protected vehicles. How can we expect high results from such psychologically depressed personnel?

Counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists require integrated operations because insurgents when pursued in one state manage to take shelter in the neighbouring states. Every major operation requires detailed planning, coordination, and follow-up on the intelligence and combat aspects. Inter-state coordination and disputes over the state or Central responsibility can be resolved if there are effective Unified Command Headquarters with clear-cut political, operational and coordinating responsibilities.

We need a synergised Centre-state strategy and doctrine to deal with the different aspects of the Maoist insurgency. This should cover the earlier mentioned internal security-related reforms as well as policies on accelerated economic development and social justice in the affected areas.
The writer is a former Army Chief.
Read the full analysis: Different aspects of Maoist problem: How to handle it effectively by Gen V. P. Malik (retd) click here

Strategy to tame the Maoists: Do we need systemic changes?

The massacre at Dantewada is a wake-up call for the entire nation and not just for the police forces that are involved in conducting counter-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh and other affected states. This is the time for soul-searching, introspection and coming up with a strategy that can effectively deal with this major challenge to the nation.

The various tactical aspects of the unfortunate incident and the motivations of the Maoists have been well debated. The focus unfortunately is on equipment upgrades, whereas the essential requirement is to change the ethos, training and leadership of the police forces and make them more capable. By focusing on high technology weaponry, we seem to forget the old adage – “it is the man behind the gun and not the gun that matters”. Current weaponry with some technical upgrades is adequate, as in such operation skills are more important than firepower.

There are six states that are in the grip of militancy. I am intentionally using the word militant (s), as opposed to insurgents or terrorists, for the Maoists are very much part of our polity and have resorted to taking up arms when other methods have not succeeded. They are not in the same category as insurgents and terrorists in J&K and hence need to be treated differently, especially in the case of quantum of force and the manner in which it is applied.

There has been some talk of deploying the Army to deal with the Maoist militants. This may seem an attractive option, but in actuality it is not. In principle, the Army should not be committed to tackling internal militancy. The Army is meant to fight external aggression, which includes tackling external insurgency. If at all it is to be employed to tackle internal militancy, it should be as the last resort when the police forces of all types have failed. It should also be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.

In our country, the instrument of choice for tackling internal militancy and insurgency is the civil police, assisted by the CRPF, which is a component of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs). The police have enormous advantages over the military. They have legitimacy, close knowledge of local conditions, an extensive bank of local intelligence and means of acquiring fresh intelligence, close familiarity with the law and expertise in criminal investigations. Consequently, the use of the state police with the CRPF units superimposed, as at present, needs to continue.

Over a period of time the country has raised vast numbers of CPO units, but they have unfortunately not been trained well for their primary tasks and there is little bonding among the personnel (including officers) in sub-units and units. The senior hierarchy of the CPOs comprises solely of IPS officers, who have never commanded platoons, companies and battalions. Resultantly, they are unable to appreciate the ground situation and plan operations correctly. As opposed to this, all senior Army officers have risen in rank after serving extensively at the levels of platoons, companies and battalions.

The major drawbacks of both the state police and the CRPF include the typical police culture of delayed and lethargic responses, lack of adequate training for executing the assigned tasks, lack of competent leadership, lack of some items of technical equipment and not the least their thinking that the Army is always there to take over, as it has done in the past! This attitude needs to be disabused, as it is fraught with a very large number of negatives. The Maoist militancy has not suddenly appeared; it has been a festering concern for decades and yet we have not been able to make these CPO units fit to tackle internal militancy and insurgency. The Central government must take early and active measures to enhance the capabilities of the CPOs while the state governments must do the same for their respective police forces, especially their armed police units.

For decades now, the Army has repeatedly suggested that both the CPOs and the Army will benefit by lateral induction of trained Army personnel to the CPO units and their headquarters. This has also featured as a strong recommendation by the Sixth Pay Commission. All such recommendations have, however, been summarily rejected by the Home Ministry mainly on account of preserving their turf. Short Service Commissioned Officers, who cannot be retained in the Army after their mandatory service of five years, extendable to 10 in selected cases, are ideal material to be inducted into the CPOs. They are excellent officers, highly competent and well versed in conducting counter-militancy operations.

Such lateral shifts will give the CPOs ready and well-trained young officers, who with their Army ethos, excellent leadership qualities and professional outlook would change the CPO units from complacent to competent and would make them capable of fighting not just the Maoists but even other insurgents in future.

There is urgent need to do away with the current compartmentalised existence and take much broader views. Otherwise, we will continue to wallow in the usual copious reports of committees, demands for raising more units, import of sophisticated weapons that are really not needed, the continuing blame-game and so on, but nothing will be done to remove the systemic deficiencies and weaknesses!

There is also a political aspect that needs to change. The Centre cites the Constitution and says that security is a state subject, thus throwing the ball directly in the state’s court. The states deftly parry with the logic of lack of resources! In some states, the Maoists are even looked at as assets for elections and their violence gets subtly condoned! In addition, when militancy is active in six states, how can each state fight it on its own? Unless there is a joint and concerted attempt simultaneously in all the affected states, nothing is likely to be achieved. The time has come for setting aside the political baggage and getting together for the common cause. Let political expediency be kept aside while the full weight of the nation is used to confront the Maoists.

The need of the hour is to quickly set up two sets of structures, one for addressing the genuine concerns of the Maoists and the other for the conduct of police operations. The former is the concern of each state government and to varying extent it is already being done, but the latter needs a well-thought-out centralised structure under an overall force headquarters, headed by a DGP-level officer. This headquarters, while maintaining liaison and coordination with each state government, must have autonomy to plan and conduct all counter-militant operations in the entire Maoist-affected areas. The staff must report only to the Force Commander and not to their parent organisations, as is the current practice.

All counter-militancy operations are of a long duration, but if the structures are correct and adequate attention is paid to removing systemic deficiencies, it would be possible to address both the amelioration of the concerns of the Maoists and the violence unleashed by them.
The writer is a former Vice-Chief of the Army Staff.
Strategy to tame the Maoists: Need for systemic changes by Lt-Gen Vijay Oberoi (retd)

CRPF Massacre- Dantewada Inquiry

13 Apr 2010: Veteran Views
Do you think India is soft on terror?
There were three recent news items of significance related to the Dantewada episode.

1. First, an inquiry has been set up to look into what went wrong at Dantewada resulting in the massacre.

2. Next, another item stated that all reporters and other media people were prevented by CRPF officials from talking to the non-critically injured admitted in hospital to share their experience firsthand.

3. The third said, quoting someone from the CRPF,"The troops walked into the ambush site as they had missed the point in hours of darkness. Such a thing could have happened to the best trained force in the world. It was not due to lack of training of troops".

Setting up an inquiry is fine. What comes out of it can be made out to a great extent from the items 2 and 3 mentioned above.

There will be a general cover-up to shield the organization’s top brass who in my opinion are culpable of not training their men for the envisaged operations. I fail to understand how a force moving at night, be it on foot, in vehicles, in dark, in close country (forest), on a foot track, or on road can ever 'miss the point'. Obviously they were not aware at all times where the column was at a given point of time. This is a basic need for any kind of movement by day or by night. Well trained troops cannot afford to make such mistakes. If we accept this logic put forward by some CRPF official we should be having far more army casualties patrolling the LC and fighting terrorists in J&K. Any force on the move has to know at all times where its head and where its tail is at a given point of time to able to respond correctly to an enemy strike anywhere along its length.

Reluctance of CRPF officials to permit the injured to share information of general nature is an obvious attempt to bottle up any adverse comment on the state of training of the Force: uncomfortable for the higher-ups.

True to our old habits our inquiries on Dantewada will also go the 26/11 way.
Col Vijay Rajdhan (Retd)
Dantewada Inquiry