USE OF INCORRECT TERMINOLOGY
Dear Chander,
I had written an article titled "Restructuring the Central Police Forces and the State Armed Police to Combat Internal Insurgencies". It was published in the South Asia Defence and Strategic Year Book 2011, which was published early this year. I am enclosing a copy as an attachment. As you will see, it is a long article of 4781 words, which all may not be interested to read. However, I would recommend that the portion highlighted in yellow be read by all. Following the publishing of the article, I was informed that the then Home Secretary (retired recently) issued immediate instructions to the police forces not to call themselves para military forces. As suggested by me, the Home Ministry issued a policy letter dated 18/22 March 2011 wherein all the armed police forces were instructed to adopt a uniform nomenclature as suggested by me. I am enclosing a scanned copy of the same as the second attachment. I do not know whether the police forces and others will follow the instructions but it is important that they do. The media continues to use the term para military forces incorrectly and so do even defence officers. Army Headquarters needs to contact all editors of newspapers and magazines, as well as others, including their subordinate formations and request them to instruct their scribes/ others to use the correct nomenclature. I thought the readers of your blog would be interested to know; they could then correct people who continue to use the wrong nomenclature.
Warm regards.
Vijay Oberoi
Former Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS)
Former Director Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
Click here to read the full article
Showing posts with label CRPF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CRPF. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Sunday, October 17, 2010
CRPF masquerading as a paramilitary force
Specialised Force for Internal Unrests
By Maj Gen Mrinal Suman
IDR Issue: Vol 25.4 Oct-Dec 2010 | Date: 11 October, 2010
Policy and methodology to counter the Naxalite threat have been subjects of intense debate recently. Army’s reluctance to get embroiled has been questioned in some government quarters. Sadly, opinions are being expressed, both by military and non-military experts, more as short term fire-fighting solutions rather than well analysed long term strategy.
It requires no crystal gazing to foresee increasing unrest amongst various sections of Indian society. Awareness has fired the urge of the people for a higher standard of living and enhanced opportunities for advancement. As the country fails to ensure that fruits of development get equitably and evenly distributed across the complete spectrum of society, disadvantaged segments lose confidence in the fairness of governance. They resort to violent means to wrest their perceived share of resources from an apathetic government. Naxalite unrest is a manifestation of the same challenge to the lawful authority of the state. Needless to say, in addition to effective use of force, convincing measures have to be initiated at political, economical, social and cultural levels to restore credibility of governance amongst the aggrieved people.
This article restricts itself to the nature and type of force that should be employed to counter Naxalites. As the alienated populace is highly motivated and possesses intimate knowledge of the local terrain, a well equipped and suitably trained force becomes an absolute necessity. India has three broad options open to it – employment of an existing central police force (CPO) with additional training and equipment; deployment of the Army to crush armed resistance; and raising of a special force for the assignment. Each of these have been analysed below to identify the most suitable option.
Use of CPO
The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is currently countering the Naxalites. CRPF came into existence as Crown Representative’s Police on 27th July 1939. It became the Central Reserve Police Force on enactment of the CRPF Act on 28th December 1949. Over the last sixty years, it has grown into sizeable entity with 207 battalions. It is a federal law enforcement agency and a police force. It has been organised, equipped, structured and trained to supplement efforts of state police forces in the maintenance of law and order.
... it is an unwritten convention in the Indian Army that an officer always leads from the front – he is the first one to step into a danger zone. No officer thinks twice about it.
Presently, a crisis of identity is overwhelming CRPF. A part of the blame for the prevailing confusion about its exact character can be apportioned to CRPF itself. Symptomatic of the same is the message of its Director General on its website. To start with, he refers to CRPF as one of the ‘Para Military Police Force’ of the Nation and subsequently calls it as the most experienced ‘Armed Police Force’ of the country. Apparently, the organisation does not know where to position itself. There can never be a ‘paramilitary police force’ – a force is either a paramilitary force or a police force. The term paramilitary police force is self-contradictory, dichotomist in substance, paradoxical in nature and ambivalent in identity.
It must be understood that a true paramilitary force is an auxiliary force whose function and structure are similar to those of a regular military force. In other words, it should be capable of acting as an adjunct to regular military. CRPF, by no stretch of imagination, can be called a paramilitary force. With a view to garner enhanced status and to demand equivalence with the armed forces, it has been masquerading as a paramilitary force. Resultantly, it has got trapped in the self created delusion that it can perform like a paramilitary force.
Read More: click here
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Poor Governance and Corruption gives birth to Naxals and Maoists
The Maoist threat – And what it Tells us about our Governance
Posted on September 15, 2010 by Gopalkarunakaran
This was written by me about three years ago after an opportunity to be part of group debating internal security threats to India. The group comprised of very eminent people, Mr Arun Shourie, Mr Ved Marwah, General Ved Malik, Commodore Uday Bhasker, Mr Ajay Sahni, General Patanker, Mr Rammoham of the BSF , Mr Ajit Duval of the IB. We were trying to put together a paper for the government to act soon. What was startling, but not surprising, was that the threat was well known – but till it reached the drawing rooms of the upper class, through attacks on Rajdhani trains and the stories began in the Media – it was unattended by the State of India. Do give me your views!
by Col. Gopal Karunakaran (retd)
There is so much noise in the media now on the Maoist – so many extreme views – on the one side the Home Ministry who see it as a law and order problem and on the other, left wing intellectuals who see the State being oppressive and unfair to the forgotten masses of India.
What about the larger debate on what the Maoists are fighting for? Who are they? What are their demands? What do they want?
Have our recent economic polices triggered social unrest in India, unknown to the small urban English speaking opinion makers and decision makers of India? It has now risen from a slow simmer, to a raging boiling point, creeping up into our drawing rooms, and finally drawing the attention of our ruling class...
Read more
The Maoist threat – And what it Tells us about our Governance
India is safe, PC tells Naxal-wary investors
Naxals out to capture power through the use of gun: Pranab Mukherjee
Posted on September 15, 2010 by Gopalkarunakaran
This was written by me about three years ago after an opportunity to be part of group debating internal security threats to India. The group comprised of very eminent people, Mr Arun Shourie, Mr Ved Marwah, General Ved Malik, Commodore Uday Bhasker, Mr Ajay Sahni, General Patanker, Mr Rammoham of the BSF , Mr Ajit Duval of the IB. We were trying to put together a paper for the government to act soon. What was startling, but not surprising, was that the threat was well known – but till it reached the drawing rooms of the upper class, through attacks on Rajdhani trains and the stories began in the Media – it was unattended by the State of India. Do give me your views!
by Col. Gopal Karunakaran (retd)
There is so much noise in the media now on the Maoist – so many extreme views – on the one side the Home Ministry who see it as a law and order problem and on the other, left wing intellectuals who see the State being oppressive and unfair to the forgotten masses of India.
What about the larger debate on what the Maoists are fighting for? Who are they? What are their demands? What do they want?
Have our recent economic polices triggered social unrest in India, unknown to the small urban English speaking opinion makers and decision makers of India? It has now risen from a slow simmer, to a raging boiling point, creeping up into our drawing rooms, and finally drawing the attention of our ruling class...
Read more
The Maoist threat – And what it Tells us about our Governance
India is safe, PC tells Naxal-wary investors
Naxals out to capture power through the use of gun: Pranab Mukherjee
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Tendulkar can’t make the uniform aspirational
Anshul Chaturvedi, Times of India 07 September 2010, 06:30 PM IST
Sachin Tendulkar being conferred an honorary IAF rank, one must assume, is at its core, an effort to gain greater visibility and aspirational status for the Air Force among the country’s youth. The IAF as such can surely have no agenda to promote or reward cricketing legends – God knows there is no deficit of agencies keen to felicitate Sachin – and the reality, unfortunate or otherwise, is that it needs the positive rub-off of an idol sporting an IAF uniform more than the cricketing maestro needs any recognition from the uniformed services.
The fact that all the three services in the Indian armed forces are facing a shortage of officers for several years is no breaking news. Now, we are hardly a nation facing a numerical deficiency of young men – and women, since the uniform is hardly an exclusively male domain any more – but we never seem to have enough good enough ones in this context. There are many professional domains where the demand of people good enough to get in far exceeds the supply of available slots, but the defence services are not quite there. Have not been quite there, for quite a while, actually....
And it is the adding together of all such perceptions that makes us resort to having to find a star batsman – with absolutely no offence to Sachin’s stature – to pitch the IAF’s profile. Because, frankly, as a country, we don’t really value the fundamentals that make a job that’s about defending or policing the country, quite worth it. We will come out on the streets during Kargil, applaud the NSG during 26/11, and tsk-tsk when we read that 76 CRPF men are slaughtered – but that’s about it.
Mr 210-crores-in-three-years Dhoni required to pitch for the Army now, anyone?
Read the full article:
Even Tendulkar can’t make the uniform aspirational
Comment by sharan: September 08,2010 at 08:27 AM IST
Anshul, you are writing about symptoms, not the real problems here. The real problems are that as a race of people we are weak in mind, body and character, and we always choose to do what is convenient for ourselves rather than what is right.
The symptoms of this attitude show themselves in different ways, depending on where we are. As leaders and politicians, we resort to large-scale looting without contributing anything useful. As policemen we take sides with criminals and harass the innocent, in exchange for "supari". As soldiers, we cringe before our superior officers like cowards, but in the presence of unarmed civilians we turn into bullies. As Class 4 workers we hold the country to ransom, expecting more and more for doing less and less. It doesn't matter where we are; we will find a way to sabotage the system. What we need is to find a way to strengthen ourselves mentally and acquire the right character as humans.
Sachin Tendulkar being conferred an honorary IAF rank, one must assume, is at its core, an effort to gain greater visibility and aspirational status for the Air Force among the country’s youth. The IAF as such can surely have no agenda to promote or reward cricketing legends – God knows there is no deficit of agencies keen to felicitate Sachin – and the reality, unfortunate or otherwise, is that it needs the positive rub-off of an idol sporting an IAF uniform more than the cricketing maestro needs any recognition from the uniformed services.
The fact that all the three services in the Indian armed forces are facing a shortage of officers for several years is no breaking news. Now, we are hardly a nation facing a numerical deficiency of young men – and women, since the uniform is hardly an exclusively male domain any more – but we never seem to have enough good enough ones in this context. There are many professional domains where the demand of people good enough to get in far exceeds the supply of available slots, but the defence services are not quite there. Have not been quite there, for quite a while, actually....
And it is the adding together of all such perceptions that makes us resort to having to find a star batsman – with absolutely no offence to Sachin’s stature – to pitch the IAF’s profile. Because, frankly, as a country, we don’t really value the fundamentals that make a job that’s about defending or policing the country, quite worth it. We will come out on the streets during Kargil, applaud the NSG during 26/11, and tsk-tsk when we read that 76 CRPF men are slaughtered – but that’s about it.
Mr 210-crores-in-three-years Dhoni required to pitch for the Army now, anyone?
Read the full article:
Even Tendulkar can’t make the uniform aspirational
Comment by sharan: September 08,2010 at 08:27 AM IST
Anshul, you are writing about symptoms, not the real problems here. The real problems are that as a race of people we are weak in mind, body and character, and we always choose to do what is convenient for ourselves rather than what is right.
The symptoms of this attitude show themselves in different ways, depending on where we are. As leaders and politicians, we resort to large-scale looting without contributing anything useful. As policemen we take sides with criminals and harass the innocent, in exchange for "supari". As soldiers, we cringe before our superior officers like cowards, but in the presence of unarmed civilians we turn into bullies. As Class 4 workers we hold the country to ransom, expecting more and more for doing less and less. It doesn't matter where we are; we will find a way to sabotage the system. What we need is to find a way to strengthen ourselves mentally and acquire the right character as humans.
Thursday, August 26, 2010
Channelise manpower from Armed Forces to PMF: expert
Respected Sir,
The following report-- released by the United News of India news agency on August 26, 2010 -- is for your kind perusal and the third in a series.
With regards,
Abhi
Channelise manpower from Armed Forces to PMF: expert By Abhijit C Chandra
Bhopal, Aug 26 (UNI) The ideal solution to naxal violence lies in channelising of manpower from the Armed Forces to the Para-Military Forces (PMF), opines an Indian Army veteran who took part in the Kargil conflict and superannuated after becoming a combat casualty while commanding a brigade on the Line of Control during Operation Rakshak-II.
"Such channelising must be in terms of short service officers and people leaving after completion of the colour service period," Brigadier (Retd) PT Gangadharan – who served in the Brigade of Guards (Infantry)– told UNI.
Pointing out that a sizable number of short service officers and approximately 50,000 men leave the service every year, the veteran– who possesses a doctorate in Strategic Studies– added that the measure will bring in an Armed Forces culture and ethos in the PMF and at the same time add teeth to the organisation, thus making them an effective tool in the hands of the nation.
"The induction will be the most cost-effective means available. Additionally, it will ensure employment to all ranks up to 60 years; a recommendation even made by the Sixth Pay Commission. Guaranteed employment up to 60 will ensure that people volunteer for the Armed Forces particularly in the officers' cadre where there is acute shortage. It is a win-win situation for both," said the Brigadier who was Staff Officer, Army, in the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat.
Till such time "we create a force" of that nature, the Army can continue to provide help for training in Army institutions, he said while alleging that the major weaknesses of the PMF are poor leadership and lack of training.
"All other issues are attendant problems like psychological conditioning, equipment, intelligence etc, which will readily be addressed if the major issues are attended to," felt Brig Gangadharan who was an instructor at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun.
The Army is not meant for deployment against internal disturbances, he said while adding that, "we already have committed over 3 lakh troops for internal security tasks in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast and now stand overstretched. The officers' strength at the unit level is less than 50 per cent. The present state is not healthy at all."
The following report-- released by the United News of India news agency on August 26, 2010 -- is for your kind perusal and the third in a series.
With regards,
Abhi
Channelise manpower from Armed Forces to PMF: expert By Abhijit C Chandra
Bhopal, Aug 26 (UNI) The ideal solution to naxal violence lies in channelising of manpower from the Armed Forces to the Para-Military Forces (PMF), opines an Indian Army veteran who took part in the Kargil conflict and superannuated after becoming a combat casualty while commanding a brigade on the Line of Control during Operation Rakshak-II.
"Such channelising must be in terms of short service officers and people leaving after completion of the colour service period," Brigadier (Retd) PT Gangadharan – who served in the Brigade of Guards (Infantry)– told UNI.
Pointing out that a sizable number of short service officers and approximately 50,000 men leave the service every year, the veteran– who possesses a doctorate in Strategic Studies– added that the measure will bring in an Armed Forces culture and ethos in the PMF and at the same time add teeth to the organisation, thus making them an effective tool in the hands of the nation.
"The induction will be the most cost-effective means available. Additionally, it will ensure employment to all ranks up to 60 years; a recommendation even made by the Sixth Pay Commission. Guaranteed employment up to 60 will ensure that people volunteer for the Armed Forces particularly in the officers' cadre where there is acute shortage. It is a win-win situation for both," said the Brigadier who was Staff Officer, Army, in the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat.
Till such time "we create a force" of that nature, the Army can continue to provide help for training in Army institutions, he said while alleging that the major weaknesses of the PMF are poor leadership and lack of training.
"All other issues are attendant problems like psychological conditioning, equipment, intelligence etc, which will readily be addressed if the major issues are attended to," felt Brig Gangadharan who was an instructor at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun.
The Army is not meant for deployment against internal disturbances, he said while adding that, "we already have committed over 3 lakh troops for internal security tasks in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast and now stand overstretched. The officers' strength at the unit level is less than 50 per cent. The present state is not healthy at all."
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Five steps to fix the Naxals
General J F R Jacob | 2010-07-06 14:01:07The anti-Naxal operations currently being conducted have achieved little, with the Maoists now openly challenging the government to do its worst. This is mostly due to the lack of understanding on the part of those in command of the methodology and conduct of counter insurgency operations.
The author had taken part in counter insurgency operations in Sumatra in 1945-46. Our columns were ambushed numerous times, but we were trained to react. We moved in a balanced tactical formation, by bounds - scouts, advanced guard and main body. Once we hit an ambush, we were able to deploy, encircle and break it.
Unfortunately this pattern of operation does not obtain with our paramilitary forces like the CRPF.
In 1970, I oversaw the establishment of the counter insurgency school in Mizoram. We ensured that before being inducted for counter-insurgency operations in the northeast, every battalion was put through intensive counter insurgency training for two whole months.
I have worked with Central Reserve Police [CRP] battalions, and they are good, solid units.
In 1965, when I was commanding the brigade at Samba we had 16 CRP with us. They looked after an unfenced and un-demarcated border with competence. There were several shootouts, and their performance was commendable.
Later in 1971 in East Pakistan, 16 CRP and other CRP battalions operated in border areas against the Pakistanis with courage and determination.
There is an old army saying: 'There are no bad units, only bad officers.’
The army, on the orders of then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi, was employed to break the Naxal revolt in West Bengal in 1969-71. Mrs Gandhi was pragmatic and took hard decisions, like she did in 1971.
Was Mrs Gandhi wrong? I think not. The Naxals were driven out of West Bengal by mid 1971.
Incidentally Toofani (the Dassault MD-450) and Hunter aircraft of the Indian Air Force bombed Aizwal town on March 4-5, 1966, to evict the Mizo rebels who had literally captured the town.
I do not recommend such offensive action. The air force should be used only for surveillance and logistics.
There are two factors required to keep an insurgency going - firm bases and lines of supply for money, arms and ammunition. As long as these factors obtain, the insurgency will continue.
In the present Naxal insurgency, their firm bases are in the jungles and villages, though they have started moving into the towns. The money they get is from taxes and forcible contributions. The arms they use are captured from the CRP and police. They also buy weapons from Nepal and Myanmar.
Since these two parameters still obtain and remain unbroken, the Naxals are therefore well equipped to fight on and they will do so until they achieve their aims.
There should be a review of the tactics employed by the paramilitary in counter insurgency operations. It is of little use just sending columns into the jungle to take on the elusive and highly mobile Naxal gangs. They are mobile, far more mobile than our paramilitary troops. Mobility is comparative, but it is also a key factor. Our CRP units must strive to be more mobile than the Naxals if they hope to have any effect. So far, these columns have achieved little.
The following method used by the author in1974-75 in intercepting two Naga gangs going to China to collect weapons should be employed. The second gang of some three hundred was surrounded and captured.
In a nutshell, this was the doctrine used by the author in those days, and they still have relevance today.
The Indian army still puts whole battalions into counter insurgency training for two months at the counter insurgency school in Mizoram before deploying them for counter insurgency operations. The CRP too should have a fully fledged counter insurgency school based on the army model.
If appropriate corrective measures are implemented, I am confident that that the CRP battalions will overcome the Naxals. I wish them all success.
Editor's note:
- Lt Gen Jacob is not an armchair warrior. He has dealt with terrorism and insurgency over a period of many years.
- As a young major, he took part in intensive counter insurgency operations in Sumatra 1945/1946.
- In 1970, he was responsible for setting up the army counter insurgency school in Mizoram.
- He was in charge of anti-Naxal operations in West Bengal in 1969-1971. The then chief minister Siddharta Shankar Ray used to say: 'Jake and I, we broke the Naxals.'
- In 1974/1975 the army intercepted two Naga gangs going to China [Jacob camped at Mokochong to conduct operations]. The army attacked their bases and finally forced the insurgents to sign the Shillong Accord in 1975. To recap tactics; interrupted their lines of supply for arms and ammunition from China and destroyed their bases within Nagaland. Twelve years of peace followed.
- He oversaw operations in Mizoram and got the hostiles to the negotiating table in Calcutta. [Calcutta Conference] (1978).
- On the other side of the coin, he was responsible in setting up the Bangladesh Mukti Bahini in April 1971, and oversaw their operations.
- In October 2007, He was invited to speak to the American military, State Department and CIA at Capitol Hill. The lecture was broadcast live. The US Marine Corps subsequently requested permission to incorporate parts of the talk in their counterinsurgency doctrine.
By the same author:
Hamlet and the Naxals
The truth behind the Navy's 'sinking' of Ghazi
The Af-Pak boundary is not a border
Gen JFR Jacob on the Afghan war
The rocky road to Kargil
A Himalayan Blunder: How our maps ceded land to China
1971 War: Izzat and lessons unlearnt
An Indian Homeland Act
Time to protect the Thunder Dragon
What the Dragon won't forget
CRPF Jawan was gunned down after 4-hour drama
The Hindu 17 July 2010
A “drunk” CRPF jawan allegedly opened fire from his AK-47 rifle killing six of his colleagues, including an officer who had reprimanded him for consuming alcohol on duty, minutes before the shooting spree in Saraikela district of Jharkhand.
The alleged shooter was gunned down after a four-hour drama by other CRPF personnel on Friday night, preventing any further casualties.
Shocked by the incident, CRPF headquarters in New Delhi has rushed its Additional Director General (Headquarters) J.C. Dabas to the spot to find the facts about the fratricidal incident, along with other senior officials posted in the State overseeing anti-Naxal operations.
Constable Harpinder Singh of the 196 battalion of the CRPF, who was on sentry duty at a camp in Kuchai village of Saraikela district, started firing indiscriminately on his colleagues at around 10 p.m., a CRPF spokesperson said.
Six of his colleagues, including Assistant Commandant Bikau Singh, were killed in the firing.
According to sources in the force, an altercation broke out between Singh and other CRPF men over the quantity of food being wasted in the company mess. Singh, who was the mess in-charge, started arguing.
Assistant Commandant Bikau Singh then called these men into his tent to solve the issue.
Bikau found Singh to be “drunk” and ordered a medical test, which enraged him, the sources said adding, he picked up his AK-47 rifle and shot dead four personnel, including the officer.
Shooting spree
The men at the camp tried for three hours to persuade Singh to drop the gun and surrender but the last straw came when he killed a sentry atop a watchtower, the sources said.
Then the other jawans fired at him to disarm him and stop further killings.
As Singh continued to fire, CRPF personnel at the camp shot him dead at around 2 a.m., the officer said.
The dead included Head Constables M.C. Patil and I.R. Khairnar from Maharashtra, Head Constables P.T. Rao of Andhra Pradesh, Jatav Bhav Singh from Gujarat and Constable Vijay Kumar from Uttar Pradesh.
The District Superintendent of Police and the Commandant of the battalion reached the site in the night itself. Police have registered a case, they said.
Sources said Singh had resumed duty on June 18 after returning from a vacation.
A report from Saraikela-Kharswan district said an FIR has been lodged in connection with the firing incident.
Superintendent of Police Abhisekha Kumar said Constable Harpinder Singh, who opened the fire, was made accused in the FIR.
Post-mortem of the bodies was conducted in a local government hospital on Saturday, Deputy Commissioner of Saraikela-Kharswan district A.K. Mishra said.
A jawan, who was injured in the firing, has been admitted to MGM Hospital, he said.
The SP, who visited the spot, said the preliminary investigation suggested that Harpinder Singh opened fire in a drunken state.
Jawan was gunned down after 4-hour drama
A “drunk” CRPF jawan allegedly opened fire from his AK-47 rifle killing six of his colleagues, including an officer who had reprimanded him for consuming alcohol on duty, minutes before the shooting spree in Saraikela district of Jharkhand.
The alleged shooter was gunned down after a four-hour drama by other CRPF personnel on Friday night, preventing any further casualties.
Shocked by the incident, CRPF headquarters in New Delhi has rushed its Additional Director General (Headquarters) J.C. Dabas to the spot to find the facts about the fratricidal incident, along with other senior officials posted in the State overseeing anti-Naxal operations.
Constable Harpinder Singh of the 196 battalion of the CRPF, who was on sentry duty at a camp in Kuchai village of Saraikela district, started firing indiscriminately on his colleagues at around 10 p.m., a CRPF spokesperson said.
Six of his colleagues, including Assistant Commandant Bikau Singh, were killed in the firing.
According to sources in the force, an altercation broke out between Singh and other CRPF men over the quantity of food being wasted in the company mess. Singh, who was the mess in-charge, started arguing.
Assistant Commandant Bikau Singh then called these men into his tent to solve the issue.
Bikau found Singh to be “drunk” and ordered a medical test, which enraged him, the sources said adding, he picked up his AK-47 rifle and shot dead four personnel, including the officer.
Shooting spree
The men at the camp tried for three hours to persuade Singh to drop the gun and surrender but the last straw came when he killed a sentry atop a watchtower, the sources said.
Then the other jawans fired at him to disarm him and stop further killings.
As Singh continued to fire, CRPF personnel at the camp shot him dead at around 2 a.m., the officer said.
The dead included Head Constables M.C. Patil and I.R. Khairnar from Maharashtra, Head Constables P.T. Rao of Andhra Pradesh, Jatav Bhav Singh from Gujarat and Constable Vijay Kumar from Uttar Pradesh.
The District Superintendent of Police and the Commandant of the battalion reached the site in the night itself. Police have registered a case, they said.
Sources said Singh had resumed duty on June 18 after returning from a vacation.
A report from Saraikela-Kharswan district said an FIR has been lodged in connection with the firing incident.
Superintendent of Police Abhisekha Kumar said Constable Harpinder Singh, who opened the fire, was made accused in the FIR.
Post-mortem of the bodies was conducted in a local government hospital on Saturday, Deputy Commissioner of Saraikela-Kharswan district A.K. Mishra said.
A jawan, who was injured in the firing, has been admitted to MGM Hospital, he said.
The SP, who visited the spot, said the preliminary investigation suggested that Harpinder Singh opened fire in a drunken state.
Jawan was gunned down after 4-hour drama
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Maoists attack CRPF men to snatch weapons
NEW DELHI: Three months after it lost 76 men in an ambush by Maoists, the CRPF suffered another massive loss in Bastar: 26 of its men were killed when the Maoists attacked a road opening party in Narayanpur district.
CRPF special DG Vijay Raman told the Times of India that 26 CRPF men have been confirmed dead and 5 injured. The casualties may be higher. "These are not final figures," Raman said.
The attack took place just three kilometres from a CRPF camp in Dhaudhai on a road leading to the densely forested Maoist-controlled Abhujhmad area.
The party of "about company strength with 70 personnel" was on its way back from clearing the road when the Maoists opened fire from a hilltop.
"We are in the process of evacuating our men. Some have been brought back. Others are being brought back to safety," said R K Dua, IG CRPF. He added that while two seriously injured men had been evacuated by helicopter, the air sortees had to be suspended as evening fell.
Brigadier B K Ponwar, who heads the Jungle Warfare College in Kanker said, "You have to be doubly secure when making the return journey along the same route. You need to secure all areas from where you can be fired upon."
26 CRPF personnel killed in Maoists attack in Chhattisgarh by Supriya Sharma, TNN, Jun 29, 2010, 09.03pm IST
Chronology of Naxal attacks
June 29, 2008: Maoists attack a boat on Balimela reservoir in Orissa carrying four anti -- Naxalite police officials and 60 Greyhound commandos, killing 38 troops.
July 16, 2008: 21 policemen killed when a police van is blown up in a landmine blast in Malkangiri district of Orissa.
April 13, 2009: 10 paramilitary troops killed in eastern Orissa when Maoists attack a bauxite mine in Koraput district.
April 22, 2009: Maoists hijack a train with at least 300 people on board in Jharkhand and force it to Latehar district before fleeing.
May 22, 2009: Maoists kill 16 policemen in the jungles of Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra.
June 10, 2009: Nine policemen, including CRPF troops and officers, ambushed by Maoists during a routine patrol in Saranda jungles in Jharkhand.
June 13, 2009: Naxals launch two landmine and bomb attacks in a small town close to Bokaro, killing 10 policemen and injuring several others.
June 16, 2009: Maoists kill 11 police officers in a landmine attack followed by armed assault. In a separate attack, four policemen were killed and two others seriously injured when Maoists ambush them at Beherakhand in Palamau district.
June 23, 2009: A group of motorcycle-borne armed Naxal rebels open fire on Lakhisarai district court premises in Bihar and free four of their comrades including the self-style Zonal Commander of Ranchi.
July 18, 2009: Naxalites kill a villager in Bastar and in a separate incident torch a vehicle engaged in road construction work in Bijapur district of Chhattisgarh.
July 27, 2009: Six persons killed when Naxals trigger a landmine blast at Dantewada district in Chhattisgarh.
July 31, 2009: A special police officer and another person killed by Naxals in Bijapur district.
Sep 4, 2009: Naxals kill four villagers in a forest in Aaded village in Chhattisgarh's Bijapur district.
Sep 26, 2009: Naxals kill BJP MP from Balaghat Baliram Kashyap's sons at Pairaguda village in Jagdalpur (Chhattisgarh).
Sep 30, 2009: Naxalites set ablaze Gram Panchayat offices at Korchi and Belgaon in Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra.
Oct 8, 2009: 17 policemen killed when Maoists ambushed them at Laheri police station in Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra.
Feb 15, 2010: 24 personnel of the Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) killed as Maoists attack their camp in Silda in West Midnapore district of West Bengal.
April 4, 2010: Maoists trigger a landmine blast killing 11 security personnel of the elite anti-naxal force Special Operations Group (SOG) in Koraput district of Orrisa.
April 6, 2010: 75 CRPF personnel and a Chhattisgarh police official killed in a naxal attack in Dantewada district.
May 8, 2010: Eight CRPF jawans were killed when Naxals blow up a bullet-proof vehicle in Bijapur district of Chhhattisgarh.
June 29, 2010: At least 26 CRPF personnel killed in a Naxal ambush in Narayanpur district of Chhattisgarh. Source: PTI
They want weapons. During the course of my inquiry into the (April 6) Dantewada ambush...
Maoists attack CRPF men to snatch weapons
CRPF special DG Vijay Raman told the Times of India that 26 CRPF men have been confirmed dead and 5 injured. The casualties may be higher. "These are not final figures," Raman said.
The attack took place just three kilometres from a CRPF camp in Dhaudhai on a road leading to the densely forested Maoist-controlled Abhujhmad area.
The party of "about company strength with 70 personnel" was on its way back from clearing the road when the Maoists opened fire from a hilltop.
"We are in the process of evacuating our men. Some have been brought back. Others are being brought back to safety," said R K Dua, IG CRPF. He added that while two seriously injured men had been evacuated by helicopter, the air sortees had to be suspended as evening fell.
Brigadier B K Ponwar, who heads the Jungle Warfare College in Kanker said, "You have to be doubly secure when making the return journey along the same route. You need to secure all areas from where you can be fired upon."
26 CRPF personnel killed in Maoists attack in Chhattisgarh by Supriya Sharma, TNN, Jun 29, 2010, 09.03pm IST
Chronology of Naxal attacks
They want weapons. During the course of my inquiry into the (April 6) Dantewada ambush...
Maoists attack CRPF men to snatch weapons
Friday, June 11, 2010
Naxal menace has no military solution: Ex- DG BSF
Arunima , CNN-IBN Posted on Jun 10, 2010 at 17:37
Former Director General of Border Security Force EN Rammohan has cautioned the Government against deploying Army to tackle Naxals.
Courtesy NDTV
Rammohan, the head of the one-man committee that investigated the Naxal ambush which killed 76 security personnel in Dantewada, told CNN-IBN that sending in the Army in the Naxals-infested areas will lead to civil war
CNN-IBN: Is Army the solution? What's your view?
EN Rammohan: Army is not the solution. There is no military solution to this problem. The problem is basically because of the domination of the upper class on the lower class, denial of land rights to them and now denial of forest rights to them.
CNN-IBN: Sir, a lot of people in the establishment in the government including people in positions, in the authority or the decision making think it's a purely law and order problem. That's the reason why we need more weapons and more military forces, greater air support to tackle this Naxal problem?
EN Rammohan: I don't agree at all. I don't that there is a military solution to this problem or need of Army at all because it's your own people. For 60 years you have done nothing for them, they were only suppressed; taken away everything from them. First of all give them those facilities or at least announce them. Enforce the land sealing legislation. There are people who own 15,000 acre of land. In Bihar, landlords openly say with contempt that “Hum toh apne zameen kutto or billi ke nam pe laga dete hain” (We keep our lands in the name of our dogs and cats). What is the arrogance of this kind? When is this going to stop?
CNN-IBN: Do you think CRPF is well-equipped to handle a war of this scale?
EN Rammohan: My point about CRPF is a basically a law and order force. The force is excellent, the men are excellent but it needs good leadership. Paramilitary forces like BSF and ITBP - their ethos is different.
CNN-IBN: You have mentioned problem of leadership. In your report you have cited that command and leadership failure at Chintalnar and at the same time Home Ministry went ahead and gave instructions to take action against those state level officers, who you have reportedly told to take action then. There has been no action against those state level officers. What do you have to say?
EN Rammohan: I have not named any officer in my report. It is the responsibility of the Home Ministry to publish the report or not. I will not say anything about it.
Naxal menace has no military solution: Ex- DG BSF
Former Director General of Border Security Force EN Rammohan has cautioned the Government against deploying Army to tackle Naxals.
Courtesy NDTV
Rammohan, the head of the one-man committee that investigated the Naxal ambush which killed 76 security personnel in Dantewada, told CNN-IBN that sending in the Army in the Naxals-infested areas will lead to civil warCNN-IBN: Is Army the solution? What's your view?
EN Rammohan: Army is not the solution. There is no military solution to this problem. The problem is basically because of the domination of the upper class on the lower class, denial of land rights to them and now denial of forest rights to them.
CNN-IBN: Sir, a lot of people in the establishment in the government including people in positions, in the authority or the decision making think it's a purely law and order problem. That's the reason why we need more weapons and more military forces, greater air support to tackle this Naxal problem?
EN Rammohan: I don't agree at all. I don't that there is a military solution to this problem or need of Army at all because it's your own people. For 60 years you have done nothing for them, they were only suppressed; taken away everything from them. First of all give them those facilities or at least announce them. Enforce the land sealing legislation. There are people who own 15,000 acre of land. In Bihar, landlords openly say with contempt that “Hum toh apne zameen kutto or billi ke nam pe laga dete hain” (We keep our lands in the name of our dogs and cats). What is the arrogance of this kind? When is this going to stop?
CNN-IBN: Do you think CRPF is well-equipped to handle a war of this scale?
EN Rammohan: My point about CRPF is a basically a law and order force. The force is excellent, the men are excellent but it needs good leadership. Paramilitary forces like BSF and ITBP - their ethos is different.
CNN-IBN: You have mentioned problem of leadership. In your report you have cited that command and leadership failure at Chintalnar and at the same time Home Ministry went ahead and gave instructions to take action against those state level officers, who you have reportedly told to take action then. There has been no action against those state level officers. What do you have to say?
EN Rammohan: I have not named any officer in my report. It is the responsibility of the Home Ministry to publish the report or not. I will not say anything about it.
Naxal menace has no military solution: Ex- DG BSF
Monday, May 31, 2010
Can CRPF manage Inter State Insurgency seamlessly?
The Tribune Monday, May 31, 2010, Chandigarh, India
The state armed police and the CPOs on counter-insurgency/guerrilla operational tasks and missions require different rules of engagement, training, equipment, leadership and man management.
People who have worked alongside the CRPF are aware of the constant moves of their companies at short notice, non-existent command and control at the battalion level, their inhuman living conditions, poor physical fitness, and lack of the basic equipment like bullet-proof jackets, radio sets, bullet-proof and mine-protected vehicles. How can we expect high results from such psychologically depressed personnel?
Counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists require integrated operations because insurgents when pursued in one state manage to take shelter in the neighbouring states. Every major operation requires detailed planning, coordination, and follow-up on the intelligence and combat aspects. Inter-state coordination and disputes over the state or Central responsibility can be resolved if there are effective Unified Command Headquarters with clear-cut political, operational and coordinating responsibilities.
We need a synergised Centre-state strategy and doctrine to deal with the different aspects of the Maoist insurgency. This should cover the earlier mentioned internal security-related reforms as well as policies on accelerated economic development and social justice in the affected areas.
The writer is a former Army Chief.
Read the full analysis: Different aspects of Maoist problem: How to handle it effectively by Gen V. P. Malik (retd) click here
The state armed police and the CPOs on counter-insurgency/guerrilla operational tasks and missions require different rules of engagement, training, equipment, leadership and man management.
People who have worked alongside the CRPF are aware of the constant moves of their companies at short notice, non-existent command and control at the battalion level, their inhuman living conditions, poor physical fitness, and lack of the basic equipment like bullet-proof jackets, radio sets, bullet-proof and mine-protected vehicles. How can we expect high results from such psychologically depressed personnel?
Counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists require integrated operations because insurgents when pursued in one state manage to take shelter in the neighbouring states. Every major operation requires detailed planning, coordination, and follow-up on the intelligence and combat aspects. Inter-state coordination and disputes over the state or Central responsibility can be resolved if there are effective Unified Command Headquarters with clear-cut political, operational and coordinating responsibilities.
We need a synergised Centre-state strategy and doctrine to deal with the different aspects of the Maoist insurgency. This should cover the earlier mentioned internal security-related reforms as well as policies on accelerated economic development and social justice in the affected areas.
The writer is a former Army Chief.
Read the full analysis: Different aspects of Maoist problem: How to handle it effectively by Gen V. P. Malik (retd) click here
Friday, April 30, 2010
Internal Security: Two CRPF jawans among four held for 'supplying' arms to Naxals
Two CRPF jawans among four held for 'supplying' arms to Naxals
PTI, Apr 30, 2010, 02.58pm IST
LUCKNOW/NEW DELHI: The Uttar Pradesh STF today arrested four people including two CRPF jawans in the state for allegedly stealing arms and ammunitions and supplying the same to the Naxals.
UP police said the arrests were made following an operation based on a tip off received in the aftermath of the Dantewada massacre, in which 76 security personnel were killed by the Naxals.
Official sources said the STF carried out searches in Moradabad, Rampur and Jhansi and arrested Vinod Paswan and Dinesh Singh of the CRPF.
They said one retired sub-inspector of Provincial Armed Constabulary, identified as Yashodhanad Singh, was seen moving in different armory centres of the CRPF and PAC and collecting empty shells of bullets fired during the training.
These shells were later replaced at the main Rampur armoury with live bullets and finally supplied to Naxals, sources said.
Over 5,000 live cartridges, 16 magazines of INSAS rifles, .25 bore guns, SLR and AK 47s were recovered besides 245 kg of empty shells.
The CRPF, meanwhile, has suspended both its personnel arrested by the STF and ordered an immediate Court of Enquiry.
"We have suspended both the personnel and have also ordered an immediate Court of Enquiry. We are in constant touch with the UP police and are extending all help to them," CRPF Director General Vikram Srivastava said.
Later, addressing the media, Additional Director General of UP police Brij Lal said, "We have also recovered large number of arms components, mobile phones and Rs 1.76 lakh in cash."
He said the network of the racket was large and has been running for more than six months and the police is questioning the four to look at the possibility of involvement of more persons.
Two CRPF jawans among four held for 'supplying' arms to Naxals: PTI, Apr 30, 2010, 02.58pm IST
Are IPS officers Accountable?
Reading books cannot substitute. We have successful Mizoram, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh models from which to learn; but these 'security experts', not accountable to anyone for incorrect advice, are influencing policy as never before.
Hysteria and wishful thinking are no substitute for cool and calculated thinking. It appears that even the massacre of CRPF personnel in Dantewada on April 6 has not woken up all our policy-makers. It is business as usual for them! Otherwise, how can one explain the continuing blame game between the ruling and the Opposition parties on the one hand, and between the Centre and the state on the other? The situation will only worsen if we refuse to learn from experience.
By Ved Marwah, 29/04/2010:Tackling Maoists, the buck stops at everyone
PTI, Apr 30, 2010, 02.58pm IST
LUCKNOW/NEW DELHI: The Uttar Pradesh STF today arrested four people including two CRPF jawans in the state for allegedly stealing arms and ammunitions and supplying the same to the Naxals.
UP police said the arrests were made following an operation based on a tip off received in the aftermath of the Dantewada massacre, in which 76 security personnel were killed by the Naxals.
Official sources said the STF carried out searches in Moradabad, Rampur and Jhansi and arrested Vinod Paswan and Dinesh Singh of the CRPF.
They said one retired sub-inspector of Provincial Armed Constabulary, identified as Yashodhanad Singh, was seen moving in different armory centres of the CRPF and PAC and collecting empty shells of bullets fired during the training.
These shells were later replaced at the main Rampur armoury with live bullets and finally supplied to Naxals, sources said.
Over 5,000 live cartridges, 16 magazines of INSAS rifles, .25 bore guns, SLR and AK 47s were recovered besides 245 kg of empty shells.
The CRPF, meanwhile, has suspended both its personnel arrested by the STF and ordered an immediate Court of Enquiry.
"We have suspended both the personnel and have also ordered an immediate Court of Enquiry. We are in constant touch with the UP police and are extending all help to them," CRPF Director General Vikram Srivastava said.
Later, addressing the media, Additional Director General of UP police Brij Lal said, "We have also recovered large number of arms components, mobile phones and Rs 1.76 lakh in cash."
He said the network of the racket was large and has been running for more than six months and the police is questioning the four to look at the possibility of involvement of more persons.
Two CRPF jawans among four held for 'supplying' arms to Naxals: PTI, Apr 30, 2010, 02.58pm IST
Are IPS officers Accountable?
Reading books cannot substitute. We have successful Mizoram, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh models from which to learn; but these 'security experts', not accountable to anyone for incorrect advice, are influencing policy as never before.
Hysteria and wishful thinking are no substitute for cool and calculated thinking. It appears that even the massacre of CRPF personnel in Dantewada on April 6 has not woken up all our policy-makers. It is business as usual for them! Otherwise, how can one explain the continuing blame game between the ruling and the Opposition parties on the one hand, and between the Centre and the state on the other? The situation will only worsen if we refuse to learn from experience.
By Ved Marwah, 29/04/2010:Tackling Maoists, the buck stops at everyone
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Misuse of Police Force for VIP Protection: Can we defeat Naxals?
Difference between Canada and IndiaDear Friends,
My grandson is in his school's volleyball team. The other day I drove him to a big sports complex about 80 kms away for taking part in All Ontario school matches. He said his first match was against an Ottawa team. While the teams were warming up, guess who walks in ...... none other than Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister of Canada. He had come to watch his son play for his school in Ottawa. He was received by just one official, was ushered to a spectator bench where he sat along with all the other parents. No sniffer dogs, no black cats, no automatic weapons, no gun toting guards, no mobbing, no hysteria, no fawning over the Pradhan Mantri Ji !! To emphasize the informality of the occasion, he wasn't even wearing a tie.
Our eyes met and I asked him if I could have a photo with him ( I had spotted his official camera girl taking a few of them ). Sure Sir, he said, what's your name. I told him it was Krishan. It's my pleasure Krish-anne, he said, and his right arm went around my right shoulder. I asked him if it was done for the PM to put his arm around a very ordinary citizen. Absolutely, he said, unless the citizen objected. I assured him I did not object but it was a pleasent surprise.
The pic was shot and the camera girl gave me a card with her name and email id plus my photo number. One e-mail to her and I received the attached photo.
I had a dekho outside. Just 3 cars, no police escort cars with lights and sirens. Not a single policeman on the vast grounds or on the roads leading to the venue. Apparently, all the police men and women were busy doing their normal policing duties to live upto their motto of ' To Serve and Protect'.
My friends, this is the difference between Canada and India. If the Prime Minister and all politicians intermingle freely with and listen to the common folks, if the police are not used and misused in the name of VIP security, then dragons like maoism and naxalism do not get to spawn.
So, have look at the photo. If you cannot make out who Stephen is, well he is the one with specs. AND, ham bhi kisi Manmohan Ji se kam nahin, ham ne bhi Harper Ji ke saath tasveer khichai hai!!
Regards,
Cdr KK Punchhi (Retd), 7th JSW Course, Naval Aviation, settled in Canada
Do VIPs need security in India?
Not really. Hardly 0.0001 percent population own licensed guns. Hence chances of getting shot is negligible/ remote. Instead of misusing Police for VIP security they should be employed to apprehend illegal gun- toting criminals and assist in decriminalisation of citizens by the state who presently encourage citizens to participate in corrupt/ illegal activities.
Friday, April 23, 2010
ESM for training CRPF and guard UP Statues
Govt to recruit about 2,000 ex-servicemen
Press Trust of India / New Delhi April 12, 2010, 16:47 IST
The government will recruit about 2,000 ex-servicemen specialised in commando and jungle warfare tactics to impart cutting-edge training to CRPF personnel.
The recruitment of these ex-servicemen, which will begin next month, assumes significance as 76 paramilitary personnel were massacred by Maoists in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada recently, raising questions on the operational strategies of the force.
Those servicemen, who retired as Sepoy and Havaldar, will be drawn from Army regiments and Corps like infantry, mechanised infantry, armoured, artillery, intelligence and engineering Corps for the purpose.
In order to ensure that the CRPF personnel get the best training, the government has made it mandatory for these ex-servicemen to be trained in specialised courses like 'Ghatak' commando training, weapons, IED and bomb disposal, dog handling, Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare (CIJW).
It is also mandatory for these ex-servicemen to have served in insurgency-hit areas and had stints at Army training schools.
"These men will be deputed to train our personnel at the various counter insurgency and jungle warfare schools in the country which are facing shortage of trainers. It is a fact that a good trainer can only bring out the best in an individual," a senior CRPF officer said.
The ex-servicemen will be recruited on a contractual basis for five to seven years on a total remuneration of Rs 12,625 plus other incentives.
Initially 1,950 men will be recruited and the numbers could be enhanced in the future. The all-India recruitment will begin in May and would finish by June after which the ex-servicemen would undergo initial training and briefing before they start the job, the officer said.
A board of senior CRPF and Home Ministry officials will conduct the "open rally" recruitment for which an applicant should be under 40 years of age. There will not be any criteria for physical and educational background of the ex-service personnel.
Govt to recruit about 2,000 ex-servicemen
Retired Colonel to Guard Statues
Lucknow: Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati on Friday decided to recruit former servicemen for the protection of statues and monuments without a nod from the ruling Governor B L Joshi and senior government officials.
Mayawati allegedly decided to go ahead with her plans even without Governor B L Joshi's assent to a bill and ordinance for creation of such a security force.
Mayawati convened a meeting of the state cabinet on Friday afternoon and took an administrative decision to proceed with raising the new force.
The force would be headed by a retired army officer of the rank of colonel.
The cabinet meeting was followed by a press conference, where state Cabinet Secretary Shashank Shekhar Singh gave justification for the government's decision to go ahead without waiting for a word from the governor.
ESM for protection of Statues
Press Trust of India / New Delhi April 12, 2010, 16:47 IST
The government will recruit about 2,000 ex-servicemen specialised in commando and jungle warfare tactics to impart cutting-edge training to CRPF personnel.
The recruitment of these ex-servicemen, which will begin next month, assumes significance as 76 paramilitary personnel were massacred by Maoists in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada recently, raising questions on the operational strategies of the force.
Those servicemen, who retired as Sepoy and Havaldar, will be drawn from Army regiments and Corps like infantry, mechanised infantry, armoured, artillery, intelligence and engineering Corps for the purpose.
In order to ensure that the CRPF personnel get the best training, the government has made it mandatory for these ex-servicemen to be trained in specialised courses like 'Ghatak' commando training, weapons, IED and bomb disposal, dog handling, Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare (CIJW).
It is also mandatory for these ex-servicemen to have served in insurgency-hit areas and had stints at Army training schools.
"These men will be deputed to train our personnel at the various counter insurgency and jungle warfare schools in the country which are facing shortage of trainers. It is a fact that a good trainer can only bring out the best in an individual," a senior CRPF officer said.
The ex-servicemen will be recruited on a contractual basis for five to seven years on a total remuneration of Rs 12,625 plus other incentives.
Initially 1,950 men will be recruited and the numbers could be enhanced in the future. The all-India recruitment will begin in May and would finish by June after which the ex-servicemen would undergo initial training and briefing before they start the job, the officer said.
A board of senior CRPF and Home Ministry officials will conduct the "open rally" recruitment for which an applicant should be under 40 years of age. There will not be any criteria for physical and educational background of the ex-service personnel.
Govt to recruit about 2,000 ex-servicemen
Retired Colonel to Guard Statues
Lucknow: Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati on Friday decided to recruit former servicemen for the protection of statues and monuments without a nod from the ruling Governor B L Joshi and senior government officials.
Mayawati allegedly decided to go ahead with her plans even without Governor B L Joshi's assent to a bill and ordinance for creation of such a security force.
Mayawati convened a meeting of the state cabinet on Friday afternoon and took an administrative decision to proceed with raising the new force.
The force would be headed by a retired army officer of the rank of colonel.
The cabinet meeting was followed by a press conference, where state Cabinet Secretary Shashank Shekhar Singh gave justification for the government's decision to go ahead without waiting for a word from the governor.
ESM for protection of Statues
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
PM for urgent, considered action to root out Naxalism
Wednesday 21 April, 2010. PM Manmohan Singh has pitched for urgent and considered action to root out the problem of Left-wing extremism and asserted that no quarter can be given to those challenging the authority of the Indian state.
Singling out Left-wing extremism as the gravest internal security threat faced by the nation, he said, “Recent events have underscored the need for urgent and considered action to root out this problem.”
“No quarter can be given to those who have taken upon themselves to challenge the authority of the Indian state and the fabric of our democratic polity,” he said, inaugurating the Civil Services Day function in New Delhi on Wednesday.
The Prime Minister’s remarks come in the wake of the worst-ever Maoist attack at Chitangufa in Chhattisgarh on April 6 in which 75 CRPF men and a policeman were killed.
The Naxalites had also opened fire on five separate CRPF camps in quick succession in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh on Tuesday night.
Underscoring the fact that Left-wing extremism was flourishing in under-developed areas of the country, Singh asked the civil servants to ensure that no area of the country is denied the benefits of the government’s developmental programmes.
“But we cannot overlook the fact that many areas in which such extremism flourishes are under-developed and many of the people, mainly poor tribals, who live in these areas have not shared equitably in the fruits of development.
“It is incumbent upon us to ensure that no area of our country is denied the benefits of our ambitious developmental programmes,” the Prime Minister said.
He asked them to devise innovative ways and means to harness the tools of information technology and to involve the intended beneficiaries in implementation so that complaints of leakages, corruption and lack of transparency get addressed.
Singh said that inclusive growth was the centerpiece of the developmental agenda of the UPA and fast economic growth provided the government with the resources to address the problems of poverty, ignorance and disease.
“Rapid growth will have little meaning, however, unless social and economic inequalities, which still afflict our society, are not eliminated quickly and effectively,” he said.
The Prime Minister said that despite the global economic slow down, India was able to post a respectable growth of 6.7 percent in 2008-09.
“The growth rate for 2009-10 is now estimated at 7.2 percent and the forecast for 2010-11 is 8.25 percent,” he said, adding the medium term target set by the government was to return the economy to an annual growth rate of 9 percent. (DD-21.4)
PM for urgent, considered action to root out Naxalism
Strategy to tame the Maoists: Do we need systemic changes?
The massacre at Dantewada is a wake-up call for the entire nation and not just for the police forces that are involved in conducting counter-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh and other affected states. This is the time for soul-searching, introspection and coming up with a strategy that can effectively deal with this major challenge to the nation.
The various tactical aspects of the unfortunate incident and the motivations of the Maoists have been well debated. The focus unfortunately is on equipment upgrades, whereas the essential requirement is to change the ethos, training and leadership of the police forces and make them more capable. By focusing on high technology weaponry, we seem to forget the old adage – “it is the man behind the gun and not the gun that matters”. Current weaponry with some technical upgrades is adequate, as in such operation skills are more important than firepower.
There are six states that are in the grip of militancy. I am intentionally using the word militant (s), as opposed to insurgents or terrorists, for the Maoists are very much part of our polity and have resorted to taking up arms when other methods have not succeeded. They are not in the same category as insurgents and terrorists in J&K and hence need to be treated differently, especially in the case of quantum of force and the manner in which it is applied.
There has been some talk of deploying the Army to deal with the Maoist militants. This may seem an attractive option, but in actuality it is not. In principle, the Army should not be committed to tackling internal militancy. The Army is meant to fight external aggression, which includes tackling external insurgency. If at all it is to be employed to tackle internal militancy, it should be as the last resort when the police forces of all types have failed. It should also be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.
In our country, the instrument of choice for tackling internal militancy and insurgency is the civil police, assisted by the CRPF, which is a component of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs). The police have enormous advantages over the military. They have legitimacy, close knowledge of local conditions, an extensive bank of local intelligence and means of acquiring fresh intelligence, close familiarity with the law and expertise in criminal investigations. Consequently, the use of the state police with the CRPF units superimposed, as at present, needs to continue.
Over a period of time the country has raised vast numbers of CPO units, but they have unfortunately not been trained well for their primary tasks and there is little bonding among the personnel (including officers) in sub-units and units. The senior hierarchy of the CPOs comprises solely of IPS officers, who have never commanded platoons, companies and battalions. Resultantly, they are unable to appreciate the ground situation and plan operations correctly. As opposed to this, all senior Army officers have risen in rank after serving extensively at the levels of platoons, companies and battalions.
The major drawbacks of both the state police and the CRPF include the typical police culture of delayed and lethargic responses, lack of adequate training for executing the assigned tasks, lack of competent leadership, lack of some items of technical equipment and not the least their thinking that the Army is always there to take over, as it has done in the past! This attitude needs to be disabused, as it is fraught with a very large number of negatives. The Maoist militancy has not suddenly appeared; it has been a festering concern for decades and yet we have not been able to make these CPO units fit to tackle internal militancy and insurgency. The Central government must take early and active measures to enhance the capabilities of the CPOs while the state governments must do the same for their respective police forces, especially their armed police units.
For decades now, the Army has repeatedly suggested that both the CPOs and the Army will benefit by lateral induction of trained Army personnel to the CPO units and their headquarters. This has also featured as a strong recommendation by the Sixth Pay Commission. All such recommendations have, however, been summarily rejected by the Home Ministry mainly on account of preserving their turf. Short Service Commissioned Officers, who cannot be retained in the Army after their mandatory service of five years, extendable to 10 in selected cases, are ideal material to be inducted into the CPOs. They are excellent officers, highly competent and well versed in conducting counter-militancy operations.
Such lateral shifts will give the CPOs ready and well-trained young officers, who with their Army ethos, excellent leadership qualities and professional outlook would change the CPO units from complacent to competent and would make them capable of fighting not just the Maoists but even other insurgents in future.
There is urgent need to do away with the current compartmentalised existence and take much broader views. Otherwise, we will continue to wallow in the usual copious reports of committees, demands for raising more units, import of sophisticated weapons that are really not needed, the continuing blame-game and so on, but nothing will be done to remove the systemic deficiencies and weaknesses!
There is also a political aspect that needs to change. The Centre cites the Constitution and says that security is a state subject, thus throwing the ball directly in the state’s court. The states deftly parry with the logic of lack of resources! In some states, the Maoists are even looked at as assets for elections and their violence gets subtly condoned! In addition, when militancy is active in six states, how can each state fight it on its own? Unless there is a joint and concerted attempt simultaneously in all the affected states, nothing is likely to be achieved. The time has come for setting aside the political baggage and getting together for the common cause. Let political expediency be kept aside while the full weight of the nation is used to confront the Maoists.
The need of the hour is to quickly set up two sets of structures, one for addressing the genuine concerns of the Maoists and the other for the conduct of police operations. The former is the concern of each state government and to varying extent it is already being done, but the latter needs a well-thought-out centralised structure under an overall force headquarters, headed by a DGP-level officer. This headquarters, while maintaining liaison and coordination with each state government, must have autonomy to plan and conduct all counter-militant operations in the entire Maoist-affected areas. The staff must report only to the Force Commander and not to their parent organisations, as is the current practice.
All counter-militancy operations are of a long duration, but if the structures are correct and adequate attention is paid to removing systemic deficiencies, it would be possible to address both the amelioration of the concerns of the Maoists and the violence unleashed by them.
The writer is a former Vice-Chief of the Army Staff.
Strategy to tame the Maoists: Need for systemic changes by Lt-Gen Vijay Oberoi (retd)
The various tactical aspects of the unfortunate incident and the motivations of the Maoists have been well debated. The focus unfortunately is on equipment upgrades, whereas the essential requirement is to change the ethos, training and leadership of the police forces and make them more capable. By focusing on high technology weaponry, we seem to forget the old adage – “it is the man behind the gun and not the gun that matters”. Current weaponry with some technical upgrades is adequate, as in such operation skills are more important than firepower.
There are six states that are in the grip of militancy. I am intentionally using the word militant (s), as opposed to insurgents or terrorists, for the Maoists are very much part of our polity and have resorted to taking up arms when other methods have not succeeded. They are not in the same category as insurgents and terrorists in J&K and hence need to be treated differently, especially in the case of quantum of force and the manner in which it is applied.
There has been some talk of deploying the Army to deal with the Maoist militants. This may seem an attractive option, but in actuality it is not. In principle, the Army should not be committed to tackling internal militancy. The Army is meant to fight external aggression, which includes tackling external insurgency. If at all it is to be employed to tackle internal militancy, it should be as the last resort when the police forces of all types have failed. It should also be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.
In our country, the instrument of choice for tackling internal militancy and insurgency is the civil police, assisted by the CRPF, which is a component of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs). The police have enormous advantages over the military. They have legitimacy, close knowledge of local conditions, an extensive bank of local intelligence and means of acquiring fresh intelligence, close familiarity with the law and expertise in criminal investigations. Consequently, the use of the state police with the CRPF units superimposed, as at present, needs to continue.
Over a period of time the country has raised vast numbers of CPO units, but they have unfortunately not been trained well for their primary tasks and there is little bonding among the personnel (including officers) in sub-units and units. The senior hierarchy of the CPOs comprises solely of IPS officers, who have never commanded platoons, companies and battalions. Resultantly, they are unable to appreciate the ground situation and plan operations correctly. As opposed to this, all senior Army officers have risen in rank after serving extensively at the levels of platoons, companies and battalions.
The major drawbacks of both the state police and the CRPF include the typical police culture of delayed and lethargic responses, lack of adequate training for executing the assigned tasks, lack of competent leadership, lack of some items of technical equipment and not the least their thinking that the Army is always there to take over, as it has done in the past! This attitude needs to be disabused, as it is fraught with a very large number of negatives. The Maoist militancy has not suddenly appeared; it has been a festering concern for decades and yet we have not been able to make these CPO units fit to tackle internal militancy and insurgency. The Central government must take early and active measures to enhance the capabilities of the CPOs while the state governments must do the same for their respective police forces, especially their armed police units.
For decades now, the Army has repeatedly suggested that both the CPOs and the Army will benefit by lateral induction of trained Army personnel to the CPO units and their headquarters. This has also featured as a strong recommendation by the Sixth Pay Commission. All such recommendations have, however, been summarily rejected by the Home Ministry mainly on account of preserving their turf. Short Service Commissioned Officers, who cannot be retained in the Army after their mandatory service of five years, extendable to 10 in selected cases, are ideal material to be inducted into the CPOs. They are excellent officers, highly competent and well versed in conducting counter-militancy operations.
Such lateral shifts will give the CPOs ready and well-trained young officers, who with their Army ethos, excellent leadership qualities and professional outlook would change the CPO units from complacent to competent and would make them capable of fighting not just the Maoists but even other insurgents in future.
There is urgent need to do away with the current compartmentalised existence and take much broader views. Otherwise, we will continue to wallow in the usual copious reports of committees, demands for raising more units, import of sophisticated weapons that are really not needed, the continuing blame-game and so on, but nothing will be done to remove the systemic deficiencies and weaknesses!
There is also a political aspect that needs to change. The Centre cites the Constitution and says that security is a state subject, thus throwing the ball directly in the state’s court. The states deftly parry with the logic of lack of resources! In some states, the Maoists are even looked at as assets for elections and their violence gets subtly condoned! In addition, when militancy is active in six states, how can each state fight it on its own? Unless there is a joint and concerted attempt simultaneously in all the affected states, nothing is likely to be achieved. The time has come for setting aside the political baggage and getting together for the common cause. Let political expediency be kept aside while the full weight of the nation is used to confront the Maoists.
The need of the hour is to quickly set up two sets of structures, one for addressing the genuine concerns of the Maoists and the other for the conduct of police operations. The former is the concern of each state government and to varying extent it is already being done, but the latter needs a well-thought-out centralised structure under an overall force headquarters, headed by a DGP-level officer. This headquarters, while maintaining liaison and coordination with each state government, must have autonomy to plan and conduct all counter-militant operations in the entire Maoist-affected areas. The staff must report only to the Force Commander and not to their parent organisations, as is the current practice.
All counter-militancy operations are of a long duration, but if the structures are correct and adequate attention is paid to removing systemic deficiencies, it would be possible to address both the amelioration of the concerns of the Maoists and the violence unleashed by them.
The writer is a former Vice-Chief of the Army Staff.
Strategy to tame the Maoists: Need for systemic changes by Lt-Gen Vijay Oberoi (retd)
Sunday, April 18, 2010
Dantewada Massacre: Raw face of Central incompetence
Dear Friends,
An article I received. Worth reading.
Regards,
Major Ramesh Agnani(Retd)
The introductory note below is by an Infantry officer
Below is an article written by Gen Malick. I have had first hand experience with training these police guys at the CIJW School in Vareingte. As u all know this is the premier institution in the world where jungle warfare training is conducted. Even the US Green beret troops come here. The CRPF and police fauj who come are just not interested in training. Half of them report sick on the first day including the company cdr. the other half just won't train. They are mostly overage and don't consider this their job. some come without weapons and better still no ammunition. Their job is to extort money, that's it.
The best part is that they feel by wearing a black patka and camo dress they are commandos. Help! This attitude was brought out to the Home Ministry numerous times by AHQ, unfortunately no one cares.
Dantewada was waiting to happen.
Read more:
Dantewada Massacre: Raw face of Central incompetence by Lt Gen NS Malik, PVSM,former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
An article I received. Worth reading.
Regards,
Major Ramesh Agnani(Retd)
The introductory note below is by an Infantry officer
Below is an article written by Gen Malick. I have had first hand experience with training these police guys at the CIJW School in Vareingte. As u all know this is the premier institution in the world where jungle warfare training is conducted. Even the US Green beret troops come here. The CRPF and police fauj who come are just not interested in training. Half of them report sick on the first day including the company cdr. the other half just won't train. They are mostly overage and don't consider this their job. some come without weapons and better still no ammunition. Their job is to extort money, that's it.
The best part is that they feel by wearing a black patka and camo dress they are commandos. Help! This attitude was brought out to the Home Ministry numerous times by AHQ, unfortunately no one cares.
Dantewada was waiting to happen.
Read more:
Dantewada Massacre: Raw face of Central incompetence by Lt Gen NS Malik, PVSM,former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
CRPF Massacre- Dantewada Inquiry
13 Apr 2010: Veteran Views
Do you think India is soft on terror?
There were three recent news items of significance related to the Dantewada episode.
1. First, an inquiry has been set up to look into what went wrong at Dantewada resulting in the massacre.
2. Next, another item stated that all reporters and other media people were prevented by CRPF officials from talking to the non-critically injured admitted in hospital to share their experience firsthand.
3. The third said, quoting someone from the CRPF,"The troops walked into the ambush site as they had missed the point in hours of darkness. Such a thing could have happened to the best trained force in the world. It was not due to lack of training of troops".
Setting up an inquiry is fine. What comes out of it can be made out to a great extent from the items 2 and 3 mentioned above.
There will be a general cover-up to shield the organization’s top brass who in my opinion are culpable of not training their men for the envisaged operations. I fail to understand how a force moving at night, be it on foot, in vehicles, in dark, in close country (forest), on a foot track, or on road can ever 'miss the point'. Obviously they were not aware at all times where the column was at a given point of time. This is a basic need for any kind of movement by day or by night. Well trained troops cannot afford to make such mistakes. If we accept this logic put forward by some CRPF official we should be having far more army casualties patrolling the LC and fighting terrorists in J&K. Any force on the move has to know at all times where its head and where its tail is at a given point of time to able to respond correctly to an enemy strike anywhere along its length.
Reluctance of CRPF officials to permit the injured to share information of general nature is an obvious attempt to bottle up any adverse comment on the state of training of the Force: uncomfortable for the higher-ups.
True to our old habits our inquiries on Dantewada will also go the 26/11 way.
Col Vijay Rajdhan (Retd)
Dantewada Inquiry
Do you think India is soft on terror?
There were three recent news items of significance related to the Dantewada episode.
1. First, an inquiry has been set up to look into what went wrong at Dantewada resulting in the massacre.
2. Next, another item stated that all reporters and other media people were prevented by CRPF officials from talking to the non-critically injured admitted in hospital to share their experience firsthand.
3. The third said, quoting someone from the CRPF,"The troops walked into the ambush site as they had missed the point in hours of darkness. Such a thing could have happened to the best trained force in the world. It was not due to lack of training of troops".
Setting up an inquiry is fine. What comes out of it can be made out to a great extent from the items 2 and 3 mentioned above.
There will be a general cover-up to shield the organization’s top brass who in my opinion are culpable of not training their men for the envisaged operations. I fail to understand how a force moving at night, be it on foot, in vehicles, in dark, in close country (forest), on a foot track, or on road can ever 'miss the point'. Obviously they were not aware at all times where the column was at a given point of time. This is a basic need for any kind of movement by day or by night. Well trained troops cannot afford to make such mistakes. If we accept this logic put forward by some CRPF official we should be having far more army casualties patrolling the LC and fighting terrorists in J&K. Any force on the move has to know at all times where its head and where its tail is at a given point of time to able to respond correctly to an enemy strike anywhere along its length.
Reluctance of CRPF officials to permit the injured to share information of general nature is an obvious attempt to bottle up any adverse comment on the state of training of the Force: uncomfortable for the higher-ups.
True to our old habits our inquiries on Dantewada will also go the 26/11 way.
Col Vijay Rajdhan (Retd)
Dantewada Inquiry
Monday, July 13, 2009
BSF to induct 1,000 women in combat duties for the first time
Monday 13 July, 2009.
Setting a milestone, the Border Security Force will induct about 1,000 women personnel for combat duties for the first time by the end of this month. The women, who are currently undergoing training at the BSF establishment in Khatka, Punjab, will participate in the passing out parade on 29th July, which will be attended by Union Home Minister P Chidambaram.
"It would be a proud day for us when women will work shoulder-to-shoulder with men," BSF Director General M L Kumawat told a news agency. These personnel have been imparted training in weapon handling, intelligence, border management, sports, unarmed combat frisking and guard duties.
The women, along with their male counterparts, will carry out search and frisking at check posts, immigration points and trade routes along the borders with the force guards.
"The women component is essentially needed for the force as our duty of guarding borders involves frisking women travellers besides other relevant duties," Kumawat said. The first batch will be deployed in Punjab sector.
The newly trained personnel will be inducted for the posts of constables and the BSF also expects to get women officers in the post of assistant commandants and higher ranks. The women battalion will be part of the 29 battalions sanctioned by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the BSF as part of its expansion plan.
Women personnel in central forces like CRPF, CISF and SSB are already performing ground duties, this is for the first time that BSF will deploy women on ground.(AJ-12/07)
BSF to induct 1,000 women in combat duties for the first time: DD News
Setting a milestone, the Border Security Force will induct about 1,000 women personnel for combat duties for the first time by the end of this month. The women, who are currently undergoing training at the BSF establishment in Khatka, Punjab, will participate in the passing out parade on 29th July, which will be attended by Union Home Minister P Chidambaram.
"It would be a proud day for us when women will work shoulder-to-shoulder with men," BSF Director General M L Kumawat told a news agency. These personnel have been imparted training in weapon handling, intelligence, border management, sports, unarmed combat frisking and guard duties.
The women, along with their male counterparts, will carry out search and frisking at check posts, immigration points and trade routes along the borders with the force guards.
"The women component is essentially needed for the force as our duty of guarding borders involves frisking women travellers besides other relevant duties," Kumawat said. The first batch will be deployed in Punjab sector.
The newly trained personnel will be inducted for the posts of constables and the BSF also expects to get women officers in the post of assistant commandants and higher ranks. The women battalion will be part of the 29 battalions sanctioned by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the BSF as part of its expansion plan.
Women personnel in central forces like CRPF, CISF and SSB are already performing ground duties, this is for the first time that BSF will deploy women on ground.(AJ-12/07)
BSF to induct 1,000 women in combat duties for the first time: DD News
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
