Dated: 28 May 2010
LETTER TO EDITOR
MASTER OF ARMY WANTS A PhD IN WAR CRAFT: TOI 27 MAY 2010- click here
My Dear Editor in Chief,
1. We are dismayed to read that Army Chief Gen VK Singh has applied for a PhD in Military Science from Bhopal University. His guide will be Prof. Kailash Tyagi. It is disheartening for the Defence Fraternity to know that our Army Chief needs lessons in Military Science from a Civilian Prof. who has, probably not seen a gun firing! What Gen VK Singh has learnt in 40 years of service about Military Science would enable him to be honoured with PhDs many times over.
2. Any Defence officer who is professionally competent and reaches the rank of One Star General equips himself with sufficient knowledge in Military Science which no civil University either in India or abroad can impart. Our senior officers have excelled in various seminars, courses etc held abroad and have acquitted themselves commendably. It is pertinent to mention that the only think tank of the country ie Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) which is responsible for carrying out research on all matters military both tactical and strategic had its Director an officer of the rank of Air Commodore ie (equivalent to Brig in the Army). The Dy Director of the same institution has also been an officer of the rank of Commandore of the Navy which is also equivalent to a Brig. IDSA has a large number of research scholars who are all PhDs. That a chief of the Army Staff had to approach a University for getting a doctorate in Military Science signifies non- recognition by the Govt of the specialist knowledge in Military Science acquired by senior officers during their service. Therefore, it is imperative not only for the good of the Defence Forces and the nation that all officers who achieve the rank of a Brigadier or its equivalent are automatically awarded a PhD degree in Military Science. Some of the courses like Long Defence Management Course (LMDC), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Higher Command (HC) are already being awarded MSc in Military Science.
3. A case in point is that the undersigned was a senior fellow in IDSA as a Brigadier and has been examiner of PhD thesis on Military Science of a reputed University of India after retirement as a Major General. Now that the Defence University is coming up in our country, the Govt must grant PhD to all officers who attain the rank of Brigadier.
Maj Gen (Retd) Satbir Singh, SM
The writer is a Former Senior Fellow and Security Analyst of Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), has been examiner PhD thesis in Defence & Security Studies, Ex Commandant Services Selection Centre & President SSB, besides being Instructor at four premier institutions of the Army. Presently he is Vice Chairman of Ex-Servicemen Movement (IESM).
Showing posts with label Lessons Learnt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lessons Learnt. Show all posts
Friday, May 28, 2010
Monday, December 14, 2009
Neglect defence only at India’s peril
Football that politicians play
ON November 18, 1962, C Company, 13 Kumaon faced Chinese human-waves at Rezang La in Ladakh. Out-gunned and greatly outnumbered, the company fought last-man-last round and perished in a saga of rare valour.
Four centuries earlier, Rana Sanga and the Rajput confederacy faced Babur at Khanwa, 60 km from Agra. Despite legendary heroism, extolled in ballads and folklore, the Rajputs were decisively defeated.
Other than defeat, what is common in these two heroic battles? Both symbolise the Indian warrior’s unparalleled valour and limitless capacity for sacrifice. Both also illustrate our rulers’ great capacity to neglect national defence.
The Rajputs failed to modernise artillery and cavalry. When facing Alexander, Raja Puru’s war-elephants were stampeded by the charging Macedonian phalanx and crushed their own forces.
Thousand years later, the Rana’s war-elephants were stampeded by Babur’s artillery. Then the Rajputs were enveloped and routed by the Mughal cavalry’s tulughma.
However, there is one notable difference between then and now: Rana Sangha and allied rulers personally led their men and many embraced veer-gati. In 1962, the Indian army was pushed into battle by ‘leaders’ in air-conditioned offices, totally oblivious of ground realities. The valiant Kumaonis braved the Ladakhi winter in summer uniforms. Then faced Chinese human-wave assaults with bolt-action rifles, which often jammed and vintage ammunition misfired. Nevertheless, the 120-odd heroes accounted for over 500 Chinese before their ammunition and life-blood ran out.
Fast forward to Kargil 1999. Denial of surveillance equipment for a quarter-century by uncaring, ignorant babus helped Pakiatanis to surreptitiously intrude across the LC. The ensuing war again witnessed most conspicuous valour, which ultimately negated Pak’s napak designs. But 700 gallant sons were martyred to pay for their ‘leaders’ neglect of defence preparedness.
This writer is witness to one such peremptory and callous dispensation, which literally made the Army blind. Illuminating shells for the indigenous Field Gun had been “under development” by the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) since seventies and thus faced an import ban.
Neglect of Defence only at India's peril: click here to read the full article
Maj-Gen Pushpendra Singh (Retd)
ON November 18, 1962, C Company, 13 Kumaon faced Chinese human-waves at Rezang La in Ladakh. Out-gunned and greatly outnumbered, the company fought last-man-last round and perished in a saga of rare valour.
Four centuries earlier, Rana Sanga and the Rajput confederacy faced Babur at Khanwa, 60 km from Agra. Despite legendary heroism, extolled in ballads and folklore, the Rajputs were decisively defeated.
Other than defeat, what is common in these two heroic battles? Both symbolise the Indian warrior’s unparalleled valour and limitless capacity for sacrifice. Both also illustrate our rulers’ great capacity to neglect national defence.
The Rajputs failed to modernise artillery and cavalry. When facing Alexander, Raja Puru’s war-elephants were stampeded by the charging Macedonian phalanx and crushed their own forces.
Thousand years later, the Rana’s war-elephants were stampeded by Babur’s artillery. Then the Rajputs were enveloped and routed by the Mughal cavalry’s tulughma.
However, there is one notable difference between then and now: Rana Sangha and allied rulers personally led their men and many embraced veer-gati. In 1962, the Indian army was pushed into battle by ‘leaders’ in air-conditioned offices, totally oblivious of ground realities. The valiant Kumaonis braved the Ladakhi winter in summer uniforms. Then faced Chinese human-wave assaults with bolt-action rifles, which often jammed and vintage ammunition misfired. Nevertheless, the 120-odd heroes accounted for over 500 Chinese before their ammunition and life-blood ran out.
Fast forward to Kargil 1999. Denial of surveillance equipment for a quarter-century by uncaring, ignorant babus helped Pakiatanis to surreptitiously intrude across the LC. The ensuing war again witnessed most conspicuous valour, which ultimately negated Pak’s napak designs. But 700 gallant sons were martyred to pay for their ‘leaders’ neglect of defence preparedness.
This writer is witness to one such peremptory and callous dispensation, which literally made the Army blind. Illuminating shells for the indigenous Field Gun had been “under development” by the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) since seventies and thus faced an import ban.
Neglect of Defence only at India's peril: click here to read the full article
Maj-Gen Pushpendra Singh (Retd)
Sunday, January 18, 2009
Mumbai Mayhem: Was the army ready for war?
Manoj Joshi
New Delhi, January 17, 2009
The Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy were ready to strike almost immediately after the Mumbai carnage on November 26 — the former activating its forward bases and the latter fuelling its anti-ship missiles.
But, the government stayed its hand when the Indian Army apparently indicated to the government that it might take it several weeks before it could prudently begin the operations.
In September 2002, after the crisis that developed following the December 2001 attack on Parliament had waned, President Pervez Musharraf travelled to the US and in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor , had this to say: “…my military judgment was that they [Indians] would not attack us… Militarily… there is a certain ratio required for an offensive force to succeed. The ratios that we maintain are far above that — far above what a defensive force requires to defend itself...”
Cocky Musharraf was not wrong. Fireeaters across the country have been egging the government to go to war with Pakistan over the Mumbai massacre. But could it be that India have an Army that is simply not ready for one? Who is responsible for this? Everyone, from the generals who have become progressively bureaucratised, to the bureaucrats whose only concern is over their empanelment and time- scales. And, above all, their political bosses, who are content to let things be the way they are and allow hundreds of thousands of crores of rupees to be spent for an armed force that is not ready when needed.
Extracts from: Was the army ready for war?
New Delhi, January 17, 2009
The Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy were ready to strike almost immediately after the Mumbai carnage on November 26 — the former activating its forward bases and the latter fuelling its anti-ship missiles.
But, the government stayed its hand when the Indian Army apparently indicated to the government that it might take it several weeks before it could prudently begin the operations.
In September 2002, after the crisis that developed following the December 2001 attack on Parliament had waned, President Pervez Musharraf travelled to the US and in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor , had this to say: “…my military judgment was that they [Indians] would not attack us… Militarily… there is a certain ratio required for an offensive force to succeed. The ratios that we maintain are far above that — far above what a defensive force requires to defend itself...”
Cocky Musharraf was not wrong. Fireeaters across the country have been egging the government to go to war with Pakistan over the Mumbai massacre. But could it be that India have an Army that is simply not ready for one? Who is responsible for this? Everyone, from the generals who have become progressively bureaucratised, to the bureaucrats whose only concern is over their empanelment and time- scales. And, above all, their political bosses, who are content to let things be the way they are and allow hundreds of thousands of crores of rupees to be spent for an armed force that is not ready when needed.
Extracts from: Was the army ready for war?
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