1962 debacle and disgrace due to Krishna Menon's arrogance

Where was Shekar Gupta when Krishna Menon was having tea?
Dear Friends,
This piece is by Gp Capt A Bevoor, s/o late Gen Bavoor.
True the nation should know the truth about the part played by Pt Nehru, Krishna Menon, Mullick the Int guy and their minions which led to the debacle of 1962. Pity is, Chief Editors like Shekhar Gupta, who think they know everything in this world about everything, wilfully vilify the Generals and conceal the identity of and role played by the real perpetrators!!
People of his ilk are the ones who are supposed to tell the truth to the people of India!! The result is Indian leadership in the MOD and at large is learning nothing from the commemoration of 1962 War. Same situation prevails in South and North Blocks and in the Parliament.A sure recipe for next disaster. And the Generals will be blamed again!!
Just by making statements that 1962 will not be repeated is not the solution. Our political leadership, and the bureaucracy need to listen to the professional advice of Generals/ Admirals and Air Marshals and take action.
Harbhajan Singh
Lt Gen

From: A.G. Bewoor Date: Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:45 PM
1. Forget about the Def Secy and Foreign Secy being shown the door, what about BN Malik Director IB. His outfit was singularly responsible for the crass negligence towards Chinese perceptions about the border dispute. The IB was full of arrogance and no one could override or disagree with BN Mailk. No politician had any idea what intelligence was. Nehru had the External Affairs with him, Menon was playing around with the Services. Who was willing to "listen carefully to the generals". I was but a lad in 1957/58 when father was Bde Cdr in Ambala under 4 Div commanded by Biji Kaul. 4 Indian Div (Red Eagle Div), of North Africa fame was busy building houses under OP AMAR, the project that reiterated that there was no danger to India's borders as envisaged by Nehru / Malik / Cabinet / Menon / bureaucrats. Many will not remember that our Ordnance Factories were producing coffee perculators / toasters / and other white goods. And writers have the gall to say that military leadership was the primary cause of 1962 performance? Naturally all the Brig John Dalvi's 7 Brigade had was toasters to throw at Chinese troops, and Menon was drinking tea in a restaurant named Laguna in Connaught Place, I have seen him there.
2. Blaming Thapar was easy, he was Chief. How come no one blamed Malik? Not even today. Reason is that blaming Malik means blaming Nehru and Gulzari lal Nanda. Comparing Ladhak with NEFA, Tawang / Walong sector is wrong. Gen Daulat Singh and his commanders remained who they were and Kaul could not interfere, because Daulat Singh would not take it, and Kaul knew it. But because Eastern Command was in Lucknow, 4 Corps was created in Tezpur, and Kaul took it over. What did he do to make East defendable since he was CGS? Nothing. He behaved like the CIGS, the I standing for Imperial. It is easy to crucify Pathania who was given 4 Div after removing Niranjan Prasad. What did Pathania have to fight with? What strategic / tactical orders did Kaul issue from Tezpur / Delhi / or his sick bed? What intelligence did Malik provide? Pathania had a history of gallantry, being a Military Cross + MVC. Not chota mota decorations. Powers in Delhi must have thought he will create miracles. But he was not the "baba" who was Mailk's guru. For years IB policemen swore that, and I quote freely as heard in late 60s, " when baba raised his hand, the Chinese stopped, and went back" Now it is upto those who can, to find out who was this baba. I saw him only once on board an AN-12.
3. There is also comment about supply drops falling into the hands of the Chinese and not Indians. It is true that this happened. On many occasions, by the time our Daks reached the DZ as indicated to Jorhat, Indian forces had withdrawn South. There being no contact between ground and aircraft, the drop went through as planned. The write up makes it sound as though inspite of all modern commn the drops were a big mess. In the West, it was different. Leh based troops were acclimatised. Open areas permitted photo recce, recall Jaggi Naths photos of Chinese troops. This was not possible in NEFA. Besides, many units fought well in NEFA, and units also failed in Ladhak. The IAF was held back for all sorts of reasons. Whether offensive air support could have been given successfully is a matter for debate given the primitive commn, lack of FACs, swift retreats, and no definable Front Line of Own Troops. That is not germane here.
4. Most surely our troops were badly kitted and poorly armed for mountain warfare. Look at it this way in 2012. If VK Singh can say that the civilian bureaucrats with their political masters have made the Army "nanga", and not one Indian is worried, the same situation prevailed in the late 50s with the very same interlocutors, Generals / politicians / bureaucrats. What is the difference, same difference. If a Chief threatens to resign today and tells Indians on TV prime time why he is resigning, who is bothered? Will any NGO, political party, Mamta, Mayawati, Thakery, Lallu, Jayalalitha make an issue. No way. So what impact would have resulted by resignations of Thapar, Sen, Thorat, Daulat, Engineer, Arjan, Jaswant, etc? In 1962 no one except maybe a few 100 people in Delhi would have known, Akaashvani would not have broadcast it. BN Malik would have frightened Nehru by calling it an attempted coup. Resigning is not the solution, never has been. Resigning is what Arjun wanted to do at Kurukshetra, I am not being dramatic, the story tells us that, and his adviser prevents him from doing so. The rest we all know.
5. Maxwell wrote well, much of what he says has merit. Lets not forget that Henderson Brooks was commanding XI Corps, Bhagat was his BGS, and Daulat was his Army Cdr. I am certain that at least one copy of the report is somewhere waiting to be found. Wonder why no journalist has pursued this? Gen HB could not have consigned everything to Army HQ / MOD. The military can prepare itself, troops / officers can be motivated, training can be done, equipment can be kept fully serviceable etc. But what does a military commander do with out of date fighting weapons? What does he do when his boys do not have even a OG jersey, not even angola shirts, forget great coats, mittens, woolen socks, high ankle boots etc. How does he ensure food when MOD has not sanctioned resources for setting up Rear Area Supply Zones.
MOD says not reqd, there is no danger from China, no funds will be given. Can the commander loot a granary? Yes, many unit / bde / Div cdrs / platoon cdrs failed, were overtaken by events, and every failed commander was sacked. Who was sacked from MOD, which politician resigned? There used to be Three Dy Def Ministers then, who resigned?
6. Now recall the very recent IPKF fiasco. Our troops were with SLRs against AK-47s. Our troops had no maps, poor intelligence, uncertain and conflicting orders, hastily gathered, all commanders were sure that it will end within a few weeks. This in 1987, exactly 25 years after Bomdi La, Se La, Walong, Chushul, Chip Chap etc. Are we doubting military leadership? But unit commanders were sacked. If I am correct more Indians died in Lanka than in 1962, I may be wrong. Once again, why did we intervene? This was not an adventure planned and conceived by generals of the Indian Army. The whole thing came out of RAW, MEA, PMO, with gung-ho inputs from Army Hq. Which MEA / PMO / RAW offical was dismissed? Many army guys went home.
7. There is a need for the 1962 battles to be explained to Indians thru TV. Anchors can take it up if Vadras, Khurshids, Gadkaris, Kejriwals, Khaps, will allow them to do so. Gross misconceptions and misinformation is floating around freely, has been for the last 50 years, and keeping the report secret adds to the disinformation.
Chinese can say what they want. We know that they had to go back since their lines had become too long and could easily be cut off. The "baba" had nothing to do with it. They had an aim, it was achieved, they went back. How much pressure USSR or USA & UK put seems to be unknown, but it must have been there. And lets not forget Nehrus famous line that my heart goes out to the people of Assam. He was ready to abandon the East. Who gave him inputs to say such a dastardly thing? Certainly not Thapar. Best wishes
anant bewoor
The 1962- the story of arrogance.
Defence minister Krishna Menon was undoubtedly the most arrogant man of the subcontinent, but there are many other arrogant personae in the saga of 1962. One was BN Mullik, the Intelligence Chief (IB director) who kept repeating ad nauseam: “The Chinese will not attack”; then Lt Gen BM Kaul who announced to the world that a new Corps (4 Corps), composed of himself and a couple of staff officers, would have no problem to get the Chinese out.
Where is the bloody border?’ The arrogant men of 1962

Decoding Dragon for Dummies

Decoding the Dragon
India can’t be complacent on national security
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

THERE can be no greater proof of failure of India’s foreign policy than the reality of our unsatisfactory relations with all our immediate neighbours. From Pakistan in the West to Nepal and China in the North, Burma and Bangladesh in the East and Sri Lanka in the South, our relations with these countries vary from hostility to indifference.

China’s influence in countries on our periphery has been on the increase. In addition, China has this ‘String of pearls policy’. Though it is a nightmarish situation, India’s security establishment seems to sleep well. The Maoists’ problem and the one in Kashmir are security challenges being addressed in a cavalier fashion. Even if one is to discount the problems in the North-East, the overall security scene is disquieting.

We have been decidedly and overwhelmingly complacent on the issue of national security. Not only has our foreign policy failed to create friendly environment on our periphery but grossly neglected the emerging threats.

This policy suffered further setback when distant Japan, Australia and some South East Asian countries acquiesced to China’s claim that Arunachal Pradesh is a disputed territory. China has been calling it South Tibet and not a part of India.

Moreover, China has declared Jammu and Kashmir a disputed territory and started stapling visas of visitors from that state. More recently, it has reaffirmed its stand on this issue by denying visa to a senior army officer posted in Jammu and Kashmir and who was leader of a military delegation to China.

This stance of China and reportedly inducting large body of troops into Gilgit region of the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) is to give a fillip to the ongoing turmoil in the Kashmir valley, besides controlling any unrest in this part of POK. While China occupied large tracts of territory in Ladakh, Pakistan illegally acceded the Shaksam valley in PoK to it. China is also reported to be improving the Karakoram highway and setting out to build a high-speed railway line to Gwadar port on the Gulf of Oman, for transporting oil to Tibet and Xinjiang province from where it can be ferried to mainland China.

There are suggestions flying thick and fast in the media that India must strongly protest against this Chinese move into PoK. But, protest to whom? China will summarily dismiss such protests and going to the United Nations will merely resurrect the old ghosts of Jammu and Kashmir. At best India can deny visa facility to Chinese, but what of the massive trade we have with that country?

China’s policy keeps time on its side while complacency is our forte. Even keeping time on its side, China has been assiduously and with single-mindedness creating overall military capabilities and military infrastructure in Tibet and spreading its influence in countries on our periphery. It has with equal zeal and purpose followed the policy of using Pakistan as a proxy and a cheap option to tie down India locally.

Then, there is the ‘String of pearls policy’ to squeeze India from all sides. China is building its naval strength at a furious pace and making forays into the Indian Ocean. We have slept through more than half a century, ignoring the emerging security scene and the gathering storms all around and within India.

Not only have we been complacent but decidedly negligent of the emerging security threats, both internal and external. At 2 per cent of GDP for defence as against 7 per cent of China out of GDP, twice the size of ours, India’s lack of concern for its security ought to appear alarming, even to one with impaired vision and the dimwitted.

In the real world, economic strength in the absence of military power is unsustainable. The gunboat diplomacy and wars of nineteen century were to capture markets and enhance influence and commerce for economic gains. The power play of the 21st century is going to be no different except that the form, formulations and contours of policy and coercive techniques will undergo a change.

For long we have been indulging in a puerile debate on the issue of ‘development versus defence,’ as if the two are mutually exclusive and in no way reinforce each other. The mandarins in Delhi have been smug in a world of make believe. To quote Arun Shourie, “Corresponding factors that keep us from growing as fast as our potential are precisely the ones that weaken our defence. The same holds for constituents of defence: the choice is not, ‘valour or high technology,’ cyber warfare or conventional warfare or nuclear capability but capabilities across the broad spectrum.”

China has developed the Gwadar port and it will have a strong naval presence there. This port is at the mouth of straight of Hurmoz through which oil supplies from the Middle East flow to India. The strategic importance of this move by China does not seem to have fully dawned on the Indian security establishment.

The Chinese Navy will also have berthing facilities at the Sri Lankan and Burmese ports. Radars at Coco Island keep watch over the naval ship movement from mainland to Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India’s missile launches from the Balasore missile range in Orissa.

India has helplessly watched developments in Nepal. It is with China’s help that the Sri Lankan government was able to decimate the Tamil Tigers. China, even with a late start, has galloped ahead, leaving us far behind in the fields of economy, science and technology and military capabilities.

It is not our case that the developments on the Tibet border and in POK are the harbinger of an early conflict, but these do not bode well for India. These developments need to be taken as a wake-up call and shake ourselves out of our complacency and stupor. Activating a few airfields and adding some roads or two mountain divisions and deploying two squadrons of fighter aircraft or lodging a protest will not do. These are knee-jerk reactions and reminiscent of our actions leading to the 1962 war with China.

India as a nuclear and emerging economic power, in the midst of potentially unstable regimes and with ambitions to exercise influence for the stability and security of the region and to safeguard vital national interests, cannot have military capabilities which in no way match those of the potential adversaries. Equally, an antiquated and potentially dysfunctional decision-making and operational system in the defence apparatus is anathema to the successful conduct of defence and foreign policy. India’s ability to meet future security challenges is highly suspect and this state of affairs cannot prevail any longer without seriously jeopardising national security.

There is, therefore, the requirement of evolving a comprehensive and long term national security policy taking into account the current and future security concerns and synergising these with foreign policy. Thereafter, we must work assiduously to develop military capabilities backed by diplomatic thrusts to meet the security challenges of the future and be in a position to exercise influence in our immediate neighbourhood. We need to double our efforts to enhance our economic strength and create compatible defence capabilities.
The writer is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
The Tribune- Decoding the Dragon

1962 Indo China War: 48 Years Later, A Soldier Returns

48 Years Later, A Soldier Returns by Shiv Aroor on Tuesday, July 13th 2010
The mortal remains of Sepoy KC Katoch were found by Border Roads engineers on 1 July in Arunachal's Lohit Valley -- 48 years after he perished in battle against the Chinese in the 1962 war. The 4th Dogra soldier was part of the brave resistance at Walong. He will be cremated with full military honours on July 15 in his village near Palampur, HP. Coverage on Headlines Today from tomorrow.

Musings of Missing the Magic

With a feeling of euphoria and in an expansive mood we came out of the Air Conditioned Noida Golf Course Pub, after an enjoyable evening of dinner drinks and entered a different world: a full moon in the sky, the emerald green, greens and the freeways bathed pale, a pleasant mildly cool breeze caressing us and lingered for a while, we had a meet to welcome Maliks, common friends, on a short visit from USA, still talking of past with feelings dipped in nostalgia.

Earlier with the tables cleared, the Kulfies and Gulab-jamuns, slowly savoured, we had lingered at the table and later we had lingered at the car park, hands extended, with the feeling of bonhomie, but reluctant to bid goodbye, unconsciously, trying to hold on to the magic of the evening as long as possible.

Combine of the moon and the cool breeze, unusual for this time in the world of Noida, brought back the magical memories of the legendary Malwa nights: the vast landscape lit by the full moon in the sky, stretching far towards the Bercaha lake; back in time in Mhow and in the company of my late wife. Also evocative of similar night of Dawars at Tezpur, the airfield area, spread as far as eyes could see, suffused with the pale-white moon-light, the tall reed like grass swaying in the mild breeze with the white plumes shining silver reflected by the full moon, high in the sky on a winter night was an ethereal light. The sight, the peace and quiet of those special nights provided, though a sheer magic, no compensation for all the pain of separation from the family some 2000 Km away in Dehradun.

I came home, parked the car, changed and came down to the park below. It was now past twelve in the night, the moon, and now high in the sky, was still bright, the breeze also blowing and the park suffused with the same evocative pale-white moon-light, alas, the magic that I had come down in search of was missing and so was the company and the companion.
Brig Lakshman Singh (Retd)

India China Conflict 1962: Recollections of Chief Signal Officer

Dear Lakshman

I am grateful to you for letting me go through the Signals Story. It is an excellent personal account by a Brigade Signals Officer, who performed his duties unfailingly, under extreme difficulties of inhospitable terrain and weather conditions, shortages of equipment or high altitude clothing.

You have penned so tellingly the entire gamut of emotions as the leader of your men and, one separated from one's family often without news or contact for long intervals. Your intrinsic qualities of leadership and the personal example you set throughout those difficult days, was a major factor for survival of your men, considering that the paralysed higher headquarters could give no succour of any kind, and in fact failed you, and 7 Bde completely.

When placed in similar circumstances we (in the Services) all feel the things you have felt and penned so aptly, but seldom written down. At least I have not come across any. For me reading your story has been a unique and a rewarding experience.

It also fulfils the crying need for educating our country's babudom (politico-bureaucratic) mindset, which believes (mistakenly of course) that those who don the uniform have chosen voluntarily, to suffer (uncalled for) hardship and to die. I once came across such an attitude, and had to remind the 'babu' in no uncertain terms that we are there to see that the enemy suffers and dies and thus ensure continued safety of the likes of him– we accept only the attendant risks. The risks that can be reduced by loosening of purse strings at the appropriate time.

It is also my (1962) experience that often good signal communications, for some, was an unmitigated nuisance since the user commander could be asked for a decision or such like. So he was 'always gone forward' without the rover set. I once even asked one such commander as to where was his Rover WAS. He replied he did not need one.

Those days I personally (from Tezpur) closed down the VHF (ANT/ARC) link at Sela, as everyone of any consequence had vanished. The same happened at Darrang (4 Div HQ) and Bomdilla (48 Bde HQ). Sodhi (who had taken KK's place) contacted me to know what he should do now that Anant Pathania and his GSO1 Manohar were nowhere to be seen. I authorised him to make his own way as best as practical. Lakhanpal, the 48 Bde Signals Officer, contacted me and presented a similar situation and I had to authorise the 'pull-out' and a move back by certain 'bounds'. He was intercepted by the Chinese at the second bound and was obliged to hide till nightfall in a nearby stream. A week later he turned up looking famished and under-weight, but in good heart.

At the Henderson Brook's Committee later on, of course Signals were the favourite whipping boy. I however had taken good care, to provide convincing proof to the contrary in every case. Even our DD Sigs (Chakerburty) had turned up at Tezpur 'to know what went wrong'. I directed him to the BGS, who directed him back to me, saying 'nothing went wrong, and, to remember PS gave us signal comns while we were retreating'. A mere officer in Signals like him, as against a Signals Officer, cannot be expected to comprehend such subtleties.

My wife, Harbans, also has liked your book. We expect to be in Delhi for two weeks from about 20 Feb and would love to meet you. Shall let you know actual dates and contact you on arrival.

Brigadier PS GILL (Retd)
January 30th, 2002

Signal Communications India- China conflict 1962: CSO IV Corps

HQ Eastern Command Lucknow
After my meeting with Lt Gen EG Pettengell at Dehradun I reckon that Kaul having taken charge of the affairs and with direct access to the Defence Minister had absolved the Eastern Command of all responsibility. Things were normal at Lucknow in so far as Signals were concerned, General Pettengell would have definitely recalled had there been any anxiety or incident regarding message traffic between 7 Brigade and New Delhi.

Army HQ New Delhi
Lt Col CUK Nair was the Commanding Officer of the Signal Regiment at Army HQ, the last link in the Signals chain that started from Dhola, at the Tri Junction in NEFA, a chain formed by Runners from Dhola to Ziminthung, carrying the Top Secret, Exclusive For, hand written messages from Kaul to the Nehru or Menon as the case may be, to be enciphered for transmission to Tezpur by Morse code on the wireless link. I did have the privilege of having a look at one of these messages, but it was of no interest to me at that time nor do I recollect any thing of it now, I only had a cursory look at it and it hardly registered, I had my own problems to sort out rather than worry about higher conduct of war and national policies and priorities to bother about. At Tezpur the messages were re-enciphered in machine cipher for transmission to Army HQ on the direct link established from 4 Corps. As soon the operator at the Cipher Office at Army HQ Signal Centre at New Delhi decoded to the words 'Exclusive For' he would stop and handover further deciphering to the Duty Cipher officer. On deciphering the Signal Officer on duty would personally carry and deliver the message to the addressee, the PM or the DM as the case maybe. Day or night, the messages were marked FLASH, the highest priority for clearance, even then it took three days for the first message to reach Delhi. On delivery the CO would be informed who possibly may have also informed the Director Signals Maj Gen Batra the next day of the receipt and successful delivery of the message. Col Nair, unfortunately developed bleeding ulcers and had to be rushed to the Military Hospital due to an allergic reaction to Aspirin the "on" medicine in maximum demand by officers those days.

Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)

We Thank Brig Lakshman Singh for giving us all the episodes on India China Conflict which are really extracts from his book and also sharing his personal and gripping experiences with us. Our Politicians Dilemma as of today:
Left faction of India’s Communists (Karat supporting UPA) had been repeating what Mao Zedhong said to Ajoy Ghosh: “That Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA are provinces peopled by the same race, that China had a historic right to these territories, that the McMahon line was not valid, and that the Indian government’s raising of 'the bogey of Chinese aggression' had resulted from its realisation that Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and India would be deeply affected by the social and economic revolution in Tibet”.

Guess who is who?

Nasib Singh, Kapoor, Sethi, Rajpal
Chowdhry, Sethi, Rajpal, Lal Singh
Tiwari ,Guide, Rajpal at Bumla Pass
Photographs 4 Div Signals 1959- 62

Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)

Abandoned? Life in Tezpur 1959

Like a good soldier I abandoned my wife of less than two years and the child of nine months or so to join the unit by 29th October 1959 in far away Assam. ‘Abandon’ was the word she used then and again and again later to remind her mental state on being left behind.

Mrs Lakshman Singh and 9 month Baby
The train journey to Tezpur across the vast breadth of India from UP through Bihar West Bengal and on to Assam a distance of more than 2000 Kms with three changes of trains and rail gauges was slow time consuming and tedious. One did see the changing landscape the distinct cultural differences of the people that made the nation the changing dresses the spoken language the dialects the accents and the food habits so obvious from the fare sold on the platform even the flavour of the tea sold on the stalls which became sweeter and richer in aroma as one neared Assam, the home of most of the tea gardens. One normally did encounter some old friend on the train which helped in decreasing the tedium of the journey and help in updating about others friends.

Tezpur town is situated on the north bank of the massive and majestic Brahmaputra so broad at Tezpur that the other bank in not visible to the eye. The Signal Regiment was located far away from the town on the airfield a Second World War legacy left by the British. The IAC daily flight from Calcutta with the characteristic drone of the twin engine Dakota took- off and landed regularly at the Sonebari Airport a friendly sight and sound. The Vampire fighters of the IAF also thundered in and out burning rubber on the runway flying training sorties. I do still wonder as to what they were training for since when we needed them most they were conspicuous by their absence. The difficult times under the tough Commanding officer call it my fate or luck proved to be a boon in the long run.

The CO’s Team Third row2 Lt KV Ram Das, Maj Nasib Singh, Capt R S Trehan, Capt SVS Choudhry, Capt K S Man, Maj SMM Jaffery
Second RowCapt Pinto, Maj Brij Lal, Lt Col KK Tewari, Capt AS Bawa, AuthorFront Row2 Lt Mohan Lal, Maj Sardul Singh Gupta, 2 Lt V K Kapoor, 2 Lt Lal Singh, Lt G L Rajpal

I had been with the Regiment holding a difficult and responsible appointment now for more than two years on round the clock duty. Our waking hours were long for more reasons than one. Our living conditions were primitive to say the least. No electricity except for a short duration in the evenings the accommodation consisted of barracks with bamboo matting walls tin roofs and good old mother earth for a floor. The water table was so high that at times the legs of the bed would sink a few inches in the soft earth canting the bed at most unnatural angles. Weather wise except for the short winters.

2 Lt CL Anand, and Maj Gangadharan, OC1
Tezpur was hot humid and sultry with all sorts of crawling and flying insects of the latter mosquitoes were in abundance. The sun rose early in Tezpur we were on 'Garden Time' hours ahead of the Indian Standard Time an innovation of the Planters to save daylight hours. We rose early for work and after a long day late in the night soon after the 9 PM news on the Radio eyes drooping with sleep when one wanted to be excused from the Mess he was generally reminded that it was only 9 PM in Delhi and still too early to call it a day.

If not on duty for entertainment one could go on Saturdays to the Tea Planters club at Thakurbari forty miles or so away where on those days a film show was generally held. One could also drink or get drunk and make a fool of oneself. In any case dressed in our mandatory working uniforms with an unauthorised tie round the neck a concession to the club rules we would be visible like a sore thumb even from a distance. We were a species apart unwelcome unwanted but a necessary evil to be tolerated suffered and endured. With all this there was no chance of any social interaction with the club members more so for us junior officers. However, what is still fresh in my memory is the view of the airfield area.

The mundane and uninspiring view during the day of the flat expense of ground with the ugly concrete aircraft pens constructed during the Second World War dotting the landscape with clumps of tall ungainly wild grass growing all over would suddenly transform itself into a beautiful night scape. Spread as far as the eye could see suffused with pale white moonlight the tall reed like grass with white plumes swayed in the breeze shining as if made of silver. On a cold winter night with the moon high in the sky it was an ethereal sight so vastly different from that of the day. The sight and sounds and the peace and quiet of those special nights some what compensated for all the hardships of separation from the family a difficult job and general discomforts of the place of work. Though disappointed in not getting annual leave life had to be lived and work done. I was in the service of my wife now for good seven years and her call could not be ignored also any change from Tezpur was welcome. The two years or so spent with the Regiment in Tezpur were a prelude to the more momentous postings and events to follow at Tawang and forward areas bordering China in 1962.

Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)