RMS: Prtofessional Blog

Ref: Profession Blog: click here
Esteemed Veterans,
Some interesting articles on Professional Matters dealing with National Security, China, Pakistan, India and warfare are being posted on the REPORT MY SIGNAL PROFESSIONAL MATTERS BLOG.
A very interesting book AIR POWER at 18,000' has recently been published. All those who are interested in reading it ON LINE Click Here.
Harbhajan Singh
Lt Gen (Retd)

Indian Army’s unpaid spy dies in oblivion

SPECIAL TO THE TRIBUNE Wednesday, May 30, 2012, Chandigarh, India
British-born Sydney Wignall discovered the secrets of China’s expansion across Tibet to the borders of India and Nepal

Sadly, New Delhi has ignored the death of Cheshire-born Sydney Wignall who died a few weeks ago in the UK at the age of 89. A British-born hero and unpaid spy of the Indian Army, he used both brains and brawn to discover the secrets of China’s expansion across Tibet to the borders of India and Nepal.
Wignall suffered frost bite, dysentery and regular beatings at the hands of Chinese army guards during his two-month incarceration in a rat-infested prison in Tibet. After his release, he received profuse thanks from his Indian Army contacts for the valuable data he obtained. But the only ‘reward’ he claimed and obtained was a supply of cricket bats and balls for the children of a Nepalese village school that he visited on his way to Tibet.
In 1955, seven years before the Indian Army’s disastrous rout at the hands of Chinese forces, Cheshire-born Sydney Wignall was inspired to lead a Welsh Himalayan Expedition to try and climb the 25,355-foot-high Gurla Mandhata peak in Western Tibet.
Sponsored by the Liverpool Daily Post newspaper and Life magazine, the ostensible objective of the team was to place the flags of Wales and the Chinese Republic on the Gurla Mandhata summit.
Unbeknown to his fellow climbers, however, Wignall had also agreed to gather information for the Indian Army intelligence worried about China’s secret military build up in what was then the autonomous region of Tibet.
Although he and his fellow climber John Harrop, together with their Nepalese liaison officer Damodar Narayan Suwal, were captured soon after they crossed the ill-defined Nepalese border, the information that Wignall collected was the equivalent of intelligence gold dust.
It was gratefully received and analysed by his Indian Army contact, Lieut-Col ‘Baij’ Mehta, who was later killed during the Chinese invasion of Arunachel Pradesh in 1962. It was passed on to an equally grateful Gen KS Thimayya, who later became India’s Chief of Army Staff. He tried and failed to persuade Jawaharlal Nehru of China’s aggressive intentions.
Tellingly, Wignall subsequently had little time for Indian politicians, especially Krishna Menon, who allowed their communist sympathies to blind them to Beijing’s aim of dominating South Asia.
Wignall had met Menon many years earlier in London in 1940, seven years before Independence, when India’s future defence minister and other fellow left-wing activists toed the Soviet Union’s then policy of avoiding confrontation with Adolph Hitler. Menon called 18-year-old Wignall ‘impertinent’ and Wignall formed the impression that Menon was ‘vain, arrogant and conceited.” He called him ‘A thoroughly detestable man.’
Wignall’s Indian heroes were the likes of Gen Thimayya, Col Mehta and Brig John Dalvi, who, in 1962, had only 2,700 soldiers under his command to resist a Chinese division of 12,000 that swept down on him from the Thagla Ridge in what was then known as the North East Frontier Agency or NEFA.
Brigadier Dalvi’s 7th Brigade, which ran out of ammunition, suffered 90 per cent casualties. Those who survived the immediate onslaught died overnight because they had not been supplied with adequate tents, sleeping bags or warm winter clothing. Brigadier Dalvi himself was captured and tortured. A broken man when he was released, he died a few years later much before his time.
It was while he was preparing for his Himalayan expedition in 1955 that Wignall made contact with a retired Indian Army officer, one Lieut-Col Toby Tobin, who was then the vice-president of the Himalayan Club and editor of the Himalayan Journal. Tobin told him, “You might be able to do some friends a favour” before introducing him to a contact called ‘Singh’ at the Indian High Commission in London.
What followed thereafter was like something out of a John Buchan novel. Singh briefed Wignall about the bellicose statements that some Chinese generals had been making about territorial claims to large parts of Northern India, Nepal, Sikkim and Burma. For that reason the Indian military authorities were interested in rumours of China’s intention of building a military highway in west Tibet, close to the sacred lake of Mansarowar.
“You happen to be the only one visiting what to us is the most sensitive area in the whole border region,” Singh explained. “From a vantage point on the north-west ridge of Gurla Mandhata you would be able to see, with a telescope, any sign of a military encampment in that area, and you could look for evidence of the building of that military highway to west Tibet.”
Supplied with maps provided by the British War office, Wignall and his team soon embarked on their 6,500-mile trip from London to the borders of India, Nepal and Tibet. Within days of crossing into Tibet from the Khatang Pass, however, the three lead members of the team were arrested for illegally crossing into Chinese territory.
For the next two months they were held in freezing, rat-infested rooms and interrogated by a team led by Gen Chang Kuo-hua, the military commander of Tibet. These were hard-line party supporters, very different from the likes of 21st century Chinese communist VIPS like millionaire Bo Xilai who had his son Bo Guagua educated at Harrow, Oxford and Harvard.
General Chang was made of much sterner stuff. His minions beat up and abused the British mountaineers, subjecting them to mock executions and telling them, “You intended disguising your illegal armed invasion of China so that the Tibetans would not know you are agents of a foreign power, Western Fascist Lackey Imperial Running Dogs.”
Wignall himself was told, “Sign the confession that you are a Western Fascist Lackey Imperialist Running Dog of the American CIA and we will be very good to you. Otherwise you will be severely punished.”
Although they were under close surveillance during their captivity, Wignall and his friends were able to extract vital information, both from their interrogators and from some of the more friendly guards.
In what was then the pre-satellite age, Wignall managed to accurately estimate the strength of the secret Chinese army base at Jitkot, 17 miles from Tklakot close to the Nepal border. More importantly he was able to gauge that China’s strategic highway from Lhasa would reach Tklakot within the next two years. And from General Chang he heard how Beijing laid claim to India’s Aksai Chin and NEFA regions, as well as parts of Nepal, Kashmir, all of Sikkim, all of Bhutan and parts of northern Burma.
Much of what Wignall discovered was confirmed and reconfirmed before, during and after the 1962 Chinese invasion of India. He himself neither asked for, nor was given any form of compensation by the authorities in India.
Wignall did brief members of the British Foreign Office about his adventures when he returned to London, but his main satisfaction was extracted from the belief that he had taken high risks for the right reasons. In later years he became an underwater archaeologist, uncovering wrecks in British, Portugese and Panamanian waters. A handful of Indians may still remember both his affection for the country and his perilous exploits in the Himalayas. For them he remains a much-loved friend of Mother India.
Indian Army’s unpaid spy dies in oblivion

Conquerors of Himalayan peaks deserve better

Saturday, September 22, 2012, Chandigarh, The Tribune India
Conquerors of peaks deserve better
A Punjab Regiment expedition team on a mission to conquer 6,830m peak of Mountain Kedar Dome in Uttarakhand was faced with a natural ordeal in the form of an avalanche around 11 am on September 19 when it was on its last leg to achieve the objective. Three members of the team were untraceable after the nature’s fury subsided.
An Army helicopter was put into service to locate the missing members of the expedition team (“Three missing as avalanche hits Punjab Regiment expedition team”, September 20).
Those countries that have made their mark in the international arena have shown concern for their single citizens in the hour of their needs. No concrete steps were taken by the Disaster Mitigation and Management Centre and other authorities for making this expedition safe and a sure success since each little event and achievement affect the morale and motivation of the organisation to which a team belongs and the nation in general.
JAGVINDER SINGH BRAR, Patiala
Conquerors of peaks deserve better

Remembering 1962 debacle: Is the Military better prepared?

Ref: Can China repeat its 1962 military humiliation of India?
Comment
IAF101 • 28 minutes ago • parent −
What a "surprise" - a military officer blames the politicians and bureaucrats for failure! Guess we haven't heard that excuse from military officers before!
Who ever loses a conflict is a "Yes Man" general and whoever wins is a "skilled" general right? What convenient logic!
Dealing with the political authority is part and parcel of being a general in a democracy. Blaming X and Y is meaningless because it is not some politician or some bureaucrat whose fate is affected but the entire nation! Just as Nehru takes the ultimate blame for failure, the Indian Army also must accept blame that it was unprepared and over matched by the Chinese military. Individual heroism of a few brave officers means nothing if defeat is the outcome. Even the Nazi had heroic officers who fought for their side but today nobody remembers them because they LOST. It is a fact that some Indian commanders gave bad orders and the Indian military headquarters as a whole was struggling to resupply and move troops to the remote NE while the Chinese were crawling up and down Tibet with ease.
As long as the Indian military does not accept responsibility for defeat, it can never learn the lessons required.
Click here for more interesting comments

Balance and Restraint: Corruption and Indiscipline cannot be equated

NEED OF THE HOUR Balance and Restraint by the Media By Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi
A recent incident of indiscipline in a unit of the army was dutifully reported by the media, but a few newspapers and TV news channels that indulge in yellow journalism, continue to sensationalise it. This is despite the army having unequivocally stated that the incident is being investigated thoroughly. Implicit in various media releases by the army is that there is no move whatsoever to push the incident under the carpet and that exemplary disciplinary action would be taken against all those found guilty. This being so, speculative innuendos and sensational stances must stop.
 My intention is not to say that the news of the incident should not have been reported, or that the media should only report favourable news about the army. However, one starts losing faith in our supposedly independent media when sensationalism takes over and phrases like ˜unique case" or ˜army getting indisciplined" are bandied about.
This is not the first time such an incident has occurred. Â Without going too far back, there was a case in 1978 and another in 1979, both in Ladakh. In 1986 and 1987, two such incidents occurred in the eastern sector. During Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka, there were two incidents, one each in 1987 and 1989. Mutinous actions of a number of units following Operation Blue Star in 1984 are well known. There have been similar incidents in the navy and air force too. All these were handled by the hierarchy of the armed forces with balance, maturity and panache and no editor-in-chief of those days interfered or offered advice, as is being done by a few upstarts today! Neither was there any dilution in the professional capabilities of our forces!

All artillery units fire their artillery guns a number of times every year, but the annual practice firing camp has a special sanctity. During this camp, all artillery guns of the unit fire at the field firing ranges and all personnel of the unit are fully involved. When all the guns of the unit fire simultaneously, the noise, dust, smoke and explosions they produce can only be described as spectacular.

During these camps, there is a surge in adrenalin levels of all ranks, as well as tension, as everyone wants to do well. On the day the entire regiment fires, many guests are invited to witness this spectacular event. Once the firing is wound up, there is visible decrease in tension and everyone gets in to a celebratory frame of mind, having successfully achieved what they had set out to do.

It is unfortunate that after the culmination of this specific event, the unfortunate incident of indiscipline occurred. It was an isolated incident, where tempers were allowed to rise unnecessarily. There was no pre-mediation or planning, let alone a conspiracy on anyone’s part. It was simply an accident and hence there is no reason to sensationalise it or make it larger than life. From the very beginning, no attempt was made by the army to hush up the incident. One therefore cannot understand why a section of the media is bent upon making it sinister and trying to link it with other recent events.

In a 1.3 million strong army, where individuals interact with each other on a 24X7 basis, the odd aberration does occur. Despite discipline being ingrained in them from the very first day they don a uniform, and despite the excellent officer-man relationship that is nurtured on a continuous basis, tempers sometimes run high. All ranks do understand that it is this close relationship that sustains them even in the most difficult situations, but anger subsumes this temporarily. Despite the many ups and downs in the working environment of the army, officer-man relationship has endured. These are the facets that have contributed to making the Indian Army professionally highly competent and behaviourally the best in the business. This needs to be commended not criticized. I would urge those elements of the media that are going unnecessarily overboard in bashing the entire army to desist, for if such coverage continues, it will do great harm to the army and the nation.

The army has time-tested and well laid out procedures for dealing with all types of indiscipline. The media neither has the expertise nor the knowledge of doing so. Even those segments of the media that may have been goaded to unnecessarily raise the issue to absurd heights on account of their vested interests will do well to confine their reports to news and desist from voicing irrelevant views and comments. The country continues to have faith in the prowess and honesty of purpose of their army. It is best for amateurs of the media, however much they may think of themselves as the greatest media honchos, to let the army take remedial actions in their own professional manner. They will, in due course, share their conclusions with everyone.
Let me end this piece by adding that the motto of the Regiment of Artillery of your army is “Izzat o Iqbalâ€, to which they adhere to scrupulously. This particular unit- “ 226 Field Regiment, will also bounce back, provided unnecessary hounding of the unit and its personnel comes to an end immediately.
Comment:The corruption amongst the Officer Cadre need be investigated and exemplary punishment meted speedily. Indiscipline amongst Jawans is a different cup of tea- needs to investigated, correctives measures applied- Revolt and Mutiny is very rare. One should not confuse the issues!
Balance and Restraint

Revolt of Field Regiment in Ladakh: An Analysis

Blame the Army's cover-up culture, not ‘colonial-era institutions'
Manvendra Singh The Hindu, May 23, 2012
Praveen Swami caught the wrong end of a long stick in his article “Ladakh troop revolt underlines Army class tensions” (The Hindu, May 13, 2012). His interesting analysis of the indiscipline and disorder by personnel of the Ladakh-based 226 Field Regiment was based on two arguments. His main argument was that the Army continued to run on antiquated arrangements which then created the conditions for troops and officers of the Artillery regiment to come to blows. Combustion is inbuilt in the functioning of the Army and the fracas at Nyoma in Leh was waiting to happen. He makes two points to underline this argument.
First, the Army continues to run on “colonial-era institutions” and, second, that it remains “divided rigidly between sahibs and men, which allowed, enabled, or rather created conditions for tempers to boil over in Nyoma. Before responding to his line of reasoning, it is important to firstly condemn the incidents that happened in Nyoma. There are no grounds to justify, or let alone explain, the fisticuffs during the bara khana after the regiment had completed its field firing practice. It must be understood that a bara khana is standard procedure following any field firing, by any unit. That an Army tradition came to be marred by unforeseen incidents is a sad commentary on the calibre of officers who were holding staff and command appointments of the 226 Field Regiment. For they are the principal beneficiaries of what Praveen Swami has called “colonial-era institutions.”
His first line of attack is on the continued practice of employing combat trained soldiers as the personal valets of officers — once called batmen by British Indian Army officers and now known as sewadars, sahayaks, and also buddies in many units. His argument is that this institution is outdated in today's India. It humiliates the soldier detailed for such duties with an officer. And because of its misuse, the Nyoma incident happened. Class tension is inherent in the structure of the Army, hence the fires of revolt in the 226 Field Regiment.
There is a basic flaw in this reasoning. For if that were the case, the Army would long have been reduced to an institution wrecked by confronting its thousand inbuilt mutinies. But that has not happened and neither will the Army go that way. Regiments and battalions under far greater combat stress, and with far higher levels of battle training, would also have been stricken with this ailment. Infantry units, the primary application of force by the Republic of India, would not have been able to perform their basic military tasks if the “colonial-era institutions” remained the prevailing atmosphere in the battalion. The institution of sahayak is certainly an outdated one, and there can be no two views on that score. But it is not responsible, whatever its levels of misuse, for the acts of indiscipline in Nyoma.
The second point raised in the report was about the Army being a house “divided between sahibs and men.” Sahib is an honorific bestowed on those who have attained certain ranks, officers or men. Officers are taught by tradition to address as “Sahib” those who have achieved such ranks even if they are junior in the command structure. Consider this: India's Army achieved one of its greatest military feats 25 years ago during this time of the year. On June 26, 1987, the 8 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry captured Quaid Post from Pakistan in the battle to dominate Siachen. The success of that operation was because of the extreme bravery of late 2/Lt Rajiv Pande who began the operation, that was completed by then Naib Subedar Bana Singh, for which he was awarded the Param Vir Chakra. To come to the point — even in the midst of the highest combat ever fought, Pande and Bana Singh would only address each other as “Sahib,” despite the vast difference in age and rank. That has been the practice ever since the Indian Army came to be made, and it will remain so. The addressing of someone as “Sahib” doesn't cause divisions in the Army. And neither does the presence of the ‘Sahib culture'. What causes divisions, and which lie at the root of the problems on display in Nyoma, is, in fact, of far more recent origin.
The armed forces of India, unlike other government services, have a sharply pyramidal structure, both within a unit and as institutions as a whole. The competition of ranks is far higher in the armed forces than anywhere else in the country. And this is as true for officers as it is for enlisted men, for the number of junior commissioned ranks are few and far in between. This competition for higher ranks has created a culture of command that revolves around the “zero-error syndrome.” Simply explained, this essentially means the avoidance of risk so as to sail the waters calmly. When no risks are taken, no mistakes are made. So annual confidential reports remain sanitised to the last line and the grading is excellent. Thus, promotions are easier achieved provided the examinations and courses are also graded well. True of men as also of officers. But human life is not so mechanical, and military life less so. The lure of higher ranks, however, requires that the record be spotless, so units do what they know best: brush the mess under the carpet. Lapses are routinely covered up, and command failures remain un-reported, or at best under-reported.
The failings of command, thus, come to be hidden, from platoon level upward. It is plain to the eye who is and is not fit for the higher ranks. But the military bureaucracy only looks at sterilised pieces of paper in the Military Secretary's Branch. Who they select for commanding a combat unit may really not be fit for that appointment, intellectually, physically or even morally. Murphy's Law is the most popular dictum in the armed forces, and it catches up some time or the other. In Nyoma, it caught up with the 226 Field Regiment. It is certain that this regiment has had numerous incidents of indiscipline in the past. None came to be reported, or they were covered up. Indiscipline to the point of revolt does not only affect those in the unit, but even those commanding higher formations. Accountability in the Army is lateral and vertical. So to avoid stains, some in the past have ignored goings on inside the 226 Field Regiment. All that it required was an incapable officer and an incapacitated soldier to come together, and they did in Nyoma. First-rate officers and first-rate soldiers in other units continue to perform commendably by “colonial-era institutions.” It is obvious the first-rate are not in the 226 Field Regiment.
(Manvendra Singh is co-convener of the Bharatiya Janata Party's defence cell. He was a member of the Standing Committee on Defence in the 14th Lok Sabha.)
Blame the Army's cover-up culture, not ‘colonial-era institutions'

Trilogy of the Northeast

By Dipti Bhalla & Kunal Verma
Set of Three Volumes
Published by KaleidoIndia
Released in OTA by Gen VK Singh on 27 Apr 2012
Northeast Trilogy raises a curtain on the wonders of Northeast India – a land, which was to many and perhaps still is a land of mystery and mystique. Published in three volumes, it is an in-depth collection of hundreds of photographs taken in the field by Dipti Bhalla and Kunal Verma over a period of three years. Through their images they have captured a world hitherto unknown to many - the richness and the grandeur of the Northeast. The entire collection goes beyond the realm of one’s imagination.
This lavish set of three is a celebration and a tribute to the people of the Northeast - from stunning portraits to landscapes and the rich flora and fauna. Dipti and Kunal have demystified an entire area that was hitherto unknown not only to the rest of the country but also to the communities that live in the region in isolated pockets demarcated by difficult terrain. The seclusion was geographical. But the story today is different. The Northeastern states are among the best performing ones in the country. There has been immense improvement in literacy, health, and infrastructure.
The first volume of the trilogy takes the reader through Sikkim, North Bengal, Assam, and Meghalaya. The second is devoted entirely to Arunachal. Aptly titled Brahma’s Creation, it explores fourteen of the state’s sixteen districts, from the plains to the deepest core of the Himalaya. The remaining two districts are covered in Volume III of the trilogy – Children of the Dawn – together with Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, and Mizoram.
The Trilogy is a delight – and a nugget!
Northeast Trilogy

Service to the Veterans in Remote Regions of Garhwal

Sir,
Our second trip to the last village en route to ROOPKUND to meet the ESM, widows & dependents. It may be of some general interest for the pensioner fraternity. You may consider accepting it for your widely read Blog.
Our next trip will be to Mandoli-Wan, another last village on the Aali - Beduni Bugyal Axis.
In these remote areas they are totally illiterate, ignorant & neglected. So, our interaction is highly valuable.
The detailed report click here
The slideshow of photos are as above with caption titles which are in the report.
Regards
Big RS Rawat (Retd)

Readers Responses
Dear Rajender Rawat and like -minded Veteran Leaders,
Thanks for a fascinating account- what an awesome adventure and such an inspiring story of your 'service to the veterans' of a remote region. My humble compliments and admiration. May God bless you to undertake many more such 'missions'. The photographs are amazing.
Some thoughts below to ponder over- for Management and Members:-

Ar'nt such contributions as rewarding as a unifocal struggle for OROP and will such deprivations/ injustices vanish when 'that' is sanctioned - failure is and will remain in the implementation System?

Wonder how many more such deprived Veterans, widows/dependants?

Should IESM energies/objectives, therefore, be more 'inclusively' re-cast and re-directed in pursuing a comprehensive concept of JUSTICE for the Veterans?
The priority area being resolving systemic flaws and synergising with allied agencies such as Regtl networks/RSB/ZSB etc, rather than setting up stand-alone IESM 'helplines'.
My congrats once again to Brig Rawat and his Team.
Yoginder Sharma
Lt Gen YN Sharma, Former Army Commander

Sir,
Thanks very much sir for this very interesting update. We need more such efforts, but preferably as part of the system. The challenge is how to get updated information and action to reach ESM at grassroots level/ remote areas. Though organizationally we may have a process for the above, but obviously it is not working. May need to be taken up as agenda item for next meeting.
Regards,
Cdr NA Mohan (Retd)

k\Kudos to the team. We need more Rawats to keep the service and spirit of ESMS going
Brig SK Mehta, AVSM

Kudos to the initiative of Brig Rawat. I am sure that it will motivate others.
Maj BBL Narang (Retd)

IESM Advocacy Opportunity
One of our primary goals is to provide a voice for Ex Servicemen and their families. We can accomplish this by working with government to promote forward- looking policy, organizing calls-to-action, and keeping our brethren informed about changes in laws and regulations. We need to create, advocate, and lobby for legislation that will support ESM and their families long into the future. OROP is not the only issue- We should continue to focus our legislative and government efforts in areas that positively impact an ESM's quality of life, including policy and legislative improvements to provide high-quality healthcare (ECHS), age- appropriate rehabilitation options, and community- based and peer- supported care specifically for the war wounded- we all must support Gen Vijay Oberoi in his selfless service to the Physically Challenged Veterans. Lt Gen YN Sharma's call to quote "The priority area being resolving systemic flaws and synergising with allied agencies such as Regtl networks/RSB/ZSB etc, rather than setting up stand-alone IESM 'helplines'." is of paramount importance and most appropriate.

India has no war memorial even 6 decades after independence

Respected Sir/Madam,
The following report -- released by the United News of India news agency on December 16, 2010 -- is for your kind perusal. I request you to further publicise the issue.
With regards,
Abhi

India has no war memorial even 6 decades after freedom: IESM
Bhopal, Dec 16 (UNI) As the nation observes the anniversary of the 1971 Bangladesh War, the Indian Ex-Servicemen Movement (IESM) today described as "a monumental shame" the fact that -- even six decades after Independence -- the country does not have a war memorial in honour of those who made the supreme sacrifice in bitter conflicts since 1947.
"It is a day of rejoicing and jubilation, as also reflection and remembrance. Yet only 1.3 million souls who don the uniform, nearly three million veterans and their families commemorate this day. The rest, comprising over a billion Indians, are not even aware of it, thanks to the Government that has no time to even commend the soldiers for their sacrifices," IESM Vice-Chairman Major-General (Retd) Satbir Singh, Sena Medal, said in a release.
Most nations have days or weeks earmarked for felicitating their soldiers and veterans.
"What do we do in India? Not only we do nothing but also our governments continue to be oblivious to the need and welfare of soldiers. In the name of civilian control of defence forces, which really means control by elected representatives, the bureaucrats continue to ill-treat the military," the veteran alleged.
"Two years back, political leaders stooped to the lowest level possible when they dubbed two conflicts as the Congress war and the Bharatiya Janata Party war. There is a need for people to join in creating ethos and traditions to give due respect and honour to soldiers," the release said.
On Vijay Diwas, the Defence Minister makes an appearance at the India Gate's Amar Jawan Jyoti to lay a wreath 'oblivious' of the fact that he is laying a wreath at a place constructed by the British when India was a colony. An IESM delegation laid a wreath at Amar Jawan Jyoti at noon today.
On this day in 1971 the Indian military won resounding victories in all theatres of that war with the crowning glory being the capture of East Pakistan; the birth of Bangladesh and taking more than 93,000 Pakistani soldiers as prisoners of war. At 1631 hrs, Lt-Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Naizi signed the surrender document offered by Indian Lt-Gen Jagjit Singh Arora. He also surrendered his pistol in a symbolic gesture.
This great victory was achieved at a price. A total of 68 officers, 60 junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and 1,293 other ranks sacrificed their lives. As many as 211 officers, 160 JCOs and more than 3,500 other ranks were wounded. The Indian Armed Forces took merely 14 days to liberate Bangladesh, in a lighting campaign to the surprise of the entire world.

Strategic alliance to check assertive China

Grave security challenges and the risk of armed confrontation exist in South Asia. India must have potent politico-diplomatic deterrence, strategic alliances and the military wherewithal to ensure peace as well has ability to check adventurism by assertive neighbours or fight a war on two fronts.

India has had defence relations with the US since the Chinese attack in 1962. It was the US that India looked towards when Chinese troops were racing down towards the plains of Assam and Indian political and military leadership was paralysed. Americans airlifted badly needed weapons, equipment and a few fighter aircraft. Later, they equipped three mountain divisions with war equipment and there was a US military mission in New Delhi for a few years for the purpose.

During his November visit, President Barack Obama lifted sanctions against defence research and production establishments, including DRDO, paving the way for greater co-operation.

In the foreseeable future China and Pakistan would be India's main adversaries. There are significant differences in the fundamentals of these three societies, their value systems, religious beliefs and tolerance levels of others. India is a democracy and open society while China and Pakistan are comparatively closed societies, where military plays a dominant role. There is also economic competitiveness between China and India, though the Indian prime minister has repeatedly stated that there is enough room in the world for both China and India. In addition, there is a long-standing border dispute between China and India.
Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh (Retd)
Former Signal Officer-in-Chief of the Indian Army
Click here to read the full analysis in the Professional Matters Blog

Will the Dragon swallow Arunachal Pradesh?

CHINA HAS A “BIG PROBLEM" WITH INDIA? By Bhaskar Roy
The government of China appears to extremely upset by a news report in the Indian media that two Mountain Divisions of the Indian army will be deployed in Arunachal Pradesh, and become fully operational by next year.

In response, the China Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ma Zhaoxu cautioned India to address Beijing’s “serious concerns” and not trigger a disturbance in the region “so as to facilitate the healthy development of China-India relations.”

China’s official English language daily, The Global Times (Nov 23) almost questioned the intention of the Indian media report since China's Premier Wen Jiabao was to visit India in three weeks time to celebrate the 60th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The Global Times, a subsidiary of the communist party mouth piece, the Peoples daily, the most authentic official view carrier, reported the views of several Chinese experts to decipher India’s intention. Wang Dehua, an expert on India at the Shaughai International Studies Centre (SICC) was of the opinion that the Indian move was strengthen its hands ahead of the India-China talks on the border scheduled for December 29-30, in Beijing. Sun Shihai, an expert on Asia-Pacific studies with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) opined that military strength of Arunachal Pradesh showed India’s unwillingness to make any concession during border demarcation talks.

More interestingly, the Global Times, decided to recall that the Chinese Foreign Ministry had “condemned” Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in October 2009. The newspaper, known for its hard-line nationalist views did not, however, proceed to recall what happened next. Prime Minister Singh visited Arunachal Pradesh, made it clear that there was no dispute over the state, and was invited for a meeting by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao soon after at a conclave in Thailand when the Chinese side sought to cool down matters.

It is surprising that even after six decades of bilateral relations the Chinese establishment has failed to understand how India works. Or is it a ploy to pick up items from India’s independent media to berate India? The Chinese must understand that the Indian government is answerable to Parliament and the people and, hence, decisions like major deployments by even the armed forces have to be transparently conveyed to the people. In China, the people do not matter and the media is controlled by the state and the party as per the respective constitutions.

While the Indian and Chinese leaders have agreed on more than one occasion to avoid confrontation and provocation, work to further improve bilateral relations, and cooperate on a wide range of issues bilaterally, regionally and globally, it is obvious that a section of the powerful Chinese leadership seem determined to queer the pitch. Why else would the Chinese foreign ministry choose to warn India on a non-consequential issue on the eve of the border talks and ahead of Chinese Premier’s visit to India. Why else would the The Global times repeatedly refer to Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Southern Tibet’ over which “China claims sovereignty”.

Historically, there is nothing called Southern Tibet. It is a new concoction being tried over the last two years or so to claim Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory. The fact that the 4th Dalai Lama was born in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh does not mean anything. The Dalai Lamas or any other Tibetan Living Buddhas can be born anywhere in the world.

Reading recent Chinese official media reports and studies in reputed official journals, there is every reason to believe there is a split in China’s top most hierarchy on foreign policy. Following global reactions to its assertive behaviour with neighbours, the party central committee appears to have laid down a policy of restraint but adhering to the country’s already stated position. Yet, there are strong indications that a section aligned with the army is determined to demonstrate and project power outside the country.

President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao does not seem to be in a position to fully restrain the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which holds a major say in the affairs of security, neighbours and the USA. A conservative in many ways, Hu Jiantao had to rely on the PLA to buttress his position and give way to them even if he does not want to do so. Deng Xiaoping was the last Chinese leader to control the PLA .

A brief review of statements from the Chinese foreign ministry on India in the last two years suggest an unfriendly hard-line. This is something different from the decade of the 1990s when, in the aftermath of the Tienanmen Square incident, India was one on the few countries of substance which protected China from the Western onslaught on the human rights issue and outside intervence in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. The Chinese foreign ministry then was more friendly. In contrast, as Chinese grew stronger economically and militarily in the last decade it formulated a new strategy with Pakistan to chip away at India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The latest in these examples are issuing stapled visas to anyone who resided in Kashmir, projecting Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) as Pakistan’s sovereign territory and Indian Kashmir as disputed territory, and trying to raise a new debate that the Kashmir issue is a trilateral question between India, Pakistan and China.

China is trying to convince India that these are small issues not to be bothered about, but cooperate on larger issues including climate change and currency values against the west. While the two largest countries of Asia must cooperate and work together for common cause, the region’s development and making the 21st Century for Asia, China’s behaviour does not inspire confidence. India experimented on joint bidding for oil and gas resources with China, but woke up one morning to see China had sabotaged India literally at midnight.

Geography forces the two countries to work together and raise mutual trust. Till now, however, China has given no evidence to India that it can be trusted. If it thinks India will conspire with the US to counter China, it must see India’s policy on Iran and Myanmar post-Obama visit. People outside the government in India, save for the ardent sinophiles, are beginning to think there is a too much double-speak from China. Beijing must also realise that despite their huge nuclear and asymmetric warfare superiority over India, it is no longer 1962. China will be welcome if it truly demonstrates it is a development cooperative partner. This has not happened yet.

When Premier Wen Jiabao makes his official visit to India in mid-December, he will come as a lame duck premier. He lost a lot of political clout when he called for greater democracy to consolidate China economic gains. But the party plenum in October smothered his voice. He was subsumed by the hardliners, and he will spend his next two years in position as only echoing laid down policies.

Much cannot be expected from Wen Jiabo’s visit. He will read from the Beijing script in both India and Pakistan. But the Indian government must use this opportunity to deliver India’s concerns and position without pulling the punches. It is time India tells China what are the ‘big issues” and “small issues” for India.
Bhaskar Roy is an experienced China analyst.
CHINA HAS A “BIG PROBLEM" WITH INDIA?

Will the ghost of 1962 dragon continue to haunt the South Block?

Ref: The amateurs in charge
In 1962, Intelligence Chief B.N. Mullick ruled the roost. These days it is the mandarins of External Affairs Ministry and Babus in the MOD. There is no single point military advice.
Things are not good at all.
Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh (Retd)

Extract
indian express oped
Posted: Sat Nov 20 2010, 03:34 hrs
Blaming Pandit Nehru for everything wrong with India has grown from a fashion to a rage, so the letters he addressed to American President John F. Kennedy on November 19, 1962, will be used as another stick with which to beat him. Destructive denigration serves him as ill as the idolatry in which he could do no wrong. Of course he made mistakes, who doesn’t, and to pretend they really were not mistakes worse, to conceal facts only feeds his detractors. What our country owes him becomes ever more apparent, time and our travails keep confirming its value. Viewing so great a man whole, faults and all, cannot diminish his stature, or our debt. What we need is to learn from the mistakes, his and ours which we stubbornly refuse to do.

November 1962 was a national disaster, all the more painful for being so self-inflicted: blinding ourselves to it is to invite repeats. Panditji must bear his share of responsibility, but the totality of our failure extends far beyond individuals. India failed to function as an organised state, alive to its challenges and opportunities, appropriately prepared to deal with them. Have we used our experience to become such a state now?
People today cannot realise the horrific pressures of those weeks. Despite our foolishness in imagining that suppressing facts can change them, plentiful evidence has been published by important actors of the time, inter alia recording the frightening situation Delhi saw itself facing that November 19 morning. Key positions had been left to the enemy, Sela and Bomdila augured horrendous dangers, civil officers had started being withdrawn and a complete evacuation from Assam was being considered, the DIB even starting to plan a resistance movement. An outstanding soldier, Major-General Monty Palit wrote 20 years ago that he was shown the draft letter seeking 12 fighter and two bomber squadrons; as DMO, at a desperate stage of a war that seemed to be moving along a course of escalating disasters, [he] could only welcome the proposal of obtaining military help, whatever its source, though confessing he had not for a moment imagined that... the architect of India's non-alignment policy, would ask for actual intervention by US forces. (War in the High Himalayas pp 342-343)
Read more click here

Can we safeguard our Territorial Integrity?

1962 redux?
The Asian Age Oct 19th, 2010
All wars commence in the mind, and escalate with words. “Zhang Nan” or “Southern Tibet”, the designation bestowed by the People’s Republic of China on India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh bordering Tibet, is one such example. China now claims Arunachal Pradesh as its historic territory comprising the three southern districts of the Tawang Tract unilaterally acquired by the then British Empire after the Treaty of Simla in 1913. New demands, which were first articulated around 2005, initially concerned Tawang as a traditional tributary region of Lhasa, being the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama (Tsangyang Gyatso, enthroned 1697, probably murdered 1706 by Mongol guards who were escorting him to Beijing under arrest). Subsequently, a day prior to the visit of China’s President Hu Jintao to India in 2006, Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese ambassador to India, stridently reiterated in public China’s claims to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh in a deliberately provocative gesture designed to put New Delhi on notice of Beijing’s intention to dominate the agenda of interaction according to its own priorities. In a longer-term perspective, these needlessly provocative claims could escalate to a flash point with the potential to provoke a major confrontation between the two countries, and create an existential crisis for the entire region, a contingency for which India has to prepare itself adequately.
Indian reaction has been characteristically muted, constantly choosing to soft pedal and play down the issue — a unilateral gesture of restraint regardless of the degree of blatant provocation, which exasperated many in this country. It is seen as making a virtue out of necessity, because India has neglected to build up the requisite capabilities to adopt stronger alternatives. This is surely an unenviable position for a country seeking to promote itself as a major power for a permanent seat on the Security Council.
The present Sino-Indian equation is almost irresistibly reminiscent of the run-up to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, and provides a fascinating playback of China’s postures at that time with its disconcertingly similar sequence of claims along the McMahon Line in North East Frontier Agency (Nefa), as well as along the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border and in Ladakh, as relics of historic injustices perpetrated in earlier days by British imperialists. A naive and militarily ill-prepared India, with an exaggerated self image of its own international relevance as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, had sought to dissuade a determined China with platitudinous Nehruvian philosophies of anti-colonial solidarity, all of which were contemptuously disposed of by “a whiff of grapeshot” on the desolate slopes of the Namkha Chu and Rezang La. India’s collapse and comprehensive downsizing in short order in 1962 was primarily because it lacked military capability vis-a-vis China, a fatal flaw which has a disconcerting tendency of repeating itself when lessons of earlier debacles wear off from the country, as they seem to be doing now. “1962 redux” is slowly grinding into gear again, with end results unforeseeable, except that an enhanced replay at some stage (2020?) can never be totally discounted. India must not repeat its follies of the past because this time around it has been adequately forewarned.
Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament.
click here to read more
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Can we Confront China?

Ref: Indo China war- The shock and awe of '62
China is an established and growing world power, economically and militarily with nuclear and space capability. All the western powers including USA are in awe and are scared to confront the Dragon!!

As far as India is concerned, China has always tried to do down India. It has heaped insults after insults on our country (emphatic claims on Arunachal, warning to Manmohan Singh about his visit to this State, stapled visas for people living in J&K, refusal to give Visa to Lt Gen Jamwal to visit China, military aid to Pakistan, supplying nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan etc etc, the list is endless).

The construction of railway line to Lhasa and its planned extension to Nepal Border, construction of airfields and roads along Southern border areas of Tibet has enhanced Chinese military capability against India manifold. The strategic nuances of the Pearl of strings around India are well known. Chinese military is just too strong for India and added to this are the Chinese close strategic ties with Pakistan!!!

USA is a declining power and after its long military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will not enter into any military conflict with China to bail out India. In any case why should it?? What has India done for USA??? Russia similarly has no stomach to threaten China in case of any hostilities between India and China.

This means, India will have to rely on its own military prowess in case there is a conflict between India and China. Lately some measures have been taken to strengthen our military posture in the East, but these are slow and insufficient. Indian Government (its political leaders and bureaucrats) have not changed their ways of functioning. The Congress Party (its President, budding scion of Nehru Pariwar and their hangers on) have little interest and knowledge of national security. They remain busy politicking with the prime aim of how to remain in power. National security also does not seem to interest the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh much. He is an economist and a peace loving man where as India is facing leaders in China and Pakistan who are hell bent on destabilising India. Those on Opposition benches are no better!!!

The Veterans need to awaken the nation on matters of National security and looming threat from China and Pakistan. We owe it to the nation to take a lead in bringing to focus the poor state of equipment (ships, fighter aircraft, guns, tanks etc) of the Army, Navy and the Air Force and the very very slow pace of new critical acquisitions. Also non implementation of Kargil Committee Report- click here.

India has to be fully prepared to fight on two fronts. The conflict will be swift and at a place and time of Chinese choosing and they will come in with overwhelming superiority. It is a sound interim policy to try and keep a low key and not overly react to pin pricks by China. But this cannot be ever lasting scenario. India has to have the required force levels and weaponry to deter China. Though this should have happened 'yesterday', and hence there is no time to lose!! The World must be made to realise that India is not a soft state.

VETERANS ARE REQUESTED TO SEND IN THEIR COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON HOW INDIA NEEDS TO GEAR UP TO FACE THE DUAL CHALLENGE FROM CHINA AND PAKISTAN AND ALSO INTERNAL INSURGENCY.

Harbhajan Singh
Lt Gen
(Former Signal Officer in Chief)

Status of Classified Report of 1962 Indo China Debacle
The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, also referred to as the Henderson Brooks report, is the report of an analysis (Operations Review) of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Its authors are officers of the Indian armed forces. They are Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig P S Bhagat, commandant of the Indian Military Academy at the time.

The report continues to be classified by the Indian Government. In April 2010, India's Defence Minister A.K. Antony told Parliament that the report could not be declassified because its contents “are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value."

The report is said to be openly critical of the Indian political and military structure of that time, as well as of the execution of military operations.

Author Neville Maxwell has published what he claims are summaries of the report. While this has not been verified by comparisons with the (still classified) text, it has been accepted as a reasonable summary by the Indian media. This report of Indo-China war makes interesting reading.

As of Feb 2008, MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar has requested the report to be declassified in the National Security interest. This has been declined by the defense Minster A K Antony. He has quoted that the same would not be released "considering the sensitivity of information contained in the report and its security implications"
Henderson Brooks- Bhagat Report
Kargil Review Committee Report: click here

Indo China war: The shock and awe of 1962

Dear Veterans,
One wonders if the situation is any better now and with multiplied force levels of the Chinese. Are we not waiting for another humiliation? Who will be blamed politicians, bureaucracy or the armed forces? The special article by A Bhatacharayya of Statesman is a pointer to political indifference to National Security in connivance with Bureaucratic incompetence.
Warm regards,
Brigadier PTGangadharan,Guards,
Veteran

The Statesman, 21 October 2010- Shock and awe of ’62, A War That Was Lost Before It Began By Abhijit Bhattacharyya
After 37 years, precisely on 7 October 2010, Israel relived, as it were, the declassified documents of the Yom Kippur war. The confidential discussions of Israel’s top leaders in the first days of the Arab-Israeli war are now in the open. However, no such declassification has taken place in India even 48 years after the war with China. The most devastating setback was suffered by the army at the battle of Namka Chu (Kechilang to the Chinese) at 5 am on Saturday, 20 October 1962. Namka Chu was a national shame, an unprecedented battering for the military, an unparalleled command failure on the part of spineless, non-professional Generals, an ignominy for the over-rated and conspiratorial bureaucracy and a case of rare political irresponsibility and foolishness. It was not a military conflict fought on the ground, but the outcome of a myopic political process which was tantamount to self-inflicted humiliation in a potential conflict zone.
The Indian politicians in the fifties and sixties were so out-of-depth that the Government still does not feel confident enough to declassify the 48-year-old documents. This only encourages speculation.
Indeed, India was done-in much before the hostility in the Namka Chu valley. The die was actually cast on Sunday, 9 September 1962. With both Prime Minister Nehru and Finance Minister Morarji Desai out of the country, and Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri nowhere in the loop, Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon took upon himself the role and responsibility to hold a meeting in his South Block office on a holiday. With the army chief and two army commanders and presumably one or two ministry officials in attendance, Menon “unilaterally” gave the “marching order” to the army to go forward, according to Brigadier John P. Dalvi, the fall guy of the 1962 defeat, in his military classic, Himalayan Blunder. Neville Maxwell in his authentic India’s China War corroborates Dalvi’s version with a blow-by-blow account, which he reportedly “managed” to access from Lt. General Henderson Brooks’ enquiry report on the disaster.
The government decided to “go forward” and set up a post at the trijunction of India-Bhutan-China at Dhola on the Thagla ridge on the Namka Chu river. Dalvi’s description of the confusion, ignorance of Delhi-based military generals and civilian babus make ironic, yet comical and hilarious, reading. A sketch map was the “only map” available as there “were no accurate survey maps of this area. The ¼-inch editions were very old and vaguely based on the details provided by the British officer who was deputed to visit the area and align the McMahon Line, as agreed at the Simla Conference of 1913-14. It showed the Namka Chu flowing from north to south, whereas it actually flowed from west to east”.
It was another bigger river, named Nyamjang Chu, which flowed from north to south from the Thagla watershed. This appears to have led to the conclusion that the flow of Namka Chu too must be following the same north-south axis. Dalvi wrote: “I have often wondered if this map misled our planners into thinking that 9 Punjab were facing east instead of north”. The strategy, therefore, exposed a deficit in the planners’ knowledge of history and geography, ignorance of the terrain, non-application of mind and a political compulsion that was thrust upon the army’s field commanders. The end-result of India’s adventure in the face of the obdurate Chinese was a foregone conclusion.
The order issued by the Army chief’s office in mid-September 1962 stated: “9 Punjab will capture Thagla, contain Yumtsola and Karpola-II by September 19.” It was “issued while the Prime Minister and Finance Minister were abroad and the Defence Minister was having his western clothes dry-cleaned for New York. The Chief of General Staff of the Army was enjoying the salubrious climate of Kashmir. All the key desks in Delhi were empty”.
The Prime Minister made an uncharacteristically aggressive statement at Colombo airport on 12 October 1962: “The Army has been told to drive away the Chinese from our territory in NEFA”. This worsened the situation. It served as the clarion call for war by India’s Head of Government, and one that was made on foreign soil. It was a humiliating assault on the pride and ego of any nation, not to speak of China alone. It once again brought into sharp and contrasting focus the issue of war preparedness and the psyche thereof. The Indian military was simply in no position to fight because the 600 ragtag men had nothing to fight with and did not know where to fight and when and how to begin in the face of a mighty enemy of 40000 men coming from across the Namka Chu. The war was over in three hours, to be precise.
Nemesis caught up with Namka Chu because the operational “Brigade Headquarters was at Towang, some five days’ march from the intrusion at Thagla Ridge. Towang is a field posting and a hardship station. The Division was at Tezpur, 200 miles away. Although Tezpur is considered to be a field area, life is more or less normal, with planters’ clubs, golf courses and cinemas. Corps HQ was at Shillong, another 200 miles away. Shillong is a salubrious hill station and a ‘peace posting’. Command HQ was at Lucknow some 600 miles from Shillong ... The last tier is the holy of holies at Delhi where we have Army HQ and ‘Government’. Delhi is the most peaceful of the world’s capitals and so far removed from military realities that political factors perforce dominate the formulation of national strategy”.
This was the ground reality for the demoralized soldiers in the frontline during September-October 1962. It was a “lost war” even before the war had begun as the “peace stations” of Shillong (Corps HQ); Lucknow (Command HQ) and Delhi gave China a “head start” in the October 1962 war with India.
How were the Chinese placed in contrast to India’s plight at the Namka Chu/Thagla axis? How did they inflict one of the most spectacular and stunning defeats on an enemy in the field? The Chinese followed the doctrines of their ancient scholar-soldier Sun Tzu, enshrined in the Art of War. War, being a “matter of life and death for the state”, must not be neglected. “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”. This is the doctrine that was followed in Namka Chu.
The Indian resistance simply ended in three hours on Saturday, 20 October 1962 “without fighting”. The soldiers fought as hard as they could from 5 am to 8 am, thereby writing a fresh, humiliating chapter in the country’s history.
Let India not forget that 48-year-old chapter written with the blood, toil, tears and death of some of the crack units of her fighting machine. Let India not allow Sun Tzu’s success to be repeated at its expense in the Namka Chu valley. Let India declassify the official documents and the full text of Lt.- Gen Henderson Brooks if the government is inclined to “prove” that 1962 was actually “China’s India war” and not “India’s China war” as Neville Maxwell would have us believe.

The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College of India and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Indo- China war: The shock and awe of 1962

Decoding Dragon for Dummies

Decoding the Dragon
India can’t be complacent on national security
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

THERE can be no greater proof of failure of India’s foreign policy than the reality of our unsatisfactory relations with all our immediate neighbours. From Pakistan in the West to Nepal and China in the North, Burma and Bangladesh in the East and Sri Lanka in the South, our relations with these countries vary from hostility to indifference.

China’s influence in countries on our periphery has been on the increase. In addition, China has this ‘String of pearls policy’. Though it is a nightmarish situation, India’s security establishment seems to sleep well. The Maoists’ problem and the one in Kashmir are security challenges being addressed in a cavalier fashion. Even if one is to discount the problems in the North-East, the overall security scene is disquieting.

We have been decidedly and overwhelmingly complacent on the issue of national security. Not only has our foreign policy failed to create friendly environment on our periphery but grossly neglected the emerging threats.

This policy suffered further setback when distant Japan, Australia and some South East Asian countries acquiesced to China’s claim that Arunachal Pradesh is a disputed territory. China has been calling it South Tibet and not a part of India.

Moreover, China has declared Jammu and Kashmir a disputed territory and started stapling visas of visitors from that state. More recently, it has reaffirmed its stand on this issue by denying visa to a senior army officer posted in Jammu and Kashmir and who was leader of a military delegation to China.

This stance of China and reportedly inducting large body of troops into Gilgit region of the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) is to give a fillip to the ongoing turmoil in the Kashmir valley, besides controlling any unrest in this part of POK. While China occupied large tracts of territory in Ladakh, Pakistan illegally acceded the Shaksam valley in PoK to it. China is also reported to be improving the Karakoram highway and setting out to build a high-speed railway line to Gwadar port on the Gulf of Oman, for transporting oil to Tibet and Xinjiang province from where it can be ferried to mainland China.

There are suggestions flying thick and fast in the media that India must strongly protest against this Chinese move into PoK. But, protest to whom? China will summarily dismiss such protests and going to the United Nations will merely resurrect the old ghosts of Jammu and Kashmir. At best India can deny visa facility to Chinese, but what of the massive trade we have with that country?

China’s policy keeps time on its side while complacency is our forte. Even keeping time on its side, China has been assiduously and with single-mindedness creating overall military capabilities and military infrastructure in Tibet and spreading its influence in countries on our periphery. It has with equal zeal and purpose followed the policy of using Pakistan as a proxy and a cheap option to tie down India locally.

Then, there is the ‘String of pearls policy’ to squeeze India from all sides. China is building its naval strength at a furious pace and making forays into the Indian Ocean. We have slept through more than half a century, ignoring the emerging security scene and the gathering storms all around and within India.

Not only have we been complacent but decidedly negligent of the emerging security threats, both internal and external. At 2 per cent of GDP for defence as against 7 per cent of China out of GDP, twice the size of ours, India’s lack of concern for its security ought to appear alarming, even to one with impaired vision and the dimwitted.

In the real world, economic strength in the absence of military power is unsustainable. The gunboat diplomacy and wars of nineteen century were to capture markets and enhance influence and commerce for economic gains. The power play of the 21st century is going to be no different except that the form, formulations and contours of policy and coercive techniques will undergo a change.

For long we have been indulging in a puerile debate on the issue of ‘development versus defence,’ as if the two are mutually exclusive and in no way reinforce each other. The mandarins in Delhi have been smug in a world of make believe. To quote Arun Shourie, “Corresponding factors that keep us from growing as fast as our potential are precisely the ones that weaken our defence. The same holds for constituents of defence: the choice is not, ‘valour or high technology,’ cyber warfare or conventional warfare or nuclear capability but capabilities across the broad spectrum.”

China has developed the Gwadar port and it will have a strong naval presence there. This port is at the mouth of straight of Hurmoz through which oil supplies from the Middle East flow to India. The strategic importance of this move by China does not seem to have fully dawned on the Indian security establishment.

The Chinese Navy will also have berthing facilities at the Sri Lankan and Burmese ports. Radars at Coco Island keep watch over the naval ship movement from mainland to Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India’s missile launches from the Balasore missile range in Orissa.

India has helplessly watched developments in Nepal. It is with China’s help that the Sri Lankan government was able to decimate the Tamil Tigers. China, even with a late start, has galloped ahead, leaving us far behind in the fields of economy, science and technology and military capabilities.

It is not our case that the developments on the Tibet border and in POK are the harbinger of an early conflict, but these do not bode well for India. These developments need to be taken as a wake-up call and shake ourselves out of our complacency and stupor. Activating a few airfields and adding some roads or two mountain divisions and deploying two squadrons of fighter aircraft or lodging a protest will not do. These are knee-jerk reactions and reminiscent of our actions leading to the 1962 war with China.

India as a nuclear and emerging economic power, in the midst of potentially unstable regimes and with ambitions to exercise influence for the stability and security of the region and to safeguard vital national interests, cannot have military capabilities which in no way match those of the potential adversaries. Equally, an antiquated and potentially dysfunctional decision-making and operational system in the defence apparatus is anathema to the successful conduct of defence and foreign policy. India’s ability to meet future security challenges is highly suspect and this state of affairs cannot prevail any longer without seriously jeopardising national security.

There is, therefore, the requirement of evolving a comprehensive and long term national security policy taking into account the current and future security concerns and synergising these with foreign policy. Thereafter, we must work assiduously to develop military capabilities backed by diplomatic thrusts to meet the security challenges of the future and be in a position to exercise influence in our immediate neighbourhood. We need to double our efforts to enhance our economic strength and create compatible defence capabilities.
The writer is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
The Tribune- Decoding the Dragon

Lt Gen Nathu Singh's Appreciation of Land Forces for Defence of India in 1948

From: vinay singh
Sent: 14 September 2010 09:58
Subject: GEN NATHU SINGH
Dear Brigadier Kamboj,
Thank you for posting Sarojini Naidu’s letter to Nathu Singh. Here is something else on the same lines, which is as relevant today as it was then. In January 1948, soon after taking over as GOC UP Area in Lucknow, Gen Nathu Singh wrote an Appreciation on the Defence of India, and forwarded it to Army HQ. He was greatly perturbed by a directive issued from the office of the C-in-C, which sought to reduce the size of the Regular Army to 150,000 - during World War II, it had risen to 2.5 million - with an annual budget allocation of 45 crore rupees for the next three years.

In the preamble, he wrote:
"We as soldiers must approach our leaders and submit our minimum requirements and make it clear that if funds are not provided for such a force, the responsibility will be upon them. A soldier is but a servant of the State. He must however, point out any weaknesses in the defensive structure of the country with all the emphasis at his command. In order to arrive at a correct appreciation, we must consider both military and allied factors and not be swayed by any notions of idealism or allow political considerations to affect our judgment...
A NEWLY CREATED NATION WHICH HAS ONLY JUST THROWN OFF HER BONDAGE OF FOREIGN RULE OF 200 YEARS AND MORE CANNOT RISK A REVERSE ALMOST AT HER REBIRTH.
...We must NOT decide on the size of our Defence Service on what we can financially afford but on what we need in the form of a Modern Defence based on the following considerations:
(a) What is the strength and armament of present and potential enemies of India?
(b) What is the force required by India to meet this threat
(c) What will be the cost of maintaining such a force?
(d) What is the maximum amount the country can afford to pay for its Defence Forces?
(e) To arrive at a compromise between (b), (c) and (do above, consistent with the safety of our land.
Keeping the above in view, the Land Forces which India should maintain are given in the enclosed appreciation. They are only my first thoughts."

Nathu Singh proceeded to list out the frame work of the Indian Army, for the future. By present standards, he was extremely conservative - he asked for one corps headquarters, one armoured division, two infantry divisions, one parachute brigade, one armoured brigade, and the associated complement of Artillery, Engineers and Signals. The number of infantry battalions was only 28. However, he advocated a large complement of territorial army, which would provide the second line of defence, and boost the resources of the regular army, during war.
In April 1948, Nathu Singh was promoted to the rank of Lt Gen and appointed GOC-in-C Eastern Command, at Ranchi. He continued his efforts to convince the political and military leadership of the necessity of maintaining a strong Army. When asked for a run-down of the Army, he wrote to Army HQ on 24 October 1950:
"...The situation facing the country from the military point of view is today virtually the same if not worse because, although Pakistan outwardly appears to be fraternising with our country, recent speeches of their leaders leave no room for doubt that they are preparing for a show-down with our country over the KASHMIR issue.
...Communist China's complete success over the KUOMINTANG and the establishment of the Peoples' Government, their recent activities, their declared policy towards liberation of Tibet, and the recent Mission from the latter country clearly indicate the writing on the wall. The Communist menace is gradually spreading towards the very borders of India.
...To ensure the security of our borders and our State, the Defence service ratio between INDIA and PAKISTAN should be two to one . If this is reduced, we will be laying our country open to an ever present danger of a major war."

Nathu Singh's remarks, especially with reference to Pakistan and China, display an insight of international affairs which very few Indians had, at that time. Even Nehru, who orchestrated India's foreign policy for almost two decades following Independence, failed to grasp the nuances which Nathu Singh had perceived. As a result, the Defence Forces were neglected, with disastrous results in 1962. An intimate knowledge of military affairs is important for those who decide the fate of peoples, and nations. Among his contemporaries, such as Churchill, Stalin, Chiang Kai Shek, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Tito, and Nasser, Nehru was one of the few who had never worn an uniform.

This applies even to our present day political masters. Not one of our Prime Ministers or Defence Ministers, from 1947 till now, has ever worn an uniform.
Maj Gen VK Singh

Chinese smart diplomatic tantrums raises India's emotional decibel level

By TJS George, 05/09/2010
Options we have; have we the will?
Another war with India is unlikely to be on China's agenda. But menacing military build-up and other needling tactics to divert India's energies and attention is central to its agenda. It’s an old ploy. But the level of aggressiveness is new.
India's politicians, the TV channels in particular, have a way of reacting to such unfriendly actions in an emotional, high-decibel style. Which is reminiscent of the Nehru-era cries like "we won't let them get one inch of Indian territory". If anything, such declamatory posturings only reduce our own ability to work out counter-strategies in a cool and calculating manner.

Actually, we should learn from the Chinese how to be calculating. With a hundred-year perspective, they planned the strategic encirclement of India, with bases in Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan - even as we steadily lost our influence in neighbouring countries.

With the same long-term view of history, they built up their road and rail networks in the Tibetan territory previously considered inhospitable to such transportation facilities. Recently they successfully tested their strategic airlift capability, an area where they have advanced very far with 450 high-capacity military cargo planes.

India is famous for dithering when it comes to military acquisition. Unseen middlemen still controlling the bulk of the transactions is only half the problem. The other half is our insistence of all kinds of special provisions, from incorporating systems still on the drawing board to establishing joint venture facilities. The result is that in all three wings of the defence forces, our strike capacity is well below the required level.
Options we have; have we the will? click here to read more
Related Reading
The writer is a former Director General, Defence Planning Staff
South Asian security: India faces a major challenge by Air Marshal R.S.Bedi (retd)

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's appreciation of dangers from China

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 November 1950 not only deploring Indian Ambassador KM Panikkar's action but also warning about dangers from China.
My dear Jawaharlal,
....
It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.

A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.

An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.

An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new threat.

A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.

The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.

The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.

Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.

Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.

The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.

The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.

These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention.

I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.
Vallabhbhai Patel,
7th November 1950
To read the full appreciation contained in the letter click link in red:
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's letter to Jawaharlal Nehru wriiten 60 years ago is more relevant today

Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report of 1962 Indo China debacle
The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, also referred to as the Henderson Brooks report, is the report of an analysis (Operations Review) of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Its authors are officers of the Indian armed forces. They are Lieutenant-General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P S Bhagat, commandant of the Indian Military Academy at the time.

The report continues to be classified by the Indian Government, as of October 2006. In April 2010, India's Defence Minister A.K. Antony told Parliament that the report could not be declassified because its contents “are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value."

The report is said to be openly critical of the Indian political and military structure of the time, as well as of the execution of operations.

Author Neville Maxwell has published what he claims are summaries of the report. While this has not been verified by comparisons with the (still classified) text, it has been accepted as a reasonable summary by the Indian media. Another extract of Indo-China war makes interesting reading.

As of Feb 2008, MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar has requested the report to be declassified in the National Security interest, This has been declined by the defense Minster A K Antony. He has quoted that the same would not be released "considering the sensitivity of information contained in the report and its security implications"

Chinese Satellites: Close encounters

For two years, the Chinese science satellite SJ-06F flew solo orbits around the Earth (or, as solo as a machine could be in the expanding haze of space junk in orbit). But now it has a partner: Last month China executed the delicate maneuver of aligning another satellite launched this year, SJ-12, with its older counterpart.
Only the United States had executed such a satellite rendezvous before this, and it shows off China’s advancement in satellite sophistication. Three years ago the country blew one of its satellites to smithereens in a practice test—a test that created thousands of additional chunks of debris in orbit. The satellite meet-up is a more elegant trick, and one whose implications could be sinister or benign. Let’s explore both possibilities.
Don’t Worry
China’s game of catch-up, which has its space program closing in on America’s abilities in orbit, strikes fear into the hearts of some politicos. But malfeasance need not be the aim of the satellite maneuver.
OK, Worry
Whether or not China is pursuing space warfare in this instance, the country is certainly trying to measure up to whatever the United States can do.
“The Chinese would be absolutely incompetent to not be trying to reduce U.S advantage in space,” James Oberg, a former NASA space engineer specializing in orbital rendezvous, tells Danger Room. “No potential adversary in their right mind would give us permanent advantage in space operations.” [Wired.com]
China might not need rendezvous capability to tinker with another country’s satellites, but it would need that capability to spy on them—taking an up-close look at the competitor’s product. There may be no way to gauge true intentions. According to Oberg, the satellite meet-up occurred in an orbit almost exclusively devoted to earth observation — spy and weather satellites, for example — where “a potential adversary would be most interested in rendezvousing. On the other hand, it’s also where a satellite might need refueling,” he adds. “It’s like you could be changing a screwdriver for a hammer, or you could be turning a peaceful ‘bot into a killer one.”
Close Encounters of the Worrisome Kind? Chinese Satellites Meet in Space