From sea to shining sea Arun Prakash
Tue May 18 2010,
Jawaharlal Nehru’s gallant endeavour to establish a pan-Asian identity through the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 proved futile for a number of reasons, of which prime was the firm resolve of Mao Tse Tung to arrogate for China the mantle of Asian leadership. In the six decades since then, India has persevered with other initiatives to create South Asian and Indian Ocean Region (IOR) identities. Unfortunately these initiatives have languished. The Indian Navy (IN) has always fancied itself as a trail blazer in the limited context of maritime diplomacy.
Read more: From sea to shining sea by Arun Prakash former Chief of the Naval Staff, is currently Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation
The larger issue behind Ramesh's outburst in China
May 17, 2010
The case of Jairam Ramesh is particularly curious. He challenged his government's policy on a foreign soil, in essence suggesting that its is the Chinese government that is right when it underscores time and again that India, not China, is responsible for the recent downward spiral in Sino-Indian ties. What a remarkable achievement for a government minister that he ends up giving ammunition to an adversary that has left no stone unturned in challenging India's rise at every possible forum.
Read the full article: The larger issue behind Ramesh's outburst in China by Harsh V Pant
India’s military diplomacy in the Gulf: The importance of Oman by C Raja Mohan
Mon May 17 2010, 15:29 hrs, New Delhi
As Defence Minister A K Antony arrives in Muscat on Monday to review and reinforce the bilateral security partnership, he will hopefully measure up to the challenge of intensifying India’s military engagement in the Gulf. At a time when most major powers - including the older European ones and the new one from China - are deepening their military cooperation with the Gulf, India’s security partnerships in the region remain way below potential.
Read more: India’s military diplomacy in the Gulf: The importance of Oman by C Raja Mohan
Treating China Differently
Since India and China will continue to be potential adversaries so long as the border dispute is not settled, the argument that we should treat the Chinese companies in the same way we treat the Western companies does not hold good.
Read the full article: Treating China Differently by B Raman
1950 Treaty: A Visionary Approach
Guest Column by Hari Bansh Jha- 17 May 2010
In Nepal, there are certain groups of people who hold 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed between Nepal and India on 31st July 1950 as a great asset to Nepal; while others take it as liability. However, the dilemma is that those who take it as an asset have not been able to speak so strongly as to how much the nation benefits from the Treaty. Those who oppose it have also miserably failed to bring out its alternative. And the common mass of the Nepalese population who continue to benefit from the Treaty provisions through its social, cultural, political and economic arrangements are simply the silent spectators.
1950 Treaty: A Visionary Approach by Guest Column by Hari Bansh Jha
Argumentative Chinese step forward
By Sreeram Chaulia
May 18, 2010
BEIJING - This year marks the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and India, a momentous occasion that invites reflection on where the two Asian giants are heading in the much-touted "Asian century".
Awareness that this bilateral relationship is critical to the current world order is rising in both countries as they try to position themselves as drivers and pivots of global economic and security structures.
Read full article: Argumentative Chinese step forward By Sreeram Chaulia
Kashmir and the tale of two Faisals
Col (Dr) Anil Athale | 2010-05-18 15:11:30
Breaking news specialists have brought the Indo-Pak peace process back again. This peace process has been frozen and thawed so many times, that an automatic defrost model is called for. The American decision to ‘reward’ Pakistan with weapons to ‘defend’ itself against India is also a repeat of history. Pakistan thereby hopes to counter the threat of an Indian retaliation to a terrorist attack. In Afghanistan the Americans seem to have come to a conclusion that if you can’t beat them, then join them. Even given the dismal US record in South Asia, this seems the acme of short term thinking. The notion that by directing the jihadi’s towards India, the US will be safe had big hole blown into it with the failed car bombing in Times Square.
Read more: Kashmir and the tale of two Faisals by Col (Dr) Anil Athale
Showing posts with label Maritime. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Maritime. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Thursday, April 15, 2010
The Curse Of The Gorshkov and now a honey trap to turn the tide
The Curse Of The Gorshkov
November 17, 2008: Russia is risking its reputation as a reliable source of weapons, and related services, over a botched deal to refurbish an old Russian aircraft carrier (the Admiral Gorshkov) for the Indian Navy. The latest twist in this four year old saga has Russia threatening to give the Gorshkov back to the Russian Navy if the Indians don't, again, come up with more money. All this is a sad tale of bungling, corruption, greed and lost blueprints. Work on the Gorshkov is about half completed. The 44,000 ton Gorshkov, was supposed to be delivered this year, and renamed the INS Vikramaditya. But now delivery has been delayed until 2012. The Russians admitted that this project suffered from inept planning, shoddy workmanship, and poor management.
The original price for the refurbishment of the of the Gorshkov was $1.5 billion. Building a Gorshkov type carrier today would cost about $4 billion, and take eight years. Last year, the Russians admitted there were problems, and demanded another half billion dollars to make it all right. India went along with that. But this year the Russians raised the price again, and now want $3.5 billion for the job, and an additional four years. The Indians refuse to pay, and the Russians are playing hardball with one of their biggest arms export customers.
Given that India currently has $10 billion worth of Russian military items on order, and has been Russia's biggest, and most profitable customer for military equipment for decades, the Gorshkov is looking to be an error of gigantic proportions. The boss of Sevmash naval shipyard, when the Gorshkov deal was negotiated, has been fired and is under criminal investigation, on suspicion of financial mismanagement. Naturally, the Indians were not happy, and at first insisted that the Russian government (which owns many of the entities involved) make good on the original deal. India sent its own team of technical experts to Russia, and their report apparently confirmed what the Russians reported, about shipyard officials low-balling the cost of the work needed. This is a common tactic for firms building weapons for their own country. It gets more complicated when you try to pull that sort of thing on a foreign customer. The Russian government initially offered to cover some of the overrun cost. But now they insist that India cover all the costs, or lose the ship entirely. There's no word on whether or not the Indians would get any of their money refunded.
The Admiral Gorshkov entered service in 1987, but was inactivated in 1996 (too expensive to operate on a post Cold War budget). India is building another carrier, from scratch, but that 37,000 ton vessel won't be ready until 2015. India's sole aircraft carrier, the 29,000 ton INS Viraat, is currently spending 16 months in a shipyard getting maintenance and upgrades, leaving India with no carrier capability. This was to have been avoided by the timely arrival (this year) of the refurbished Russian carrier. If that had happened, the INS Viraat would have been retired in 2012, after 53 years service (for Britain and India). But now the INS Viraat will get its engine and hull refurbished, and its electronics upgraded, and possibly serve for another decade.
Unless the Russians suddenly backtrack and offer to eat the overruns, this is not going to end well for anyone involved. Indian officials believe that they can persuade the Russians to make a deal that will be more acceptable.
The Curse Of The Gorshkov
Photos from Russia
Honey Trap of Commodore S Singh
November 17, 2008: Russia is risking its reputation as a reliable source of weapons, and related services, over a botched deal to refurbish an old Russian aircraft carrier (the Admiral Gorshkov) for the Indian Navy. The latest twist in this four year old saga has Russia threatening to give the Gorshkov back to the Russian Navy if the Indians don't, again, come up with more money. All this is a sad tale of bungling, corruption, greed and lost blueprints. Work on the Gorshkov is about half completed. The 44,000 ton Gorshkov, was supposed to be delivered this year, and renamed the INS Vikramaditya. But now delivery has been delayed until 2012. The Russians admitted that this project suffered from inept planning, shoddy workmanship, and poor management.
The original price for the refurbishment of the of the Gorshkov was $1.5 billion. Building a Gorshkov type carrier today would cost about $4 billion, and take eight years. Last year, the Russians admitted there were problems, and demanded another half billion dollars to make it all right. India went along with that. But this year the Russians raised the price again, and now want $3.5 billion for the job, and an additional four years. The Indians refuse to pay, and the Russians are playing hardball with one of their biggest arms export customers.
Given that India currently has $10 billion worth of Russian military items on order, and has been Russia's biggest, and most profitable customer for military equipment for decades, the Gorshkov is looking to be an error of gigantic proportions. The boss of Sevmash naval shipyard, when the Gorshkov deal was negotiated, has been fired and is under criminal investigation, on suspicion of financial mismanagement. Naturally, the Indians were not happy, and at first insisted that the Russian government (which owns many of the entities involved) make good on the original deal. India sent its own team of technical experts to Russia, and their report apparently confirmed what the Russians reported, about shipyard officials low-balling the cost of the work needed. This is a common tactic for firms building weapons for their own country. It gets more complicated when you try to pull that sort of thing on a foreign customer. The Russian government initially offered to cover some of the overrun cost. But now they insist that India cover all the costs, or lose the ship entirely. There's no word on whether or not the Indians would get any of their money refunded.
The Admiral Gorshkov entered service in 1987, but was inactivated in 1996 (too expensive to operate on a post Cold War budget). India is building another carrier, from scratch, but that 37,000 ton vessel won't be ready until 2015. India's sole aircraft carrier, the 29,000 ton INS Viraat, is currently spending 16 months in a shipyard getting maintenance and upgrades, leaving India with no carrier capability. This was to have been avoided by the timely arrival (this year) of the refurbished Russian carrier. If that had happened, the INS Viraat would have been retired in 2012, after 53 years service (for Britain and India). But now the INS Viraat will get its engine and hull refurbished, and its electronics upgraded, and possibly serve for another decade.
Unless the Russians suddenly backtrack and offer to eat the overruns, this is not going to end well for anyone involved. Indian officials believe that they can persuade the Russians to make a deal that will be more acceptable.
The Curse Of The Gorshkov
Photos from Russia
Honey Trap of Commodore S Singh
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Indian armed forces release joint warfare doctrines
New Delhi, Feb 9 : The Indian armed forces, in a major step towards synergising their fighting capabilities, Tuesday released three joint doctrines -- on sub-conventional operations, electronic warfare and maritime air operations -- that also redefine the battlefield of the future as battle space.
"The joint doctrines collectively aver that it may be more appropriate to call the battlefield of the future as battle space, since wars would be fought not only in air, on land and sea but also in cyberspace, on electronic fronts, along information highways and media fronts," a defence ministry statement said.
"Success in such a battle space depends on joint teamwork by maritime, ground and air forces operating effectively, individually and together in support of shared military objectives," it added.
"Considering the prevailing security environment in the country and its neighbourhood, it is mandatory to ensure that the thrust of all agencies involved in combating terrorism is focussed towards the common enemy and the synergised endeavour produces best results.
"Taking the lead from the operational imperatives, these doctrines would fundamentally shape the way armed forces plan, think and train for military operations," statement said, adding: "The Indian armed forces are one of the few militaries in the world which have joint operational doctrines for optimising their capabilities."
The doctrines were released by Indian Army chief General Deepak Kapoor, who is also the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee. Indian Navy chief Admiral Nirmal Verma and Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik were also present on the occasion. --IANS
India armed forces release joint warfare doctrines
"The joint doctrines collectively aver that it may be more appropriate to call the battlefield of the future as battle space, since wars would be fought not only in air, on land and sea but also in cyberspace, on electronic fronts, along information highways and media fronts," a defence ministry statement said.
"Success in such a battle space depends on joint teamwork by maritime, ground and air forces operating effectively, individually and together in support of shared military objectives," it added.
"Considering the prevailing security environment in the country and its neighbourhood, it is mandatory to ensure that the thrust of all agencies involved in combating terrorism is focussed towards the common enemy and the synergised endeavour produces best results.
"Taking the lead from the operational imperatives, these doctrines would fundamentally shape the way armed forces plan, think and train for military operations," statement said, adding: "The Indian armed forces are one of the few militaries in the world which have joint operational doctrines for optimising their capabilities."
The doctrines were released by Indian Army chief General Deepak Kapoor, who is also the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee. Indian Navy chief Admiral Nirmal Verma and Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik were also present on the occasion. --IANS
India armed forces release joint warfare doctrines
Labels:
Battle Space,
C4I2,
Cyber Warfare,
EW,
Maritime,
Military,
National Security,
War on Terror
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
National Security: India- Japan launch Defence Plan
India and Japan will launch a defence action plan to firm up their strategic partnership that includes jointly combating maritime piracy and give a push to negotiations over a key economic agreement that can multiply their bilateral trade manifold.
The two sides on Monday signed agreements to build eco-friendly cities along the Rs.3.6 lakh crore ($72 billion) Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor, setting the tone for talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterpart Yukio Hatoyama on Tuesday. Hatoyama began his three-day visit to India Sunday and arrived in the Indian capital for talks Monday afternoon.
However, a civil nuclear deal looks unlikely with a Japanese official Monday urging India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), opposed by New Delhi which regards it as "unfair and discriminatory."
The two leaders will discuss a host of bilateral, regional and global issues, including an ambitious plan to scale bilateral trade to $20 billion by 2010, the UN reforms, nuclear issues, and coordination over climate change negotiations in the aftermath of the Copenhagen accord.
Read the full account
India, Japan to launch defence action plan
The two sides on Monday signed agreements to build eco-friendly cities along the Rs.3.6 lakh crore ($72 billion) Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor, setting the tone for talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterpart Yukio Hatoyama on Tuesday. Hatoyama began his three-day visit to India Sunday and arrived in the Indian capital for talks Monday afternoon.
However, a civil nuclear deal looks unlikely with a Japanese official Monday urging India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), opposed by New Delhi which regards it as "unfair and discriminatory."
The two leaders will discuss a host of bilateral, regional and global issues, including an ambitious plan to scale bilateral trade to $20 billion by 2010, the UN reforms, nuclear issues, and coordination over climate change negotiations in the aftermath of the Copenhagen accord.
Read the full account
India, Japan to launch defence action plan
Tuesday, December 23, 2008
SCPC: The clear and present danger
The "blame-game" which has inevitably reared its ugly head in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks instantly reminded me of the fervent appeals of three successive Chiefs of R&AW to Naval HQ, in recent years, to loan them naval officers for analysis of maritime intelligence. They were seriously concerned that they did not have the necessary in-house expertise available to draw the right conclusions and inferences from the mass of information the agency collected from open, human and technical sources. And very correctly they approached the Navy.
Lack of maritime intelligence has also been the Navy's bane for years, so we understood the handicap R&AW worked under, fully shared their concern, and felt that it was the navy's duty to help. I recall (as the Chief of Personnel) having personally selected some officers for deputation to R&AW, but to my consternation, I learnt within a few months that most wanted to return to the navy. Before I go any further, let me just say that this piece is not about intelligence failure. It is about a failure on a larger scale which represents an equal degree of danger to the nation.
The naval officers deputed to R&AW did not wish to continue with their deputation (and I learnt that this was not a new phenomenon) because when they were assigned their desks in the Cabinet Secretariat they found to their dismay that they had been placed under officers who were many years their junior in terms of service. Having taken this stoically, they then found that they were deprived of things like telephones, stenographers and transport because the "status" assigned to them did not entitle them to these utilities.
The R&AW authorities were most sympathetic but pleaded that the they were not in a position to alter the equivalences, apparently "laid down" by a Kafkaesque Department of Personnel. Neither pay-scales nor years of service nor any logic seem to guide this fixation of relativities of Armed Forces officers with civilian counterparts. It was not that we had not experienced such discrimination earlier - the Service HQ have always been chary of sending their officers on deputation - but one felt that intelligence was an issue of national importance and certainly worth undergoing some inconvenience. But we found that naval officers would accept such assignments only with the utmost reluctance.
I have used this example, only because it is symptomatic of a larger malaise: the lack of coordination between organs of the Government of India (GoI) which has contributed to the recent Mumbai fiasco. This should not come as a surprise because the GoI seems so laissez faire in its approach that it will not intervene to eliminate inter-agency inequity even when it clearly results in crippling disfunctionality, as mentioned above. On the contrary, by its acts of omission as well as commission the GoI has been contributing to steady erosion of the locus standi of the Armed Forces in the national security matrix.
In a seemingly illogical and self-destructive continuum, the GoI has progressively and with great deliberation proceeded to marginalize, downgrade and degrade its own Armed Forces, thus undermining the security of the Indian State as surely as the nation's worst enemy. This is a process that has been underway since independence, and at the risk of sounding hyperbolic, I would venture to state that the proverbial last straw may have been added by the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC).
Today, there is a distinct impression that the CPC has erred grievously on many issues relating to the Armed Forces because they were not represented in the commission, and its recommendations have spread confusion and consternation. One of the most serious consequences (whether intended or not) is the sudden and arbitrary alteration of relativities between the Armed Forces and their civilian counterparts, to the detriment of the former. The resulting change in relationships between the Armed Forces and para-militaries has grave operational implications which do not seem to have been understood at all at the political level.
The ex-Servicemen (ESM) are completely stunned to see the number of anomalies thrown up by the CPC. This confusion has been further compounded by different interpretations being put out in successive letters by the Controller of Defence Accounts. To take just one example: no one understands by what logic a Lieutenant-General, Major-General and Brigadier are going to be paid exactly the same pension, and a Colonel (with half the service) will receive just one hundred rupees less.
The GoI has yet again rejected the "one rank on pension" demand, but not even a feeble attempt has been made to bridge the yawning gap between today's and yesterday's pensioners of the same rank. There is also a distinct impression that the CPC recommendations have been fiddled with, and even changed by the bureaucracy, without due authorization at the political level. Such is the level of discontent and strength of feelings that one hears of planned hunger strikes by ESM; something that would have earlier been unthinkable in the Armed Forces ethos.
The most logical way to avoid this confusion and the resultant sense of grievance in the armed forces and the ESM would have been to place a Service representative, if not in the CPC, then in the Review Committee. Either the committee would have convinced this representative of the appropriateness of the issues or the other way round; thus avoiding controversy, speculation and unhappiness. A few retired Service Chiefs (including this writer) had written to the PM to accord this concession but the appeal remained unanswered.
What people have either not understood, or are imprudently ignoring, is the fact that the CPC recommendations (and subsequent developments) are causing deep resentment, because they strike, not at the monetary status of the Services and the ESM, but at their standing relative to the other services. The Armed Forces just cannot understand (nor has anyone explained to them) why it was necessary to cut them down, yet again, a few notches relative to the police or the civil services at this particular junction. This severe blow to their "izzat" appears illogical and incomprehensible.
If there is indeed a sound rationale for the down-gradation of the Armed Forces, the Government must share it with them, and with the nation. Most importantly, the impression that this is the result of machinations of the bureaucracy, must be dispelled, if untrue; and it must be made amply clear that this decision emanates from the GoI.
Spreading unhappiness and confusion amongst the nation's Armed Forces or demoralizing them, and the 2-3 million strong ESM community does not serve anyone's interest. Should someone in authority not sit up and take notice?
Adm Arun Prakash (Retd)
Lack of maritime intelligence has also been the Navy's bane for years, so we understood the handicap R&AW worked under, fully shared their concern, and felt that it was the navy's duty to help. I recall (as the Chief of Personnel) having personally selected some officers for deputation to R&AW, but to my consternation, I learnt within a few months that most wanted to return to the navy. Before I go any further, let me just say that this piece is not about intelligence failure. It is about a failure on a larger scale which represents an equal degree of danger to the nation.
The naval officers deputed to R&AW did not wish to continue with their deputation (and I learnt that this was not a new phenomenon) because when they were assigned their desks in the Cabinet Secretariat they found to their dismay that they had been placed under officers who were many years their junior in terms of service. Having taken this stoically, they then found that they were deprived of things like telephones, stenographers and transport because the "status" assigned to them did not entitle them to these utilities.
The R&AW authorities were most sympathetic but pleaded that the they were not in a position to alter the equivalences, apparently "laid down" by a Kafkaesque Department of Personnel. Neither pay-scales nor years of service nor any logic seem to guide this fixation of relativities of Armed Forces officers with civilian counterparts. It was not that we had not experienced such discrimination earlier - the Service HQ have always been chary of sending their officers on deputation - but one felt that intelligence was an issue of national importance and certainly worth undergoing some inconvenience. But we found that naval officers would accept such assignments only with the utmost reluctance.
I have used this example, only because it is symptomatic of a larger malaise: the lack of coordination between organs of the Government of India (GoI) which has contributed to the recent Mumbai fiasco. This should not come as a surprise because the GoI seems so laissez faire in its approach that it will not intervene to eliminate inter-agency inequity even when it clearly results in crippling disfunctionality, as mentioned above. On the contrary, by its acts of omission as well as commission the GoI has been contributing to steady erosion of the locus standi of the Armed Forces in the national security matrix.
In a seemingly illogical and self-destructive continuum, the GoI has progressively and with great deliberation proceeded to marginalize, downgrade and degrade its own Armed Forces, thus undermining the security of the Indian State as surely as the nation's worst enemy. This is a process that has been underway since independence, and at the risk of sounding hyperbolic, I would venture to state that the proverbial last straw may have been added by the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC).
Today, there is a distinct impression that the CPC has erred grievously on many issues relating to the Armed Forces because they were not represented in the commission, and its recommendations have spread confusion and consternation. One of the most serious consequences (whether intended or not) is the sudden and arbitrary alteration of relativities between the Armed Forces and their civilian counterparts, to the detriment of the former. The resulting change in relationships between the Armed Forces and para-militaries has grave operational implications which do not seem to have been understood at all at the political level.
The ex-Servicemen (ESM) are completely stunned to see the number of anomalies thrown up by the CPC. This confusion has been further compounded by different interpretations being put out in successive letters by the Controller of Defence Accounts. To take just one example: no one understands by what logic a Lieutenant-General, Major-General and Brigadier are going to be paid exactly the same pension, and a Colonel (with half the service) will receive just one hundred rupees less.
The GoI has yet again rejected the "one rank on pension" demand, but not even a feeble attempt has been made to bridge the yawning gap between today's and yesterday's pensioners of the same rank. There is also a distinct impression that the CPC recommendations have been fiddled with, and even changed by the bureaucracy, without due authorization at the political level. Such is the level of discontent and strength of feelings that one hears of planned hunger strikes by ESM; something that would have earlier been unthinkable in the Armed Forces ethos.
The most logical way to avoid this confusion and the resultant sense of grievance in the armed forces and the ESM would have been to place a Service representative, if not in the CPC, then in the Review Committee. Either the committee would have convinced this representative of the appropriateness of the issues or the other way round; thus avoiding controversy, speculation and unhappiness. A few retired Service Chiefs (including this writer) had written to the PM to accord this concession but the appeal remained unanswered.
What people have either not understood, or are imprudently ignoring, is the fact that the CPC recommendations (and subsequent developments) are causing deep resentment, because they strike, not at the monetary status of the Services and the ESM, but at their standing relative to the other services. The Armed Forces just cannot understand (nor has anyone explained to them) why it was necessary to cut them down, yet again, a few notches relative to the police or the civil services at this particular junction. This severe blow to their "izzat" appears illogical and incomprehensible.
If there is indeed a sound rationale for the down-gradation of the Armed Forces, the Government must share it with them, and with the nation. Most importantly, the impression that this is the result of machinations of the bureaucracy, must be dispelled, if untrue; and it must be made amply clear that this decision emanates from the GoI.
Spreading unhappiness and confusion amongst the nation's Armed Forces or demoralizing them, and the 2-3 million strong ESM community does not serve anyone's interest. Should someone in authority not sit up and take notice?
Adm Arun Prakash (Retd)
Thursday, December 4, 2008
Mumbai Attack & India’s vulnerable maritime flanks
Our response to the asymmetric war has remained disjointed, fragmented and disorganized for three reasons.
Firstly the netas have has emasculated the police forces and made the intelligence agencies ineffective by interference and politicization, so that they are unable to discharge their core functions.
Secondly, the national security establishment has encouraged turf distribution and creation of fiefdoms, and thereby deprived itself of the benefits of holistic thinking and synchronized action.
And lastly, in a system that must be unique world-wide, the Armed Forces are kept on the margins of national security management by a powerful bureaucracy, and rarely consulted or heard by politicians; even on issues in which they have exclusive expertise.
For years, the IN has been pleading with the GoI that there is a dire need to constitute a central Maritime Commission for regulation, coordination and oversight of maritime security. That this eminently sensible proposal is languishing due to bureaucratic obduracy is proof of our political myopia and lack of resolve. Let us look at how other nations handle similar situations.
New York was struck by terrorists on 11thSeptember 2001. By 1st October, a Homeland Defence Command had been established and placed under a 4-star military officer. The US Secretary of the Army stated: “…homeland security is the No. 1 job for the US military and we will act accordingly.” On 26th October, Public Law 107-56 was enacted by the US Congress without debate. The contrived acronym USA PATRIOT (standing for: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) explains the purport of the Act. With the sweeping powers available, the Homeland Defence Command has ensured that the USA has remained free of terrorism since 2001. Need one say more?
France, perceiving many serious threats from seawards, revived an old Napoleonic institution: the Prefet Maritime(Maritime Prefect) to implement security in a coherent and holistic manner. This functionary is the “…servant of the French State who exercises authority over the sea in a Prefecture. He reports to the Prime Minister for civil functions and to the Chief of Defence Staff for military operations.” A 3-star Admiral each has been placed in charge of the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Channel coasts of France, and is empowered to coordinate the efficient functioning of agencies like the navy, coast guard, marine police, customs, immigration, pollution control, search & rescue etc. No bickering like we have in Mumbai; France can afford to sleep in peace.
India’s coastal, maritime and national security too, would be tremendously enhanced if the Commanders-in- Chief of the Western and Eastern Naval Commands were to be similarly empowered. But for that we will not only need to reach a higher level of security consciousness but also learn to repose faith, confidence and responsibility in the only national institution which continues to function with dedication, efficiency and intense patriotism: the Indian Armed Forces.
Post-script.
Every newspaper and TV channel is, today, reflecting how drastically the stock of the politician has fallen with the common man. If India’s polity wants to redeem itself in the public eye, there is only one thing for them to do: convene an emergency session of both Houses of Parliament, and, sinking their petty differences, show the people that they have the nation’s vital interests at heart by enacting (or starting the process for) legislation for:
A Homeland Defence Organization, be it a civil ministry, a military command or a combination of the two.
Empowerment of the this organization with wide-ranging authority to, inter alia, gain access to telephones, e-mails, bank accounts of individuals suspected of posing a threat to our homeland, and to monitor their movements, search and detain them if necessary.
Adm Arun Prakash (Retd)
Read the full article: Mumbai attacks India's vulnerable maritime flanks
Firstly the netas have has emasculated the police forces and made the intelligence agencies ineffective by interference and politicization, so that they are unable to discharge their core functions.
Secondly, the national security establishment has encouraged turf distribution and creation of fiefdoms, and thereby deprived itself of the benefits of holistic thinking and synchronized action.
And lastly, in a system that must be unique world-wide, the Armed Forces are kept on the margins of national security management by a powerful bureaucracy, and rarely consulted or heard by politicians; even on issues in which they have exclusive expertise.
For years, the IN has been pleading with the GoI that there is a dire need to constitute a central Maritime Commission for regulation, coordination and oversight of maritime security. That this eminently sensible proposal is languishing due to bureaucratic obduracy is proof of our political myopia and lack of resolve. Let us look at how other nations handle similar situations.
New York was struck by terrorists on 11thSeptember 2001. By 1st October, a Homeland Defence Command had been established and placed under a 4-star military officer. The US Secretary of the Army stated: “…homeland security is the No. 1 job for the US military and we will act accordingly.” On 26th October, Public Law 107-56 was enacted by the US Congress without debate. The contrived acronym USA PATRIOT (standing for: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) explains the purport of the Act. With the sweeping powers available, the Homeland Defence Command has ensured that the USA has remained free of terrorism since 2001. Need one say more?
France, perceiving many serious threats from seawards, revived an old Napoleonic institution: the Prefet Maritime(Maritime Prefect) to implement security in a coherent and holistic manner. This functionary is the “…servant of the French State who exercises authority over the sea in a Prefecture. He reports to the Prime Minister for civil functions and to the Chief of Defence Staff for military operations.” A 3-star Admiral each has been placed in charge of the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Channel coasts of France, and is empowered to coordinate the efficient functioning of agencies like the navy, coast guard, marine police, customs, immigration, pollution control, search & rescue etc. No bickering like we have in Mumbai; France can afford to sleep in peace.
India’s coastal, maritime and national security too, would be tremendously enhanced if the Commanders-in- Chief of the Western and Eastern Naval Commands were to be similarly empowered. But for that we will not only need to reach a higher level of security consciousness but also learn to repose faith, confidence and responsibility in the only national institution which continues to function with dedication, efficiency and intense patriotism: the Indian Armed Forces.
Post-script.
Every newspaper and TV channel is, today, reflecting how drastically the stock of the politician has fallen with the common man. If India’s polity wants to redeem itself in the public eye, there is only one thing for them to do: convene an emergency session of both Houses of Parliament, and, sinking their petty differences, show the people that they have the nation’s vital interests at heart by enacting (or starting the process for) legislation for:
Adm Arun Prakash (Retd)
Read the full article: Mumbai attacks India's vulnerable maritime flanks
Friday, November 28, 2008
Mumbai was a sitting duck
Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh, who retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, had sounded an eerily prescient warning in an article in this newspaper over six months ago. On May 19, 2008, he wrote that the next major terror attack might come from the sea.
On the evening of November 26 I was on a TV panel, explaining how the Indian Navy had taken the correct action on November 18, 2008 by sinking a pirate ship in the Gulf of Aden. This act marked a refreshing departure from our timid national response to the war on terror. A few hours later I watched the TV in horror and disbelief as news unfolded about the terror strike in Mumbai. It was being reported that the two dozen odd terrorists had come by a mother ship from Karachi, disembarked on Mumbai harbour and arrived at the Sassoon Docks, in high-speed rubber inflatables, with their automatic weapons and heavy bags of ammunition and grenades.
The terrorists obviously had fifth columnists’ help since they went to their 11 targets with pinpoint accuracy and caused mayhem, which flashed across TV screens around the globe. My horror changed to anger and then disgust at the sheer inaptitude of our national leadership to protect our citizens from terrorist attacks. I remember writing an article in The Asian Age of May 19, 2008, where I said: "The next terror attack could be from the sea". I also remember writing another half-a-dozen articles about the urgent need for institutional and legislative reforms, along with accountability, given the experience of how ruthlessly other nations have dealt with terrorists and protected their citizens.
Of course, our politicians and bureaucrats, in their ignorance and arrogance, would have the people believe that "India is unique and we have nothing to learn from others... Besides, our people have resilience".
The customary noises about "bringing the culprits to book" are already being made, while young Army, Navy and police commandoes are again shedding blood to ferret out these terrorists. A few TV debates will take place with a few ignorant participants and the politicians will soon get back to their "election mode," unmindful of the terrible beating India’s reputation has taken by this act. Hopefully, the sacrifices of our young soldiers and sailors during this attack will not be communalised in the way the Batla House shootout in Delhi was, despite police inspector Sharma sacrificing his life at the altar of national security.
At the time of writing this article the Navy had launched a search by ships and aircraft and captured the terrorist mother ship the MV ALFA. which had brought these killers from Karachi to Mumbai. I sincerely hope and pray that the Indian Navy again replicates its ruthless action of sinking a pirate mother ship. This will be the best tribute to the numerous innocent lives lost and will send a signal to our politicians, bureaucrats and citizens that India’s military will act ruthlessly against terrorists.
What needs to be done to prevent a repeat of such attacks? The answers are simple:
Single-window approach to deal with terrorism, modelled on the US’ department of homeland security
Anti-terror legislation with dedicated fast-track "anti-terror courts"
Legislation permitting the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard to stop and search suspected merchant ships before they enter the Indian harbour
Double the strength of the Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Police and intelligence agencies
The ridiculous policy of making an unequipped Port Authorities responsible for port security must be discontinued. Security of all the 13 major ports must be handed over to the Navy and security of the 36 minor ports be handed over to the Coast Guard.
A single-window National Maritime Advisor be created, headed by a professional Naval or Coast Guard officer, and not a bureaucrat. Set up a national electronic anti-terrorist data link and data bank, based on the American system. Co-operation with other maritime nations who face the same threats of terrorism and piracy. This is a war on terror against a faceless and fanatic enemy. This war is not for the faint hearted, and can only be won by ruthless action.
Mumbai was a sitting duck: Asian Age
Mumbai was a sitting duck: Deccan Chronicle
On the evening of November 26 I was on a TV panel, explaining how the Indian Navy had taken the correct action on November 18, 2008 by sinking a pirate ship in the Gulf of Aden. This act marked a refreshing departure from our timid national response to the war on terror. A few hours later I watched the TV in horror and disbelief as news unfolded about the terror strike in Mumbai. It was being reported that the two dozen odd terrorists had come by a mother ship from Karachi, disembarked on Mumbai harbour and arrived at the Sassoon Docks, in high-speed rubber inflatables, with their automatic weapons and heavy bags of ammunition and grenades.
The terrorists obviously had fifth columnists’ help since they went to their 11 targets with pinpoint accuracy and caused mayhem, which flashed across TV screens around the globe. My horror changed to anger and then disgust at the sheer inaptitude of our national leadership to protect our citizens from terrorist attacks. I remember writing an article in The Asian Age of May 19, 2008, where I said: "The next terror attack could be from the sea". I also remember writing another half-a-dozen articles about the urgent need for institutional and legislative reforms, along with accountability, given the experience of how ruthlessly other nations have dealt with terrorists and protected their citizens.
Of course, our politicians and bureaucrats, in their ignorance and arrogance, would have the people believe that "India is unique and we have nothing to learn from others... Besides, our people have resilience".
The customary noises about "bringing the culprits to book" are already being made, while young Army, Navy and police commandoes are again shedding blood to ferret out these terrorists. A few TV debates will take place with a few ignorant participants and the politicians will soon get back to their "election mode," unmindful of the terrible beating India’s reputation has taken by this act. Hopefully, the sacrifices of our young soldiers and sailors during this attack will not be communalised in the way the Batla House shootout in Delhi was, despite police inspector Sharma sacrificing his life at the altar of national security.
At the time of writing this article the Navy had launched a search by ships and aircraft and captured the terrorist mother ship the MV ALFA. which had brought these killers from Karachi to Mumbai. I sincerely hope and pray that the Indian Navy again replicates its ruthless action of sinking a pirate mother ship. This will be the best tribute to the numerous innocent lives lost and will send a signal to our politicians, bureaucrats and citizens that India’s military will act ruthlessly against terrorists.
What needs to be done to prevent a repeat of such attacks? The answers are simple:
The ridiculous policy of making an unequipped Port Authorities responsible for port security must be discontinued. Security of all the 13 major ports must be handed over to the Navy and security of the 36 minor ports be handed over to the Coast Guard.
A single-window National Maritime Advisor be created, headed by a professional Naval or Coast Guard officer, and not a bureaucrat. Set up a national electronic anti-terrorist data link and data bank, based on the American system. Co-operation with other maritime nations who face the same threats of terrorism and piracy. This is a war on terror against a faceless and fanatic enemy. This war is not for the faint hearted, and can only be won by ruthless action.
Mumbai was a sitting duck: Asian Age
Mumbai was a sitting duck: Deccan Chronicle
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Neither the "Report my Signal -Blogs" nor the individual authors of any material on these Blogs accept responsibility for any loss or damage caused (including through negligence), which anyone may directly or indirectly suffer arising out of use of or reliance on information contained in or accessed through these Blogs.
This is not an official Blog site. This forum is run by team of ex- Corps of Signals, Indian Army, Veterans for social networking of Indian Defence Veterans. It is not affiliated to or officially recognized by the MoD or the AHQ, Director General of Signals or Government/ State.
The Report My Signal Forum will endeavor to edit/ delete any material which is considered offensive, undesirable and or impinging on national security. The Blog Team is very conscious of potentially questionable content. However, where a content is posted and between posting and removal from the blog in such cases, the act does not reflect either the condoning or endorsing of said material by the Team.
Blog Moderator: Lt Col James Kanagaraj (Retd)