Mumbai Attack & India’s vulnerable maritime flanks

Our response to the asymmetric war has remained disjointed, fragmented and disorganized for three reasons.

Firstly the netas have has emasculated the police forces and made the intelligence agencies ineffective by interference and politicization, so that they are unable to discharge their core functions.

Secondly, the national security establishment has encouraged turf distribution and creation of fiefdoms, and thereby deprived itself of the benefits of holistic thinking and synchronized action.

And lastly, in a system that must be unique world-wide, the Armed Forces are kept on the margins of national security management by a powerful bureaucracy, and rarely consulted or heard by politicians; even on issues in which they have exclusive expertise.

For years, the IN has been pleading with the GoI that there is a dire need to constitute a central Maritime Commission for regulation, coordination and oversight of maritime security. That this eminently sensible proposal is languishing due to bureaucratic obduracy is proof of our political myopia and lack of resolve. Let us look at how other nations handle similar situations.

New York was struck by terrorists on 11thSeptember 2001. By 1st October, a Homeland Defence Command had been established and placed under a 4-star military officer. The US Secretary of the Army stated: “…homeland security is the No. 1 job for the US military and we will act accordingly.” On 26th October, Public Law 107-56 was enacted by the US Congress without debate. The contrived acronym USA PATRIOT (standing for: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) explains the purport of the Act. With the sweeping powers available, the Homeland Defence Command has ensured that the USA has remained free of terrorism since 2001. Need one say more?

France, perceiving many serious threats from seawards, revived an old Napoleonic institution: the Prefet Maritime(Maritime Prefect) to implement security in a coherent and holistic manner. This functionary is the “…servant of the French State who exercises authority over the sea in a Prefecture. He reports to the Prime Minister for civil functions and to the Chief of Defence Staff for military operations.” A 3-star Admiral each has been placed in charge of the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Channel coasts of France, and is empowered to coordinate the efficient functioning of agencies like the navy, coast guard, marine police, customs, immigration, pollution control, search & rescue etc. No bickering like we have in Mumbai; France can afford to sleep in peace.

India’s coastal, maritime and national security too, would be tremendously enhanced if the Commanders-in- Chief of the Western and Eastern Naval Commands were to be similarly empowered. But for that we will not only need to reach a higher level of security consciousness but also learn to repose faith, confidence and responsibility in the only national institution which continues to function with dedication, efficiency and intense patriotism: the Indian Armed Forces.

Post-script.
Every newspaper and TV channel is, today, reflecting how drastically the stock of the politician has fallen with the common man. If India’s polity wants to redeem itself in the public eye, there is only one thing for them to do: convene an emergency session of both Houses of Parliament, and, sinking their petty differences, show the people that they have the nation’s vital interests at heart by enacting (or starting the process for) legislation for:

A Homeland Defence Organization, be it a civil ministry, a military command or a combination of the two.

Empowerment of the this organization with wide-ranging authority to, inter alia, gain access to telephones, e-mails, bank accounts of individuals suspected of posing a threat to our homeland, and to monitor their movements, search and detain them if necessary.

Adm Arun Prakash (Retd)
Read the full article: Mumbai attacks India's vulnerable maritime flanks

Operational Metamorphosis: Mumbai, ISI, LeT and al-Qaeda

To understand how the Mumbai attack seems to have been an original small-scale ISI plan for Kashmir which was then ‘hijacked’ by al-Qaeda and turned into a three-day display of urban terrorism, read Syed Saleem Shahzad today in the Asia Times. After a superbly concise (and essential) background history of the al-Qaeda-India-Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) dynamic, Shahzad cuts to the chase.

India has never been a direct al-Qaeda target. This has been due in part to Delhi’s traditionally impartial policy of strategic non-alignment and in part to al-Qaeda using India as a safe route from the Arabian Sea into Gujrat and then on to Mumbai and then either by air or overland to the United Arab Emirates. Al-Qaeda did not want to disrupt this arrangement by stirring up attacks in India.

Nevertheless, growing voices from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and from within India for the country to be a strategic partner of NATO and the US in Afghanistan compelled al-Qaeda, a year ago, to consider a plan to utilize Islamic militancy structures should this occur.

Several low-profile attacks were carried out in various parts of India as a rehearsal and Indian security agencies still have no idea who was behind them. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda was not yet prepared for any bigger moves, like the Mumbai attacks.

Under directives from Pakistan’s army chief, General Ashfaq Kiani, who was then director general (DG) of the ISI, a low-profile plan was prepared to support Kashmiri militancy. That was normal, even in light of the peace process with India. Although Pakistan had closed down its major operations, it still provided some support to the militants so that the Kashmiri movement would not die down completely.

After Kiani was promoted to chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj was placed as DG of the ISI. The external section under him routinely executed the plan of Kiani and trained a few dozen LET militants near Mangla Dam (near the capital Islamabad). They were sent by sea to Gujrat, from where they had to travel to Kashmir to carry out operations.

Meanwhile, a major reshuffle in the ISI two months ago officially shelved this low-key plan as the country’s whole focus had shifted towards Pakistan’s tribal areas. The director of the external wing was also changed, placing the “game” in the hands of a low-level ISI forward section head (a major) and the LET’s commander-in-chief, Zakiur Rahman.

Zakiur was in Karachi for two months to personally oversee the plan. However, the militant networks in India and Bangladesh comprising the Harkat, which were now in al-Qaeda’s hands, tailored some changes. Instead of Kashmir, they planned to attack Mumbai, using their existent local networks, with Westerners and the Jewish community center as targets.

Zakiur and the ISI’s forward section in Karachi, completely disconnected from the top brass, approved the plan under which more than 10 men took Mumbai hostage for nearly three days and successfully established a reign of terror.

The attack, started from ISI headquarters and fined-tuned by al-Qaeda, has obviously caused outrage across India. The next issue is whether it has the potential to change the course of India’s regional strategy and deter it from participating in NATO plans in Afghanistan.

He goes on to explain what few have well: That the fighting in Karachi since the Mumbai attacks that has left 35 killed and over 200 injured is between the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement), “comprising people who migrated to Pakistan after the partition of British India in 1947,” and the Pashtun sub-nationalist ANP (Awami National Party). This ethnic dynamic is critical to understanding the conflict in Karachi, and another indication of just how much a tinderbox Pakistan is.

A couple points on what Shahzad has written. If accurate (and Shahzad in normally uncannily so), then:

1. ISI fingerprints are on the genesis of the attack plan.
2. Upper echelons of ISI delegated seemingly unsupervised to a junior officer, who signed off on the LeT/al-Qaeda alterations from small Kashmir assault to large scale Mumbai killing spree.
3. Upper echelons of ISI & military perhaps unaware of alterations, but not with clean hands. Kashmir or Mumbai, they planned terror attacks.
4. That “major reshuffle in the ISI two months ago,” recall, was when Lt General Nadeem Taj, a relative of Musharraf, was forced out as Director General of the ISI. It was a Pakistani intelligence shake-up largely by American insistence.
5. While the US had hoped the ‘double dealing’ of Taj would have left with him, it has to be understood that General Kiyani - head of Pakistan’s military and thus effectively its military intelligence (ISI) - while admirably stalwart against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the North West and tribal areas, has always been equally stalwart regarding the Pakistani conflict with India over disputed Kashmir.
General Kiyani may have intended a minor operation for Kashmir and was almost certainly in the dark about the metamorphosis of the operation into a Mumbai massacre, but the law of unintended consequences holds little acquittal when leaders play with the fire of terrorism.

Even while the ISI political wing was disbanded just days before the Mumbai attack, the shakeup atop the ISI is irrelevant without a trickle-down impact. And so long as ‘mid-level’ men such as Major Zakiur Rahman man posts and sign off on al-Qaeda affiliates’ massacres, there is little hope for Pakistan’s emergence from the tinderbox of terrorism without itself being consumed by the very fires it tolerates.

Westerners call it a ‘come to Jesus’ moment. Whatever the South Asian equivalent, Pakistan has yet to have its own. When it does, the fighting inside Pakistan, among Pakistanis (and assorted imported radical travelers) will be fierce and bloody. May the jihadiyun not be the only ones armed and willing to fight.
Operational Metamorphosis: Mumbai, ISI, LeT and al-Qaeda

ESM Press release: Indian Armed Forces role in neutralising terrorists

Sir,
1. We appreciate united & quick reaction by the Indian Forces to neutralize the terrorist's attack. In which Indian Army, Navy, Air Force, Para military Forces commandos and NSG took on combined operations successfully. Though this was very painful & unfortunate but inevitable.

2. But we do not like the way statement have been issued by Mr ML Kumawat, Spl Secy Ministry of Home affairs of India. While giving account of the entire Bombay episode 27-29 Nov at 5:30 pm on 29/11/08 to Press & Prime TV, he deliberately omitted the role of the Armed Forces. He bragged as if all the operations were carried out by the NSG Commandos only and Army was merely put on ground role only. While issuing this statement from his cozy office 1000 miles away from the actual site, he was seen lacking professional information & conduct of operations, with sole aim to take whole credit of success. Whereas, he was not sure of even terrorists Numbers, by then, if they were 29 or 10 only. Such a sensitive & irresponsible statement on behalf of Govt, was aiming to undermine the role of the Army? Such attitudes do not improve understanding between various Forces and must be avoided.

3. It was the first time that whole World was watching every action live with running commentary like a cricket match. We all saw Role of Indian Army, Navy, Air Force, Local Army commanders, Police and Para Military Forces, minute by minute. Role of Police, its vehicle being taken away by Terrorists and killing of senior officers innocently, was unfortunate. We expected that Mr Baal & Raaj Thakerays could have also appreciated Force's role played in Bombay to save lives. All the forces & operational details have been well covered by the print media also.

4. By the way, Major Sandeep Unikrishnan was from Army (7 Bihar Regt) & Havildar Chander of Army were attached with NSG, who sacrificed lives for the sake of peace in Bombay & India as such. Therefore, only professional & responsible Officers should be made to disclose official version in future, please. Such things only hurts feelings of others.

5. The above views & serious concern was expressed during sudden meeting of Indian ESM Movement (Pb) members at Mohali today.

Released by: Lt Col SS Sohi, Retd. Coord IESM (Punjab), on behalf of all Ex- Servicemen
Dated: 30/11/08.