I read the trials and tribulations of Maj Rastogi OC 7 Brigade Signal Company, with amusement and nostalgia. I had commanded the same company in 1962, when it was a only a section and a captain's command, (those interested can refer to my book 'Letters From the Border" covering the ill fated op Leghorn). It is always the fate of Seven Brigade to fight an unplanned war. Even our commander Brig Dalvi was taken prisoner a fate worse than being sacked. My congratulations to Rastogi to have penned the incident. Yes, 4 grenadiers was also one of our battalions during 1962 Sino Indian conflict at the tri- junction of India, Tibet and Bhutan border in the Keming Forward Defences of North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as it was then known. Truly down the memory lane!
Brig Lakshman Singh (Retd)
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Indo China War 1962
Memoirs: 1965 Indo- Pak Operations Khemkaran Sector
Showing posts with label 7 Inf Bde. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 7 Inf Bde. Show all posts
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Monday, June 8, 2009
Memoirs: 1965 Indo- Pak Operations Khemkaran Sector
Khemkaran
My story begins in May 1965, when I was asked to move to Ambala on Temporary Duty. Immediately on arrival, Lt Col R C Rawat, CO, overruling the objections gave me acting Major’s pips and asked me to move to Ferozepur next morning, where 7 Mtn Bde had concentrated. We were manning the border during the Kutch ops. After suffering heat and dust and doing nothing, the Bde reverted to Ambala sometimes in July. During the first week of Sep, after bombardment in Jaurian, we were asked to move to Khemkaran on 4th Sep 1965.
It was a classic case of high level comedy of inefficieny and lack of foresight and planning. Almost a corps moved on the narrow roads of Punjab; Tactical signs obliterated temporarily from OG vehicles, but carrying camouflage nets; All ranks moving in civvies but carrying weapons and ammunition and helmets even. There was utter confusion on the roads, more so because at every crossing in the towns, they offered us tea and biscuits even late at night; the result was a complete traffic jam. To achieve surprise on the enemy [could they!!!!!!], there were no road signs and MP’s had no idea about who was to go where. So everyone navigated for himself. Some may have reached their village even.
I was asked to collect the Top Secret Op Order from the Div HQ, which was Not ready till the mid-night on 4/5 Sep. I spent the evening with my wife at the dilapidated Perry’s Hotel, which, I believe was the accommodation for British NCO’s. On my way, I saw the complete confusion on the road side, but managed to reach Kalia Sanktara, North of Khemkaran, by the morning of 5 Sep. I was able to read the Op Order, as had been directed. In my civvies I had just a few rupees in my pocket, so the problem was to locate the company to have some breakfast. Luckily, I found the Line laying team along the road, but their first complaint was that all the ‘B’ echelons had been separated and there was no food available for any unit. Luckily, some road side villagers over heard our plight. In less than an hour, they brought chapaties and lassi and gur for the company. They had come to know about our imminent attack, so cheered us up and offered to help us to carry our heavy stores even. So much for the surprise on the enemy.
FUP’s for the battalions had been fixed on the map, but no body had the idea where to locate them exactly on the ground. Even own scattered troops could not be collected, leave alone the marrying up with various other sub–units and detachments. Under these circumstances, our boys laid the telephone lines during day time on the road side and waited for the units to arrive. Even Bde HQ was not located in one position. They were still in the vehicles, everyone trying to locate everyone else. There was complete radio silence imposed.
Evening orders: Change into Uniform and battalions ordered to attack as planned. As anticipated, there was no contact with Bns. Radio silence would be lifted only prior to the H hr of the First Bn attack. Bde Cdr, Brig D S Sidhu [9 HORSE], asked me to establish contact with each Bn along with GSO3 [Col Abdul Rasul Khan, 4 Greanadiers, Retd, living in Noida]. Their rifle companies were not even 50% strength, support company all scattered; ammunition, except carried on person, not available. But the assaulting Bns were not unduly perturbed because border posts were not supposed to give them much opposition and surprise was expected.
6 sep 0600 hrs. Pre H hr bombardment began on Theh Pannu where 4 Grenadiers were supposed to attack on the border post. Radio Silence was lifted but no body except the SIGNALS radio operator attached with each unit was using it. After the attack, ENGINEERS were supposed to clear mine fields. But there were changes in H hr etc; plenty of flexibility, but supporting and neighbouring units were not informed. Engineers reached the objective long before the Infantry and had to face the pre- H hr bombardment. While pulling back they were in the line of fire of 4 Grenadiers having taken up position in the FUP. Luckily, Lt Col Farhat Bhatti [later M/Gen] came on the line asking permission to fire before the revised H Hr. Fortunately, Bde Cdr having nerves of steel refused. Subsequently we used to meet the Engrs Coy Cdr, Maj Satish Thareja who would tell the story of escape from own fire with relish. 4 Grenadiers captured the post by about 1100 hrs.
06 Sep 2300 hrs. Heavy artillery shelling on the border posts. Radio silence partially lifted but the operators in the FUP were not allowed to answer since the nearby enemy would come to know their location. We both ie Sparrow & Pigeon were watching the scene from the top of a school. Pre H hr bombardment was a spectacular scene. 7 Grenadiers were going in for the assault when we wanted to move back. Unfortunately the jeep bogged down. After wasting about an hour to retrieve it, we decided to move on foot and report the details to Cdr. It was about 4 AM in the morning when we had a cup of tea under a Kikar tree, and reported to Cdr. After sunrise, I and the jeep dvr, moved back to bring the jeep. We were lost in wheat fields. Locals refused to help us because the assaulting battalion had fallen back and they were scared the enemy may close in. Luckily a threat with sten gun worked and by about 9 AM we reached the jeep and pulled it out. But we found retaliatory heavy shelling from the enemy side. Very many vehicles and other stores were lying scattered all over. But where was the Bn? Had it captured the objective? But some of the farmers informed us that the unit had fallen back leaving behind plenty of stores and some wounded even. Utter chaos and confusion. We started as many jeeps as we could drive, each offr and dvr and even untrained dvrs. On the way back we met many wounded personnel, some with heavy weapons -- machine guns and heavy mortars. We tried to locate the Bde HQ, but it was not at the place where we had left it at dawn. Vehicle marks, cooking places were visible. Again the locals informed us that they were disappointed since the troops had fallen back. It was a lucky break that we found Cheema Village,the mound, 11r, on the Road Bhikkiwid – Khemkaran, where bang on the road Bde HQ was to be established. Cdr told us not to waste time in telling him about the situation in the front, but ensure defences were ready as soon as possible. Defences? I thought we had come for an assault.
Gradually the mist had cleared up. Our Op Order had said Pak Armr Div would move from Quetta and not reach before 8th Sep, so we had planned our assault for 6th. Unfortunately they had already concentrated there for an imminent attack on the 8th. Hence the complete failure of our assaults and this hurried defence. Of course, in the hind sight this was the wisest decision of our Top Guns and it saved our country from being overrun by their Pattons, supported by Sabres.
Our defences were barely started when we had a visit from a saber for about 45 minutes. We cursed our own Air Force; luckily, I don’t recall any casualty from their straffing, though I dug out later on two 50 mm bullets about one foot each Left and Right of my position in a trench of about two feet deep. A narrow Providential escape, indeed.
08 Sep 1965. We were a very compact Bde HQ on 11r, in Cheema Village, on the Road itself. Signals Company deployed around it to the North. 4 Grenadiers across the road. On the East was 62 Mtn Bde, Yati Pratap[later M /Gen] was the sparrow. The enemy began their assault from Asal Uttar on 1/9 GR of the neighbouring Bde. By about 1100 hrs they contacted 4 Grenadiers. Luckily MMG & RCL guns were effective. The enemy tank troops were mostly sticking to the narrow road, so quite a few tanks were damaged and abandoned, thus choking those narrow roads. Later in the evening, I went with Cdr to have a look at these invincible tanks. Our boys pulled out some radio equipments along with their Instruction books which were still wrapped in polythene bags. I forwarded these to the Regimental HQ. Luckily like Mahabharat, there was no fight at night. The enemy tanks used to pull back and rest for night.
09 Sep 1965. Next morning the enemy came close to probe our defences, but 4 Grenadiers were ready. Especially, CQMH Abdul Hamid had destroyed three tanks, for which on the recommendation of the Bn Cdr, Brig Sidhu asked me to send an ‘Emergency’ Signal, recommending him for Maha Vir Chakra. In the mean time some tanks outflanked us from the West but were stuck up in the flooded fields where the drains had been ruptured by the Artillery fire. They surrendered to the Infantry Pl of 4 Grenadiers sent to round them up.
10 Sep 1965. Early morning, plenty of smoke and dust, but the enemy was halted at a distance only. Later we learnt that their commanders expecting the road to Delhi to be clear were advancing in jeeps protected by armour, to reach Harike. CQMH Abdul Hamid again destroyed one tank, but was killed on the spot. Cdr asked me to send a ‘Flash’ message to read ‘Param Vir Chakra, posthumous’ in place of ‘Maha Vir Chakra’. Luckily the same evening AIR announced his decoration and Pakistan Radio, the decoration, Hallal e –Zurrat, for their GOC. Brig Shami, their C Arty was killed and his jeep with his body was captured along with their Op Order and fully marked Arty map. The body of another Cdr, perhaps the Armd Bde Cdr had been taken away.
In the afternoon, one Pakistani tank had reached behind our location but was abandoned when bogged down on a bund near the water tank along the road. We had a shower of machine gun fire from behind. Everyone lying doggo thinking the end of our stories, since surrounded by enemy tanks. Somehow I heard some shouting and thinking it to be our own troops, I crawled forward along the grove to meet them with a soiled so-called white kerchief. Maj Vohra (?) of 3 CAV had been told that our position had been over run so they came to liberate us. Luckily we escaped again, this time from our own fire.
11 Sep 1965. An eerie silence. But everyone on tenterhooks. The enemy may come back any time. Early morning a ring in the Ops Room, which I was manning.
"Oye, this is Corps Cmdr, Gen Dhillon. Your boys have done extremely well; we are proud of you all. Call your Cdr, chhetti."
Of course, we were all proud, to have resisted the attack of the Armd Div successfully. By the afternoon I took a jeep with some of our daring boys. Telling 8 CAV crew in front of our defences to protect us, we moved forward about two KM, when we spotted a Pak Sigs trailer abandoned right in the middle of the road. I reversed the jeep and the boys hurriedly hooked the trailer; we rushed back. Of course there was a cloud of dust raised. Our tanks had withdrawn for some other purpose. At our Bde HQ entrance there was a great commotion. Bde Cdr came running out & fired me for not informing any one and making the entire Brigade stand to. Another lucky escape. There were plenty of spare parts and instruction books all of which were sent to the Regt.
In the evening we were told that 4 SIKHS would infiltrate behind the enemy lines and 2 MAHAR coming from Rajasthan will link up with them. No time for recce or marrying up. 13 Sep, SARAGARHI day, so 4 SIKHS must recreate history.
13 Sep. 0400 hrs. In order to hand over the radio detachment, I met L/Col Bakshi, CO 2 MAHAR, traveling non – stop from Jodhpur, trudging along the road with a pack on his back. He asked me the names of the Bde Offrs and the units under command and support. He was worried about finding his companies arriving later. He did not have enough maps of the area for his Coy Cdrs. I gave him my own. Wishing him luck, I passed on all this info to Bde HQ. About 0600 hrs Bde Cdr asked me to join his Rover Gp. We advanced to the place of assault. There was murderous fire even before the Bn reached their FUP. A very large number of casualties. Commander gave me his jeep also, so we ferried as many casualties as possible to the make shift RAP just behind the Bde HQ location. By 0900 hrs, Cdr still on foot reorganized another attack, but the enemy was well prepared and no movement was possible. Where was 4 SIKH ? Only in the evening Pakistan radio announced the capture of Col Anant Singh & his troops. A complete fiasco of Saragarhi Day.
As far as we were concerned the main activity was over. There was a talk of holding Col Bakshi responsible for failing to link up with 4 SIKH, but Brig David Sidhu, a true soldier stood by him. One evening I was asked to accompany BM to Corps HQ, where BGS wanted to hear the actual happenings. After a sumptuous dinner we returned. R S Kardam, my colleague [ Later on he too was transferred to Infantry. Retd as Brig, now settled in Gurgaon], mentioned jocularly that how did we reappear when we had vanished from the face of the Earth. For them 7 Mtn Bde had been over run and decimated completely and ceased to be a formation.
For the Board of officers, I accompanied L/col AS Vaidya [ later Chief], CO, 9 HORSE, to count the enemy tanks destroyed in the ‘Grave yard of Pattons’. I, in my own hand wrote down the serial number, tactical sign, the exact location and the likely cause of the damage of each. I remember counting 69 tanks, and most of those were destroyed by our tank fire, as assessed by L/Col Vaidya. Of course, having seen the performance of 4 Grenadiers, I had disagreed, but juniors have a muffled voice.
Subsequently, Brig Sidhu was asked to relinquish the command and we moved to Chharhata near Amritsar, where we all saw the tremendous fireworks at midnight till 0400 hrs on 22 Sep, the time of cease fire. The ammunition brought forward was NOT to be carried back.
In 1968, I asked a Corps Commander, that everyone had asked for one more day for recce and joint planning, but their request was turned down, because the date 13 Sep was sacrosanct. Yet, when 4 SIKH had never reached their objective, 2 MAHAR had no chance to link up, so there was no question of failure. How could they sack such a gallant Commander, who single-handedly had withstood the enemy Armd Div assault, and had tried to protect his subordinates. His answer was very simple. If the Operations were NOT feasible, Commander should have put his foot down and refused to take part in these operations and faced the music as an individual, but spared the formation that he commanded. In other words, Junior commanders are responsible even for the poor planning at higher levels.
Luckily, in my Sigs company, I think, we were able to decorate three of our boys with gallantry awards.
I would Salute Brig David Sidhu and the troops of 4 Greandiers, for their outstanding gallantry and the heroic tenacity, and always leading from the front. He had full confidence in SIGNALS and kept me close to him always.
Comments
Khemkaran was the graveyard of Pattons, the terror of those days. Strategic and Tactical planning at the highest level paid the dividends. The Invincible Armoured Division had been lured into a terrain most unsuitable for armour operations, where it was restricted to be used in penny packets and was decimated slowly but surely. Enemy commanders were cocksure of themselves and ignorant of the capability of Indian troops and locals. They had decided to reach Delhi in jeeps following their armour; such an audacity had to be paid dearly. Our planning and execution of operations, including the mechanism for information collecting and intelligence building, on ground was dismal, to say the least. But leaders like Brig David Sidhu, L/Col Farhat Bhatti and troops like CQMH Abdul Hamid showed exemplary courage and cool leadership, which saved our country from a 1962 repeat.
I was commissioned in the Corps of Signals in June 1957; transferred to 8 Madras in June 1971, which enabled me to see Infantry operations in Jessore & Khulna and later in Western Sector in 1972.
Over the Years some details may have dimmed in memory, but most of the activities are still vivid in mind.
Lt Col Naresh K Rastogi (Retd)
My story begins in May 1965, when I was asked to move to Ambala on Temporary Duty. Immediately on arrival, Lt Col R C Rawat, CO, overruling the objections gave me acting Major’s pips and asked me to move to Ferozepur next morning, where 7 Mtn Bde had concentrated. We were manning the border during the Kutch ops. After suffering heat and dust and doing nothing, the Bde reverted to Ambala sometimes in July. During the first week of Sep, after bombardment in Jaurian, we were asked to move to Khemkaran on 4th Sep 1965.
It was a classic case of high level comedy of inefficieny and lack of foresight and planning. Almost a corps moved on the narrow roads of Punjab; Tactical signs obliterated temporarily from OG vehicles, but carrying camouflage nets; All ranks moving in civvies but carrying weapons and ammunition and helmets even. There was utter confusion on the roads, more so because at every crossing in the towns, they offered us tea and biscuits even late at night; the result was a complete traffic jam. To achieve surprise on the enemy [could they!!!!!!], there were no road signs and MP’s had no idea about who was to go where. So everyone navigated for himself. Some may have reached their village even.
I was asked to collect the Top Secret Op Order from the Div HQ, which was Not ready till the mid-night on 4/5 Sep. I spent the evening with my wife at the dilapidated Perry’s Hotel, which, I believe was the accommodation for British NCO’s. On my way, I saw the complete confusion on the road side, but managed to reach Kalia Sanktara, North of Khemkaran, by the morning of 5 Sep. I was able to read the Op Order, as had been directed. In my civvies I had just a few rupees in my pocket, so the problem was to locate the company to have some breakfast. Luckily, I found the Line laying team along the road, but their first complaint was that all the ‘B’ echelons had been separated and there was no food available for any unit. Luckily, some road side villagers over heard our plight. In less than an hour, they brought chapaties and lassi and gur for the company. They had come to know about our imminent attack, so cheered us up and offered to help us to carry our heavy stores even. So much for the surprise on the enemy.
FUP’s for the battalions had been fixed on the map, but no body had the idea where to locate them exactly on the ground. Even own scattered troops could not be collected, leave alone the marrying up with various other sub–units and detachments. Under these circumstances, our boys laid the telephone lines during day time on the road side and waited for the units to arrive. Even Bde HQ was not located in one position. They were still in the vehicles, everyone trying to locate everyone else. There was complete radio silence imposed.
Evening orders: Change into Uniform and battalions ordered to attack as planned. As anticipated, there was no contact with Bns. Radio silence would be lifted only prior to the H hr of the First Bn attack. Bde Cdr, Brig D S Sidhu [9 HORSE], asked me to establish contact with each Bn along with GSO3 [Col Abdul Rasul Khan, 4 Greanadiers, Retd, living in Noida]. Their rifle companies were not even 50% strength, support company all scattered; ammunition, except carried on person, not available. But the assaulting Bns were not unduly perturbed because border posts were not supposed to give them much opposition and surprise was expected.
6 sep 0600 hrs. Pre H hr bombardment began on Theh Pannu where 4 Grenadiers were supposed to attack on the border post. Radio Silence was lifted but no body except the SIGNALS radio operator attached with each unit was using it. After the attack, ENGINEERS were supposed to clear mine fields. But there were changes in H hr etc; plenty of flexibility, but supporting and neighbouring units were not informed. Engineers reached the objective long before the Infantry and had to face the pre- H hr bombardment. While pulling back they were in the line of fire of 4 Grenadiers having taken up position in the FUP. Luckily, Lt Col Farhat Bhatti [later M/Gen] came on the line asking permission to fire before the revised H Hr. Fortunately, Bde Cdr having nerves of steel refused. Subsequently we used to meet the Engrs Coy Cdr, Maj Satish Thareja who would tell the story of escape from own fire with relish. 4 Grenadiers captured the post by about 1100 hrs.
06 Sep 2300 hrs. Heavy artillery shelling on the border posts. Radio silence partially lifted but the operators in the FUP were not allowed to answer since the nearby enemy would come to know their location. We both ie Sparrow & Pigeon were watching the scene from the top of a school. Pre H hr bombardment was a spectacular scene. 7 Grenadiers were going in for the assault when we wanted to move back. Unfortunately the jeep bogged down. After wasting about an hour to retrieve it, we decided to move on foot and report the details to Cdr. It was about 4 AM in the morning when we had a cup of tea under a Kikar tree, and reported to Cdr. After sunrise, I and the jeep dvr, moved back to bring the jeep. We were lost in wheat fields. Locals refused to help us because the assaulting battalion had fallen back and they were scared the enemy may close in. Luckily a threat with sten gun worked and by about 9 AM we reached the jeep and pulled it out. But we found retaliatory heavy shelling from the enemy side. Very many vehicles and other stores were lying scattered all over. But where was the Bn? Had it captured the objective? But some of the farmers informed us that the unit had fallen back leaving behind plenty of stores and some wounded even. Utter chaos and confusion. We started as many jeeps as we could drive, each offr and dvr and even untrained dvrs. On the way back we met many wounded personnel, some with heavy weapons -- machine guns and heavy mortars. We tried to locate the Bde HQ, but it was not at the place where we had left it at dawn. Vehicle marks, cooking places were visible. Again the locals informed us that they were disappointed since the troops had fallen back. It was a lucky break that we found Cheema Village,the mound, 11r, on the Road Bhikkiwid – Khemkaran, where bang on the road Bde HQ was to be established. Cdr told us not to waste time in telling him about the situation in the front, but ensure defences were ready as soon as possible. Defences? I thought we had come for an assault.
Gradually the mist had cleared up. Our Op Order had said Pak Armr Div would move from Quetta and not reach before 8th Sep, so we had planned our assault for 6th. Unfortunately they had already concentrated there for an imminent attack on the 8th. Hence the complete failure of our assaults and this hurried defence. Of course, in the hind sight this was the wisest decision of our Top Guns and it saved our country from being overrun by their Pattons, supported by Sabres.
Our defences were barely started when we had a visit from a saber for about 45 minutes. We cursed our own Air Force; luckily, I don’t recall any casualty from their straffing, though I dug out later on two 50 mm bullets about one foot each Left and Right of my position in a trench of about two feet deep. A narrow Providential escape, indeed.
08 Sep 1965. We were a very compact Bde HQ on 11r, in Cheema Village, on the Road itself. Signals Company deployed around it to the North. 4 Grenadiers across the road. On the East was 62 Mtn Bde, Yati Pratap[later M /Gen] was the sparrow. The enemy began their assault from Asal Uttar on 1/9 GR of the neighbouring Bde. By about 1100 hrs they contacted 4 Grenadiers. Luckily MMG & RCL guns were effective. The enemy tank troops were mostly sticking to the narrow road, so quite a few tanks were damaged and abandoned, thus choking those narrow roads. Later in the evening, I went with Cdr to have a look at these invincible tanks. Our boys pulled out some radio equipments along with their Instruction books which were still wrapped in polythene bags. I forwarded these to the Regimental HQ. Luckily like Mahabharat, there was no fight at night. The enemy tanks used to pull back and rest for night.
09 Sep 1965. Next morning the enemy came close to probe our defences, but 4 Grenadiers were ready. Especially, CQMH Abdul Hamid had destroyed three tanks, for which on the recommendation of the Bn Cdr, Brig Sidhu asked me to send an ‘Emergency’ Signal, recommending him for Maha Vir Chakra. In the mean time some tanks outflanked us from the West but were stuck up in the flooded fields where the drains had been ruptured by the Artillery fire. They surrendered to the Infantry Pl of 4 Grenadiers sent to round them up.
10 Sep 1965. Early morning, plenty of smoke and dust, but the enemy was halted at a distance only. Later we learnt that their commanders expecting the road to Delhi to be clear were advancing in jeeps protected by armour, to reach Harike. CQMH Abdul Hamid again destroyed one tank, but was killed on the spot. Cdr asked me to send a ‘Flash’ message to read ‘Param Vir Chakra, posthumous’ in place of ‘Maha Vir Chakra’. Luckily the same evening AIR announced his decoration and Pakistan Radio, the decoration, Hallal e –Zurrat, for their GOC. Brig Shami, their C Arty was killed and his jeep with his body was captured along with their Op Order and fully marked Arty map. The body of another Cdr, perhaps the Armd Bde Cdr had been taken away.
In the afternoon, one Pakistani tank had reached behind our location but was abandoned when bogged down on a bund near the water tank along the road. We had a shower of machine gun fire from behind. Everyone lying doggo thinking the end of our stories, since surrounded by enemy tanks. Somehow I heard some shouting and thinking it to be our own troops, I crawled forward along the grove to meet them with a soiled so-called white kerchief. Maj Vohra (?) of 3 CAV had been told that our position had been over run so they came to liberate us. Luckily we escaped again, this time from our own fire.
11 Sep 1965. An eerie silence. But everyone on tenterhooks. The enemy may come back any time. Early morning a ring in the Ops Room, which I was manning.
"Oye, this is Corps Cmdr, Gen Dhillon. Your boys have done extremely well; we are proud of you all. Call your Cdr, chhetti."
Of course, we were all proud, to have resisted the attack of the Armd Div successfully. By the afternoon I took a jeep with some of our daring boys. Telling 8 CAV crew in front of our defences to protect us, we moved forward about two KM, when we spotted a Pak Sigs trailer abandoned right in the middle of the road. I reversed the jeep and the boys hurriedly hooked the trailer; we rushed back. Of course there was a cloud of dust raised. Our tanks had withdrawn for some other purpose. At our Bde HQ entrance there was a great commotion. Bde Cdr came running out & fired me for not informing any one and making the entire Brigade stand to. Another lucky escape. There were plenty of spare parts and instruction books all of which were sent to the Regt.
In the evening we were told that 4 SIKHS would infiltrate behind the enemy lines and 2 MAHAR coming from Rajasthan will link up with them. No time for recce or marrying up. 13 Sep, SARAGARHI day, so 4 SIKHS must recreate history.
13 Sep. 0400 hrs. In order to hand over the radio detachment, I met L/Col Bakshi, CO 2 MAHAR, traveling non – stop from Jodhpur, trudging along the road with a pack on his back. He asked me the names of the Bde Offrs and the units under command and support. He was worried about finding his companies arriving later. He did not have enough maps of the area for his Coy Cdrs. I gave him my own. Wishing him luck, I passed on all this info to Bde HQ. About 0600 hrs Bde Cdr asked me to join his Rover Gp. We advanced to the place of assault. There was murderous fire even before the Bn reached their FUP. A very large number of casualties. Commander gave me his jeep also, so we ferried as many casualties as possible to the make shift RAP just behind the Bde HQ location. By 0900 hrs, Cdr still on foot reorganized another attack, but the enemy was well prepared and no movement was possible. Where was 4 SIKH ? Only in the evening Pakistan radio announced the capture of Col Anant Singh & his troops. A complete fiasco of Saragarhi Day.
As far as we were concerned the main activity was over. There was a talk of holding Col Bakshi responsible for failing to link up with 4 SIKH, but Brig David Sidhu, a true soldier stood by him. One evening I was asked to accompany BM to Corps HQ, where BGS wanted to hear the actual happenings. After a sumptuous dinner we returned. R S Kardam, my colleague [ Later on he too was transferred to Infantry. Retd as Brig, now settled in Gurgaon], mentioned jocularly that how did we reappear when we had vanished from the face of the Earth. For them 7 Mtn Bde had been over run and decimated completely and ceased to be a formation.
For the Board of officers, I accompanied L/col AS Vaidya [ later Chief], CO, 9 HORSE, to count the enemy tanks destroyed in the ‘Grave yard of Pattons’. I, in my own hand wrote down the serial number, tactical sign, the exact location and the likely cause of the damage of each. I remember counting 69 tanks, and most of those were destroyed by our tank fire, as assessed by L/Col Vaidya. Of course, having seen the performance of 4 Grenadiers, I had disagreed, but juniors have a muffled voice.
Subsequently, Brig Sidhu was asked to relinquish the command and we moved to Chharhata near Amritsar, where we all saw the tremendous fireworks at midnight till 0400 hrs on 22 Sep, the time of cease fire. The ammunition brought forward was NOT to be carried back.
In 1968, I asked a Corps Commander, that everyone had asked for one more day for recce and joint planning, but their request was turned down, because the date 13 Sep was sacrosanct. Yet, when 4 SIKH had never reached their objective, 2 MAHAR had no chance to link up, so there was no question of failure. How could they sack such a gallant Commander, who single-handedly had withstood the enemy Armd Div assault, and had tried to protect his subordinates. His answer was very simple. If the Operations were NOT feasible, Commander should have put his foot down and refused to take part in these operations and faced the music as an individual, but spared the formation that he commanded. In other words, Junior commanders are responsible even for the poor planning at higher levels.
Luckily, in my Sigs company, I think, we were able to decorate three of our boys with gallantry awards.
I would Salute Brig David Sidhu and the troops of 4 Greandiers, for their outstanding gallantry and the heroic tenacity, and always leading from the front. He had full confidence in SIGNALS and kept me close to him always.
Comments
Khemkaran was the graveyard of Pattons, the terror of those days. Strategic and Tactical planning at the highest level paid the dividends. The Invincible Armoured Division had been lured into a terrain most unsuitable for armour operations, where it was restricted to be used in penny packets and was decimated slowly but surely. Enemy commanders were cocksure of themselves and ignorant of the capability of Indian troops and locals. They had decided to reach Delhi in jeeps following their armour; such an audacity had to be paid dearly. Our planning and execution of operations, including the mechanism for information collecting and intelligence building, on ground was dismal, to say the least. But leaders like Brig David Sidhu, L/Col Farhat Bhatti and troops like CQMH Abdul Hamid showed exemplary courage and cool leadership, which saved our country from a 1962 repeat.
I was commissioned in the Corps of Signals in June 1957; transferred to 8 Madras in June 1971, which enabled me to see Infantry operations in Jessore & Khulna and later in Western Sector in 1972.
Over the Years some details may have dimmed in memory, but most of the activities are still vivid in mind.
Lt Col Naresh K Rastogi (Retd)
Thursday, July 10, 2008
India China Conflict 1962: Mobility of 7 Inf Brigade
The only road available as line of communication for operations in Keming Division was road Tezpur-Misamari-Foot Hills-Rupa-Tenga valley and from there to Bomdila-Dirang Dzong upto Sela (4,198m) down to Nuranang-Jang and Towang. This was a fair weather class 9 road passing through some very difficult terrain. In the dry weather the road was dusty with sharp hairpin bends, steep inclines with overhanging rocks at many places. The culverts were
un-metalled and in places half built with wooden trestles. In the rains the road quickly became a quagmire and deeply rutted; any vehicle having got into one of the ruts had to move in it for long distances before it could come out of it .The frame of the vehicle particularly the suspension and steering system were subjected to severe stress and strains.
Tenga valley
On this line of communication it was not a question of steady climb in elevation but the road was like a roller coaster starting at an elevation of 305m at the Foot Hills, climbing up to Eagles Nest (2,837m) in a distance of 62 kms down to Tenga Valley (1,367m) over 39 kms. From here the road climbed to Bomdila (2,379m) over a distance of 21 kms. Bomdila to Sappers Camp (1,830m) a distance of 53 kms was comparatively easy except for land slides in places which made it difficult to negotiate without Engineer effort and assistance of dozers and recovery vehicles. Sapper Camp to Sela (4,198m) a distance of 41 kms was a hard climb with sharp bends some of which could only be negotiated by reversing the vehicle once or twice- a difficult operation even on best of the hill roads.
Approach to Sela
The approach to Sela was under improvement and paved by boulders. From Sela the road dropped to Nuronang (4,117m) over a distance of 8 kms. From here, there was down hill drive to Jang (2,502m) with twenty-seven hairpin bends in about 9 kms requiring the reversing of vehicles to negotiate each bend. The road to Towang crossed Twang Chu (river) over a wooden bridge of 27m span. . From here onwards, the road to Towang a distance of nearly 37 kms, was over a mud flat deeply rutted; calling for considerable skill and patience on the part of the vehicle drivers as well necessitating assistance from dozers and recovery vehicles to force the passage. Many vehicles stalled and burnt their clutches on this stretch of the road.
Freezing cold
Temperature varied from the very hot and humid climate of the tropical forests of the foothills to the freezing cold of Sela and the wind swept funnel of Nuranang where the wind chill factor constantly kept the temperature extremely low: a bottle of beer had to be thawed even at mid day with the sun shining bright overhead.
Mule pack
In the plains the road meandered through paddy fields with extremely soft berms requiring constant maintenance. Due to narrow roads overtaking of vehicles was not possible except at a few places. Movement away from the centre of the road invariably resulted in vehicles getting in the slush and at places where the road was elevated called for recovery assistance. Movement beyond Tawang had to be on foot and mule pack.
(Extract from History of Corps of EME)
Fwd by Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Saturday, July 5, 2008
India China Conflict 1962: Sealing the lie
The fact is that on the 19th evening India had no plan to attack across the river Namak Chu, If there was any plan, it was that of the Chinese. The Chinese told the world: "At 7 O’ Clock (Peking time) in the morning of 20th October the aggressive Indian forces, under cover of fierce artillery fire launched massive attacks against the Chinese Frontier Guards."
The Times of India dated 28 May 1998 had published a letter from me to editor titled "Sealing a Lie" which highlighted the above Radio Peking lie. Quote, I was the Signal Officer of the late Brigadier J P Dalvi’s illfated 7 Brigade deployed in Namka Chu Valley in NEFA, and which faced the brunt of the massive Chinese attack in 1962. The then Lt Col K K Tewari, CO 4th Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, came to visit me in the Bde HQ on October 18, 1962. He, among other things, asked me to work out the leave plans of my section. Subsequently, he was captured by the Chinese on the morning of October 20, 1962 in the forward infantry battalion location which he was visiting.
The point to note is that forward formations that are intending to attack do not plan leave for its personnel. The Commander Signals of the division also remains with the divisional HQ to control and execute the overall communication plan and does no go and stay with the forward most infantry battalion on the eve of the attack. This should seal the Chinese lie- if it has not been sealed yet- that India attacked the Chinese Frontier Guards on October 20, 1962.
Brig Lakshman Singh,VSM (Retd)
Western Theatre
On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart. In the western theater, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theater, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in Sikkim, a protectorate of India at that time. Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.
Eastern theatre
Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on October 20. The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river. The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings. However their strategy was wrong as while the Indian troops settled for the night on the banks of the river, the PLA crossed over the shallow October river and made their way to the other side. They gathered themselves up into battalions on the Indian- held south side of the river in the camouflage of the night, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.
India's China War by Neville Maxwell
India's shameful Debacle
There has never been a clear answer from the Leftists and Communists in India with respect to these questions concerning China.
Was China the aggressor in 1962?
Is China in illegal possession of Indian territory?
Do they support the Hananisation of Tibet ?
Do they condemn the facilitation of acquisition of missile and nuclear technology by China to Pakistan?
Do they support religious freedom in China?
Do they support Chinese activities in India’s neighbourhood?
What is Karat now saying about the Nuclear Deal? Endgame not clear!
The Times of India dated 28 May 1998 had published a letter from me to editor titled "Sealing a Lie" which highlighted the above Radio Peking lie. Quote, I was the Signal Officer of the late Brigadier J P Dalvi’s illfated 7 Brigade deployed in Namka Chu Valley in NEFA, and which faced the brunt of the massive Chinese attack in 1962. The then Lt Col K K Tewari, CO 4th Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, came to visit me in the Bde HQ on October 18, 1962. He, among other things, asked me to work out the leave plans of my section. Subsequently, he was captured by the Chinese on the morning of October 20, 1962 in the forward infantry battalion location which he was visiting.
The point to note is that forward formations that are intending to attack do not plan leave for its personnel. The Commander Signals of the division also remains with the divisional HQ to control and execute the overall communication plan and does no go and stay with the forward most infantry battalion on the eve of the attack. This should seal the Chinese lie- if it has not been sealed yet- that India attacked the Chinese Frontier Guards on October 20, 1962.
Brig Lakshman Singh,VSM (Retd)
Western Theatre
On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart. In the western theater, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theater, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in Sikkim, a protectorate of India at that time. Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.
Eastern theatre
Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on October 20. The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river. The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings. However their strategy was wrong as while the Indian troops settled for the night on the banks of the river, the PLA crossed over the shallow October river and made their way to the other side. They gathered themselves up into battalions on the Indian- held south side of the river in the camouflage of the night, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.
India's China War by Neville Maxwell
India's shameful Debacle
There has never been a clear answer from the Leftists and Communists in India with respect to these questions concerning China.
Sunday, June 22, 2008
India China conflict 1962: 4 Grenadiers Operational Role
Narrated by Gen Kahlon: Continued from earlier post
The Escape
There was another bridge short of the bridge at Bleeting, this was guarded by the Chinese on both sides. We decided to cross Twang Chu and in to Bhutan at night. I have never seen 150 or so men, coughing and in bad shape move so silently. We crossed at about 75 yards distance from the Chinese Camp quietly in the night, we could see the lights burning in their tents. Like ghosts we slithered past, moving fast as we had a track to move on and a guide. There I see a 9 Punjab jawan with his boots removed and gangrene set in his feet, when I told him that your CO is ahead, not too far. Look at this Punjabi boy he says 'Saihab CO Saihab hain fir to mare liya bhi koi bandobast ho jai ga (CO is there then some thing will be arranged for me also)' . I don’t know how long the boy survived because as he removed his boots his soles also came with them and yet he had so much faith in his CO. That is what has made this army tick all these years.
Bhutan
Ahead of Bleeting, which was totally deserted, we came to a village called Khini where the villagers looked after us well and we spent a night there, however being in bad shape we could hardly eat what was offered by the villagers. Ultimately after walking in Bhutan for ….days, we reached Tasigang Dzong . Here we were told to hand over our weapons to Bhutan Government, I tried to hide my pistol but Oscar Thomas insisted that I had to surrender it .
The Home Coming
Rakesh Jha of Engineers, my course mate saw some of my men walking through the town and enquired about the identity of the battalion. On learning it was 4 Grenadiers, he came running from the other side in search of me. He banged into me as we were walking up. I held him in my arms, first time I realised that I was safe and alive having come through this terrible ordeal. With the shock of realisation hitting me hard, I broke down and cried like a child. Rakesh held me tight in his arms, saying you are safe, you are with me now, remember me, I am Rakesh your batch-mate from NDA. He did not let me go with battalion, you stay here with me for a day or so. The rest of the people were put in vehicles and taken away. I stayed with Rakesh for one more day. He kept on feeding me and I kept on vomiting as my stomach had shrunk due to the long bout of starvation. It may sound strange but once again I took a helicopter flight, but this time back to Darranga . The Engineers were building a bridge there and had helicopter support Rakesh had organised a place for me on a return flight. At Darranga I ran into Brig KK Singh the BGS of 4 Corps; he asked me a few questions and I replied very curtly 'Sir, you should know better'. We were all so angry with the powers that be.
Recovery
We were finally taken to Tezpur hospital, our clothes, dirty and filthy, were taken off and burnt. We were looked after rather well at the hospital. Maj Rachhpal Singh Mann the 2 IC came to see us, by the time he reached Tawang the show at Bridge One on Namka Chu was over and he had returned from there only, and asked what did we want; Imagine what the four or five of us asked, we asked for our special cook, please send us Rehman our cook special, we are famished. Rehman would keep cooking and we would keep eating, The stomach would say no but the brain would not say no. I bloated from a 120-pound lad to a nice fat young man. Drinking and eating for a long time was the hobby. Being alive was too good to be true.
President visit
I recall the President of India visiting us in the hospital. How do you feel about the visit of the President?, I was asked by a press reporter and I said 'His visit will put us on our feet faster' a well quoted statement, reflecting the morale of 4 Grenadiers.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Comment: Two of the world’s fastest growing economies with different Political Concepts are starting to think of themselves as partners and as competitors. Both countries have great scope for bilateral trade. It is not that two countries should not or will not compete in the future, it is already happening. Only that the scope of cooperation, so far unexplored, is tremendous. Our Defence Forces could effect a savings of over 30% by making intelligent purchases from China starting from basic and quality products and items like tentages for the troops. The list is endless.
The Escape
There was another bridge short of the bridge at Bleeting, this was guarded by the Chinese on both sides. We decided to cross Twang Chu and in to Bhutan at night. I have never seen 150 or so men, coughing and in bad shape move so silently. We crossed at about 75 yards distance from the Chinese Camp quietly in the night, we could see the lights burning in their tents. Like ghosts we slithered past, moving fast as we had a track to move on and a guide. There I see a 9 Punjab jawan with his boots removed and gangrene set in his feet, when I told him that your CO is ahead, not too far. Look at this Punjabi boy he says 'Saihab CO Saihab hain fir to mare liya bhi koi bandobast ho jai ga (CO is there then some thing will be arranged for me also)' . I don’t know how long the boy survived because as he removed his boots his soles also came with them and yet he had so much faith in his CO. That is what has made this army tick all these years.
Bhutan
Ahead of Bleeting, which was totally deserted, we came to a village called Khini where the villagers looked after us well and we spent a night there, however being in bad shape we could hardly eat what was offered by the villagers. Ultimately after walking in Bhutan for ….days, we reached Tasigang Dzong . Here we were told to hand over our weapons to Bhutan Government, I tried to hide my pistol but Oscar Thomas insisted that I had to surrender it .
The Home Coming
Rakesh Jha of Engineers, my course mate saw some of my men walking through the town and enquired about the identity of the battalion. On learning it was 4 Grenadiers, he came running from the other side in search of me. He banged into me as we were walking up. I held him in my arms, first time I realised that I was safe and alive having come through this terrible ordeal. With the shock of realisation hitting me hard, I broke down and cried like a child. Rakesh held me tight in his arms, saying you are safe, you are with me now, remember me, I am Rakesh your batch-mate from NDA. He did not let me go with battalion, you stay here with me for a day or so. The rest of the people were put in vehicles and taken away. I stayed with Rakesh for one more day. He kept on feeding me and I kept on vomiting as my stomach had shrunk due to the long bout of starvation. It may sound strange but once again I took a helicopter flight, but this time back to Darranga . The Engineers were building a bridge there and had helicopter support Rakesh had organised a place for me on a return flight. At Darranga I ran into Brig KK Singh the BGS of 4 Corps; he asked me a few questions and I replied very curtly 'Sir, you should know better'. We were all so angry with the powers that be.
Recovery
We were finally taken to Tezpur hospital, our clothes, dirty and filthy, were taken off and burnt. We were looked after rather well at the hospital. Maj Rachhpal Singh Mann the 2 IC came to see us, by the time he reached Tawang the show at Bridge One on Namka Chu was over and he had returned from there only, and asked what did we want; Imagine what the four or five of us asked, we asked for our special cook, please send us Rehman our cook special, we are famished. Rehman would keep cooking and we would keep eating, The stomach would say no but the brain would not say no. I bloated from a 120-pound lad to a nice fat young man. Drinking and eating for a long time was the hobby. Being alive was too good to be true.
President visit
I recall the President of India visiting us in the hospital. How do you feel about the visit of the President?, I was asked by a press reporter and I said 'His visit will put us on our feet faster' a well quoted statement, reflecting the morale of 4 Grenadiers.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Comment: Two of the world’s fastest growing economies with different Political Concepts are starting to think of themselves as partners and as competitors. Both countries have great scope for bilateral trade. It is not that two countries should not or will not compete in the future, it is already happening. Only that the scope of cooperation, so far unexplored, is tremendous. Our Defence Forces could effect a savings of over 30% by making intelligent purchases from China starting from basic and quality products and items like tentages for the troops. The list is endless.
Friday, June 20, 2008
India China Conflict 1962: 4 Grenadiers Operational Role
Lost Between the Two Tracks
It was nightfall now, darkness comes suddenly in the mountains and we stopped unable to proceed further. We could hear some stray firing, next day also we could hear small arm firing, I reckon that we were just going round and round in circles in same area of a few square miles. At dawn we would start moving but where to we had no clue. Our knowledge was that of Hatungla- Shakti route, which in case was not followed. Now we were in wilderness, some where between the Hatungla-Lumpu and the Karpola- Lumpu tracks. On fourth or fifth day Lt Col RN Mishra the CO 9 Punjab runs in to us. He was quite lost himself. Having got separated from his protection section which was marching, all this time, with us. He did have a few boys with him. The protection section boys assured him. 'Sir don’t worry we are with you'. From some where they produced some biscuits ,some nick knacks some and milk for him and they fed their CO. I have never forgotten this. These small things and how they matter in Army life. This is the strength of the Indian Army; the Soldier.
Meeting up with 9 Punjab
With the arrival of CO 9 Punjab we got some assurance, at least he knew the area, the tracks and various places, and where we had to head for. Earlier the problem was that the regiment had come to the area only in early October and was unfamiliar with the area and on top saddled with an IO, the points- man, totally new to the area. I was running up and down like a monkey, up and down the hills, but there is a limit to human endurance. I think it was on the 8th day that we reached a huge open area with a spur running from right to left in front, this I think was the Karpola track going down and leading to Lumpu. It was a sunny day, we were tired, eight days hungry, living on leaves and shrubs. We plonked down to rest our dog tired limbs. We were so tired that LMG was being carried in parts, if I had the barrel some one else had the bipod and another the piston group. Fatigued to the limit it was no more possible for one individual to carry the whole weapon in one piece. The mortars in any case had been abandoned in deep a ravine earlier. You can see the morale, a lot of wounded persons from other battalions had some how smelled and joined us. We lay in the sun resting but not for long, soon resuming the march. My CO's party and the party of the CO of 9 Punjab was in the vanguard. Col Mishra was now leading every body. In the absence of Maps sun was guiding us in trying to cross in to Bhutan. As this group crossed the spur and went on the other side, suddenly fire opened on us. Now in hindsight I feel, a Chinese patrol was coming down the Karpola track and they saw a group of 100 or 150 soldiers resting in the open, realising that this was roughly the line on which we will cross the spur, they went past and laid an ambush.
Battalion Spirit
When they fired the people who were ahead, my CO's party and the Punjabis took off. It was an open patch and on the other side also it was open for some distance till the tree line became thick once again. When the firing started on top I saw people slithering down in sheer terror down he steep slope. I had a group of soldiers lying around me and I did not know what to do. Some senior officers were still resting in the rear and two very senior officers had crossed over, and then came a lesson which I have carried all my life and fought for what is the value of the Regimental System in the army. I looked at a six foot tall Jat, Jeevan Singh, one of the finest specimen of human being and admonished him in the most foul language. "Jeevan you so and so, lying like a widow, go put on a skirt". The vanity of the Jat being hurt, Jeevan got up, standing all his six foot; 'You want us to be killed , OK I get up now tell where to go'. He picked up his rifle, Jeevan got up, Ram Singh got up, Shyam Singh got up then some other boys got up, fifteen or sixteen of us got up and others got up, and then we charged up shouting our battle cry at the top of our voice. We fired a few rounds, Chinese who were a small group of eight or ten ran away. We climbed to the top and looked at the other side for our two CO's party. I could see them about a Kilometre away, I shouted from the top of my lung 'CO Saihab please stop the Chinese have run away'. No one stopped, next we met the two CO's only at Tezpur after a break of two weeks when we also arrived there after wandering in the wilderness for so long, hungry, tired, some even wounded. But with sad memories of those left behind; friends and colleagues, some who could walk no more and others dead. Had they stopped on my hailing them, many more would have returned to the anxiously waiting near and dear one at home.
Chinese Mortar Fire
The remnants of the other two companies also joined us on top. Oscar Thomas and Major Balbir, now the senior most after the CO also joined. We started, moving down. As luck would have it, we were still to hit the thicket when the Chinese engaged us with mortar fire, We hid under the cover provided by the trees and planned to get away during the night to avoid being observed. Though a moon lit night, yet our movement was painfully slow, once again we halted and sat down. We were almost in the snow bound area. I can't help narrating the death of barber Ganpat, a man who was in the fifties. The company commander 'B' Company, my company told him; 'Go back to the centre, you are too old for NEFA tenure'; which he ignored. I still wonder what he was doing there at this age. Our solders were young.
Death and Rum to keep our spirit alive
That night two things happened. One Ganpat died, he froze stiff, sitting in the snow, before he died he cried like an animal, for nearly an hour, not aware that he was crying while others kept shouting at him to shut up worried that Chinese would hear his cries. The second thing that happened wasthat one of my Gorkha Instructors, when I was doing the D&M course, had come to take a promotion examination and got caught. Hav Chhatri shook hands with me and we sat, shivering with cold, huddled together in our two blankets. 'Saihab would you have Rakshi (Rum)', Chatrtri came out with a most welcome query after some time. I do not know from where he produced a bottle of rum, and that night the two of took turns taking swigs from the bottle.
Lost
For the next couple of days we were totally lost and kept wandering aimlessly. Maj Balbir at this point of time gave up, in that he was not coherent enough to lead and Oscar Thomas took over the leadership, who provided excellent leadership otherwise we would all have perished. He daughter had a born recently and that too after three sons, he had not yet seen her being away at the time of delivery. He used to say that nothing could keep him from seeing her, possibly that was his will to survive,
Fall of Tawang
We knew where the Chinese were and that Tawang had fallen courtesy, All India Radio, Capt Nagrani had a Transistor Radio and that’s why we never approached a track. We had a war council and observed that all the nallas must be flowing down into Twang Chu, so we took a painful decision to follow one of the nallas. It was a trail, each one for himself. Some fell down and broke their limbs others fell behind and could not be helped yet later joined the group at midnight where you were resting. Some gave up some continued. Our doctor Kasyap, the fifth officer, we lost him some where there, luckily he did survive.
In these three four days we came across an area full of bushes laden with some kind of berries. We went at the bushes with our hands at the back, like hungry animals. If some one came to share your bush, he was shooed away. I was shocked to see this animal instinct in all of us.
Escape to Bhutan
Going further down, we encountered the welcome sight of Gorsem Chorten on the wrong side of Nyam Jang Chu, the river joining Tawang Chu some distance ahead. We started moving down stream on our side on the hill till we reached a spot from where further progress was blocked. Down below we could see the Shakti Bridge now guarded by the Chinese. We halted there for a day and half, we even made a plan to attack the Chinese guarding the Shakti bridge even if it was certain death. We took stock of the ammunition with us, some were down to ten others to eight cartridges or so. Better sense prevailed and we stayed put for one more day. Next day early in the morning, one of the boys who had gone to ease himself stumbled on a narrow track going down from the solitary Chori Hut right on top, on our side of the river. He came running with this good news. Without wasting any more time we moved down this track at a fast clip and came to a village from where we hired a guide to take us to Bleeting (with the bridge across Tawang Chu into Bhutan).
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Note: Last episode of Gen Kahlon
Tawang Slideshow: Praveen's Tawang Album
India China Conflict 1962: 4 Grenadiers Operational Role
General Kahlon narration (ref post dated 17 June 2008)
Medical Aid post
Next day in the night 19th/ 20th oct 1962 we heard some definite noise and I, the youngest officer sleeping in the Chauri hut, was asked to take out a patrol and investigate. I could definitely hear the sound of wood cutting, which I reported back. From where we were at the Chauri Hut, if one went towards Hatungla there was an opening, with sparse cover of trees extending to 300 yards or so, beyond this was located the RAP of some Medical Aid Post. Lt Balsubrramaniam of 51 Mountain Regiment along with his OP party was also located in this area.
Chinese commenced firing
On 20th morning, as the day broke, the Chinese started firing on us. We were engaged basically by small arms from close quarters. Now by hindsight, the sound we heard the previous night was of the Chinese cutting the wood and making lanes to mark the area to which they came down and from where they brought effective fire on us. From Thagla, being out of range they could not have engaged us. From that height they could have only thrown stones at us, even now they were firing at us from up down and we were sitting in the valley.
Bala died in my lap
Naturally there was a lot of chaos and commotion, the omnibus started ringing, people returned fire, the company across returned fire effectively. Subsequently they pulled back towards the home side of the river. The clearing I mentioned earlier was covered by a Chinese MMG with a clear line of fire. Balasubramaniam, my course mate, knew that I was the IO of the battalion and also that there was a group of officers near the bridge, he tried to move from his location under threat by the enemy fire, he sprinted through this clearing to reach us. The first time the Chinese fired a long burst was when they fired at him. I heard that some one has been hit, being the youngest I ran to investigate and then realised that it was Bala. We put him under cover, but by this time excessive blood loss had taken from his injuries, sadly Bala died in my lap. (Even as the Brigade Signals Officer I had no idea what Lt Bala was doing in that place, what was his communication set up, what fire and from which guns was he supposed to bring down on the enemy. What a waste of a young officer and his team of three gunners who also perished.)
Hatungla route closed
Psychologically this opening route was closed for us and it had a very important impact on our further decision. This was the short route leading to Hatungla, and right in the vicinity of the bridge was this opening, the Chinese had effectively blocked it. They had blocked this 500 to 600 Yards of clearing by covering it by MMG, we knew that if we were caught in this clearing we had it. No assault came on us in all fairness; we were assaulted only by infantry Weapons.
No rounds
I remember on night of 18 Oct Subedar Kumbha Ram, a fine JCO of 2nd World War veteran subsequently retired as Hony Capt, was the battalion mortar JCO who came to my CO. He spoke bitterly, "I have no Rounds with me, I have only Tubes. I am asked to deploy in a mortar position, you brought me in this, tell me what do I do?" The CO rang the CO Rajputs Lt Col Rikh and Lt Col Mishra CO of 9 Punjab. Punjabis were well established and well stocked having come much earlier. He gave us 32 Mortar rounds so when the battle started 4 Grenadiers had 4 tubes and 32 of 3-inch mortar rounds. We had started with 90 rounds of 303 rifle ammunition each, 60 plus 40 reserve, that is 90 and for LMG 700 plus 500 reserve rounds, if I remember rightly. I was wearing a para jacket, officers generally used to put on the para jackets, purchased from the shop run by Ordnance Corps. As a matter of fact they stood out and the Chinese could make out the officers easily.
Order to withdraw
At 1115 the CO got orders from Div HQ to withdraw. I do not know if he personally spoke o the CO or that someone else on his behalf passed the orders. The CO ordered me, as the IO, to lead the Battalion's withdrawal. He did give a semblance of orders. Being the IO a pertinent point came to my mind, we had no Maps, we only had a sketch a cyclostyled /blue print (the only map available from the lowest formation right up to the Army HQ to plan and fight against the Chinese) of the area covering from Bridge one to five. The question was where do you go, the moment you get-out of the boundary of the sketch?
Fall back to Hatungla
Our plan, I reckon as given by GOC was for us to fall back on Hatungla and then defend the pass as a battalion, it is a defensible area, rather than sitting in the Nalla. It was a good decision, problem was in its execution. As I started climbing as the no one man of the battalion the, IO asked to use his discretion, no maps, but I had binocular and a compass with me and I knew which way was East, West, North and South.
Lost Battalion
By deploying a pair of MMGs the Chinese had ensured that we do not use the easy track. Having attended to Bala my self and seen the casualties in the opening, I made a small appreciation in my mind. This opening on the track where there is a good chance of getting the bullets needs to be avoided at all costs.. I reasoned that if we climb two to three hundred feet up the mountain side, take a detour under the cover of the trees, circuit behind for five six hundred yards and come down,once again, back on to the track once again we would avoid this clearance and be safe from the Chinese observed fire. We would also be able to move faster and by evening would be on the top of Hatungla and able to deploy as planned. I had just gone 500 to 600 yards or so and was veering to my left, when as luck would have it, the CO saw me turning to the left. I was sent for and the Commanding officer wanted to know as to why I was turning left. I said 'Sir I want to get to Hatungla'. He gave m a piece of his mind', You want to get all of us killed, we are well within the range of the weapons that are firing from across, you keep climbing till I tell you and then we will take the necessary detour. That detour never happened, we never turned left because then the hills and the gorges and the ravines took over. In the absence of any maps we did not know as to where we were going and by evening we were a lost battalion. At Hatungla 4 Grenadiers had a section under Naik Prithi Singh or Prithi Chand, Dogra boy of 'Delta' Company, a hero by any reckoning. He along with a group of 8 boys had been left at the pass to guard it. This section stopped the Chinese who had followed us next day for a day and half, ultimately they were overrun and killed. Proving the point that it was a defensible position if any proof was required.
Rao awarded MVC posthumously
If only the 4 Grenadiers had landed at Hatungla that day as planned, we would have covered us with glory. God had given us an opportunity but we missed it. It is one of the regrets of my life that why this move of mine was detected, not a big-shake, I was just coming back on to the track, simple. The irony of the story is that one of our officers Kartar Singh with a few boys was located slight farther away from the action, he was not aware as to when the Battalion vacated all the posts, till the boys informed him that the whole battalion had moved out. He followed the short track to Hatungla, crossing the open patch, along with his boys with impunity, some how he carried on I have not been able to find out how he missed Prithi and his group. The point is that the action had died after few hours, once the Chinese realised that there is nothing to worry in the area. In the mean time the Drokung Samba had been attacked on the first day itself and GV Parsanna Rao died manning a LMG himself it was well sited on the home side of Nyam Jung Chu, which the Chinese had to take, I had a hand in siting the weapon. Rao did a great job and was awarded MVC posthumously.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Saturday, June 14, 2008
India China Conflict 1962: Recollections of Chief Signal Officer
Dear Lakshman
I am grateful to you for letting me go through the Signals Story. It is an excellent personal account by a Brigade Signals Officer, who performed his duties unfailingly, under extreme difficulties of inhospitable terrain and weather conditions, shortages of equipment or high altitude clothing.
You have penned so tellingly the entire gamut of emotions as the leader of your men and, one separated from one's family often without news or contact for long intervals. Your intrinsic qualities of leadership and the personal example you set throughout those difficult days, was a major factor for survival of your men, considering that the paralysed higher headquarters could give no succour of any kind, and in fact failed you, and 7 Bde completely.
When placed in similar circumstances we (in the Services) all feel the things you have felt and penned so aptly, but seldom written down. At least I have not come across any. For me reading your story has been a unique and a rewarding experience.
It also fulfils the crying need for educating our country's babudom (politico-bureaucratic) mindset, which believes (mistakenly of course) that those who don the uniform have chosen voluntarily, to suffer (uncalled for) hardship and to die. I once came across such an attitude, and had to remind the 'babu' in no uncertain terms that we are there to see that the enemy suffers and dies and thus ensure continued safety of the likes of him– we accept only the attendant risks. The risks that can be reduced by loosening of purse strings at the appropriate time.
It is also my (1962) experience that often good signal communications, for some, was an unmitigated nuisance since the user commander could be asked for a decision or such like. So he was 'always gone forward' without the rover set. I once even asked one such commander as to where was his Rover WAS. He replied he did not need one.
Those days I personally (from Tezpur) closed down the VHF (ANT/ARC) link at Sela, as everyone of any consequence had vanished. The same happened at Darrang (4 Div HQ) and Bomdilla (48 Bde HQ). Sodhi (who had taken KK's place) contacted me to know what he should do now that Anant Pathania and his GSO1 Manohar were nowhere to be seen. I authorised him to make his own way as best as practical. Lakhanpal, the 48 Bde Signals Officer, contacted me and presented a similar situation and I had to authorise the 'pull-out' and a move back by certain 'bounds'. He was intercepted by the Chinese at the second bound and was obliged to hide till nightfall in a nearby stream. A week later he turned up looking famished and under-weight, but in good heart.
At the Henderson Brook's Committee later on, of course Signals were the favourite whipping boy. I however had taken good care, to provide convincing proof to the contrary in every case. Even our DD Sigs (Chakerburty) had turned up at Tezpur 'to know what went wrong'. I directed him to the BGS, who directed him back to me, saying 'nothing went wrong, and, to remember PS gave us signal comns while we were retreating'. A mere officer in Signals like him, as against a Signals Officer, cannot be expected to comprehend such subtleties.
My wife, Harbans, also has liked your book. We expect to be in Delhi for two weeks from about 20 Feb and would love to meet you. Shall let you know actual dates and contact you on arrival.
Brigadier PS GILL (Retd)
January 30th, 2002
Signal Communications India- China conflict 1962: CSO IV Corps
HQ Eastern Command Lucknow
After my meeting with Lt Gen EG Pettengell at Dehradun I reckon that Kaul having taken charge of the affairs and with direct access to the Defence Minister had absolved the Eastern Command of all responsibility. Things were normal at Lucknow in so far as Signals were concerned, General Pettengell would have definitely recalled had there been any anxiety or incident regarding message traffic between 7 Brigade and New Delhi.
Army HQ New Delhi
Lt Col CUK Nair was the Commanding Officer of the Signal Regiment at Army HQ, the last link in the Signals chain that started from Dhola, at the Tri Junction in NEFA, a chain formed by Runners from Dhola to Ziminthung, carrying the Top Secret, Exclusive For, hand written messages from Kaul to the Nehru or Menon as the case may be, to be enciphered for transmission to Tezpur by Morse code on the wireless link. I did have the privilege of having a look at one of these messages, but it was of no interest to me at that time nor do I recollect any thing of it now, I only had a cursory look at it and it hardly registered, I had my own problems to sort out rather than worry about higher conduct of war and national policies and priorities to bother about. At Tezpur the messages were re-enciphered in machine cipher for transmission to Army HQ on the direct link established from 4 Corps. As soon the operator at the Cipher Office at Army HQ Signal Centre at New Delhi decoded to the words 'Exclusive For' he would stop and handover further deciphering to the Duty Cipher officer. On deciphering the Signal Officer on duty would personally carry and deliver the message to the addressee, the PM or the DM as the case maybe. Day or night, the messages were marked FLASH, the highest priority for clearance, even then it took three days for the first message to reach Delhi. On delivery the CO would be informed who possibly may have also informed the Director Signals Maj Gen Batra the next day of the receipt and successful delivery of the message. Col Nair, unfortunately developed bleeding ulcers and had to be rushed to the Military Hospital due to an allergic reaction to Aspirin the "on" medicine in maximum demand by officers those days.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
We Thank Brig Lakshman Singh for giving us all the episodes on India China Conflict which are really extracts from his book and also sharing his personal and gripping experiences with us. Our Politicians Dilemma as of today:
Left faction of India’s Communists (Karat supporting UPA) had been repeating what Mao Zedhong said to Ajoy Ghosh: “That Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA are provinces peopled by the same race, that China had a historic right to these territories, that the McMahon line was not valid, and that the Indian government’s raising of 'the bogey of Chinese aggression' had resulted from its realisation that Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and India would be deeply affected by the social and economic revolution in Tibet”.
I am grateful to you for letting me go through the Signals Story. It is an excellent personal account by a Brigade Signals Officer, who performed his duties unfailingly, under extreme difficulties of inhospitable terrain and weather conditions, shortages of equipment or high altitude clothing.
You have penned so tellingly the entire gamut of emotions as the leader of your men and, one separated from one's family often without news or contact for long intervals. Your intrinsic qualities of leadership and the personal example you set throughout those difficult days, was a major factor for survival of your men, considering that the paralysed higher headquarters could give no succour of any kind, and in fact failed you, and 7 Bde completely.
When placed in similar circumstances we (in the Services) all feel the things you have felt and penned so aptly, but seldom written down. At least I have not come across any. For me reading your story has been a unique and a rewarding experience.
It also fulfils the crying need for educating our country's babudom (politico-bureaucratic) mindset, which believes (mistakenly of course) that those who don the uniform have chosen voluntarily, to suffer (uncalled for) hardship and to die. I once came across such an attitude, and had to remind the 'babu' in no uncertain terms that we are there to see that the enemy suffers and dies and thus ensure continued safety of the likes of him– we accept only the attendant risks. The risks that can be reduced by loosening of purse strings at the appropriate time.
It is also my (1962) experience that often good signal communications, for some, was an unmitigated nuisance since the user commander could be asked for a decision or such like. So he was 'always gone forward' without the rover set. I once even asked one such commander as to where was his Rover WAS. He replied he did not need one.
Those days I personally (from Tezpur) closed down the VHF (ANT/ARC) link at Sela, as everyone of any consequence had vanished. The same happened at Darrang (4 Div HQ) and Bomdilla (48 Bde HQ). Sodhi (who had taken KK's place) contacted me to know what he should do now that Anant Pathania and his GSO1 Manohar were nowhere to be seen. I authorised him to make his own way as best as practical. Lakhanpal, the 48 Bde Signals Officer, contacted me and presented a similar situation and I had to authorise the 'pull-out' and a move back by certain 'bounds'. He was intercepted by the Chinese at the second bound and was obliged to hide till nightfall in a nearby stream. A week later he turned up looking famished and under-weight, but in good heart.
At the Henderson Brook's Committee later on, of course Signals were the favourite whipping boy. I however had taken good care, to provide convincing proof to the contrary in every case. Even our DD Sigs (Chakerburty) had turned up at Tezpur 'to know what went wrong'. I directed him to the BGS, who directed him back to me, saying 'nothing went wrong, and, to remember PS gave us signal comns while we were retreating'. A mere officer in Signals like him, as against a Signals Officer, cannot be expected to comprehend such subtleties.
My wife, Harbans, also has liked your book. We expect to be in Delhi for two weeks from about 20 Feb and would love to meet you. Shall let you know actual dates and contact you on arrival.
Brigadier PS GILL (Retd)
January 30th, 2002
Signal Communications India- China conflict 1962: CSO IV Corps
HQ Eastern Command Lucknow
After my meeting with Lt Gen EG Pettengell at Dehradun I reckon that Kaul having taken charge of the affairs and with direct access to the Defence Minister had absolved the Eastern Command of all responsibility. Things were normal at Lucknow in so far as Signals were concerned, General Pettengell would have definitely recalled had there been any anxiety or incident regarding message traffic between 7 Brigade and New Delhi.
Army HQ New Delhi
Lt Col CUK Nair was the Commanding Officer of the Signal Regiment at Army HQ, the last link in the Signals chain that started from Dhola, at the Tri Junction in NEFA, a chain formed by Runners from Dhola to Ziminthung, carrying the Top Secret, Exclusive For, hand written messages from Kaul to the Nehru or Menon as the case may be, to be enciphered for transmission to Tezpur by Morse code on the wireless link. I did have the privilege of having a look at one of these messages, but it was of no interest to me at that time nor do I recollect any thing of it now, I only had a cursory look at it and it hardly registered, I had my own problems to sort out rather than worry about higher conduct of war and national policies and priorities to bother about. At Tezpur the messages were re-enciphered in machine cipher for transmission to Army HQ on the direct link established from 4 Corps. As soon the operator at the Cipher Office at Army HQ Signal Centre at New Delhi decoded to the words 'Exclusive For' he would stop and handover further deciphering to the Duty Cipher officer. On deciphering the Signal Officer on duty would personally carry and deliver the message to the addressee, the PM or the DM as the case maybe. Day or night, the messages were marked FLASH, the highest priority for clearance, even then it took three days for the first message to reach Delhi. On delivery the CO would be informed who possibly may have also informed the Director Signals Maj Gen Batra the next day of the receipt and successful delivery of the message. Col Nair, unfortunately developed bleeding ulcers and had to be rushed to the Military Hospital due to an allergic reaction to Aspirin the "on" medicine in maximum demand by officers those days.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
We Thank Brig Lakshman Singh for giving us all the episodes on India China Conflict which are really extracts from his book and also sharing his personal and gripping experiences with us. Our Politicians Dilemma as of today:
Left faction of India’s Communists (Karat supporting UPA) had been repeating what Mao Zedhong said to Ajoy Ghosh: “That Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA are provinces peopled by the same race, that China had a historic right to these territories, that the McMahon line was not valid, and that the Indian government’s raising of 'the bogey of Chinese aggression' had resulted from its realisation that Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and India would be deeply affected by the social and economic revolution in Tibet”.
Friday, June 13, 2008
India China Conflict 1962. The Big Picture Perceived by Signal Officer
IV Corps Signals at TEZPUR
As Sparrow of 7 Brigade I had no idea as to what was happening at the twice- removed Corps HQ in so far as Signals were concerned. Even later I could find nothing that could help me complete the big picture of Signals during Op Leghorn. However, I was lucky in that, during one of my visits to USI (United Services Institute) at New Delhi, Col VK Singh provided me with the address and Telephone No of Brig PS Gill the then CSO 4 Corps at Pune from his records. Brig Gill has been more than kind to provide material from his personal papers, which could not have been found anywhere else.
Biji Kaul's DHOLA- NAMKA CHU adventure of 1962 as told by Brig PS Gill the then CSO IV Corps.
Forward Policy
The genesis lay in Biji Kaul's forward policy (AR posts, assisted by regular army officers such as Mahabir, were to be Tactically sited right up to the MacMohan Line to remain there throughout the year), and the notion that 'possession is nine- tenth of the law.' Of course Nehru was taken in by his 'novel' approach. Additionally Biji had convinced himself that his destiny was heading for really great things. (Retirement of Chaudhary, next in line to be the Chief, had been announced). Of course he had not bothered himself about the severe restrictions imposed by terrain, extremes of weather condition nor distances from rail/ road head, nor even the inaccuracies in the available maps.
IB assessment parallels recent CIA assessment of Iraq
In September/ October 1962, barring Thapar, Sen and Kaul, everyone was certain that an ill- equipped unready 7 Brigade (seven days from the road head) was being assigned an untenable role. Assurances by Mullick of the IB were taken as the Gospel truth- Chinese will never attack.
Misadventure not heeded
Umrao's reasoned pleadings against any such venture were not heeded– to this effect he had put his signatures to two really telling appreciations of the situation for Eastern command and the AHQ. Also a clash of personalities (Sen/ Umrao) surfaced. Sen went about assuring anyone willing to listen that Umrao was the sole obstacle i.e. but for him Dhola could be secured/ cleared easily. Sitting in Lucknow, how he came to this conclusion remains a mystery.
Birth of IV Corps
Result: Biji's Kaul's IV Corps was born at midnight of 3rd Oct 62. I was awakened and summoned to Kaul's residence around 1 AM that night to be told by him personally, I had been selected to be his CSO. Lack of seniority, the basis of moving me from Shillong in May to Sigs Dte as DD Tels (the very job I had held as GSO1 Tels from 1953 to 1957) was given the go-by. Some 10 hours later (4th October) I accompanied him to Tezpur, in a Viscount of the Presidential flight. En-route, quite naturally, I quizzed him regarding the role, area of responsibility of IV Corps and the troops allocation. He had no satisfactory answer but kept on repeating ap nahin samjhen –ge. I was left with the impression that he was going to Tezpur more to instil some urgency into the Dhola affair/ action.
Hastily formed team
I had never worked with Kaul. I was picked because I had known the NEFA region as CSO XXXIII Corps, since handed over to MBK Nair. Kaul left for LUMPU on 05 Oct. I was to organize and set up the new Corps HQ. Kaul had asked me to send the BGS and the CE to join him 'at the front' on arrival. My good friend "Bhaiya" Rajwade who had been CE XXXIII Corps along with me and was shunted to the CME, also for lack of seniority, was brought in on 6th October as the CE. KK Singh of the Armoured Corps another good friend joined on the seventh as BGS. Both were sent on to join Kaul.
Kaul's Political clout paid dividends
I soon realised what a clout Kaul wielded. DG P&T Nanjappa of the ICS, would call me twice a day to ascertain what he could do for IV Corps and so also other worthies at Army HQ. In no time there were direct telephone and tele-printer lines connecting Tezpur to Delhi. Nanjappa also gave me (on attachment) a P&T Dept LO – IK Gupta, a very capable and efficient officer. As for SDS Indian Airlines instituted a daily Viscount flight Delhi-Tezpur-Delhi – a sort of daily Air Courier. Delhi planners in their keenness to fulfil Kaul's bidding failed to instruct the Courier aircraft to make a stop at Lucknow – ie Eastcom HQ which nominally was controlling IV Corps. I put this right in time.
Porter based supply chain
In the fortnight prior to the Chinese attack of Twentieth October there was very little that IV Corps could do for 7 Bde. I visited Zimithang (TAC HQ 4 Div) and met Ram Singh who despite the various odds had the situation under control. I was certainly appalled by the difficult terrain conditions and the extremely precarious porter- based supply line forward to Namka Chu. Recovery of air dropped supplies was as low as 30 per cent- most of it falling into deep ravines. Two seater Bell Helicopter, which could carry very little, was the only efficient means of getting around.
We lost Ram Singh a very fine officer. He had been our Adjutant in 1950 in 26(2AB) DIV SIGS at Jammu while I was the 2IC and KK was OC 1 Coy.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
The "Traditional China" includes all of South East Asia! Thus, the lessons and implications of the 1962 China- India Border War could be relevant to us for decades or for centuries to come.....
For serious study visit: The China- India Border War (1962) in depth
As Sparrow of 7 Brigade I had no idea as to what was happening at the twice- removed Corps HQ in so far as Signals were concerned. Even later I could find nothing that could help me complete the big picture of Signals during Op Leghorn. However, I was lucky in that, during one of my visits to USI (United Services Institute) at New Delhi, Col VK Singh provided me with the address and Telephone No of Brig PS Gill the then CSO 4 Corps at Pune from his records. Brig Gill has been more than kind to provide material from his personal papers, which could not have been found anywhere else.
Biji Kaul's DHOLA- NAMKA CHU adventure of 1962 as told by Brig PS Gill the then CSO IV Corps.
Forward Policy
The genesis lay in Biji Kaul's forward policy (AR posts, assisted by regular army officers such as Mahabir, were to be Tactically sited right up to the MacMohan Line to remain there throughout the year), and the notion that 'possession is nine- tenth of the law.' Of course Nehru was taken in by his 'novel' approach. Additionally Biji had convinced himself that his destiny was heading for really great things. (Retirement of Chaudhary, next in line to be the Chief, had been announced). Of course he had not bothered himself about the severe restrictions imposed by terrain, extremes of weather condition nor distances from rail/ road head, nor even the inaccuracies in the available maps.
IB assessment parallels recent CIA assessment of Iraq
In September/ October 1962, barring Thapar, Sen and Kaul, everyone was certain that an ill- equipped unready 7 Brigade (seven days from the road head) was being assigned an untenable role. Assurances by Mullick of the IB were taken as the Gospel truth- Chinese will never attack.
Misadventure not heeded
Umrao's reasoned pleadings against any such venture were not heeded– to this effect he had put his signatures to two really telling appreciations of the situation for Eastern command and the AHQ. Also a clash of personalities (Sen/ Umrao) surfaced. Sen went about assuring anyone willing to listen that Umrao was the sole obstacle i.e. but for him Dhola could be secured/ cleared easily. Sitting in Lucknow, how he came to this conclusion remains a mystery.
Birth of IV Corps
Result: Biji's Kaul's IV Corps was born at midnight of 3rd Oct 62. I was awakened and summoned to Kaul's residence around 1 AM that night to be told by him personally, I had been selected to be his CSO. Lack of seniority, the basis of moving me from Shillong in May to Sigs Dte as DD Tels (the very job I had held as GSO1 Tels from 1953 to 1957) was given the go-by. Some 10 hours later (4th October) I accompanied him to Tezpur, in a Viscount of the Presidential flight. En-route, quite naturally, I quizzed him regarding the role, area of responsibility of IV Corps and the troops allocation. He had no satisfactory answer but kept on repeating ap nahin samjhen –ge. I was left with the impression that he was going to Tezpur more to instil some urgency into the Dhola affair/ action.
Hastily formed team
I had never worked with Kaul. I was picked because I had known the NEFA region as CSO XXXIII Corps, since handed over to MBK Nair. Kaul left for LUMPU on 05 Oct. I was to organize and set up the new Corps HQ. Kaul had asked me to send the BGS and the CE to join him 'at the front' on arrival. My good friend "Bhaiya" Rajwade who had been CE XXXIII Corps along with me and was shunted to the CME, also for lack of seniority, was brought in on 6th October as the CE. KK Singh of the Armoured Corps another good friend joined on the seventh as BGS. Both were sent on to join Kaul.
Kaul's Political clout paid dividends
I soon realised what a clout Kaul wielded. DG P&T Nanjappa of the ICS, would call me twice a day to ascertain what he could do for IV Corps and so also other worthies at Army HQ. In no time there were direct telephone and tele-printer lines connecting Tezpur to Delhi. Nanjappa also gave me (on attachment) a P&T Dept LO – IK Gupta, a very capable and efficient officer. As for SDS Indian Airlines instituted a daily Viscount flight Delhi-Tezpur-Delhi – a sort of daily Air Courier. Delhi planners in their keenness to fulfil Kaul's bidding failed to instruct the Courier aircraft to make a stop at Lucknow – ie Eastcom HQ which nominally was controlling IV Corps. I put this right in time.
Porter based supply chain
In the fortnight prior to the Chinese attack of Twentieth October there was very little that IV Corps could do for 7 Bde. I visited Zimithang (TAC HQ 4 Div) and met Ram Singh who despite the various odds had the situation under control. I was certainly appalled by the difficult terrain conditions and the extremely precarious porter- based supply line forward to Namka Chu. Recovery of air dropped supplies was as low as 30 per cent- most of it falling into deep ravines. Two seater Bell Helicopter, which could carry very little, was the only efficient means of getting around.
We lost Ram Singh a very fine officer. He had been our Adjutant in 1950 in 26(2AB) DIV SIGS at Jammu while I was the 2IC and KK was OC 1 Coy.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
The "Traditional China" includes all of South East Asia! Thus, the lessons and implications of the 1962 China- India Border War could be relevant to us for decades or for centuries to come.....
For serious study visit: The China- India Border War (1962) in depth
Saturday, May 31, 2008
Indo- China War 1962
Inaccurate Maps
Suddenly our role was changed from defence of Tawang, the Divisional Vital Ground, to evict the Chinese from DHOLA post. Moves on the chessboard started. Planting of small flags on maps in the Operations Rooms of various HQ had commenced. Unfortunately most of the maps were sketchy and at best inaccurate. Incredibly the whole of the operation of river Namka Chu involving 7 Bde was planned on a sketch prepared by an Assam Rifles jawan. This was the best available at all levels from Brigade to Army HQ. It was inaccurate, not to scale and was supplied to all and sundry in the form of a blueprint. Even I was de- briefed on the same on my return from the debacle by the Director Military Intelligence and the Director Signals.
No Border Maps
A word about the state of maps of the area of Op Leghorn and why the Assam Rifle sketch became so important and indispensable. I quote from a letter, dated 24 Sep 2001, from my elder brother Shri Ratna Singh.
Quote.- It was about October, at this time, I was a supervisory officer in Survey of India at Dehradun and we were working round the clock in connection with the up dating of our Northern Border maps using Aerial Photography and photogrammetric techniques. It is interesting to, note that till then our border maps were sketchy and could not be relied upon. -Unquote.
Communications
9 Punjab was ordered to move from Tawang and contact Dhola post. CO Lt Col Mishra in the process deployed his battalion along the Namka Chu River line. To my ill luck, he never took the Signals detachment with him and left the 62 Set and the operators at his base at Lumpu with his 2IC Major Dilbagh Singh. He had his own set working back to the base at Lumpu. He must have had his own reasons for this unconventional action. However, my problems and brickbats from higher HQ had already started, who were not interested in Mishra's reasons, they were more worried as to why information was not coming through signal channels.
Delay in passage of messages
The extremely long distances over which communications were required, all the way from Army HQ at Delhi to Dhola, on the Tri- junction of India China and Bhutan had its own problems. Engineered on different and mostly mismatched equipment, vagaries of atmospherics and the physics of ionosphere, the system was far from robust with little redundancy. Holdings and use of multiple cryptographic systems, Linex, Book and Machine at various levels from Battalions, Brigade, Division to Army HQ added their own share to the bottlenecks and delays at various levels in the passage of the messages.
Mobile communication
Split HQs, Commanders and Staff mostly away from their HQs, Signals uprooted time and again and mostly on move, it was a wonder that Communications did exist, if at all. Delays had to happen in the passage of messages. No doubt I had to bear the brunt, even though both my CO Lt Col Tewari and the Commander Brig Dalvi shielded me. However, Priority messages pending in the signal centre or on the wireless links, the only means of clearing traffic, did create their own share of stress in me, as would have been the case with any other signal officer.
Delay of Top Secret Messages
Senior Signals Officers had also to share the burden of pressures from top. Brig Dalvi has recorded in his book about the delay in a Top Secret message from Gen Kaul originated from 1/9 GR location, from where there was no provision or facility to clear such messages. The Signal elements of the Brigade including me were all this time on move, the Brigade had neither a functioning HQ nor any signal communication system.
Brigadier Dalvi writes
quote- A sturdy Sikh from the Punjabis would be detailed to 'run' with the vital message to Lumpu. From there, the second- in–command of the Punjabis would phone it through to Ziminthaung (A Top Secret message on an open line, to which a Chinese agent possibly could have te-ed in his telephone for transmission to Peking even before it reached Delhi.) where it would be enciphered and transmitted to Tezpur, Delhi and Lucknow. The first message reached Delhi after three days. Mr Menon was extremely annoyed and demanding the dismissal of the Chief Signal Officer of Eastern Command for inefficiency.-unquote
Brig Lakshman Singh (Retd)
Tawang was returned to the control of India. The valiant last stand of Mahavir Chakra awardee Jaswant Singh Rawat took place in Tawang. After the voluntary withdrawal of Chinese troops, Tawang was once again under Indian administration. In recent years, China has occasionally voiced its claims on Arunachal Pradesh, especially Tawang, and Chinese troop incursions continue to occur frequently. According to news reports, the state government was willing to swap territories with China in order to make border adjustments, but it firmly refused to lose out any major towns or monasteries to China. Today, Tawang serves as a center for tourist attractions, thanks to the preserved beauty of the Tawang monastery.
Saturday, May 24, 2008
1962 Indo- China War
The scene now shifts to the October 20th morning when the Chinese launched a massive attack on the 7 Inf Brigade.
A soldiers version, Bhairon Singh narrates:
Chinese firing
I was part of a three men patrol which had gone out on the night of 19th and we had returned to our company location say at about 3 AM, we had made tea and were resting, it was still dark when the Chinese firing started.
Deployment
The company was deployed with the number one platoon well forward, right on the river line, number two on the left. The number three platoon alongwith the Company HQ was right at the back. Lt Ravi Sahib, who had taken over the command from Mangat Sahib at the time of the company taking defensive position and Subedar Phool Singh the Company JCO were located in the company HQ.
Do not fire at random
Heavy firing continued, after about one hour Ravi Sahib came down to the number one platoon location. We were deployed right on the river line with the Chinese on the other side, so near to us that a strong man like me could easily lob a grenade at them. We were still in bunkers. ‘Fire the moment you see the enemy, don’t fire at random’. Ravi Sahib told the jawans.
Loss of communications
At about 8 AM, I was called by Ravi Sahib. He ordered me to go to Bn HQ and bring verbal orders from the CO. The company was now cut- off from the Bn HQ and none of the communication links were working. The telephone line to the Battalion HQ had been cut earlier by the Chinese, the Radio was also not through. (The Signals bunker at the Bn HQ had already been destroyed due to Chinese fire) He also sent a young boy, Govind Singh to accompany me. Even before we could get out of the company defended locality, a mortar bomb landed directly on Govind Singh killing him on the spot. Now I was left alone and was on my own.
Protection Force
On reaching the Bn HQ I found all the men of his protection platoon had been killed Rikh Sahib had carried three LMG’s in side his bunker along with all the ammunition. Keeping his pistol aside he would, fill, load and fire the LMG’s himself. He should have been awarded the PVC; there is no justice in this world. If some one will ask me I will tell him all about Rikh Sahib. To this I (Author) responded by the question to him that the book written by Maj Gen Verma does not mention this. ‘Sir No one ever asked me. No JCO or Officer knows as much about Rikh Sahib as I do because I was on the ground and no one else had reached there till then those who wish can say anything they want’.
Commanding Officer
He continued, behind the CO’s Command Post there was a cutting and the Chinese were attacking from there from the rear. The attack did not come from the front, the riverside, but from the rear. He had turned the LMG around and was firing at the Chinese. There was fog and it had also started to snow the low visibility making it difficult for the Chinese to pinpoint from where the fire was coming. I was also finding it difficult to locate Rikh Sahib and reach near him. I had taken position. Now only one LMG was firing. Ultimately the Chinese fired a burst aiming at the muzzle flash of the LMG, smashing his right arm. Undaunted he continued to still fill the magazine with his left hand and also fire by the same hand. He had not fallen down and was still standing.
Chinese Capture
By that time a Chinese soldier had crawled up to the bunker and he lobed a grenade in the bunker. I had also reached near by this time. There was a hissing sound from the grenade, Rikh Sahib caught hold of the grenade and threw it out side. It needs courage to do what he did. As you know, you are a senior officer (author) one is scared of even touching a grenade. The grenade burst before hitting the ground and one splinter hit Rikh Sahib breaking his Jaw and he fell down. The Chinese now approached the bunker, angry that this particular man had inflicted the maximum damage to them they dragged him, he was not wearing the badges of rank, out of the bunker pulling him by his legs.
Chinese casualties
What I am telling is the reality, the facts no one knows as much about the incident as I do. Because of the casualties they had suffered at the hands of Rikh Sahib the Chinese were furious and tried to bayonet him. Luckily he escaped, as he was about to be bayoneted, I fired and the bullet went through the hand of the Chinese who fell ahead of Rikh Sahib with the bayonet missing him. By this time some of our men and Maj Gurdial Singh Sahib, the 2 IC, were also being escorted to the same place as prisoners.
Prisoners
Seeing him, I started shouting loudly ‘Commanding Officer ko mar rahain hain.’(They are killing the Commanding officer) Gurdial Singh Sahib came running others had not yet reached there, even though his hands were tied. He stood with his two feet astride Rick Sahib lying injured on the ground. ‘If you want to shoot, shoot me, he is already injured what is the purpose of shooting him’ said Gurdial Singh Sahib in an emotionally charged voice. By that time a senior Chinese officer had also arrived there. There was some discussion between him and Gurdial Singh in English, some heated words were also exchanged but ultimately the Chinese cooled down and asked "What do you want". Gurdial Singh "We want to carry him, he is our CO"
No order to withdraw
The Chinese officer acceded to the request. Gurdial Singh Sahib shouted towards me in a loud voice ‘You go back and tell your Company Commander to move to the location of the company (1/9 GR) deployed near the Bde HQ on the mountain side join them and fight along them’. I ran back to the company and conveyed the order from Gurdial Singh Sahib to Lt Ravi. I also told him that the CO was injured. Subedar Vasudev Sahib also joined in. At this Ravi Sahib reacted ‘One does not withdraw from battlefield, I cannot order withdrawal. ‘But, Sir where is the question of withdrawal, the order is to go to Brigade HQ, it is only a change of position’
‘No, I can’t give this order’ He did not give the order.
Heavy fighting
Anyway by now the company was also under attack by the Chinese. There was hand to hand and bayonet fighting in our company locality and one after another the Chinese fell. I forgot to mention that after the 9 Punjab action the 9th of October the Chinese kept on carrying away their dead, the casualties, resulting from the firing by ‘C’ Company, for three days and we kept on watching from the bridge. Heavy casualties had taken place in our company, ultimately at about 8 AM Ravi Sahib gave the order that surviving Jawans should move to the Brigade HQ. Ravi Sahib, few other Jawans and I rushed to the Brigade HQ.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Not a single man from B, C or D Companies was awarded any gallantry medal as there was no one left to write the citations because there was no officer or JCO who was not killed or seriously wounded and taken POW. When the CO, Lt Col MS Rikh was released from the POW camp, he wrote up the citations but GoI and MoD made lame excuses and did not pay any attention to them. There is a memorial erected to those who fought at Namka Chu, which is a ricktey tin shed with names still missing from it and names of persons who were not there have been put up. Major BK Pant's company of 112 men had 82 killed and wounded. What more does a country want from its brave sons and not honour them properly?
Orbat
7th Infantry Brigade at the Battle of the Namkachu 1962
Commander Brigadier John Dalvi
1/9th Gorkhas Lt Col BS Alhuwalia
2nd Rajputs Lt Col Maha Singh Rikh
4th Grenadiers Lt Col KS Harihar Singh
9th Punjab Lt Col RN Mishra
Commanding Officers: Due to up gradation the Battalions which were previously commanded by Lt Colonels are now commanded by full Colonels. Only future full scale wars will tell if the up gradation was a wise decision or a trap by bureaucracy to dilute the command and control structure of a Battalion. One wishes that in future the Battalions are not commanded by Brigadiers as ongoing process of up gradation!
A soldiers version, Bhairon Singh narrates:
Chinese firing
I was part of a three men patrol which had gone out on the night of 19th and we had returned to our company location say at about 3 AM, we had made tea and were resting, it was still dark when the Chinese firing started.
Deployment
The company was deployed with the number one platoon well forward, right on the river line, number two on the left. The number three platoon alongwith the Company HQ was right at the back. Lt Ravi Sahib, who had taken over the command from Mangat Sahib at the time of the company taking defensive position and Subedar Phool Singh the Company JCO were located in the company HQ.
Do not fire at random
Heavy firing continued, after about one hour Ravi Sahib came down to the number one platoon location. We were deployed right on the river line with the Chinese on the other side, so near to us that a strong man like me could easily lob a grenade at them. We were still in bunkers. ‘Fire the moment you see the enemy, don’t fire at random’. Ravi Sahib told the jawans.
Loss of communications
At about 8 AM, I was called by Ravi Sahib. He ordered me to go to Bn HQ and bring verbal orders from the CO. The company was now cut- off from the Bn HQ and none of the communication links were working. The telephone line to the Battalion HQ had been cut earlier by the Chinese, the Radio was also not through. (The Signals bunker at the Bn HQ had already been destroyed due to Chinese fire) He also sent a young boy, Govind Singh to accompany me. Even before we could get out of the company defended locality, a mortar bomb landed directly on Govind Singh killing him on the spot. Now I was left alone and was on my own.
Protection Force
On reaching the Bn HQ I found all the men of his protection platoon had been killed Rikh Sahib had carried three LMG’s in side his bunker along with all the ammunition. Keeping his pistol aside he would, fill, load and fire the LMG’s himself. He should have been awarded the PVC; there is no justice in this world. If some one will ask me I will tell him all about Rikh Sahib. To this I (Author) responded by the question to him that the book written by Maj Gen Verma does not mention this. ‘Sir No one ever asked me. No JCO or Officer knows as much about Rikh Sahib as I do because I was on the ground and no one else had reached there till then those who wish can say anything they want’.
Commanding Officer
He continued, behind the CO’s Command Post there was a cutting and the Chinese were attacking from there from the rear. The attack did not come from the front, the riverside, but from the rear. He had turned the LMG around and was firing at the Chinese. There was fog and it had also started to snow the low visibility making it difficult for the Chinese to pinpoint from where the fire was coming. I was also finding it difficult to locate Rikh Sahib and reach near him. I had taken position. Now only one LMG was firing. Ultimately the Chinese fired a burst aiming at the muzzle flash of the LMG, smashing his right arm. Undaunted he continued to still fill the magazine with his left hand and also fire by the same hand. He had not fallen down and was still standing.
Chinese Capture
By that time a Chinese soldier had crawled up to the bunker and he lobed a grenade in the bunker. I had also reached near by this time. There was a hissing sound from the grenade, Rikh Sahib caught hold of the grenade and threw it out side. It needs courage to do what he did. As you know, you are a senior officer (author) one is scared of even touching a grenade. The grenade burst before hitting the ground and one splinter hit Rikh Sahib breaking his Jaw and he fell down. The Chinese now approached the bunker, angry that this particular man had inflicted the maximum damage to them they dragged him, he was not wearing the badges of rank, out of the bunker pulling him by his legs.
Chinese casualties
What I am telling is the reality, the facts no one knows as much about the incident as I do. Because of the casualties they had suffered at the hands of Rikh Sahib the Chinese were furious and tried to bayonet him. Luckily he escaped, as he was about to be bayoneted, I fired and the bullet went through the hand of the Chinese who fell ahead of Rikh Sahib with the bayonet missing him. By this time some of our men and Maj Gurdial Singh Sahib, the 2 IC, were also being escorted to the same place as prisoners.
Prisoners
Seeing him, I started shouting loudly ‘Commanding Officer ko mar rahain hain.’(They are killing the Commanding officer) Gurdial Singh Sahib came running others had not yet reached there, even though his hands were tied. He stood with his two feet astride Rick Sahib lying injured on the ground. ‘If you want to shoot, shoot me, he is already injured what is the purpose of shooting him’ said Gurdial Singh Sahib in an emotionally charged voice. By that time a senior Chinese officer had also arrived there. There was some discussion between him and Gurdial Singh in English, some heated words were also exchanged but ultimately the Chinese cooled down and asked "What do you want". Gurdial Singh "We want to carry him, he is our CO"
No order to withdraw
The Chinese officer acceded to the request. Gurdial Singh Sahib shouted towards me in a loud voice ‘You go back and tell your Company Commander to move to the location of the company (1/9 GR) deployed near the Bde HQ on the mountain side join them and fight along them’. I ran back to the company and conveyed the order from Gurdial Singh Sahib to Lt Ravi. I also told him that the CO was injured. Subedar Vasudev Sahib also joined in. At this Ravi Sahib reacted ‘One does not withdraw from battlefield, I cannot order withdrawal. ‘But, Sir where is the question of withdrawal, the order is to go to Brigade HQ, it is only a change of position’
‘No, I can’t give this order’ He did not give the order.
Heavy fighting
Anyway by now the company was also under attack by the Chinese. There was hand to hand and bayonet fighting in our company locality and one after another the Chinese fell. I forgot to mention that after the 9 Punjab action the 9th of October the Chinese kept on carrying away their dead, the casualties, resulting from the firing by ‘C’ Company, for three days and we kept on watching from the bridge. Heavy casualties had taken place in our company, ultimately at about 8 AM Ravi Sahib gave the order that surviving Jawans should move to the Brigade HQ. Ravi Sahib, few other Jawans and I rushed to the Brigade HQ.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Not a single man from B, C or D Companies was awarded any gallantry medal as there was no one left to write the citations because there was no officer or JCO who was not killed or seriously wounded and taken POW. When the CO, Lt Col MS Rikh was released from the POW camp, he wrote up the citations but GoI and MoD made lame excuses and did not pay any attention to them. There is a memorial erected to those who fought at Namka Chu, which is a ricktey tin shed with names still missing from it and names of persons who were not there have been put up. Major BK Pant's company of 112 men had 82 killed and wounded. What more does a country want from its brave sons and not honour them properly?
Orbat
7th Infantry Brigade at the Battle of the Namkachu 1962
Commander Brigadier John Dalvi
1/9th Gorkhas Lt Col BS Alhuwalia
2nd Rajputs Lt Col Maha Singh Rikh
4th Grenadiers Lt Col KS Harihar Singh
9th Punjab Lt Col RN Mishra
Commanding Officers: Due to up gradation the Battalions which were previously commanded by Lt Colonels are now commanded by full Colonels. Only future full scale wars will tell if the up gradation was a wise decision or a trap by bureaucracy to dilute the command and control structure of a Battalion. One wishes that in future the Battalions are not commanded by Brigadiers as ongoing process of up gradation!
Saturday, May 10, 2008
Battle of the Namkachu 1962
One was Breathless, Sleepless, Hungry and Tired beyond words. No Oxygen and no Snow clothing. The Karpola pass was the Battle Zone. One can imagine what would have been the condition when we were withdrawing from the Chinese onslaught.
Brig lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Summary: 7th Infantry Brigade paid the price with its blood.
Chinese forces directly attacking 7th Brigade included 11th Division, Tsona Dzong. A second division and a separate or independent regiment joined 11th Division in the subsequent fight against 4th Division.
That the Indian infantry stood and fought and died in the conditions and circumstances of the Battle of Namkachu had nothing to do with its senior officers, and everything to do with its company and battalion officers and its traditions of honour– honour to your brother soldier, to your unit, to your officers, and to your flag.
Tailpiece: The higher military leadership had been so beaten down and cowed by the Government, that the senior officers who should have set the terms and the timetable for this offensive remained silent. 7 Infantry Brigade paid the price in blood. Our hearts go out to them. Is there a memorial to honour them or to place a wreath or candle for their eternal supreme sacrifice?
We acknowledge with thanks “Famous Battles” from http://www.bharat-rakshak.com
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