Is the Army physically fit for warfare?

Unfit Army? Survey finds 30% overweight
Durgesh Nandan Jha, TNN Sep 5, 2011, 01.07am IST
NEW DELHI: A study on the health of Indian Army personnel has thrown up worrying results. Four out of five personnel surveyed, including officers, were found suffering from pre-hypertension, about a third were overweight and two-thirds had low levels of good cholesterol (HDL), caused by lack of exercise.
The sample survey was conducted by the defence ministry and Indian Council of Medical Research on 767 'healthy' personnel including 130 officers. Their ages ranged from 18 to 50 years.
The study also found a majority of the personnel had bad eating habits. Most of them added salt or pickle to their food and used ghee/butter regularly.
Unfit Army

Letter to Times of India by Brig Lakshman Singh (Retd)
UNFIT ARMY –screamed the headline from the front page of the Monday Times of India.
The second or the third larges standing Army in the World discredited based on a sample survey of 767. How many of the sample were from Arms and how many from Services, how many of the surveyed were deployed in field and how many in peace stations how many married and staying with the family, was the ethnic background also taken into consideration.
I retired long back from the army, there used to tests for physical fitness like BPET and PPT, annual medical examinations both for officers and the men. The nature of job, as such, created stress and to relieve it that were regular games and sports, music on radio and magazines newspapers, books and also Sanik Sammelans, where the Commanding Officer addressed the unit personnel once a month.
Has everything changed in the present day army, I do wonder: not possible to my mind.
If Army is unfit, the reason has to be found some where else. In September of 1962 we, of Seven Brigade ocated at Tawang, ill-equipped and ill clothed for winter, with no snow clothing available, in woollen jersey and angora shirt, for fighting at the heights of 16000 feet plus, for personal arms the troops had the, World War Two, 303 Le-Enfield rifle with 50 rounds of ammunition and the units without digging tools, barbed -wire, mines and no Artillery support, were told to take on the Chinese.
Possibly equipment wise with modernising lagging behind for one reason or other, things are no batter even now. If Army is unfit one has to seek the reason somewhere else.
I would also suggest your copywriter to be slightly more discreet ‘Eye Catching’ head lines look good but can be damaging to the institutions in the eyes of the Nation,

National Security: Brace for two-front war, Army told

Rahul Datta | New Delhi Tuesday, June 29, 2010
In an unprecedented move that has confirmed India’s concerns about China’s growing military might, the Government has for the first time given a directive in writing to the armed forces to enhance their military capabilities vis-a-vis the neighbouring country and prepare for a two-front war scenario with China and Pakistan.

Asking the armed forces to prepare themselves to fight simultaneous wars on the eastern and western fronts with China and Pakistan, Defence Minister AK Antony has directed the chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force to rapidly modernise and upgrade their weapon systems and tone up operational preparedness.

The Services have been assured full support from the Government in this endeavour, sources said.

Explaining the significance of the directive, the sources maintained that it came against the backdrop of the armed forces’ apprehensions about the rapid modernisation programme of their Chinese counterparts. The directive will allow the armed forces to build capabilities to rapidly move troops from one theatre of war to the other by procuring more transport planes and improved rail and road network for ferrying weapons systems.

Modern warfare was all about speed, lethality and mobility and the directive would go a long way in helping the armed forces achieve this objective as soon as possible, the sources added.

The directive follows the Cabinet Committee on Security’s (CCS) nod to the Army to raise two more mountain divisions (each division has 10,000 troops) on the China front. With the focus on improving infrastructure, the Army was last year allowed to raise two mountain divisions. It means that in the next four or five years, it would have four divisions on the China front.

The Government has also removed the 10-year cap on recruitment and permitted the Army to go for fresh intakes. Coupled with this important development, the Government has cleared the proposal to acquire more than 200 Howitzer guns for these divisions through the foreign military sale route from the US.

“The Howitzer guns are light. These can be dismantled and carried on horseback or by helicopters to the remote and rugged terrain of Arunachal Pradesh and other such regions in Jammu & Kashmir where road infrastructure is non-existent,” sources said.

While the two-front war concept was in public domain and being discussed in seminars and TV debates, the political leadership had so far refrained from joining the debate. The recently-issued directive clearly indicates that the Government has finally heeded the concerns of the armed forces and given them unambiguous orders to go ahead and do the needful, sources said.

This decision would give the necessary momentum to the security establishment to improve the infrastructure, including all-weather roads right up to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and airports and helipads in remote regions of States like Arunachal Pradesh. In fact, the armed forces are already engaged in upgrading nearly 25 airports in the North-East and the project is likely to be over within the next two years.

India and China have a 5,000-km-long disputed border and the Chinese have over the years rapidly improved their logistical lines by building roads right up to their side of the LAC. India is in a disadvantageous position as the terrain on its side is hilly and building roads there takes more time than in the plains, sources said, adding that the slopes on the Chinese side are gentler.
Brace for two-front war, Army told by Rahul Datta | New Delhi

Are We Heading for a 1962 Repeat?

Numerous reports have been emerging in the print and electronic media of a possible repeat of 1962 by the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), objective Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh (AP/NEFA).

Bharat Verma, Editor of Defence Today in an article in his Journal states that it may be as early as October 2009 (before the onset of the winter). Linked with the ambivalent Chinese posture it appears a possibility. Yet another China watcher confirms in his letter “The inflation noose”, this possibility is to divert the attention of the Chinese from the rising inflation in that country. So China may well head for Tawang. And to add credence to this deadline, a well known Sinologist of a reputed Think Tank quotes a Chinese writer from Beijing that the Chinese plan is to fragment India and hence the “String of Pearls” strategy. This assessment has not yet been refuted by the Beijing Mandarins! So what better take off point than the occupation of NEFA? These views have been prominently discussed in the Indian media; to which the three Service Chiefs have emphatically stated that the modernisation of the Armed Forces lags far behind that of China in every field including the Defence budget. The Naval Chief has bluntly stated that the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) is well ahead of the Indian Navy as was demonstrated at an imposing naval review showcasing the Chinese Blue Water Fleet, be it aircraft carriers, submarines or other surface warships.
Read full article:
Are We Heading for a 1962 Repeat? Maj. Gen.(Retd) E. D’Souza
Related reading
Dalai Lama may visit Tawang in November

Indo- China war 1962: Battle of Namkachu

Why we forget the heroes of the Battle of Namkachu at the tri junction of INDIA, BHUTAN and TIBET October 20, 1962? Question still lingers... bureaucrats enlightened... the Military remain confused...

Down Memory Lane
Sometime earlier, Mangat had written a letter to Ian Cardozo, his erstwhile roommate at IMA, that aptly describes the situation prevailing and the spirit and morale of the officers and men of 2 Rajput deployed in the valley.
He wrote:
My dear Cardi It looks like it is I who will go first into battle. I am not able to tell you where I am but we are just short of the McMahon Line. The Chinese hold the high ground and seem to be in great strength. Should they attack we will defend our territory to our very last breath. It is very cold out here and we do not have snow clothing but we will give the Chinese a hot reception if they dare to attack. Will tell you all about it, IF and WHEN we meet again, I don't know where you are but I wish we were better prepared.
With regards and best wishes,
Mahabir

His room mate, Cardozo, after the war was inspired to write a poem about his friend Mangat.

Prelude to the Battle of Namkachu– 1962
Do not wait for me when I am gone
Duty calls and I must go
For this last battle was I born
When our great country’s friend has turned a foe
Much has happened in recent times gone by
Blinkered vision blinds our leader’s eyes
They fail to heed our army’s desperate cry
Disabled minds prefer our neighbour’s lies
To understand our Army’s basic need
Our leaders do not even seem to try
To do or die has been our basic creed
And not to question how or when or why
This brigade is tasked to face first blow
We fight with old and antiquated arms
We’re up against a far superior foe
On ground dictated by their forceful terms
This battleground in which we now are placed
Below the enemy’s dominating ground
A malignant Chinese force is what we face
With all advantage in their favour found
Wars only start when leaders fail
When armies are allowed to lose their strength
When governance permits itself to become frail
And fails to execute the role for which it’s meant
We know that we are in a desperate state
There is no way that we can save the day
Leaders far away decide our fate
Ignorant of the need for better ways
To further complicate the game
The enemy continues to call the shots
And to our everlasting shame
We have no game, no plan, no plot
Daily we see the Chinese army grow
They now have massed on Upper Thagla hill
We’re badly placed in positions down below
No mines, no guns no winter clothing still
Winter’s cold and icy hand of death.
Has announced its presence in skies no longer blue
And all we do is wait with baited breath
For death to strike across the Namkachu
When we are gone it’s only this we ask
A chance to snatch fair victory from the jaws of death
To give our sons the means so they can do their task
In defending freedom with every mortal breath.
- Maj Gen Cardozo
Brig lakshman Singh VSM (Retd)

7 Inf Bde: Parallel tasks in 1962 and 1965 conflicts

I read the trials and tribulations of Maj Rastogi OC 7 Brigade Signal Company, with amusement and nostalgia. I had commanded the same company in 1962, when it was a only a section and a captain's command, (those interested can refer to my book 'Letters From the Border" covering the ill fated op Leghorn). It is always the fate of Seven Brigade to fight an unplanned war. Even our commander Brig Dalvi was taken prisoner a fate worse than being sacked. My congratulations to Rastogi to have penned the incident. Yes, 4 grenadiers was also one of our battalions during 1962 Sino Indian conflict at the tri- junction of India, Tibet and Bhutan border in the Keming Forward Defences of North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as it was then known. Truly down the memory lane!
Brig Lakshman Singh (Retd)

Blog Links
Indo China War 1962
Memoirs: 1965 Indo- Pak Operations Khemkaran Sector

India red faced as China gets tough

NEW DELHI/ BEIJING: India appears to be a glutton for diplomatic punishment at the hands of China, particularly at a time when Beijing has clearly decided to adopt a tough posture on its claim to Arunachal Pradesh.

In what is clearly a major goof-up, India opened itself to a resounding rebuff from the Chinese, when despite knowing full well Beijing would not give a visa to anyone from Arunachal Pradesh, the government included an officer from the state in a delegation of 107 IAS officers due to travel to China on Saturday.

The result was predictable. The entire trip had to be called off and the IAS officers were asked to disperse, leaving MEA and PMO ducking for cover. The embarrassment is all the more acute as the officers were travelling to China as part of a mid-career programme that has been strongly advocated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The government will soon face a similar test— sports and youth affairs minister Mani Shankar Aiyar will be leading a 100- strong youth delegation to China, an exchange decided during Chinese leader Hu Jintao's visit here last year. It's not yet clear if there are any members from Arunachal Pradesh in this delegation.

According TOI reports from Beijing, the refusal to grant a visa to an Arunachal IAS officer was taken at a senior level of the Communist leadership and signifies China's "seriousness" about its claim to the state.

Unlike the Indian reading that the Chinese focus was essentially on Tawang, the issue, as far as China is concerned, is the entire state.
India red-faced as China gets tough
Additional Reading:
Beijing reloads Arunachal gun

Comment: The IAS officer's mid term career programme should include a stint of at least 6 months with the Armed Forces frontline troops to get the feel of defending the nation and imbibing the Patriotic feeling towards the Nation. Bureaucrats need to know where and what are the national boundaries on ground (not maps) which we need to defend as they will be the advisors to our Politicians!

India China Conflict 1962

OP LEGHORN: A Planners Nightmare

Driving and road conditions
The nearest Road head and administrative base was at Tawang, 100 Kms away from the location of our forward troops. Only a one-ton one way fair weather road connected Tawang from the foothills. This road followed a circuitous path with steep gradients requiring great skill on the part of the drivers and the vehicles to be in first class mechanical condition. Even the slightest miscalculation on part of the driver while negotiating bends could land the vehicle in the ravines often three to four thousand feet deep. Quite often there were delays due to the road being cut off by avalanches and extensive damage caused during the monsoons.

Stocking and maintenance
Further stocking and maintenance beyond Tawang was carried out by animal transport and porters.7 Infantry Brigade had been allotted only two Animal Transport (AT) Companies which were inadequate. At places, even the mules were found to be of little use due to the weak log bridges, which could not take the weight of laden animals. Besides, the maintenance of the AT companies itself further added to the problems. The shortage of ponies and porters was so great that units were moved without their full complement of even first line ammunition, thus severely restricting the availability of fire power to the troops.

Air Maintenance
Our troops had, therefore, to depend largely on air maintenance. It was estimated that the total requirement of airlift for both 2 and 4 Infantry Divisions was 260 Tons daily where as the airlift available amounted to not more than 80 Tons daily due to non availability of aircraft. There was also an acute shortage of supply dropping equipment, which was required to be salvaged and returned. Even the quality of supply dropping equipment was poor. In one case, vitally needed guns airdropped at Tsangdhar were damaged beyond repair when the parachutes failed to open.

Improvised Dropping Zones
For the maintenance of the troops at Dhola area, two improvised dropping zones were commissioned at Tsangdhar and Lumpu. Both these dropping zones were above 4500M with inadequate flat space. Approaches to these were hazardous and the pilots had to be careful not to over fly, as otherwise they would be above Chinese posts. With these constraints, the air supply proved to be extremely costly and ineffective. Quite often the supplies fell into inaccessible ravines and were irretrievable Supply of stores from the dropping zones to the forward troops involved a number of days turnaround. In the case of Lumpu, It meant going along the Namka Chu with a turn round of seven days.

(Extract from History of the Army Service Corps)
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)

Chinese troops launch a massive attack on Indian positions in NEFA on 20 Oct 1962. Over the next 31 days, the numerically superior People's Liberation Army overruns poorly equipped Indian troops. The Chinese almost reach the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire. Over 2400 Indian officers and soldiers died in the conflict. The plain fact is: a psychologically ill prepared and physically unacclimatized Indian Army was thoroughly defeated by the Chinese. So what has changed in the 45 years since then?
1962 war zone, revisited

India China Conflict 1962: 4 Grenadiers Operational Role

Tawang War Memorial
Bunkers used in 1962
Loss of Sona Jung Peak after 1962 war
Kahlon (2/Lt then) reached the Battalion HQ at Bridge I on Namka Chu in company of a link patrol on the evening of 16 October 1962. As generally happens in the Army so often, having just returned from the D&M course was appointed the IO (Intelligence Officer) of the Battalion.

The battalion at Bridge 1 was deployed with Major Balbir's company across the river, the reason being that the Battalion HQ and the two companies could not housed in the area of the river at the bridge site. The river was no more than a rivulet with a few logs thrown across. Of the other two companies one was at Dorkung Samba and the other at Serkhim at the bottom of Hatungla pass, both directly under the Div HQ. The Battalion HQ occupied the only Chauri Hut in the area, because it gave protection from the elements. All the six or seven officers, including the Commanding officer were loacted in the hut.

Gen Kahlon narates:
The whole battalion was huddled behind boulders in a small area, I wonder if any one was beyond 200 yards. We were at the lowest point of the valley with hand built Sangars as our only protection from the enemy and the elements. Thagla rose Phoenix like, steep and tall just across the river. Was it the PM's instructions that Indian Army should occupy the forward most inch of Indian soil, that had forced the commanders to sit in such a hopeless defensive posture or what. No Army School talked about such defensive position. What then forced us in such a self defeating position? With hindsight no one from political hierarchy to commanders on the ground took the Chinese that seriously. Hindi Cheeni Bhai Bhai was too seriously imbedded in our psyche. (Years later our PM's Lahore Yatra had similarly contributed to the Kargil fiasco.)

The only support weapons of battalion 3inch Mortars were almost non existent. Though our boys had carried four tubes all the way, we had no bombs. One Arty OP party had come in possibly the same morning. However with half the 17 Para field guns dropped to support the Brigade having been lost during the para drop, there was no Artillery support available. So far as the communication was concerned, one telephone line ran along the river (Nullah) as an omnibus circuit when the phone ran it took us good 5 minutes to sort out who was calling whom. (Possibly he was referring to the lateral line to 9 Punjab. Many unconventional things were happening the Punjabis and the Grenadiers had 'Teed' in to the line running from the Brigade exchange to the Div TAC HQ in a clandestine manner. A fact that came to light only on the 20th October, when the Chinese launched their attack). Oblivious of all these snags I was happy to be home with the Paltan and spent the my day in going from Sanghar to Sanghar meeting officers and men and running errands for Maj Oscar Thomas, our Adjutant. Bridge I was closest to the Hatungla Pass over which crossed the old trade track. Next to us on the left were the Punjabis.

Lunch in the Brigade HQ
The very next day that is on the 18th I was summoned, along the IO's of the other Battalions by the Brigade Major. "Come for a conference at the HQ, tomorrow morning at 10 O' clock. You guys are talking about so much Chinese movement opposite you. Let us take stock". I called 2 Lt Naveen Kohli, a course junior to me, and the IO of the Punjab Bn to guide me since I was new. We agreed to walk up together to the Brigade HQ, Naveen told me that he was not from an affluent family. Since his commissioning he was stuck here in NEFA and had seen no life though he had ended up saving some money. "On 10th October during the Tseng Jong operations undertaken by the battalion I saw six foot tall Khalsas drop like bananas with a bullet through them and realised how fragile a man is".

Naveen awarded VrC posthumously
Two youngsters in early twenties discussing life! As Naveen continued, he became philosophical, Now I believe that one should live life for the day one is alive, who knows if there is going to be a tomorrow. I am expecting to proceed on casual leave, this time I have decided to enjoy life. Little did he know that the sands of his life were running fast with just a couple of day's worth of particles left in the glass to flow down. Sadly, his small wish to ejoy life remained unfulfilled. 2 Lt Naveen died during the withdrawal on the 21 of October, 1962 and was awarded VrC posthumously.

Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Photographs: Courtesy Praveen

India- China Conflict 1962. The Big Picture

The Signboard at Jaswantgarh in memory of Rfn Jaswant Singh, who paralysed Chinese forces almost single handedly
4 Inf Div Sig Regt -Tezpur
My main contact during the operations remained with Maj Ram Singh who was responsible for the Div TAC HQ, initially at Tawang later at Lumpu and finally at Zimnithaung. However, I did remain in touch with the CO and other officers at Regimental HQ at Tezpur by RT on D1.

IV Corps
On 3rd Oct 62, 4 Corps was to take birth later in the night. Lt Col K K Tewari addressed me with copies to Maj Ram Singh (RAMU) and Maj K G Gangadharan, OC I COY, provides an insight as to what was happening and being planned in the rear. As is well known events did take a dramatic turn once Kaul arrived in Tezpur on the afternoon of 4th October as the GOC of new born 4 Corps. Based on the tentative plans, of which I was not aware, till that day nothing had been finalised at least at the Bde level.

General Umrao Visit
The results of General Umrao visit on 28th and his departure from Lumpu on 29th September for discussions with the Army Commander, were still anxiously awaited. However, it appears that as forward planning the CO wanted the existing line from Shakti to be extended by Maj Ram Singh to Lumpu by 9th October, achieved only by 12th October.

Rearward Communication
I was required to extend the line from Lumpu to Tsangdhar by 8th October. Normally Bde Signals are responsible for forward communications but in my case the priority had always been the rear communication. I still wonder as to by whom and how the thin cable laid on the boulder strewn, undulating ground, covering a distance of three days march and crossing over the 16,000 feet Karpola pass could have been maintained.

Forward Planning
Thanks to Kaul, I was out of Lumpu before 8th Oct 1962. The line to Rongla the final Brigade HQ from Div TAC HQ at Ziminthaung was
completed only by 17th October, just two days before the Chinese
attack. In so far as D4 was concerned I do not recall coming on the net. So much for the forward planning which Signals are required to do!

Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Photos from
Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh

Indo- China War 1962

Tawang Monastery
Inaccurate Maps
Suddenly our role was changed from defence of Tawang, the Divisional Vital Ground, to evict the Chinese from DHOLA post. Moves on the chessboard started. Planting of small flags on maps in the Operations Rooms of various HQ had commenced. Unfortunately most of the maps were sketchy and at best inaccurate. Incredibly the whole of the operation of river Namka Chu involving 7 Bde was planned on a sketch prepared by an Assam Rifles jawan. This was the best available at all levels from Brigade to Army HQ. It was inaccurate, not to scale and was supplied to all and sundry in the form of a blueprint. Even I was de- briefed on the same on my return from the debacle by the Director Military Intelligence and the Director Signals.

No Border Maps
A word about the state of maps of the area of Op Leghorn and why the Assam Rifle sketch became so important and indispensable. I quote from a letter, dated 24 Sep 2001, from my elder brother Shri Ratna Singh.
Quote.- It was about October, at this time, I was a supervisory officer in Survey of India at Dehradun and we were working round the clock in connection with the up dating of our Northern Border maps using Aerial Photography and photogrammetric techniques. It is interesting to, note that till then our border maps were sketchy and could not be relied upon. -Unquote.

Communications
9 Punjab was ordered to move from Tawang and contact Dhola post. CO Lt Col Mishra in the process deployed his battalion along the Namka Chu River line. To my ill luck, he never took the Signals detachment with him and left the 62 Set and the operators at his base at Lumpu with his 2IC Major Dilbagh Singh. He had his own set working back to the base at Lumpu. He must have had his own reasons for this unconventional action. However, my problems and brickbats from higher HQ had already started, who were not interested in Mishra's reasons, they were more worried as to why information was not coming through signal channels.

Delay in passage of messages
The extremely long distances over which communications were required, all the way from Army HQ at Delhi to Dhola, on the Tri- junction of India China and Bhutan had its own problems. Engineered on different and mostly mismatched equipment, vagaries of atmospherics and the physics of ionosphere, the system was far from robust with little redundancy. Holdings and use of multiple cryptographic systems, Linex, Book and Machine at various levels from Battalions, Brigade, Division to Army HQ added their own share to the bottlenecks and delays at various levels in the passage of the messages.

Mobile communication
Split HQs, Commanders and Staff mostly away from their HQs, Signals uprooted time and again and mostly on move, it was a wonder that Communications did exist, if at all. Delays had to happen in the passage of messages. No doubt I had to bear the brunt, even though both my CO Lt Col Tewari and the Commander Brig Dalvi shielded me. However, Priority messages pending in the signal centre or on the wireless links, the only means of clearing traffic, did create their own share of stress in me, as would have been the case with any other signal officer.

Delay of Top Secret Messages
Senior Signals Officers had also to share the burden of pressures from top. Brig Dalvi has recorded in his book about the delay in a Top Secret message from Gen Kaul originated from 1/9 GR location, from where there was no provision or facility to clear such messages. The Signal elements of the Brigade including me were all this time on move, the Brigade had neither a functioning HQ nor any signal communication system.

Brigadier Dalvi writes
quote- A sturdy Sikh from the Punjabis would be detailed to 'run' with the vital message to Lumpu. From there, the second- in–command of the Punjabis would phone it through to Ziminthaung (A Top Secret message on an open line, to which a Chinese agent possibly could have te-ed in his telephone for transmission to Peking even before it reached Delhi.) where it would be enciphered and transmitted to Tezpur, Delhi and Lucknow. The first message reached Delhi after three days. Mr Menon was extremely annoyed and demanding the dismissal of the Chief Signal Officer of Eastern Command for inefficiency.-unquote

Brig Lakshman Singh (Retd)

Tawang was returned to the control of India. The valiant last stand of Mahavir Chakra awardee Jaswant Singh Rawat took place in Tawang. After the voluntary withdrawal of Chinese troops, Tawang was once again under Indian administration. In recent years, China has occasionally voiced its claims on Arunachal Pradesh, especially Tawang, and Chinese troop incursions continue to occur frequently. According to news reports, the state government was willing to swap territories with China in order to make border adjustments, but it firmly refused to lose out any major towns or monasteries to China. Today, Tawang serves as a center for tourist attractions, thanks to the preserved beauty of the Tawang monastery.

Tawang September 1962 The Balloon goes up

Lull before the storm
It was the proverbial ‘Lull before the Storm’ that day on 8th of September of 1962, a Saturday, a weekend the legacy left by the British. In bracing cold Tawang at 10000feet plus was basking in bright sunshine. A clear day with the greens of the meadows, the deep blues of the sky, the silver of the river Tawang Chu flowing deep in the valley, the browns and reds of houses of the Tawang village, the majesty of the Tawang Monastery visible not far away was over powering. It was not too cold, not too hot but just pleasant Tawang that day was a tourist’s delight. However, there were no tourists in Tawang those days except the occasional VIP's who choppered to stay for lunch, give sermons, talk in platitudes and fly back again to civilisation in plains of Tezpur, Lucknow or Delhi.

Bde HQ
In any case it was too quiet and peaceful to resemble a noisy and bustling tourists resort with the Brigade HQ equally quiet. There was no officer present in the HQ except Lt Sharma the Brigade Ordnance Officer the duty-officer of the day; all others had gone off to attend a Bara Khana in one of the battalions.

Tension
It was my practice to go for an evening walk in the afternoon. I was reluctant to go out on this day as there was no one in the Bde HQ. However Lt Sharma insisted even though he was the duty officer. We had been lulled to the extent that even the duty officer was willing to leave his post with firm faith that nothing could happen especially in our Brigade Sector. We left via the Signal Centre as was my practice. It was all quiet there nothing on the air or line: some how too peaceful to my liking. We may have been away from the HQ at the most for an hour. However as we approached the HQ I could feel a tension in the air resulting in quickening of our pace. The scene had completely changed. It was getting dark and gloomy and there was unease in the atmosphere. Some thing was wrong very wrong.

Assam Rifles Post Surrounded
Wondering as to what had happened to bring about the sudden change both of us gingerly trooped in to the BM’s room apprehensive and expecting a rocket for our absence from the HQ where in every one seemed to have gathered. No one took notice of our entry. Kharbanda a bit worse for wear due to some extra beer incoherent with his eyes- bleary red and watering but a soldier to core - he was all decked up in full battle gear with his large pack ready for move. It transpired that Bingo the Assam Rifles post had been surrounded by more than 600 Chinese earlier in the day. This was according to a message received in a round about manner late in the evening; that is how the communication system was functioning those days. Kharbanda as we could see was all set to relieve the post single handed. All of us were more worried about him desperately trying to hold him back than the Chinese or Bingo. The scene would have definitely appeared a bit comical to an outsider ideal for a sequence in the war movies being produced in Bombay.

Suddenly Hindi Chini ‘bhai bhai’ became Hindi Chini ‘bye bye’

Ops Room Buzzing
Kharbanda’s small room, the telephone ringing continuously with incoming and out going calls to Tezpur where all of us of the Bde HQ had gathered resembled an ad hoc Operational Room. With so many of us crowding around the air had become charged with combined energy of diverse emotions; excitement apprehension uncertainty and even fear of the unknown all adding to the whole in various proportions depending on the attitude of the particular individual. With the BM being out of action Pereira the DQ the only possible link with the Commander at Tezpur and possibly me the Signals officer had a role to play others apart from the mess staff providing unending supply of mugs of coffee and tea were just hanging around trying to look involved and useful not unlike friends and relations holding vigil outside the Operating Theatre with some near and dear one on the surgeon’s table inside.

Commander Recalled
Willy- nilly the Brigade HQ swung into action Maj Pereira took charge of the situation. Commander was located in the guest room of the Mahar Regiment at the Tezpur airfield next door to the airfield from where his IAC plane was to take off early next morning carrying him thousands of miles away to Meerut in North India. The plane did take off the next morning. However his seat was empty. He took another seat but in a helicopter back to Tawang.

Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)