Memoirs: 1965 Indo- Pak Operations Khemkaran Sector

Khemkaran
My story begins in May 1965, when I was asked to move to Ambala on Temporary Duty. Immediately on arrival, Lt Col R C Rawat, CO, overruling the objections gave me acting Major’s pips and asked me to move to Ferozepur next morning, where 7 Mtn Bde had concentrated. We were manning the border during the Kutch ops. After suffering heat and dust and doing nothing, the Bde reverted to Ambala sometimes in July. During the first week of Sep, after bombardment in Jaurian, we were asked to move to Khemkaran on 4th Sep 1965.

It was a classic case of high level comedy of inefficieny and lack of foresight and planning. Almost a corps moved on the narrow roads of Punjab; Tactical signs obliterated temporarily from OG vehicles, but carrying camouflage nets; All ranks moving in civvies but carrying weapons and ammunition and helmets even. There was utter confusion on the roads, more so because at every crossing in the towns, they offered us tea and biscuits even late at night; the result was a complete traffic jam. To achieve surprise on the enemy [could they!!!!!!], there were no road signs and MP’s had no idea about who was to go where. So everyone navigated for himself. Some may have reached their village even.

I was asked to collect the Top Secret Op Order from the Div HQ, which was Not ready till the mid-night on 4/5 Sep. I spent the evening with my wife at the dilapidated Perry’s Hotel, which, I believe was the accommodation for British NCO’s. On my way, I saw the complete confusion on the road side, but managed to reach Kalia Sanktara, North of Khemkaran, by the morning of 5 Sep. I was able to read the Op Order, as had been directed. In my civvies I had just a few rupees in my pocket, so the problem was to locate the company to have some breakfast. Luckily, I found the Line laying team along the road, but their first complaint was that all the ‘B’ echelons had been separated and there was no food available for any unit. Luckily, some road side villagers over heard our plight. In less than an hour, they brought chapaties and lassi and gur for the company. They had come to know about our imminent attack, so cheered us up and offered to help us to carry our heavy stores even. So much for the surprise on the enemy.

FUP’s for the battalions had been fixed on the map, but no body had the idea where to locate them exactly on the ground. Even own scattered troops could not be collected, leave alone the marrying up with various other sub–units and detachments. Under these circumstances, our boys laid the telephone lines during day time on the road side and waited for the units to arrive. Even Bde HQ was not located in one position. They were still in the vehicles, everyone trying to locate everyone else. There was complete radio silence imposed.

Evening orders: Change into Uniform and battalions ordered to attack as planned. As anticipated, there was no contact with Bns. Radio silence would be lifted only prior to the H hr of the First Bn attack. Bde Cdr, Brig D S Sidhu [9 HORSE], asked me to establish contact with each Bn along with GSO3 [Col Abdul Rasul Khan, 4 Greanadiers, Retd, living in Noida]. Their rifle companies were not even 50% strength, support company all scattered; ammunition, except carried on person, not available. But the assaulting Bns were not unduly perturbed because border posts were not supposed to give them much opposition and surprise was expected.

6 sep 0600 hrs. Pre H hr bombardment began on Theh Pannu where 4 Grenadiers were supposed to attack on the border post. Radio Silence was lifted but no body except the SIGNALS radio operator attached with each unit was using it. After the attack, ENGINEERS were supposed to clear mine fields. But there were changes in H hr etc; plenty of flexibility, but supporting and neighbouring units were not informed. Engineers reached the objective long before the Infantry and had to face the pre- H hr bombardment. While pulling back they were in the line of fire of 4 Grenadiers having taken up position in the FUP. Luckily, Lt Col Farhat Bhatti [later M/Gen] came on the line asking permission to fire before the revised H Hr. Fortunately, Bde Cdr having nerves of steel refused. Subsequently we used to meet the Engrs Coy Cdr, Maj Satish Thareja who would tell the story of escape from own fire with relish. 4 Grenadiers captured the post by about 1100 hrs.

06 Sep 2300 hrs. Heavy artillery shelling on the border posts. Radio silence partially lifted but the operators in the FUP were not allowed to answer since the nearby enemy would come to know their location. We both ie Sparrow & Pigeon were watching the scene from the top of a school. Pre H hr bombardment was a spectacular scene. 7 Grenadiers were going in for the assault when we wanted to move back. Unfortunately the jeep bogged down. After wasting about an hour to retrieve it, we decided to move on foot and report the details to Cdr. It was about 4 AM in the morning when we had a cup of tea under a Kikar tree, and reported to Cdr. After sunrise, I and the jeep dvr, moved back to bring the jeep. We were lost in wheat fields. Locals refused to help us because the assaulting battalion had fallen back and they were scared the enemy may close in. Luckily a threat with sten gun worked and by about 9 AM we reached the jeep and pulled it out. But we found retaliatory heavy shelling from the enemy side. Very many vehicles and other stores were lying scattered all over. But where was the Bn? Had it captured the objective? But some of the farmers informed us that the unit had fallen back leaving behind plenty of stores and some wounded even. Utter chaos and confusion. We started as many jeeps as we could drive, each offr and dvr and even untrained dvrs. On the way back we met many wounded personnel, some with heavy weapons -- machine guns and heavy mortars. We tried to locate the Bde HQ, but it was not at the place where we had left it at dawn. Vehicle marks, cooking places were visible. Again the locals informed us that they were disappointed since the troops had fallen back. It was a lucky break that we found Cheema Village,the mound, 11r, on the Road Bhikkiwid – Khemkaran, where bang on the road Bde HQ was to be established. Cdr told us not to waste time in telling him about the situation in the front, but ensure defences were ready as soon as possible. Defences? I thought we had come for an assault.

Gradually the mist had cleared up. Our Op Order had said Pak Armr Div would move from Quetta and not reach before 8th Sep, so we had planned our assault for 6th. Unfortunately they had already concentrated there for an imminent attack on the 8th. Hence the complete failure of our assaults and this hurried defence. Of course, in the hind sight this was the wisest decision of our Top Guns and it saved our country from being overrun by their Pattons, supported by Sabres.

Our defences were barely started when we had a visit from a saber for about 45 minutes. We cursed our own Air Force; luckily, I don’t recall any casualty from their straffing, though I dug out later on two 50 mm bullets about one foot each Left and Right of my position in a trench of about two feet deep. A narrow Providential escape, indeed.

08 Sep 1965. We were a very compact Bde HQ on 11r, in Cheema Village, on the Road itself. Signals Company deployed around it to the North. 4 Grenadiers across the road. On the East was 62 Mtn Bde, Yati Pratap[later M /Gen] was the sparrow. The enemy began their assault from Asal Uttar on 1/9 GR of the neighbouring Bde. By about 1100 hrs they contacted 4 Grenadiers. Luckily MMG & RCL guns were effective. The enemy tank troops were mostly sticking to the narrow road, so quite a few tanks were damaged and abandoned, thus choking those narrow roads. Later in the evening, I went with Cdr to have a look at these invincible tanks. Our boys pulled out some radio equipments along with their Instruction books which were still wrapped in polythene bags. I forwarded these to the Regimental HQ. Luckily like Mahabharat, there was no fight at night. The enemy tanks used to pull back and rest for night.

09 Sep 1965. Next morning the enemy came close to probe our defences, but 4 Grenadiers were ready. Especially, CQMH Abdul Hamid had destroyed three tanks, for which on the recommendation of the Bn Cdr, Brig Sidhu asked me to send an ‘Emergency’ Signal, recommending him for Maha Vir Chakra. In the mean time some tanks outflanked us from the West but were stuck up in the flooded fields where the drains had been ruptured by the Artillery fire. They surrendered to the Infantry Pl of 4 Grenadiers sent to round them up.

10 Sep 1965. Early morning, plenty of smoke and dust, but the enemy was halted at a distance only. Later we learnt that their commanders expecting the road to Delhi to be clear were advancing in jeeps protected by armour, to reach Harike. CQMH Abdul Hamid again destroyed one tank, but was killed on the spot. Cdr asked me to send a ‘Flash’ message to read ‘Param Vir Chakra, posthumous’ in place of ‘Maha Vir Chakra’. Luckily the same evening AIR announced his decoration and Pakistan Radio, the decoration, Hallal e –Zurrat, for their GOC. Brig Shami, their C Arty was killed and his jeep with his body was captured along with their Op Order and fully marked Arty map. The body of another Cdr, perhaps the Armd Bde Cdr had been taken away.

In the afternoon, one Pakistani tank had reached behind our location but was abandoned when bogged down on a bund near the water tank along the road. We had a shower of machine gun fire from behind. Everyone lying doggo thinking the end of our stories, since surrounded by enemy tanks. Somehow I heard some shouting and thinking it to be our own troops, I crawled forward along the grove to meet them with a soiled so-called white kerchief. Maj Vohra (?) of 3 CAV had been told that our position had been over run so they came to liberate us. Luckily we escaped again, this time from our own fire.

11 Sep 1965. An eerie silence. But everyone on tenterhooks. The enemy may come back any time. Early morning a ring in the Ops Room, which I was manning.

"Oye, this is Corps Cmdr, Gen Dhillon. Your boys have done extremely well; we are proud of you all. Call your Cdr, chhetti."

Of course, we were all proud, to have resisted the attack of the Armd Div successfully. By the afternoon I took a jeep with some of our daring boys. Telling 8 CAV crew in front of our defences to protect us, we moved forward about two KM, when we spotted a Pak Sigs trailer abandoned right in the middle of the road. I reversed the jeep and the boys hurriedly hooked the trailer; we rushed back. Of course there was a cloud of dust raised. Our tanks had withdrawn for some other purpose. At our Bde HQ entrance there was a great commotion. Bde Cdr came running out & fired me for not informing any one and making the entire Brigade stand to. Another lucky escape. There were plenty of spare parts and instruction books all of which were sent to the Regt.

In the evening we were told that 4 SIKHS would infiltrate behind the enemy lines and 2 MAHAR coming from Rajasthan will link up with them. No time for recce or marrying up. 13 Sep, SARAGARHI day, so 4 SIKHS must recreate history.

13 Sep. 0400 hrs. In order to hand over the radio detachment, I met L/Col Bakshi, CO 2 MAHAR, traveling non – stop from Jodhpur, trudging along the road with a pack on his back. He asked me the names of the Bde Offrs and the units under command and support. He was worried about finding his companies arriving later. He did not have enough maps of the area for his Coy Cdrs. I gave him my own. Wishing him luck, I passed on all this info to Bde HQ. About 0600 hrs Bde Cdr asked me to join his Rover Gp. We advanced to the place of assault. There was murderous fire even before the Bn reached their FUP. A very large number of casualties. Commander gave me his jeep also, so we ferried as many casualties as possible to the make shift RAP just behind the Bde HQ location. By 0900 hrs, Cdr still on foot reorganized another attack, but the enemy was well prepared and no movement was possible. Where was 4 SIKH ? Only in the evening Pakistan radio announced the capture of Col Anant Singh & his troops. A complete fiasco of Saragarhi Day.

As far as we were concerned the main activity was over. There was a talk of holding Col Bakshi responsible for failing to link up with 4 SIKH, but Brig David Sidhu, a true soldier stood by him. One evening I was asked to accompany BM to Corps HQ, where BGS wanted to hear the actual happenings. After a sumptuous dinner we returned. R S Kardam, my colleague [ Later on he too was transferred to Infantry. Retd as Brig, now settled in Gurgaon], mentioned jocularly that how did we reappear when we had vanished from the face of the Earth. For them 7 Mtn Bde had been over run and decimated completely and ceased to be a formation.

For the Board of officers, I accompanied L/col AS Vaidya [ later Chief], CO, 9 HORSE, to count the enemy tanks destroyed in the ‘Grave yard of Pattons’. I, in my own hand wrote down the serial number, tactical sign, the exact location and the likely cause of the damage of each. I remember counting 69 tanks, and most of those were destroyed by our tank fire, as assessed by L/Col Vaidya. Of course, having seen the performance of 4 Grenadiers, I had disagreed, but juniors have a muffled voice.

Subsequently, Brig Sidhu was asked to relinquish the command and we moved to Chharhata near Amritsar, where we all saw the tremendous fireworks at midnight till 0400 hrs on 22 Sep, the time of cease fire. The ammunition brought forward was NOT to be carried back.

In 1968, I asked a Corps Commander, that everyone had asked for one more day for recce and joint planning, but their request was turned down, because the date 13 Sep was sacrosanct. Yet, when 4 SIKH had never reached their objective, 2 MAHAR had no chance to link up, so there was no question of failure. How could they sack such a gallant Commander, who single-handedly had withstood the enemy Armd Div assault, and had tried to protect his subordinates. His answer was very simple. If the Operations were NOT feasible, Commander should have put his foot down and refused to take part in these operations and faced the music as an individual, but spared the formation that he commanded. In other words, Junior commanders are responsible even for the poor planning at higher levels.

Luckily, in my Sigs company, I think, we were able to decorate three of our boys with gallantry awards.

I would Salute Brig David Sidhu and the troops of 4 Greandiers, for their outstanding gallantry and the heroic tenacity, and always leading from the front. He had full confidence in SIGNALS and kept me close to him always.

Comments
Khemkaran was the graveyard of Pattons, the terror of those days. Strategic and Tactical planning at the highest level paid the dividends. The Invincible Armoured Division had been lured into a terrain most unsuitable for armour operations, where it was restricted to be used in penny packets and was decimated slowly but surely. Enemy commanders were cocksure of themselves and ignorant of the capability of Indian troops and locals. They had decided to reach Delhi in jeeps following their armour; such an audacity had to be paid dearly. Our planning and execution of operations, including the mechanism for information collecting and intelligence building, on ground was dismal, to say the least. But leaders like Brig David Sidhu, L/Col Farhat Bhatti and troops like CQMH Abdul Hamid showed exemplary courage and cool leadership, which saved our country from a 1962 repeat.

I was commissioned in the Corps of Signals in June 1957; transferred to 8 Madras in June 1971, which enabled me to see Infantry operations in Jessore & Khulna and later in Western Sector in 1972.

Over the Years some details may have dimmed in memory, but most of the activities are still vivid in mind.

Lt Col Naresh K Rastogi (Retd)