Shaurya Chakra awardee PV Manesh feels let down by nation

Splurging on Madani, crumbs for 26/11 hero!
July 20, 2011 Ashadh Krushna Panchami,Kaliyug Varsha 5112
Shame on Congress Government which can not spend money on the treatment of brave soldiers who fight for country and Indian citizens with risk of losing their own life! This same Congress Govt. is spending crores of rupees on 'security' of terrorist like Ajmal Kasab, but at the same time can't reimburse some thousand rupees to the soldier who is paralysed while fighting with the same terrorist. O Indians, now there is no other option than to oust the Nation-traitor Congress and elect righteous and patriotic rulers to change this situation! By: J Gopikrishnan
Shaurya Chakra awardee PV Manesh feels let down by nation
The Karnataka Government is forced to cough up huge sums on spa treatment of Bangalore blast accused Abdul Nasser Madani, but the authorities are not ready to reimburse a paltry 4,000 a month on Ayurvedic treatment of a NSG commando, who was paralysed in the Mumbai 26/11 operations.

Shaurya Chakra awardee PV Manesh from Kannur was paralysed after he was hit by a grenade in his head during the terror attack on Oberoi Hotel in Mumbai. But before a grenade fell on his helmet, he shot dead a terrorist. A splinter is still lodged in his brain.

Manesh recalls that his commando team was airdropped on the roof of Hotel Oberoi in the early morning hours of November 28, 2008.

“We started from the top and raided each room. We rescued around 40 people who were trapped inside their rooms. When I reached Room No 203, I sensed the presence of terrorists. After blasting the doors when I first entered, I saw the tip of an AK47 rifle behind a curtain.

In a split second, I fired and killed that terrorist. Then I saw the second man hurl grenade at me. Shooting him, I dived to catch the grenade. But it fell on my helmet,” he narrated his near-death experience.

His Shaurya Chakra citation says: “For his undaunted valour, resolute determination and dedication towards the mission beyond the call of duty, Naik PV Manesh was awarded ‘Shaurya Chakra.”

But now Manesh has been forgotten by the nation. His employers will not reimburse his treatment cost citing “blind rules” and he can’t even get a confirmed train ticket. All because, like Madani, he can’t hire top lawyers to argue his case for Ayurvedic treatment.

Manesh says his doctors have advised that Ayurveda was his last hope. “I have to travel by train every fortnight to a hospital 300 km away in Ottapalam in Palakkad district for treatment, which costs Rs. 2,000 every time,” he said.

Restructuring the Central Police Forces and the State Armed Police

USE OF INCORRECT TERMINOLOGY
Dear Chander,
I had written an article titled "Restructuring the Central Police Forces and the State Armed Police to Combat Internal Insurgencies". It was published in the South Asia Defence and Strategic Year Book 2011, which was published early this year. I am enclosing a copy as an attachment. As you will see, it is a long article of 4781 words, which all may not be interested to read. However, I would recommend that the portion highlighted in yellow be read by all. Following the publishing of the article, I was informed that the then Home Secretary (retired recently) issued immediate instructions to the police forces not to call themselves para military forces. As suggested by me, the Home Ministry issued a policy letter dated 18/22 March 2011 wherein all the armed police forces were instructed to adopt a uniform nomenclature as suggested by me. I am enclosing a scanned copy of the same as the second attachment. I do not know whether the police forces and others will follow the instructions but it is important that they do. The media continues to use the term para military forces incorrectly and so do even defence officers. Army Headquarters needs to contact all editors of newspapers and magazines, as well as others, including their subordinate formations and request them to instruct their scribes/ others to use the correct nomenclature. I thought the readers of your blog would be interested to know; they could then correct people who continue to use the wrong nomenclature.
Warm regards.
Vijay Oberoi
Former Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS)
Former Director Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
Click here to read the full article

Job Placement for Armed Forces Veterans

A Job Fair for the Armed Forces Veterans will be held on 11.12.2010 Saturday at 08.00 AM at Island Grounds, Chennai (Behind Kendriya Vidyalaya).
This fair is being arranged by the HQ, ATK&K Area, Fort St George, Chennai 600009 for the benefit of veterans.
All the Armed Forces Veterans desirous of attending the fair are to contact and register their names by 10.12.2010 with the Officer-in-Charge, Ex-servicemen Helpline Centre, ATK&K Area, Fort St George, Chennai. They have to obtain token for having registered their names. (This is very important)
Note: Plenty of vacancies are available for different types of job. There is ample opportunity for technical personnel belonging to Signals, EME, MEG & NSG.
Out station candidates will be provided accommodation at the ESM Helpline Centre. They are to report one day in advance i.e. on 10.12.2010.
For further information and assistance contact:
Hony Capt M David (Retd)
Officer-in-Charge,
Ex-servicemen Helpline Centre,
Fort St. George, Chennai -09.
Phone: 044-25675337, 044-25675236.
Email: oicesmchennai@yahoo.com
Don’t miss this golden opportunity. All veterans are to report in appropriate dress with all their testimonials.
Job Fair for the Armed Forces Veterans

Dehradun: Ex-servicemen stage dharna

Ex-servicemen hold a protest at the Gandhi Park in Dehradun on Sunday. A Tribune photograph

Ex-servicemen stage dharna
Tribune News Service
Dehradun, April 18
Members of the Uttarakhand Porav Sainik Evam Ardh Sainik Sangthan held a sit-in at the Gandhi Park here today. The members were protesting against the irregularities committed at the Uttarakhand Poorav Sainik Kalyan Nigam (a government of Uttarakhand undertaking).

Later they submitted a memorandum addressed to the Chief Minister seeking action against the Managing Director of the undertaking.

President of the organisation Ganga Singh Rawat said they had even raised the issue with Union State Minister for Labour and Employment Harish Rawat.

He alleged that the organisation was working against the interest of the ex-servicemen.
Ex-servicemen stage dharna

Governor Margaret Alva presents a draft to Vineeta Bisht, wife of commando Gajender Singh Bisht who died in the Mumbai terrorist attack in Dehradun on Sunday. A Tribune photograph

Martyr’s widow gets Rs 1,80,500
Tribune News Service
Dehradun, April 18
Margaret Alva, Governor, today handed over a draft of Rs 1,80,500 to Vineeta Bisht, widow of NSG commando Gajender Singh Bisht who lost his life in the terrorist attack of Mumbai 26/11.

A Maharashtra-based newspaper, as a gesture of compensation and support, gave the honorarium to the widow of the deceased. Alva also consoled the family of the martyr and remembered the sacrifice made by the Bisht family. Senior journalist SP Tiwari, Manjul Tiwari, VK Sharma and DK Joshi were also present to pay homage
Martyr’s widow gets Rs 1,80,500

No more VIP duty please: NSG

Sudhi Ranjan Sen, Thursday July 23, 2009, New Delhi
Parliament could not function properly on Thursday because UP Chief Minister Mayawati's partymen were enraged at the thought of their leader's security being scaled down. Maya's MPs disrupted both the Houses to such an extent that they had to be adjourned twice.

But could VIP security change altogether?
NDTV has learnt that the elite National Security Guards (NSG), used for special operations like 26/11, wants to wash its hands of guarding VIPs altogether; they'd rather focus on terror entirely but will the government agree?
The NSG wants to re-deploy the commandos for anti-terror operations, what they were originally intended for, and after 26/11 it believes they have a stronger case.

The NSG has told the Union Home Ministry:

It cannot protect any more people as it is short of hands

That affects operational capabilities

The NSG wants most of the 3000 or so commandos on VIP guard duty to be redeployed in the four new hubs set up after the Mumbai attacks

This itself could fill as many as half the vacancies

But will the government be politically brave and at least reduce the number of VIPs protected by black cats?

On Thursday, when BSP MPs disrupted the House opposing any cut in Mayawatis security the government quickly clarified.

"Government is deeply concerned about the security of all political leaders who have been given security. I want to assure the House that security will not be reduced," said Prithiviraj Chavan, Minister of State, PMO.

The Home Ministry hasn't agreed to the NSG pull out yet but sources say the government could keep its promise and free NSG commandoes and give VIPs commandos from other central forces.

The big question is whether the home minister who has set an example himself go by political compulsion or national security.

Even if that means withdrawing the NSG cover of people like Bhajan Lal and Buta Singh who got these guards at the height of their power years ago when their threat perception was higher.
No more VIP duty please: NSG

Comments on VIP Terror
Posted by murthy on Jul 24, 2009
Security forces are for the protection of people. Politicians are because of us, we are not because of politicians. SC itself had commented once "Politicians are not national asset that need protection".

Posted by suparna on Jul 24, 2009
it is time that india asks its politicians to pay for their own security, if they think they need it. why should the tax payer bear the brunt of megalomania??

Mumbai Mayhem: Revamp and Restructure Special Forces

The SF needs to be structured comprehensively for a full spectrum capability, trained and ready for victory, or in other words— a total force of quality officers and soldiers.

The November 26 terrorist attack in Mumbai and related events have brought into sharp focus the Special Forces (SF) of the nation. India fields a variety of SF, of which two— the Marine Commandos (MARCOS) of the Indian Navy and the National Security Guards (NSG) of the Cabinet Secretariat— operated against the terrorists at Mumbai. While the personnel of both the forces displayed exceptional bravery in tackling the terrorists, lacunae in the deployment and employment of these forces need early rectification in order for the SF to respond with alacrity the next time a similar situation arises. Details of what needs to be done to increase the efficiency of these forces must necessarily be preceded by an elucidation of what the SF are all about.

Most professional militaries field special units, with specialised, highly focused capabilities. Known as SF, these are small, elite military units, with special training and equipment, capable of conducting a variety of operations. SF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy, specialised training. SF are the nation’s penetration and strike forces that respond to extraordinary contingencies across the conflict spectrum, with stealth, speed and precision. Their operations differ from conventional operations in the degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support and dependence on detailed operational intelligence of a very high order. SF may be used against a wide range of adversaries, including terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, or regular combatants. SF can also be used to support insurgents, guerrillas, or regular conventional operations.

In our country, a proliferation of SF types reduces focus on certain essential tasks, undermines cost-effectiveness and sullies accountability. Weaknesses and chinks in the system need to be identified and highlighted while deliberating on the changes needed to evolve the nation’s SF structure of the future.

Changing nature of threats
Ambiguity and a marked divergence from traditional risks characterise security challenges today and in the future. Consequently, military contingencies require multi-faceted forces, like the SF, as they are able to respond to a wider spectrum of crises. Terrorism, subversion, insurgency and proxy war by neighbouring countries or by non-state actors from their soil, will continue to be major security challenges for India. The recent terrorist strike at Mumbai is an appropriate example. In this type of proxy war environment, the SF, given its low profile, may well be the force of choice for conducting operations, including across the border, without inviting the political, economic and military risks of war. SF can also assist in deterring, destroying or defending against attempts aimed at nuclear or radiological material or weapons of mass destruction, especially from non-state actors.

Several constraints impede employment of conventional forces to resolve security issues. With asymmetric opponents such as terrorists, insurgents and rebel groups increasingly holding the nation to ransom, dealing with them in a conventional manner has many pitfalls. In such an environment, SF becomes even more important. SF are also necessary to meet transnational threats resulting from the diminished authority and capacity of governments beleaguered by social, political and cultural unrest and inadequate governance. Asymmetric opponents do not attack the strengths of the nation, but target its vulnerabilities, with unorthodox measures. Such attacks can be best tackled by the SF.

Preparing for the conflicts of the next decade and beyond, we need to invest heavily in the right kind of SF, which has the agility to perform a task, disengage, regroup and be ready for the next mission. SF to tackle low intensity conflicts of the future must be purpose-filled organisations, possessing both human intelligence and signals intelligence capabilities; scientific and analytical skills; and ability to use information technology optimally. They must also possess language skills and knowledge of the cultural, social and behaviour patterns of the adversary.

In future, SF will become more relevant because they can respond to a wider spectrum of crises than conventional forces. The 2002 operations in Afghanistan by the Coalition Forces, for instance, were brought to a dramatic and early conclusion because the SF managed to bring in the forces of the Northern Alliance for the dénouement. They turned the Northern Alliance into a conquering army. Unfortunately, the SF of the Indian Army, as structured at present, are not capable of doing this. However, if restructuring is carried out with vision and all likely contingencies are catered for, no reason why our SF cannot meet such challenges.
Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi
Revamp & Restructure

Mumbai Mayhem: Attacks show rise of terror culture

The Mumbai terrorist attacks in India suggest the possibility of an escalating terrorist campaign in South Asia and the rise of a strategic terrorist culture, according to a study issued today by the RAND Corporation.

The RAND study identifies the operational and tactical features of the attack, evaluates the response of Indian security forces, and analyzes the implications for India, Pakistan and the United States.

“India will continue to face a serious jihadist threat from Pakistan-based terrorist groups, and neither Indian nor U.S. policy is likely to reduce that threat in the near future,” said Angel Rabasa, lead author of the study and a senior political scientist with RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “Other extremist groups in Pakistan likely will find inspiration in the Mumbai attacks, and we can expect more attacks with high body counts and symbolic targets.”

Mumbai is India's commercial and entertainment center, and the attacks on landmark properties amplified the psychological impact, according to the report. The selection of multiple targets — Americans, Britons and Jews, as well as Indians — suggests that the terrorists intended the attack to serve multiple objectives that extended beyond the terrorists' previous focus on Kashmir and India.

“The defining characteristic of the Mumbai attack, and what makes it so alarming, is not just the ruthless killing, but the meticulous planning and preparation that went into the operation,” said Brian Michael Jenkins, a leading terrorism expert and senior advisor at RAND.

“The goal was not only to slaughter as many people as possible, but to target specific groups of people and facilities with political, cultural and emotional value. This indicates a level of strategic thought — a strategic culture — that poses a difficult challenge: not whether we can outgun the terrorists, but can we outthink them?”

Other authors of the study are former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, now a senior fellow at RAND; Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C. Christine Fair, Seth Jones, Nathaniel Shestak, all of RAND, and Ashley Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Read more:
Mumbai Terrorist Attacks Show Rise of Strategic Terrorist Culture
Dear All
The above is an article on the study of Mumbai Attacks undertaken by RAND corporation. I dont know if some one will ever do such a study in India but may be someone who is likely to be an adviser on the future security set up can use this study.
Rgds
Pathak (Veteran)

Mumbai attacks an “act of war,” says Rushdie

Hasan Suroor
LONDON: Novelist Salman Rushdie, who grew up in what was then Bombay and insists on calling it by that name, has described the attacks on Mumbai as an “act of war.”

“There is no question that this was Pakistan. You could see it as an act of war,” he told The Times on Saturday urging the West to be “tougher” on Islamabad.

Accusing Pakistan of misleading the world into believing that it was fighting terror, he said: “It is trying to play both ends against the middle — to look like the friend of the revolutionaries, on the one hand, and a friend of the West in the fight against terrorism [on thes other]. It can’t be both things. This country [Britain] should make clear that as long as Pakistan harbours terrorists it’s not going to get any western aid.”
Mumbai attacks an “act of war,” says Rushdie

Sandeep’s parents visit his alma mater

Umesh Dewan
Tribune News Service Dehradun, December 16, 2008

On the occasion of Vijay Diwas, K. Unnikrishnan and Dhanalakshmi, parents of National Security Guard (NSG) Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan who was killed in the Mumbai terror attacks, visited the IMA and laid wreaths at the war memorial in the south block. Dhanalakshmi, mother of Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan, pays homage to the martyrs at the War Memorial in IMA on Tuesday.

Dhanalakshmi, mother of Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan, pays homage to the martyrs at the War Memorial in IMA on Tuesday. Tribune photo: Vinod Pundir

“I feel a little nervous in the Indian Military Academy (IMA) as this is the place where he was commissioned into 7 Bihar,” K. Unnikrishnan penned down these words in the visitors book at the war memorial here today.

The visit was a quiet affair as per the instructions of the couple. The IMA Commandant Lt Gen Rajinder Singh Sujlana also laid a wreath at the memorial.

An emotional K. Unnikrishnan, a former ISRO officer, while recalling the memories of his son as an IMA Gentleman Cadet said, “From the beginning, Sandeep was determined to be an

Infantryman. At his passing out parade, Sandeep was so busy in getting his arrears cleared that he even had to skip his lunch at the IMA.”

Later, the parents of Major Sandeep visited the room in which their son stayed during his training here.

IMA Commandant Lt General Rajinder Singh Sujlana said that Major Sandeep was a brave son of the nation. He added that Sandeep was an outstanding officer and has stood by the credo of the IMA which reads, “The safety, honour and welfare of your country comes first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command comes next. Your own ease, comfort and safety comes last, always and every time.”

After passing out of the National Defence Academy (NDA), Sandeep joined IMA in July 1998. In the academy, he was a sports lover and was a member of football team. He got commissioned into 7 Bihar on June 12, 1999.

He had extensive exposure to counter insurgency operations having two tenures in Jammu and Kashmir. He also served in high altitude area and was deployed with his unit in Rajasthan during Operation Parakram. He volunteered for elite NSG and joined as member of Special Action Group.
Sandeep’s parents visit his alma mater

Tribute to Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan- A Hero

DG, NSG, Jyothi Krishnan Dutt, alongwith colleagues pay their respects to NSG men Sandeep Unnikrishnan and Gajendra Singh who laid their lives fighting terrorists in Mumbai.(PTI Photo)WE WILL NOT REMEMBER HIM TOMORROW FOR SURE, AT LEAST LET US PRAY FOR HIM AND HIS FAMILY TODAY.
We salute you and your parents Dear Major Sandeep. These last few days I have learnt that India needs more people like you. There are no hopes from any political party as everybody is greedy, busy canvassing for votes. Their tears are also crocodile tears. It's We common Indian who have to save our lives. I have a son of two years old. I was thinking that I will not send my child to any army forces. But now I have changed. If we all think like this then who will protect the Nation. I thank you and many other brave soldiers for that. Now if my son wants to join the Military I will proudly say YES to him. Jai Hind, Vande Matram.

M Babu (Civilian)
Echoing Veterans' Voice

Operation Black Tornado
On the night of 26 Nov 2008, several iconic buildings in South Mumbai were attacked by terrorists. One of the buildings where the terrorists held people hostage was the 100 year old Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. Major Unnikrishnan was the commander of 51 SAG deployed in the operation at the Taj Mahal Hotel. He led his team from the front and engaged the terrorists in a fierce gunfight. When one of the NSG commandos was injured in the exchange of fire, he arranged for his evacuation and regardless of personal safety chased the terrorists who, meanwhile, escaped to another floor of the hotel, and while doing so Major Sandeep continuously engaged them. In the encounter that followed, he was shot from the back, seriously injured and succumbed to injuries.

Mumbai Massacre Time for Action

I start by humbly bowing my head to the martyrs of my old outfit, the NSG and those of the Mumbai police. NSG has never failed the nation and may that never happen. I have been a commando for a major part of my long service. Apart from being an instructor and later Commander at the Commando Wing of the Army's Infantry School, I have been the founding Chief Instructor of NSG. Today like any other Indian my chest swells with pride at their performance.

It is hard to imagine that the terrorists conducted this kind of operation in Mumbai, without a massive institutional backing. It was not just a terrorist act; it was a sea-borne commando raid the professionalism of which could be the envy of many an army in the world. The sophistication of planning, provisioning, training, intelligence gathering, coordinating and conducting such a raid is far higher than a uni-dimensional operation like 9/11. Such an operation is beyond the capability of any non-State actor in the world today, be that LeT, JeM or Al Qaeda. While the details are still to be known, one thing seems clear - this operation could not have been mounted without the serious involvement of Special Services Group of the Pakistan Army, either directly or through its officers on deputation with ISI.

Further, knowing how military hierarchy functions, there is also no doubt that it had to be with the blessings of the Chiefs of its Army and Navy. Zardari and his ministers may not have known it in advance, but that question is irrelevant. Civilian leaders in Pakistan have been traditionally nothing more than figure heads. The only difference with the return of democracy would be the Army ruling from behind a civilian façade. The man wielding the gun has always been the final arbiter.

What could be the Pakistani gain from such an operation? There could be many answers to this but the common thread running inexorably through all these is their irrationally extreme ENVY of India's booming economic prosperity. The Pakistani determination is, not to let India get ahead of her seems, which is their very raison d'etre. They became US allies and now tagging with Chinese, in pursuit of their single goal. They spend their resources on Army and ISI to a point of bankruptcy. Their sports matches against India are like a war. Their media spends more than half its space on news about India, all negative and most of it trivial. Their education curriculum has deteriorated to just one subject- JIHAD.

That obsession is under challenge again. The two countries are moving fast in opposite directions. Pakistan is heading towards bankruptcy, chaos and failure. India is moving towards modernization, prosperity and a place of respect in the comity of nations. For a fevered Pakistani mind, that outcome is unthinkable. If it cannot turn its own destiny around, it can at least mire India's. For such a mind this operation makes perfect sense. It was aimed to frighten away foreign investors, MNCs and tourists and terrorize and demoralize the Indian population.

There could be another reason too. A military tension with India can be a handy pretext to move its troops from the unpopular war on terror on its Western borders to its eastern border with India. This would avoid a conflict with its old protégé, the Taliban. She would need Taliban again to control Afghanistan, whenever the Western forces get tired of fighting and withdraw. This thinking, however, is based on a risky assumption that the Indian response would remain limited to empty noises.

Dr Manmohan Singh is a very genuine, sincere and soft spoken leader. Those are great qualities in any human being. But as Prime Minister he also bears responsibility for over a thousand people who have lost lives to terrorism under his watch. His address to the nation after the terrorists struck did contain words of reassurance, which are unusually tough for a person like him. All the actions that he has proposed are sensible and should have been implemented long ago. But they all begged the real question. How will the more stringent application of our laws and the Federal Investigative Agency prevent another attack being planned and mounted from Pakistan soil?

Unless Pakistan is made to pay the price for this attack, there would be more to come, and fiercer. The next step may be many simultaneous attacks on different cities which might last even longer; forcing NSG to disperse its resources and might even require a conventional Army assault and could result in considerably higher loss of innocent lives. How long we as a nation can tolerate such onslaughts?

The idea of making a neighbour however despicable in its conduct, pay the price does not appeal to us Indians. It is against our ethos and a big departure from our historical behavior. More so when we are being counted for something in the world, perhaps for the first time ever. But do we have a choice? Pakistan will never change its spots, no matter how many promises of good behavior we extract from its leaders. Rajiv got that assurance from Benazir but Pakistan's support for terrorism in Punjab increased not decreased. Gujral tried it. Vajpayee's efforts were rewarded in Kargil. He got another promise from Musharraf that Pakistan's soil would not be used for violence against India; a promise a seasoned politician like him would have known was insincere even when made. With all genuineness Manmohan declared in Cuba that both Pakistan and we are victims of terrorism, thus putting on the same moral pedestal the proverbial wolf and a lamb. Yes, we are both victims of terrorism; they because they created the monster and have still not abandoned feeding it and us because we are their neighbours.

The public are getting restive and no longer has faith in mere verbal assurances. It is time for action. Unlike Pakistan what we do must be straight forward and transparent. We should go all out to hurt them diplomatically, politically and economically. We should work with the international community and with our friends and use our economic clout fully. We should inform and educate the whole world through diplomatic means and use the international media that we had used very effectively during Kargil. The people to people contact has been misused to sneak in terrorists into India and must stop. We need to rethink continuation of our rail and road links. We should consider going to the Security Council and demand that it recognize our right to defend our population by every possible means including military. Should all these measures not succeed, we should use our overwhelming naval superiority and consider blockading the Karachi harbor. Let them get their oil and other supplies from Iran in trucks till they surrender the planners and inspirators of this Mumbai massacre that get named in our inquiry. Pakistan has no money to fight any war, a war that they know they cannot but lose. Their nuclear threat is nothing more than empty bluster. There is less risk even in a military option than in doing nothing meaningful against them, and not doing it soon. One must act while the barrels are still smoking.

Lt Gen Raj Kadyan (Retd)
Former Deputy Chief of Army Staff

VIP security: At the cost of common man

The country's national security guards have never been more in the limelight than now, after the Mumbai terror attacks. But, apart from coming in when the country's citizens need them, like in the hostage situation in Mumbai, one of their primary tasks is to guard politicians or VIPs.

Very Important People, a VIP tag means that an inordinate amount of our national security priorities are focused on people whose threat perception does not justify it.

Over 250 politicians are categorised as Very Very Important People (VVIPS). Samajwadi Party leaders figure in the list, and they are protected by the National security Guard (NSG) black cats. With a budget of Rs 158 crores, the Special Protection Group that protects the Prime Minister and 14 others gets Rs 180 crores.

But for every 100000 people, there are 122 policemen. While 1 per cent of the forces do intelligence duty, 33 per cent again, guard the politicians.

After former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, no government takes chances with leaders who face genuine threat. However, the argument is not that our top politicians should not get protection, but what is the criteria for it? Do the cash rich millionaire Politicians deserve state protection?
Full article at: VIP security: At the cost of common man

Mumbai Attack a glaring intelligence failure

During March 2008 an American technology company promoting CATE (Computer-Assisted Threat Evaluation) technology had organised a presentation in Mumbai for the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard, etc, as to how a terrorist group could mount an attack on Mumbai taking the sea route. This technology, when deployed, would provide surveillance of the coast line and warn the Coast Guard and the Navy of the approach of an unknown and unidentified sea vessels/boats. In the instant case, an attack similar to the one in Mumbai had been envisaged and depicted in the presentation. The case for acquisition of this equipment got wrapped in red tape and found a final resting place in some cupboard in Delhi.

The Mumbai attack is not the last of such terrorist acts that we will face. There is need for India to put its act together, so that it can, in future, deal with such situations in a more orderly and meaningful manner and with a degree of professionalism and efficiency. Some of the following points need to be looked into: One, improve the quality of intelligence by inculcating professionalism and accountability. Two, each state from within its resources should form a small group of personnel, trained in anti-terrorist tasks and be available to deal with hostage situations. This would obviate the need to call NSG personnel from Delhi. The strength of the NSG would in this case require to be scaled down.

We should have a plan to put in place a command and control structure (wherever required) immediately when such a situation arises. The command and control group(s) should coordinate the actions of various types of forces deployed, including fire brigade resources and control of crowds. Some prior training and coordination between various forces likely to be committed should be undertaken.

In the case of a hostage situation, expert(s) in this field should take charge and start dialogue with terrorists without delay. Strict control must be exercised over fire from own troops to avoid casualties among the hostages. Suitably deploy snipers to take out the terrorist(s) without any harm to the hostages. There is need to provide regular, consistent and clear information to the media and local residents to prevent the spread of misinformation/confusion.

We have now been combating terrorism for over two decades and yet do not have a viable and dependable intelligence system. A sound and reliable method of engaging terrorists and handling hostage situations is yet to be worked out. An acceptable and workable command and control set-up for a situation where a multitude of forces are deployed continues to be missing.

Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd)
Read complete article: Glaring intelligence failure Mumbai attack shows meticulous planning
More reading: End blame-game: Needed better intelligence-security coordination

Organisations for counter terrorism

Is raising new NSG- like units the solution?

The ineffectiveness of the police will soon help them to gain more high rank appointments for the IPS. The plan to raise more NSG type units to place them at four metros would relieve the state police of all responsibility.

Though Mumbai Police has an ATS we are told this is only for investigation after strikes. Yet we are told there are many encounter specialists in the org. For what? When the terrorists struck where were these encounter specialists, other than those killed in an ambush? Not even one came forward to battle the terrorists. There was not a single casualty of the ATS in any encounter or battle. Great!! Must be due to tricks picked up from Bollywood! Only catch is that they did not neutralise even a single terrorist and just waited for help.

Next we have the Marcos. Sad to say but their performance was no better than the Police. And if they are not trained for such jobs why did they deploy? To exhibit their ineffectiveness? Not being familiar with the Taj is no excuse. Were the NSG cdos familiar with Taj or Nariman House?

It is time introspect critically and increase the level of training and professionalism once we have decided to raise a force.

It must be realised that NSG or any other Cdo force can only react. The ideal organisation is where the Intelligence and Ops are integrated under one cdr. Since only four metros are not going to be threatened (See history of terrorist strikes) what will be the arrangement for the remaining country? Terrorist strike planners take time to identify weaknesses and strike only when they realise the protective measures are cosmetic and the reactions likely to be lethargic. There is no record of terrorist strikes on alert troops, in India, so far. In this I do not include strikes for assassination of specific targets. In the West, of course, there have been suicide attacks but again they were confident of getting through the protective perimeter to drive their explosive loaded trucks to the desired point. While it is true that determined terrorists can strike any target, the fact is why should they strike alert targets when there are plenty of unprotected ones? In India every other place is vulnerable barring a few VIPs.

Also it is important to note that presence of NSG cannot prevent terrorist attacks. Delhi has been hit any number of times with the complete NSG nearby. What is important is Intelligence and prevention. Had the NSG reached in, say two hrs what would have been the number of casualties? In all attacks maximum casualties take place in the first half hour.

Terrorists always strike the undefended, weakest targets killing unarmed innocent, civilians whereas the Insurgents strike the strength of the state such as police stations, Army posts, convoys etc and protect the unarmed civilians. We must understand the difference. The terrorists would never have opened fire on the ATS car in Mumbai if there was the slightest chance of retaliation.

What is the answer?

States must remain responsible to deal with terrorism. What is the difficulty in training existing police offrs and men to form (NSG like) units in their states? The Police have their Intelligence. In addition each district, each Police station must be responsible to gain its own Intelligence in its area of responsibility. If need be another police offr can be posted to each district, under the SSP for this task. The existing Intelligence setups may continue to please the political masters, as hither to fore.

The high level training needs to be given to only about a company worth of commandos in each state to be increased, if required. But it can be called a commando unit of the police. Though 200 NSG personnel came to Mumbai, we saw that very few were actually used. Even with 500% reserve we don't need too many commandos. These must be the elite not used for protection of VIPs. Black colour uniformed personnel must never be used for VIP protection. They must only be used to deal with terrorists.

The Army can help in imparting training. We also have enough reserves of personnel who have served in NSG and returned to units. Some can be absorbed in state police forces, if the Army agrees to release them.

I do wish, in the interest of our countrymen, that the authorities analyse the problem before taking the usual Home Ministry action of raising a new force after every crisis. Unfortunately their advisors are the DGs of CPOs who have no experience of handling any crisis. If any of you can do something about it, do it.

Lt Gen KK Khanna
Former Commandant IMA

Terror in Mumbai

Analysis and Lessons Learnt

The smoke has cleared and the dust settled in South Mumbai. The authorities have announced that Mumbai is safe. For the sake of Mumbaiwasis we hope and wish they are right.

As long as nothing happens we are safe. Aren't we? Forget about the terrorists who have got away! As long as they just hide they are no threat!

There can be no doubt that Mumbai would have plenty of them and many supporters even today. Being human I am sure they will give time to the police to recover before striking again (just to be fair). Strike they will; and not only in Mumbai. When and where? No worry because such decisions are taken outside the Country, in any case.

Will the Govt hold the Heads of Intelligence agencies accountable for their failures? No! Because they are doing a good job collecting intelligence of politicians. And, of course, the Maharashtra Police will be felicitated for keeping the civilians out of range of the terrorists weapons during the battle. What else is the Police supposed to do? When the top officers have been killed in an ambush, there won't be any difficult questions. The DGP is too close to the CM. Don't bother about his responsibility!

Will anyone remember that the NSG was called as soon as the strike occurred? The Home Minister announced it to one and all! Giving even the number being sent! Why did the ATS not deal with terrorists initially till they felt it was beyond their control? The same question for the naval commandos. No one would dream of doubting the courage of the Naval Commandos or the Mumbai Police. But there has been no casualty of Police or the Naval commandos in actual encounter. When the chips are down why do all the agencies with fancy names back out and the Army is called in whether donning NSG uniforms or their own? Will their reaction not be noted by our enemies?

I hope authorities and the civilians will differentiate between the two brave army men killed in action and the policemen who died as a result of terrorist action. It will be an insult to our brave Army men to equate them.

I wonder how many personnel of the NSG deployed were from the Army. How is it that there are no casualties of the other agencies? If the police don't even attempt to take on the terrorists when the encounters start how do they conduct so many encounters on their own? And related question how safe is Mumbai in their hands? There is no need to comment. Facts reveal it all. The need for greater professionalism has never been higher. Is there a need for them to bother when the Army is always there at their beck and call?

Now we hear of an NSG like organisation for Maharashtra! Why can't present organisations be more professional? Organisations are effective because of the professionalism of their leaders and the men, their traditions established over long periods; not only with sophisticated equipment. What prevents the ATS of Mumbai to be more professional?

Surprisingly the people who feel that Mumbai belongs to them have been mum during the crisis. But their attitude can be understood because these terrorists were neither from Bihar, North or the South. Foreign terrorists are not on their hit lists. These parochial organisations have good organisations but to expect to exploit the organisations to collect intelligence of foreign terrorists would be optimistic. There is no threat to the Marathas and while gaining intelligence against them maybe in National interest, but will not help them politically. So what decision do you expect? Neighbouring politicians have enough tax payers money to donate to derive full political mileage. If they don't do this they won't be politicians. If this money was used within the State sensibly a lot would be gained even to just gain intelligence of terrorists.

As far as the Army is concerned, we remain proud of our colleagues and so are the people of India, no matter how much our status is lowered by petty politicians (mistake to call them leaders). Let us just do our duty to retain the respect in the heart of the common man, which no politician or bureaucrat can lower!

Jai Hind
Lt Gen KK Khanna
Former Commandant IMA

Picture Shooters in contrast

Olympic shooter wins Gold Medal & Government awards Rs 300,00,000. A NSG Commando shoots the terrorist and lays down his life defending Mumbai and his award is Rs 5,00,000. What is the worth of a Jawan defending the Nation? Think about it!

Rescue Mother India: Press Note

1. National Security should be the Central Theme. The Development should be woven around it.
2. Politicians and bureaucrats have failed the country.
3. No Nation can become great unless its Armed Forces, Para Military Forces and Police are strong, well motivated and well equipped.
4. It is a matter of pride for any one to belong to the Armed Forces. The country must uphold this pride.
5. Chief Minister of Kerala has no moral right to remain in the chair after having uttered such outrageous and shocking remarks against the Martyr's Family.
6. Chief Minister of Kerala must himself resign or the people should ensure his exit.
7. No one can deny that it is primarily due to the role played by the Armed Forces that integrity of the Nation is intact.
8. Whereas all other institutions have failed the country quite often, the Armed Forces have been the saving grace.
9. Armed Forces for their contributions for the sustenance of the Nation MUST get due respect just and fair deal.
10. Population influence of Defence Forces both serving and retired of approx 15 Crores must be taken note of.
11. Constitute unified command headed by Army for Internal Security.
12. Unified command headed by Army only answer to terrorism.
13. Respect soldiers both serving and retired they are the saviours of the Nation.
14. Defence Forces are the last bastion, keep up their morale and motivation.
15. Any country which cannot look after its security is doomed to fail.
16. Remove Injustice to Defence Personnel of 6th CPC.
17. Attract the best and most suitable youth to Defence Forces; offer the best package.
18. NSG must be commanded by Army and not by Police.
19. Carry out Police Reforms on War footing. Remove Political interference from Police System.
20. Home and Defence Minister must have Defence background.
21. All Central Services personnel must do three years service in Defence Forces before joining their respective services.

Jai Hind
With Kind Regards,
Yours Sincerely,
Maj Gen Satbir Singh, SM
Vice Chairman Indian ESM Movement (IESM)

Operational Metamorphosis: Mumbai, ISI, LeT and al-Qaeda

To understand how the Mumbai attack seems to have been an original small-scale ISI plan for Kashmir which was then ‘hijacked’ by al-Qaeda and turned into a three-day display of urban terrorism, read Syed Saleem Shahzad today in the Asia Times. After a superbly concise (and essential) background history of the al-Qaeda-India-Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) dynamic, Shahzad cuts to the chase.

India has never been a direct al-Qaeda target. This has been due in part to Delhi’s traditionally impartial policy of strategic non-alignment and in part to al-Qaeda using India as a safe route from the Arabian Sea into Gujrat and then on to Mumbai and then either by air or overland to the United Arab Emirates. Al-Qaeda did not want to disrupt this arrangement by stirring up attacks in India.

Nevertheless, growing voices from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and from within India for the country to be a strategic partner of NATO and the US in Afghanistan compelled al-Qaeda, a year ago, to consider a plan to utilize Islamic militancy structures should this occur.

Several low-profile attacks were carried out in various parts of India as a rehearsal and Indian security agencies still have no idea who was behind them. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda was not yet prepared for any bigger moves, like the Mumbai attacks.

Under directives from Pakistan’s army chief, General Ashfaq Kiani, who was then director general (DG) of the ISI, a low-profile plan was prepared to support Kashmiri militancy. That was normal, even in light of the peace process with India. Although Pakistan had closed down its major operations, it still provided some support to the militants so that the Kashmiri movement would not die down completely.

After Kiani was promoted to chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj was placed as DG of the ISI. The external section under him routinely executed the plan of Kiani and trained a few dozen LET militants near Mangla Dam (near the capital Islamabad). They were sent by sea to Gujrat, from where they had to travel to Kashmir to carry out operations.

Meanwhile, a major reshuffle in the ISI two months ago officially shelved this low-key plan as the country’s whole focus had shifted towards Pakistan’s tribal areas. The director of the external wing was also changed, placing the “game” in the hands of a low-level ISI forward section head (a major) and the LET’s commander-in-chief, Zakiur Rahman.

Zakiur was in Karachi for two months to personally oversee the plan. However, the militant networks in India and Bangladesh comprising the Harkat, which were now in al-Qaeda’s hands, tailored some changes. Instead of Kashmir, they planned to attack Mumbai, using their existent local networks, with Westerners and the Jewish community center as targets.

Zakiur and the ISI’s forward section in Karachi, completely disconnected from the top brass, approved the plan under which more than 10 men took Mumbai hostage for nearly three days and successfully established a reign of terror.

The attack, started from ISI headquarters and fined-tuned by al-Qaeda, has obviously caused outrage across India. The next issue is whether it has the potential to change the course of India’s regional strategy and deter it from participating in NATO plans in Afghanistan.

He goes on to explain what few have well: That the fighting in Karachi since the Mumbai attacks that has left 35 killed and over 200 injured is between the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement), “comprising people who migrated to Pakistan after the partition of British India in 1947,” and the Pashtun sub-nationalist ANP (Awami National Party). This ethnic dynamic is critical to understanding the conflict in Karachi, and another indication of just how much a tinderbox Pakistan is.

A couple points on what Shahzad has written. If accurate (and Shahzad in normally uncannily so), then:

1. ISI fingerprints are on the genesis of the attack plan.
2. Upper echelons of ISI delegated seemingly unsupervised to a junior officer, who signed off on the LeT/al-Qaeda alterations from small Kashmir assault to large scale Mumbai killing spree.
3. Upper echelons of ISI & military perhaps unaware of alterations, but not with clean hands. Kashmir or Mumbai, they planned terror attacks.
4. That “major reshuffle in the ISI two months ago,” recall, was when Lt General Nadeem Taj, a relative of Musharraf, was forced out as Director General of the ISI. It was a Pakistani intelligence shake-up largely by American insistence.
5. While the US had hoped the ‘double dealing’ of Taj would have left with him, it has to be understood that General Kiyani - head of Pakistan’s military and thus effectively its military intelligence (ISI) - while admirably stalwart against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the North West and tribal areas, has always been equally stalwart regarding the Pakistani conflict with India over disputed Kashmir.
General Kiyani may have intended a minor operation for Kashmir and was almost certainly in the dark about the metamorphosis of the operation into a Mumbai massacre, but the law of unintended consequences holds little acquittal when leaders play with the fire of terrorism.

Even while the ISI political wing was disbanded just days before the Mumbai attack, the shakeup atop the ISI is irrelevant without a trickle-down impact. And so long as ‘mid-level’ men such as Major Zakiur Rahman man posts and sign off on al-Qaeda affiliates’ massacres, there is little hope for Pakistan’s emergence from the tinderbox of terrorism without itself being consumed by the very fires it tolerates.

Westerners call it a ‘come to Jesus’ moment. Whatever the South Asian equivalent, Pakistan has yet to have its own. When it does, the fighting inside Pakistan, among Pakistanis (and assorted imported radical travelers) will be fierce and bloody. May the jihadiyun not be the only ones armed and willing to fight.
Operational Metamorphosis: Mumbai, ISI, LeT and al-Qaeda

Maj Sandeep Unnikrishnan

Major SandyThe Orkut profile photo reveals a carefree youth dressed in light blue track pants and trainers and an Adidas haversack, lying across one of the huge rocks that dot Hampi.

The megawatt smile that lights up his face is the brightness of his white T shirt. That was Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan on his holiday in Hampi this August, wearing an outfit befitting someone who plays football, cricket, basketball, volleyball and lawn tennis and seemingly sharing little in common with the black dungaree clad, highly trained leader of the NSG's Special Assault Group 51 who went down in a hail of bullets, fighting Lashkar terrorists during the siege of Mumbai's Nariman building.

Four of five things he couldn't live without- sleep, food, the TV and of course, movies.

One of his last messages to a close friend was a recommendation to watch Rock On-'an amazing movie.'

Sandeep loved to drive fast, loved Indian and continental food 'at least two non vegetarian meals a day'.

Perhaps a reason why the first thing you would notice about the athlete was the embarrassing admission, 'I've finally gained a bit of weight'.

The product of the NDA's 94th course is an occasional drinker and lives alone in Manesar, Haryana (the NSG headquarters) though his 'friends visit often'.

He works in a 'government job' whose description reveals a wry sense of humour: 'non productive'.

Besides Hindi, English and Bihari which was a must for the Bihar regiment officer, he was fluent in Tamil, Malayalam and Kannada.

Friends have written in beneath his photograph. Remarks that are like the little candles of the digital age. 'Sandy...we will always remember....Your laughter...Your lovely smile...Your Bravery, Your Courage, Your Sacrifice.. We all salute you.. Our prayers are with your family.. You will be missed very much... Our Brave Heart .. Our Hero.. Our dear friend...

The 31 year old who listed 'hypocrisy, sycophancy, apathy and a lack of compassion' as major turn offs, leaves behind a grieving family, friends, batch mates.

An unfinished life and an incomplete profile
Sandeep Unnikrishnan
Major Sandeep

7 Bihar Regiment
Patna: Senior Army officers and jawans of Bihar Regimental Centre (BRC) at Danapur Cantonment felt proud of the supreme sacrifice made by NSG commando Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan for the country while fighting terrorists at the Taj in Mumbai on Friday.

Unni was an outstanding braveheart of the 7th Bihar Regiment, they said. He'd been inducted into the Bihar Regiment in June 1999. He was subsequently posted at several vulnerable and strategic places, including J&K and Rajasthan. He always boosted the morale of his colleagues during difficult times, said sources.

Expressing deep shock at Major Unnikrishnan's death, Maj R K Singh of the 7th Bihar Regiment, who is currently posted at Danapur BRC, said that the Army and country as a whole had lost a very bright officer who was just 31. Recalling his association of about four years with him, Maj Singh said, "He was valour and bravery personified. He took challenges seriously."

"When he was posted at a very high altitude in Gulmarg, he proved that he was the best while performing his duty and commanding the forces in the most difficult terrains in J&K and in snowy mountain warfare as well," said Maj Singh.

Havildar Shambhu Nath Jha, who had spent about seven years with Major Unnikrishnan, said that he was the epitome of discipline and courage. Even the commanding officer was all praise for his sense of discipline, said Jha. "He was a popular officer who was loved and adored by his seniors and juniors alike. During the `Ghatak test', the most difficult test of the Army, Maj Unnikrishnan topped twice in these tests earning commendation from seniors. Perhaps this was the reason or his passion for bravery that he opted for the NSG commando service which he joined on deputation in 2006," Jha said.

A tearful Sepoy Ajay Kumar, who spent about six years with Maj Unnikrishnan, said the entire battalion was proud of him.

Danapur sub-area commandant Brig Abhimanyu Raut, BRC commnader Brig P S Rathee, Col Manjit Singh and many other officers and jawans condoled the death of Maj Unnikrishnan and described him as the most upright, dedicated and disciplined officer. "His sacrifice would inspire others to emulate him while fighting the country's enemies," they said.
Bihar Regiment Fondly Remembers Major Sandeep
ranjan@bihartodayonline.com

ESM Press release: Indian Armed Forces role in neutralising terrorists

Sir,
1. We appreciate united & quick reaction by the Indian Forces to neutralize the terrorist's attack. In which Indian Army, Navy, Air Force, Para military Forces commandos and NSG took on combined operations successfully. Though this was very painful & unfortunate but inevitable.

2. But we do not like the way statement have been issued by Mr ML Kumawat, Spl Secy Ministry of Home affairs of India. While giving account of the entire Bombay episode 27-29 Nov at 5:30 pm on 29/11/08 to Press & Prime TV, he deliberately omitted the role of the Armed Forces. He bragged as if all the operations were carried out by the NSG Commandos only and Army was merely put on ground role only. While issuing this statement from his cozy office 1000 miles away from the actual site, he was seen lacking professional information & conduct of operations, with sole aim to take whole credit of success. Whereas, he was not sure of even terrorists Numbers, by then, if they were 29 or 10 only. Such a sensitive & irresponsible statement on behalf of Govt, was aiming to undermine the role of the Army? Such attitudes do not improve understanding between various Forces and must be avoided.

3. It was the first time that whole World was watching every action live with running commentary like a cricket match. We all saw Role of Indian Army, Navy, Air Force, Local Army commanders, Police and Para Military Forces, minute by minute. Role of Police, its vehicle being taken away by Terrorists and killing of senior officers innocently, was unfortunate. We expected that Mr Baal & Raaj Thakerays could have also appreciated Force's role played in Bombay to save lives. All the forces & operational details have been well covered by the print media also.

4. By the way, Major Sandeep Unikrishnan was from Army (7 Bihar Regt) & Havildar Chander of Army were attached with NSG, who sacrificed lives for the sake of peace in Bombay & India as such. Therefore, only professional & responsible Officers should be made to disclose official version in future, please. Such things only hurts feelings of others.

5. The above views & serious concern was expressed during sudden meeting of Indian ESM Movement (Pb) members at Mohali today.

Released by: Lt Col SS Sohi, Retd. Coord IESM (Punjab), on behalf of all Ex- Servicemen
Dated: 30/11/08.