What ails the Armed Forces: Wonderful insight into Defence Ministry's working

Indian Express Posted on Apr 17, 2003 at 0000 hrs IST.
Has anything changed for the better one wonders!
It is heartening to note that an editor of a national newspaper has taken up the case of the low-castes of the army — the other ranks. The Indian Army personnel are divided into three categories: the other ranks including the NCOs, the JCOs and the Commissioned Officers. In the US Army, there are only two categories — officers and the enlisted men.

The JCO, a peculiarity of the Indian Army, was the invention of the British and was meant to fill the communication gap between the British officers and Indian sepoys. However, after Independence, the Indian officers found it convenient to continue with the arrangement of JCOs.

It was in the tradition of the Indian caste system and helped the officers keep their distance from the sepoys. In other armies, there is no intermediary between a lieutenant and sergeant (Havildar in the Indian army). That is why Hav. Shinde could not have written to an officer. In the case of Sgt Romero and Major Sturek, communication was natural because both were in the same platoon with no JCO between them. So strict is the chain of command in the Indian Army that a letter from Shinde to his former company commander would have resulted in disciplinary action against him instead of it being appreciated. You mentioned that Maj. Sturek forwarded the sergeant’s letter to two people he thought should be reading it: Army Sergeant Major Jack Tilley and Chief of Staff (General) Eric Shineski. For us in India, it is understandable that he forwarded it to the General, but why to a Sgt Major, who is only an NCO? Because, as the US World Almanac says, ‘‘the US Army, Navy and Air Force in 1966-67 each created a position of senior enlisted advisor, whose primary job is to represent the point of view of the service’s enlisted men and women on matters of welfare, morale and any problems concerning enlisted personnel.’’ In the Indian army, there is no representation for other ranks in the higher echelons. So is the case with JCOs. The battalion has a Subedar Major, who used to be a father figure and who directly advised the commanding officer on discipline and welfare of the men. But nowadays, the post has been reduced to that of an informer, if not an errand boy of the CO. Neither was the NCO/JCO represented in the committees that advised the Pay Commission or the rehabilitation and resettlement organisations. Let me narrate a personal incident. When I requested the United Services Institution, to change my associate membership into a regular one, it was rejected by the Executive Council comprising retired generals, because I had served as a JCO. This when there are half-a-dozen books on military matters written by me in the USI Library. The Royal United Services Institution, on the lines of which the USI was established in 1870, has no such ‘‘officers only’’ restriction. Aren’t our Generals more British than the British?— Sub Maj N. Kunju (Retd)

Whither our Indian pride When I was a member of the faculty of Defence Services Staff College, I was told by an American officer that his soldiers would not serve in the conditions that our soldiers do. His statement sums up what our Army is all about: ‘‘serve without expecting anything in return’’. It is not enough for George Fernandes to just visit Siachen. Let him translate his words into deeds. He can modernise our forces instead of returning the funds unspent. . As a nation, we lack pride. This translates into the treatment of our soldiers. We think of them only during war, and make promises only to forget them. That is the difference between Shinde and Romero. Colonel A. Sridharan (Retd) The Ex-Servicemen’s Contributory Health Scheme launched with much fanfare just a fortnight ago has sought as much as 50 per cent contribution from the pensioners. If this is the way we treat our Armed Forces, the quality of those opting for it will go down. After all, who would like to get stuck in a career which demands the best part of your life and gives nothing in return?— P.M. Ravindran

The approach of our civilian leadership towards national security is absolutely scandalous. If there is an India-US war tomorrow, the fate of the Indian Army will be no better than the Iraqi Army.— Dilip

If George Fernandes was half the man that Shastri was, he should have resigned many times over with the now almost-daily MiG crashes. But he’s not, and we have to rue the fate of our jawans. Havildar Shinde is no Romero. He can be no Romero when we have callous individuals who assume and retain powerful positions without responsibility.— Jay Iyer

When real life heroes are ignored It is really very depressing to learn about the appaling conditions faced by our brave soldiers and nothing being done about it. I guess that’s the way we Indians are. Even I, after reading your article and feeling so bad for our soldiers, will forget about it in a day or two if not earlier. Recently, Aishwarya Rai, who earns in crores for each movie and got hurt in a minor accident, had private planes at her disposal to carry her back to Mumbai. I wonder whether the owners of these planes would even spare a thought for our brave soldiers, who are always facing injury and death while guarding the country. — Shankar It is so true that our politicians are so out of touch with the real issues. Our netas have to be made more more accountable. Then the death of even one jawan would be taken more seriously than just another photo-op for handing a paltry check to the widow.— Bob Thukral

I strongly believe that India has too much of democracy. By this, I mean that even buying essentials like supplies for the military is being scrutinised and criticised by the Opposition. The result: These people are scared to spend money even for basic necessities. How else can one explain the unspent funds?Basker Mathrubootham

Yes, in the Indian Army it is impossible to change or modernise anything without giving an arm and a leg. Forget Havildar Shinde, a mid-level infantry officer cannot get anything changed for his men or himself. Our senior officers reach their exalted ranks because of two premier qualities: they have to be docile in action and a tiger on paper. Among the many things that the Army really needs, but cannot articulate, are: better and lighter rifles, modern form of Web equipment (pouches etc), better water bottles, more powerful and lighter binoculars, boots which do not require an anklet, computers to accurately fire 81 mm mortars, more lethal grenades, GPS equipment, replacements for the archaic one-ton vehicles which guzzle fuel. If we could somehow bring about these changes, the Indian Infantry would be revolutionised. If India wants to be a modern nation, it will have to liberalise its Armed Forces and give them a free hand, change the cult of subservience and cut out the colonial system. Otherwise the country will be roundly defeated in the next war by a military Pakistan. If our military officers are mere lackeys, the country cannot proactively defend herself.— Maj A.K. Mathur (retd)

It is not just the Army but our entire mindset about seniority and the notion that the ground-level people don’t know anything that has to be changed. Even in our schools and colleges, are students ever encouraged to ask probing questions? How often does a company ask your opinion about their product and actually do something about it? You talk about the rifles used by the Indian Army. But think about the buses, trains and other mass transport systems in use in the country. How have they changed in the last two-three decades? It’s all due to our lazy, unimaginative approach.— S. Chatterjee

On the one hand there are American soldiers who are embarrassingly dependent on their Air Force or so called ‘‘Smart Bombs’’. On the other, are our soldiers who have a lot to grumble about, but hardly ever complain. I feel that the loss of their lives during the Kargil conflict could have been substantially reduced if we had proper equipment. I hope our politicians read your article.— Aditya Chandra

You have missed the point. Havildar Shinde stands nowhere in comparison to their Sergeant Romero because of the die-hard colonial legacy of our defence services, even 55 years after Independence. Where else do you find such ranks among NCOs ? So your well-intentioned harangue on poor equipment only touches the fringe of the malady.— R. Misra

Sergeant Romero may have become a hero in America for his email. But to me, it shows gross indiscipline on his part. I do not think it is right to allow sergeants to write letters directly to the authorities, bypassing the chain of command. In fact, such acts would create indiscipline. And while our brave jawans must be provided with the necessary equipment and the basic amenities needed for their day-to-day life, it must also be ensured that they do not end up becoming a pampered lot.— V.P. Damodar

Too often we tend to take our brave jawans for granted and expect them to perform miracles; which, given the terrible battle conditions they have to deal with, they often do. But do the brass (civilian and military) care? Perhaps not. Consider the infamous post-Kargil coffin-scandal and the every-other-day MiG crashes. So how do we set this right? A public interest litigation on behalf of our jawans?— Sriniisn

It is not right to blame just the military brass for the callous attitude towards the soldiers. Let us not forget that the English language Press lionised General Parvez Musharraf during the Agra summit. The US State Department frequently equates India and Pakistan by treating the aggressor (Pakistan) and the victim (India) as equally responsible for the situation in Kashmir. They do this to promote the interests of the US. The US Press reflects this position — as they do whenever matters of US foreign policy are concerned. The Indian press should realise that when foreign policy is concerned, the country’s interests should come first.— Nagaraja Rao

The article is a beautiful insight into the Defence Ministry’s functioning. Why don’t you lead a signature email campaign to bring this into the limelight? Like the Bofors scandal, we need to raise a big noise to be really heard. This is the least that we can do for our jawans.— N.S. Rao
What ails our Armed Forces?

National Security: Media Reports

INDIA-PAKISTAN STANDOFF- Reaching out to Pakistan has been a one-way street. The need of the hour is to drastically change our foreign policy while building up our military and internal security apparatus to meet the challenge posed by the Pakistani army.
Cut losses and change tack by Lt-Gen Vijay Oberoi (retd)

Synergy can’t be achieved without CDS by Col Pritam Bhullar (retd)

INDIA’S PAKISTAN POLICY PREDOMINATED BY FLAWED PERSPECTIVES By Dr Subhash Kapila

GEN ASHFAQ PARVEZ KAYANI by B.RAMAN

National Security: Indian Grand Strategy- a book review

Monday, June 14, 2010
Washington DC: release of book on Indian Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy

Admiral Raja Menon is a former career officer and submarine specialist in the Navy. He is the author of The Indian Navy: A Photo Essay, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars and A Nuclear Strategy for India. He is a distinguished fellow in the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies and the National Maritime Foundation.

Joining Admiral Menon for the forum will be Ashley Tellis, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lisa Curtis, Heritage Foundation's Senior Research Fellow on South Asia. S. Enders Wimbush, Hudson Institute's Senior Vice President, will moderate. Wednesday, June 23, 2010 12:30-2:30 PM

Analyzing some of the major influences on foreign and security policy in India, this synthesis of insights assesses emerging global scenarios from an Indian perspective and details their likely impact on India's current and future national interests. This study first uses the Net Assessment method to detail the scenarios that the country will face in 2020 and then utilizes a transparent method to build three scenarios that India could face and compares them to other situations created by the United States National Intelligence Council and a group of Indian Practitioners. Closing with a possible foreign policy strategy, this reference clearly explains the choices that await a rising India.

The book spells out four possible global scenarios in 2020. The first is one in which the US reinvents itself and surges forward on the tide of development of alternate energy sources. The second envisages a scenario in which the relative power of the US declines and a multipolar world emerges in which regional powers rise to run their regions unilaterally – India in South Asia, China in continental Asia, and the US with Brazil in the Americas. While globalisation reduces political rivalry between nations, there is no co-ordinated action against terrorism and rogue, non-state actors.

The third scenario is one in which the US and China establish a duopoly and begin to co-operate in controlling world institutions, leaving former friends of the US, including India, without a platform. India will then be faced with the choice of either joining the duopoly or facing isolation. The final scenario is one in which economic growth in both the United States and China remains depressed while India grows at a sustained annual rate of nine to ten per cent. The world takes longer to recover from the recession, international bodies become weak and the US becomes more isolationist. India becomes a powerful entity by 2020 but has not yet developed mechanisms to play the role of a constructive global or regional power. Of these, the worst-case scenario from India's perspective is the emergence of a US-China duopoly where China remains hostile to India and the US is unavailable as a balancing power.

The book outlines a strategy that will help India tackle the challenges posed by the possible shift in global power arrangements. It includes:

A strong focus on achieving sustained economic growth with equity as that helps India to withstand a possible duopoly

A hedging military strategy that enables India to switch theatres between North-Continental and South Maritime, abolishing all institutions for passive territorial defence and unifying military command

A technology strategy that gives the private sector its head with government joint ventures and subordinates the human resource development and science and technology ministries to that of service providers with measurable outputs to ride a possible US wave of alternate energy innovation

A national security strategy that creates mechanisms that conjoins the NSA system to the parliamentary system

A domestic strategy that reforms all domestic institutions, particularly the police and the civil service, under external supervision and

The recreation of a foreign policy apparatus that can implement this strategy abroad.

The challenges that India will face in implementing this strategy will come from:

The rise of a galloping China with perceived unsolvable disputes with India and ruled by a monolithic, single party

The fundamentalist threat from an unstable Pakistan in a close alliance with China

The region being overwhelmed by Chinese economic blandishments to support regimes politically hostile to India

The fraying of international institutions

A degraded neighbourhood because of economic compulsions in Bangladesh, continued political upheaval in Nepal, simmering discontent and low level conflict in Sri Lanka and jihadi threat in Pakistan and

The loss of naval superiority in the Indian Ocean.

The book also raises questions about whether India has operational mechanisms needed to implement the strategy that it has outlined. It points out that the lack of a strategic core, which directs policy and oversees implementation, is a major lacuna that needs to be addressed urgently.

Refreshments will be served.
Books will be available for purchase.

To RSVP, please send your name and affiliation to events@hudson.org.
Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
Hudson Institute
1015 15th St, NW,
Sixth Floor
Washington, DC 20005
www.hudson.org
washington dc: release of book on Indian Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy
US India Friendship Net

Frightened by a dragon, India shies away from Taiwan

MD Nalapat The National
Last Updated: June 27. 2010 8:50PM UAE / June 27. 2010 4:50PM GMT
The two Asian giants may share a 4,250-kilometre border and trade goods and services in excess of $60 billion every year, but when it comes to slights – perceived and otherwise – Beijing’s memory is elephantine.

India has given sanctuary to the Dalai Lama since 1959 and harbours more than 130,000 Tibetan refugees. In return, China has helped India’s rival Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons and missile systems. It helped block India’s membership in the UN Security Council and fought to the last minute in 2008 to prevent the lifting of restrictions on nuclear trade with India.

It is no wonder then that while there has been only one war between the two nations in 4,000 years (China soundly defeated India in 1962), relations between the two countries have been cool, if not frigid. Beijing believes in an eye-for-an-eye, preferably two – a penchant that drives the hand-wringing, naturally timid Indian establishment slightly crazy.

Nowhere is that fear more evident than in relations between India and Taiwan, a small island that nonetheless boasts an economy more than a third of the size of India, with foreign-exchange reserves double the size of New Delhi’s, at about $400 billion.
Frightened by a dragon, India shies away from Taiwan
China Trade Pact Draws Taiwan Into Economic Embrace June 28, 2010, 9:06 PM EDT By Frederik Balfour

India's first defence university to come up near Delhi

New Delhi: Drawing lessons from the 1999 Kargil conflict, the government on Thursday decided to set up the first defence university in the country to enable holistic study of defence and strategic security challenges.

A meeting of the Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, accorded "in principle" approval to set up the Indian National Defence University (INDU) near Delhi, Information and Broadcasting Minister Ambika Soni told reporters here.

To be established at an estimated cost of Rs 300 crore, the university would come up on a 200 acre land at Binola in Gurgaon, Haryana. A sum of Rs 100 crore has been earmarked for acquisition of the land.

The existing defence educational institutions like the National Defence College in New Delhi, College of Defence Management at Secunderabad, National Staff College at Wellington and National Defence Academy in Pune, would be affiliated to INDU. At present, these institutions are attached to various universities.

"INDU will undertake long-term defence and strategic studies and create synergy between the academic community and government functionaries," Soni said.

The proposed university, which would be fully autonomous and constituted under an Act of Parliament, would promote policy-oriented research on all aspects of national security as part of the strategic national policy-making, she said.

"It will encourage awareness of national security issues by reaching out to scholars and an audience beyond the official machinery," Soni said.

INDU would educate national security leaders on all aspects of national strategies in the fields of security, military, information and technology, through teaching and research, she added.

After the Kargil conflict, the government had set up a Review Committee, headed by eminent strategic expert K Subrahmanyam, which had recommended establishment of such a university to exclusively deal with defence and strategic matters.

The Committee had also recommended finding of ways and means to integrate the academic community, armed forces, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies and the bureaucracy in strategic security policy making and related issues. Source: PTI
India's first defence university to come up near Delhi

Nightmare 2012: Chinese Special Forces cut off Siliguri corridor

Friends,
The article Nightmare 2012: Chinese Special Forces cut off Siliguri corridor: click here is relevant though not entirely.

India must learn from its history, as pointed out in the article. India was subjugated for centuries as its rulers neglected its armies. Also Indian rulers were not united. Today, though India is one Nation but there are too many political parties and some even amicable towards the Chinese and few towards Pakistan as well!!

India's Polity and leaders are just not attuned towards National Security. The Bibles of our diplomats do not seem to have any content on Power projection. Our bureaucrats are the biggest road block in our Defence Forces getting modernised and having the weaponry to fight a successful war.

Every department, may it be Finance, Defence, External Affairs or Home Affairs is busy enlarging its turf. The top leadership is unable to provide required vision and coordinate the National Security effort successfully against internal and external threats.

No amount of money, DGP will be of use, in case India loses its freedom to act. The Chinese are already in Nepal in a big way. They do not have to paradrop forces in Siliguri Corridor!!

IESL should start a campaign to high light India's National Security neglect. May God be with Bharat.
Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh (Retd)

Dear Chander,
A very thought provoking article " NIGHTMARE 2012 : CHINESE ......." by Bharat Verma, published in Defence Review ( extracted from SIFY home page , dated 20 .04.2010), is appended below for circulation, if deemed appropriate. Please do read the Cautionary Note at the end of the article.

2. Following comments of the Author (extracted from the article) are worth noting by all of us and in turn should be highlighted by bringing it to the notice of our Netas & Defence heirarchy--
Quote
" From times immemorial this attracted hordes of invaders from Central Asia. Delhi Durbar was unable to defend itself as it neglected its military. Time and again, the rulers in Delhi were subjugated, as their incompetence in wielding the military was pathological." Once again India is generating vast wealth. Once again it refuses to defend it! Despite historical lessons of defeat at the hands of marauding armies, Delhi Durbar’s incompetence and ignorance in equipping the excellent military machine inherited from the British is again on display." ...
Unquote
Bhupal Singh, Veteran
unmasking China by Bharat Verma IDR Vol 24.3

Dreading the Dragon by Shekhar Gupta

Dear Sir,
"Dreading the Dragon" by Shekhar Gupta of September 12, click me makes for interesting reading. It is worth noting that the areas where the recently reported transgressions have occured in the Ladakh region, are well within the Johnson-Ardagh Line, which is the basis of India's claims. W.H. Johnson, a Survey of India officer did his border alignment in 1865. Later, in 1897, Maj Gen Sir John Ardagh, as Director Military Intelligence, reinforced Johnson's perceptions, and, in fact, added to them. The 1947 maps India inherited from Britain show the Northern boundary in accordance with the Johnson-Ardagh Line, so India's assertions of alleged intrusion by China have due legitimacy.
The larger issue, however, goes beyond border transgressions. India unapologetically needs to dump the Nehruvian legacy (brusquely ordering a deeply concerned Army Chief, General Cariappa, when he went to advise him in 1951 on building appropriate defences against China, "you mind only Kashmir and Pakistan!").What we now need (and Shekhar Gupta has pointed that out clearly) is a pragmatic and energetic Foreign Policy based on realpolitik, not diplomatic obliqueness; a policy that takes into account the defences forces perceptions of threat assessment and their suggested road map for our Northern and Eastern borders and need for fast track development without undue anxiety or panic. Being polite, obtuse and accommodating on issues of national security should no longer be considered the preferred option. Instead, we should resort to putting our national interest above all other considerations.
Maj Gen Raj Mehta (Retd)