General Kahlon narration (ref post dated 17 June 2008)
Medical Aid post
Next day in the night 19th/ 20th oct 1962 we heard some definite noise and I, the youngest officer sleeping in the Chauri hut, was asked to take out a patrol and investigate. I could definitely hear the sound of wood cutting, which I reported back. From where we were at the Chauri Hut, if one went towards Hatungla there was an opening, with sparse cover of trees extending to 300 yards or so, beyond this was located the RAP of some Medical Aid Post. Lt Balsubrramaniam of 51 Mountain Regiment along with his OP party was also located in this area.
Chinese commenced firing
On 20th morning, as the day broke, the Chinese started firing on us. We were engaged basically by small arms from close quarters. Now by hindsight, the sound we heard the previous night was of the Chinese cutting the wood and making lanes to mark the area to which they came down and from where they brought effective fire on us. From Thagla, being out of range they could not have engaged us. From that height they could have only thrown stones at us, even now they were firing at us from up down and we were sitting in the valley.
Bala died in my lap
Naturally there was a lot of chaos and commotion, the omnibus started ringing, people returned fire, the company across returned fire effectively. Subsequently they pulled back towards the home side of the river. The clearing I mentioned earlier was covered by a Chinese MMG with a clear line of fire. Balasubramaniam, my course mate, knew that I was the IO of the battalion and also that there was a group of officers near the bridge, he tried to move from his location under threat by the enemy fire, he sprinted through this clearing to reach us. The first time the Chinese fired a long burst was when they fired at him. I heard that some one has been hit, being the youngest I ran to investigate and then realised that it was Bala. We put him under cover, but by this time excessive blood loss had taken from his injuries, sadly Bala died in my lap. (Even as the Brigade Signals Officer I had no idea what Lt Bala was doing in that place, what was his communication set up, what fire and from which guns was he supposed to bring down on the enemy. What a waste of a young officer and his team of three gunners who also perished.)
Hatungla route closed
Psychologically this opening route was closed for us and it had a very important impact on our further decision. This was the short route leading to Hatungla, and right in the vicinity of the bridge was this opening, the Chinese had effectively blocked it. They had blocked this 500 to 600 Yards of clearing by covering it by MMG, we knew that if we were caught in this clearing we had it. No assault came on us in all fairness; we were assaulted only by infantry Weapons.
No rounds
I remember on night of 18 Oct Subedar Kumbha Ram, a fine JCO of 2nd World War veteran subsequently retired as Hony Capt, was the battalion mortar JCO who came to my CO. He spoke bitterly, "I have no Rounds with me, I have only Tubes. I am asked to deploy in a mortar position, you brought me in this, tell me what do I do?" The CO rang the CO Rajputs Lt Col Rikh and Lt Col Mishra CO of 9 Punjab. Punjabis were well established and well stocked having come much earlier. He gave us 32 Mortar rounds so when the battle started 4 Grenadiers had 4 tubes and 32 of 3-inch mortar rounds. We had started with 90 rounds of 303 rifle ammunition each, 60 plus 40 reserve, that is 90 and for LMG 700 plus 500 reserve rounds, if I remember rightly. I was wearing a para jacket, officers generally used to put on the para jackets, purchased from the shop run by Ordnance Corps. As a matter of fact they stood out and the Chinese could make out the officers easily.
Order to withdraw
At 1115 the CO got orders from Div HQ to withdraw. I do not know if he personally spoke o the CO or that someone else on his behalf passed the orders. The CO ordered me, as the IO, to lead the Battalion's withdrawal. He did give a semblance of orders. Being the IO a pertinent point came to my mind, we had no Maps, we only had a sketch a cyclostyled /blue print (the only map available from the lowest formation right up to the Army HQ to plan and fight against the Chinese) of the area covering from Bridge one to five. The question was where do you go, the moment you get-out of the boundary of the sketch?
Fall back to Hatungla
Our plan, I reckon as given by GOC was for us to fall back on Hatungla and then defend the pass as a battalion, it is a defensible area, rather than sitting in the Nalla. It was a good decision, problem was in its execution. As I started climbing as the no one man of the battalion the, IO asked to use his discretion, no maps, but I had binocular and a compass with me and I knew which way was East, West, North and South.
Lost Battalion
By deploying a pair of MMGs the Chinese had ensured that we do not use the easy track. Having attended to Bala my self and seen the casualties in the opening, I made a small appreciation in my mind. This opening on the track where there is a good chance of getting the bullets needs to be avoided at all costs.. I reasoned that if we climb two to three hundred feet up the mountain side, take a detour under the cover of the trees, circuit behind for five six hundred yards and come down,once again, back on to the track once again we would avoid this clearance and be safe from the Chinese observed fire. We would also be able to move faster and by evening would be on the top of Hatungla and able to deploy as planned. I had just gone 500 to 600 yards or so and was veering to my left, when as luck would have it, the CO saw me turning to the left. I was sent for and the Commanding officer wanted to know as to why I was turning left. I said 'Sir I want to get to Hatungla'. He gave m a piece of his mind', You want to get all of us killed, we are well within the range of the weapons that are firing from across, you keep climbing till I tell you and then we will take the necessary detour. That detour never happened, we never turned left because then the hills and the gorges and the ravines took over. In the absence of any maps we did not know as to where we were going and by evening we were a lost battalion. At Hatungla 4 Grenadiers had a section under Naik Prithi Singh or Prithi Chand, Dogra boy of 'Delta' Company, a hero by any reckoning. He along with a group of 8 boys had been left at the pass to guard it. This section stopped the Chinese who had followed us next day for a day and half, ultimately they were overrun and killed. Proving the point that it was a defensible position if any proof was required.
Rao awarded MVC posthumously
If only the 4 Grenadiers had landed at Hatungla that day as planned, we would have covered us with glory. God had given us an opportunity but we missed it. It is one of the regrets of my life that why this move of mine was detected, not a big-shake, I was just coming back on to the track, simple. The irony of the story is that one of our officers Kartar Singh with a few boys was located slight farther away from the action, he was not aware as to when the Battalion vacated all the posts, till the boys informed him that the whole battalion had moved out. He followed the short track to Hatungla, crossing the open patch, along with his boys with impunity, some how he carried on I have not been able to find out how he missed Prithi and his group. The point is that the action had died after few hours, once the Chinese realised that there is nothing to worry in the area. In the mean time the Drokung Samba had been attacked on the first day itself and GV Parsanna Rao died manning a LMG himself it was well sited on the home side of Nyam Jung Chu, which the Chinese had to take, I had a hand in siting the weapon. Rao did a great job and was awarded MVC posthumously.
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
No comments:
Post a Comment