The Times of India dated 28 May 1998 had published a letter from me to editor titled "Sealing a Lie" which highlighted the above Radio Peking lie. Quote, I was the Signal Officer of the late Brigadier J P Dalvi’s illfated 7 Brigade deployed in Namka Chu Valley in NEFA, and which faced the brunt of the massive Chinese attack in 1962. The then Lt Col K K Tewari, CO 4th Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, came to visit me in the Bde HQ on October 18, 1962. He, among other things, asked me to work out the leave plans of my section. Subsequently, he was captured by the Chinese on the morning of October 20, 1962 in the forward infantry battalion location which he was visiting.
The point to note is that forward formations that are intending to attack do not plan leave for its personnel. The Commander Signals of the division also remains with the divisional HQ to control and execute the overall communication plan and does no go and stay with the forward most infantry battalion on the eve of the attack. This should seal the Chinese lie- if it has not been sealed yet- that India attacked the Chinese Frontier Guards on October 20, 1962.
Brig Lakshman Singh,VSM (Retd)
On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart. In the western theater, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theater, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in Sikkim, a protectorate of India at that time. Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.
Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on October 20. The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river. The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings. However their strategy was wrong as while the Indian troops settled for the night on the banks of the river, the PLA crossed over the shallow October river and made their way to the other side. They gathered themselves up into battalions on the Indian- held south side of the river in the camouflage of the night, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.
India's China War by Neville Maxwell
India's shameful Debacle
There has never been a clear answer from the Leftists and Communists in India with respect to these questions concerning China.