Friday, June 13, 2008

India China Conflict 1962. The Big Picture Perceived by Signal Officer

IV Corps Signals at TEZPUR
As Sparrow of 7 Brigade I had no idea as to what was happening at the twice- removed Corps HQ in so far as Signals were concerned. Even later I could find nothing that could help me complete the big picture of Signals during Op Leghorn. However, I was lucky in that, during one of my visits to USI (United Services Institute) at New Delhi, Col VK Singh provided me with the address and Telephone No of Brig PS Gill the then CSO 4 Corps at Pune from his records. Brig Gill has been more than kind to provide material from his personal papers, which could not have been found anywhere else.

Biji Kaul's DHOLA- NAMKA CHU adventure of 1962 as told by Brig PS Gill the then CSO IV Corps.

Forward Policy
The genesis lay in Biji Kaul's forward policy (AR posts, assisted by regular army officers such as Mahabir, were to be Tactically sited right up to the MacMohan Line to remain there throughout the year), and the notion that 'possession is nine- tenth of the law.' Of course Nehru was taken in by his 'novel' approach. Additionally Biji had convinced himself that his destiny was heading for really great things. (Retirement of Chaudhary, next in line to be the Chief, had been announced). Of course he had not bothered himself about the severe restrictions imposed by terrain, extremes of weather condition nor distances from rail/ road head, nor even the inaccuracies in the available maps.

IB assessment parallels recent CIA assessment of Iraq
In September/ October 1962, barring Thapar, Sen and Kaul, everyone was certain that an ill- equipped unready 7 Brigade (seven days from the road head) was being assigned an untenable role. Assurances by Mullick of the IB were taken as the Gospel truth- Chinese will never attack.

Misadventure not heeded
Umrao's reasoned pleadings against any such venture were not heeded– to this effect he had put his signatures to two really telling appreciations of the situation for Eastern command and the AHQ. Also a clash of personalities (Sen/ Umrao) surfaced. Sen went about assuring anyone willing to listen that Umrao was the sole obstacle i.e. but for him Dhola could be secured/ cleared easily. Sitting in Lucknow, how he came to this conclusion remains a mystery.

Birth of IV Corps
Result: Biji's Kaul's IV Corps was born at midnight of 3rd Oct 62. I was awakened and summoned to Kaul's residence around 1 AM that night to be told by him personally, I had been selected to be his CSO. Lack of seniority, the basis of moving me from Shillong in May to Sigs Dte as DD Tels (the very job I had held as GSO1 Tels from 1953 to 1957) was given the go-by. Some 10 hours later (4th October) I accompanied him to Tezpur, in a Viscount of the Presidential flight. En-route, quite naturally, I quizzed him regarding the role, area of responsibility of IV Corps and the troops allocation. He had no satisfactory answer but kept on repeating ap nahin samjhen –ge. I was left with the impression that he was going to Tezpur more to instil some urgency into the Dhola affair/ action.

Hastily formed team
I had never worked with Kaul. I was picked because I had known the NEFA region as CSO XXXIII Corps, since handed over to MBK Nair. Kaul left for LUMPU on 05 Oct. I was to organize and set up the new Corps HQ. Kaul had asked me to send the BGS and the CE to join him 'at the front' on arrival. My good friend "Bhaiya" Rajwade who had been CE XXXIII Corps along with me and was shunted to the CME, also for lack of seniority, was brought in on 6th October as the CE. KK Singh of the Armoured Corps another good friend joined on the seventh as BGS. Both were sent on to join Kaul.

Kaul's Political clout paid dividends
I soon realised what a clout Kaul wielded. DG P&T Nanjappa of the ICS, would call me twice a day to ascertain what he could do for IV Corps and so also other worthies at Army HQ. In no time there were direct telephone and tele-printer lines connecting Tezpur to Delhi. Nanjappa also gave me (on attachment) a P&T Dept LO – IK Gupta, a very capable and efficient officer. As for SDS Indian Airlines instituted a daily Viscount flight Delhi-Tezpur-Delhi – a sort of daily Air Courier. Delhi planners in their keenness to fulfil Kaul's bidding failed to instruct the Courier aircraft to make a stop at Lucknow – ie Eastcom HQ which nominally was controlling IV Corps. I put this right in time.

Porter based supply chain
In the fortnight prior to the Chinese attack of Twentieth October there was very little that IV Corps could do for 7 Bde. I visited Zimithang (TAC HQ 4 Div) and met Ram Singh who despite the various odds had the situation under control. I was certainly appalled by the difficult terrain conditions and the extremely precarious porter- based supply line forward to Namka Chu. Recovery of air dropped supplies was as low as 30 per cent- most of it falling into deep ravines. Two seater Bell Helicopter, which could carry very little, was the only efficient means of getting around.

We lost Ram Singh a very fine officer. He had been our Adjutant in 1950 in 26(2AB) DIV SIGS at Jammu while I was the 2IC and KK was OC 1 Coy.

Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)

The "Traditional China" includes all of South East Asia! Thus, the lessons and implications of the 1962 China- India Border War could be relevant to us for decades or for centuries to come.....

For serious study visit: The China- India Border War (1962) in depth

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