Some historical events of far reaching consequences, though widely separated by time and space, have striking similarities. Manekshaw’s refusal to be hustled into attacking East Pakistan during April-May 1971 bears a marked parallel with the refusal by Marshal Kutuzov, the commander-in-chief of Russian armies, to defend Moscow against Napoleon’s march on that city in 1812. Both came under increasing pressure, one from his government, the other from the Czar and his entourage. One refused to defend and the other declined to attack! By refusing to defend Moscow, Kutuzov saved the Russian armies from destruction by Napoleon which eventually saved Russia. Manekshaw by declining to attack East Pakistan in April-May, preserved India’s honour. Both resolutely held on to their professional assessment of the military situation and nothing could make them budge from that position.
A whispering campaign of calumny was mounted against both of them. Manekshaw, they said, had no stomach for a fight and had developed cold feet: such was the refrain of the chattering classes of Delhi’s cock-tail circuit. Kutuzov’s detractors whispered of his senility: he was then in his late seventies. Both ignored such barbs. Manekshaw was faced with the prospect of a war on two fronts with the possibility of the opening up of the third front as well. It was a problem, more complex than what had been the bane of the German General Staff for more than half a century, across two World Wars. He wanted the Himalayan winter to set in so that threat from the North gets recessed, and redeploy troops from that front, against East Pakistan.
Had it been a lesser army chief than Manekshaw, the government would have stampeded him into going over to the offensive in April/ May as it so easily did in the 1962 war against China (recall the order from Nehru to ‘throw the Chinese out’ ), operation Blue Star, misadventure in Sri Lanka and the suicidal frontal attacks at Kargil. Undoubtedly, had India attacked East Pakistan in April-May 1971, without the essential logistics build-up etc, it would have been an unmitigated disaster for the country.
Indian troops won their last great victory against a foreign army of importance in 303 BC, when Chandragupta Maurya’s army defeated Seleucus Nicator: Alexander's general. Now after a period of twenty three hundred years of unremitting defeats for the armies of India against every invading army, Manekshaw made the country experience the glow of a stunning victory. It was a victory worthy to rank amongst the great victories and a campaign as brilliant as any in history.
Magnanimous and forgiving of nature, he exuded captivating charm and his quick wit, light hearted banter and inimitable style of command endeared him to the rank and file and others who came in contact with him. He took seven bullets in his stomach from a Japanese machine gun at the Sittang Bridge and in a critical state was put on the last ship to leave Singapore before it fell to the Japanese. Twice destiny had intervened to pull him from the jaws of death, perhaps for fulfilling a larger mission in life.
Marshal Kutuzov, at the battle of Borodino, had madean unsuccessful attempt to halt the invader’s advance into Russia and had barely managed to save the Russian armies from being destroyed by Napoleon. His strategy, aided by the Russian winter, finally brought about the decimation of Napoleon’s ‘Grand Army’ without a battle. On any working day in Moscow the queue for entry into the cyclorama, depicting the battle of Borodino is half a kilometer long. Marshal Kutuzov is a great national hero to this day. Compare this to the way we dealt with Manekshaw, who had won a stunning victory for India.
The passing away of Manekshaw, a few days ago, was mourned by the nation and the press but ignored by the Government of India, the political class and the chiefs of Air Force and Navy. Earlier he was honoured with the rank of Field Marshal (though opposed by the bureaucracy), in a rather slip-shod manner, where army HQ had to over-night deploy workmen in Chandni Chowk to make the badges of rank and baton of a Field Marshal. His privileges and place in the scheme of things not determined. His pay was fixed at the level of pension of service chief with Rs 500 as additinal allowance!
Though omitted from the government’s Warrant of Precedence, is believed to be just above the service chiefs! Amendment to WoP issued by the Home Ministry in October 2007, lifts chairperson of UPSC from Article 17 (position) to article 9-A placing him above the three service chiefs (so also a Field Marshal) who are at article 12 (12th place). What is chairperson UPSC! Earlier he ranked even below an officiating army chief of the rank of Lt Gen. A Field Marshal continues to skip the WoP!
This warrant of precedence is periodically revised by a committee of three secretaries which is rubber-stamped by the supreme commander of Indian armed forces, who has, not even once, raised a query as to why, this sustained assault on the status of his/her service chiefs and his officers, and why no place for a Field Marshal on this list!
The media which is now so much in praise of the Field Marshal would not, as late as last year, accept an article suggesting the award of Bharat Ratna to him. When high achievers from every walk of life have been honoured with this award why, in this dispensation, is there no place for one of the most eminent soldiers in Indian history. An award given to him in his life time is quite apart from one that may come to him posthumously. Why this total lack of grace, gratitude and decorum on the part of the Government of India; firstly during his life time and now on his passing away. Credit for the only decisive victory in India’s military history still belongs to him!
Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd)
Army to Hold Memorial Service on 15 July 2008 for Manekshaw
Sam H.F.J. Manekshaw Key to India's victory in 1971: The New York Times
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