Mumbai Mayhem: Revamp and Restructure Special Forces

The SF needs to be structured comprehensively for a full spectrum capability, trained and ready for victory, or in other words— a total force of quality officers and soldiers.

The November 26 terrorist attack in Mumbai and related events have brought into sharp focus the Special Forces (SF) of the nation. India fields a variety of SF, of which two— the Marine Commandos (MARCOS) of the Indian Navy and the National Security Guards (NSG) of the Cabinet Secretariat— operated against the terrorists at Mumbai. While the personnel of both the forces displayed exceptional bravery in tackling the terrorists, lacunae in the deployment and employment of these forces need early rectification in order for the SF to respond with alacrity the next time a similar situation arises. Details of what needs to be done to increase the efficiency of these forces must necessarily be preceded by an elucidation of what the SF are all about.

Most professional militaries field special units, with specialised, highly focused capabilities. Known as SF, these are small, elite military units, with special training and equipment, capable of conducting a variety of operations. SF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy, specialised training. SF are the nation’s penetration and strike forces that respond to extraordinary contingencies across the conflict spectrum, with stealth, speed and precision. Their operations differ from conventional operations in the degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support and dependence on detailed operational intelligence of a very high order. SF may be used against a wide range of adversaries, including terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, or regular combatants. SF can also be used to support insurgents, guerrillas, or regular conventional operations.

In our country, a proliferation of SF types reduces focus on certain essential tasks, undermines cost-effectiveness and sullies accountability. Weaknesses and chinks in the system need to be identified and highlighted while deliberating on the changes needed to evolve the nation’s SF structure of the future.

Changing nature of threats
Ambiguity and a marked divergence from traditional risks characterise security challenges today and in the future. Consequently, military contingencies require multi-faceted forces, like the SF, as they are able to respond to a wider spectrum of crises. Terrorism, subversion, insurgency and proxy war by neighbouring countries or by non-state actors from their soil, will continue to be major security challenges for India. The recent terrorist strike at Mumbai is an appropriate example. In this type of proxy war environment, the SF, given its low profile, may well be the force of choice for conducting operations, including across the border, without inviting the political, economic and military risks of war. SF can also assist in deterring, destroying or defending against attempts aimed at nuclear or radiological material or weapons of mass destruction, especially from non-state actors.

Several constraints impede employment of conventional forces to resolve security issues. With asymmetric opponents such as terrorists, insurgents and rebel groups increasingly holding the nation to ransom, dealing with them in a conventional manner has many pitfalls. In such an environment, SF becomes even more important. SF are also necessary to meet transnational threats resulting from the diminished authority and capacity of governments beleaguered by social, political and cultural unrest and inadequate governance. Asymmetric opponents do not attack the strengths of the nation, but target its vulnerabilities, with unorthodox measures. Such attacks can be best tackled by the SF.

Preparing for the conflicts of the next decade and beyond, we need to invest heavily in the right kind of SF, which has the agility to perform a task, disengage, regroup and be ready for the next mission. SF to tackle low intensity conflicts of the future must be purpose-filled organisations, possessing both human intelligence and signals intelligence capabilities; scientific and analytical skills; and ability to use information technology optimally. They must also possess language skills and knowledge of the cultural, social and behaviour patterns of the adversary.

In future, SF will become more relevant because they can respond to a wider spectrum of crises than conventional forces. The 2002 operations in Afghanistan by the Coalition Forces, for instance, were brought to a dramatic and early conclusion because the SF managed to bring in the forces of the Northern Alliance for the dénouement. They turned the Northern Alliance into a conquering army. Unfortunately, the SF of the Indian Army, as structured at present, are not capable of doing this. However, if restructuring is carried out with vision and all likely contingencies are catered for, no reason why our SF cannot meet such challenges.
Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi
Revamp & Restructure