India's Fauj: Who rules it?

Many people agree in private but (especially those in power) refuse to admit in public that the Indian Defence Forces comprising the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force (or, briefly, India’s “fauj”) are not treated fairly by government. Of course, there is the fringe opinion that the fauj lives in luxury and is even overpaid, when they observe things like availability of canteen facilities (especially liquor) and the period of leave admissible in a year. They obviously know nothing at all about the risks and hardships that Jawans and young officers face in daily life.
But what risk does the fauj face in peacetime? Actually the word “peacetime” used as the antonym of “wartime” is quite inappropriate, because even if India is not at war with any country, the conditions of service in countering insurgency are just as risky as any wartime deployment if not actually more so. Today, the fauj loses on average one man every day to militant action. And hardship? Even if the subhuman conditions of mere survival on the Siachen Glacier are omitted, there are severe hardships, both physical and mental, in manning posts on the borders and even in participation in military exercises from bases in “peace stations”.
The fauj consists of about 1.4 million personnel below officer rank (PBOR), with leadership provided by about 50,000 officers instead of 65,000 required, the greatest shortage (11,238 against 46,615 sanctioned) being in the army. The actual fighting is done by the PBOR but under the leadership of officers who, in the Indian fauj, have always led from the front, as statistics of officer versus PBOR casualties in operations have always shown. But without PBOR there would be no need for officers and without leadership, PBOR would be ineffective – it is the combination of the two with the right kind of weaponry, equipment, training, and motivation that can maintain India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, the primary responsibility of the fauj. It is said that the man behind the gun is at least as important as the gun itself, which means to say that superior military technology by itself may win battles but cannot win wars unless the fauji (the soldier, a generic term that includes PBOR and officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force) is adequately equipped, trained and motivated. The examples of the US military in Vietnam and in Afghanistan and Iraq bear testimony to this military truth.
Maj Gen S.G.Vombatkere (Retd)
Maj Gen S.G.Vombatkere was commissioned into the Corps of Engineers in December 1962 and held the position of Addl DG (Discipline & Vigilance) at Army HQ, New Delhi, from which he retired in September 1996. In 1993, the President of India awarded him the Visishta Seva Medal (VSM) for distinguished services rendered in Ladakh.
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