Strategy to tame the Maoists: Do we need systemic changes?

The massacre at Dantewada is a wake-up call for the entire nation and not just for the police forces that are involved in conducting counter-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh and other affected states. This is the time for soul-searching, introspection and coming up with a strategy that can effectively deal with this major challenge to the nation.

The various tactical aspects of the unfortunate incident and the motivations of the Maoists have been well debated. The focus unfortunately is on equipment upgrades, whereas the essential requirement is to change the ethos, training and leadership of the police forces and make them more capable. By focusing on high technology weaponry, we seem to forget the old adage – “it is the man behind the gun and not the gun that matters”. Current weaponry with some technical upgrades is adequate, as in such operation skills are more important than firepower.

There are six states that are in the grip of militancy. I am intentionally using the word militant (s), as opposed to insurgents or terrorists, for the Maoists are very much part of our polity and have resorted to taking up arms when other methods have not succeeded. They are not in the same category as insurgents and terrorists in J&K and hence need to be treated differently, especially in the case of quantum of force and the manner in which it is applied.

There has been some talk of deploying the Army to deal with the Maoist militants. This may seem an attractive option, but in actuality it is not. In principle, the Army should not be committed to tackling internal militancy. The Army is meant to fight external aggression, which includes tackling external insurgency. If at all it is to be employed to tackle internal militancy, it should be as the last resort when the police forces of all types have failed. It should also be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.

In our country, the instrument of choice for tackling internal militancy and insurgency is the civil police, assisted by the CRPF, which is a component of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs). The police have enormous advantages over the military. They have legitimacy, close knowledge of local conditions, an extensive bank of local intelligence and means of acquiring fresh intelligence, close familiarity with the law and expertise in criminal investigations. Consequently, the use of the state police with the CRPF units superimposed, as at present, needs to continue.

Over a period of time the country has raised vast numbers of CPO units, but they have unfortunately not been trained well for their primary tasks and there is little bonding among the personnel (including officers) in sub-units and units. The senior hierarchy of the CPOs comprises solely of IPS officers, who have never commanded platoons, companies and battalions. Resultantly, they are unable to appreciate the ground situation and plan operations correctly. As opposed to this, all senior Army officers have risen in rank after serving extensively at the levels of platoons, companies and battalions.

The major drawbacks of both the state police and the CRPF include the typical police culture of delayed and lethargic responses, lack of adequate training for executing the assigned tasks, lack of competent leadership, lack of some items of technical equipment and not the least their thinking that the Army is always there to take over, as it has done in the past! This attitude needs to be disabused, as it is fraught with a very large number of negatives. The Maoist militancy has not suddenly appeared; it has been a festering concern for decades and yet we have not been able to make these CPO units fit to tackle internal militancy and insurgency. The Central government must take early and active measures to enhance the capabilities of the CPOs while the state governments must do the same for their respective police forces, especially their armed police units.

For decades now, the Army has repeatedly suggested that both the CPOs and the Army will benefit by lateral induction of trained Army personnel to the CPO units and their headquarters. This has also featured as a strong recommendation by the Sixth Pay Commission. All such recommendations have, however, been summarily rejected by the Home Ministry mainly on account of preserving their turf. Short Service Commissioned Officers, who cannot be retained in the Army after their mandatory service of five years, extendable to 10 in selected cases, are ideal material to be inducted into the CPOs. They are excellent officers, highly competent and well versed in conducting counter-militancy operations.

Such lateral shifts will give the CPOs ready and well-trained young officers, who with their Army ethos, excellent leadership qualities and professional outlook would change the CPO units from complacent to competent and would make them capable of fighting not just the Maoists but even other insurgents in future.

There is urgent need to do away with the current compartmentalised existence and take much broader views. Otherwise, we will continue to wallow in the usual copious reports of committees, demands for raising more units, import of sophisticated weapons that are really not needed, the continuing blame-game and so on, but nothing will be done to remove the systemic deficiencies and weaknesses!

There is also a political aspect that needs to change. The Centre cites the Constitution and says that security is a state subject, thus throwing the ball directly in the state’s court. The states deftly parry with the logic of lack of resources! In some states, the Maoists are even looked at as assets for elections and their violence gets subtly condoned! In addition, when militancy is active in six states, how can each state fight it on its own? Unless there is a joint and concerted attempt simultaneously in all the affected states, nothing is likely to be achieved. The time has come for setting aside the political baggage and getting together for the common cause. Let political expediency be kept aside while the full weight of the nation is used to confront the Maoists.

The need of the hour is to quickly set up two sets of structures, one for addressing the genuine concerns of the Maoists and the other for the conduct of police operations. The former is the concern of each state government and to varying extent it is already being done, but the latter needs a well-thought-out centralised structure under an overall force headquarters, headed by a DGP-level officer. This headquarters, while maintaining liaison and coordination with each state government, must have autonomy to plan and conduct all counter-militant operations in the entire Maoist-affected areas. The staff must report only to the Force Commander and not to their parent organisations, as is the current practice.

All counter-militancy operations are of a long duration, but if the structures are correct and adequate attention is paid to removing systemic deficiencies, it would be possible to address both the amelioration of the concerns of the Maoists and the violence unleashed by them.
The writer is a former Vice-Chief of the Army Staff.
Strategy to tame the Maoists: Need for systemic changes by Lt-Gen Vijay Oberoi (retd)