The Tribune Monday, May 31, 2010, Chandigarh, India
The state armed police and the CPOs on counter-insurgency/guerrilla operational tasks and missions require different rules of engagement, training, equipment, leadership and man management.
People who have worked alongside the CRPF are aware of the constant moves of their companies at short notice, non-existent command and control at the battalion level, their inhuman living conditions, poor physical fitness, and lack of the basic equipment like bullet-proof jackets, radio sets, bullet-proof and mine-protected vehicles. How can we expect high results from such psychologically depressed personnel?
Counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists require integrated operations because insurgents when pursued in one state manage to take shelter in the neighbouring states. Every major operation requires detailed planning, coordination, and follow-up on the intelligence and combat aspects. Inter-state coordination and disputes over the state or Central responsibility can be resolved if there are effective Unified Command Headquarters with clear-cut political, operational and coordinating responsibilities.
We need a synergised Centre-state strategy and doctrine to deal with the different aspects of the Maoist insurgency. This should cover the earlier mentioned internal security-related reforms as well as policies on accelerated economic development and social justice in the affected areas.
The writer is a former Army Chief.
Read the full analysis: Different aspects of Maoist problem: How to handle it effectively by Gen V. P. Malik (retd) click here
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