Indo- China War 1962

Tawang Monastery
Inaccurate Maps
Suddenly our role was changed from defence of Tawang, the Divisional Vital Ground, to evict the Chinese from DHOLA post. Moves on the chessboard started. Planting of small flags on maps in the Operations Rooms of various HQ had commenced. Unfortunately most of the maps were sketchy and at best inaccurate. Incredibly the whole of the operation of river Namka Chu involving 7 Bde was planned on a sketch prepared by an Assam Rifles jawan. This was the best available at all levels from Brigade to Army HQ. It was inaccurate, not to scale and was supplied to all and sundry in the form of a blueprint. Even I was de- briefed on the same on my return from the debacle by the Director Military Intelligence and the Director Signals.

No Border Maps
A word about the state of maps of the area of Op Leghorn and why the Assam Rifle sketch became so important and indispensable. I quote from a letter, dated 24 Sep 2001, from my elder brother Shri Ratna Singh.
Quote.- It was about October, at this time, I was a supervisory officer in Survey of India at Dehradun and we were working round the clock in connection with the up dating of our Northern Border maps using Aerial Photography and photogrammetric techniques. It is interesting to, note that till then our border maps were sketchy and could not be relied upon. -Unquote.

Communications
9 Punjab was ordered to move from Tawang and contact Dhola post. CO Lt Col Mishra in the process deployed his battalion along the Namka Chu River line. To my ill luck, he never took the Signals detachment with him and left the 62 Set and the operators at his base at Lumpu with his 2IC Major Dilbagh Singh. He had his own set working back to the base at Lumpu. He must have had his own reasons for this unconventional action. However, my problems and brickbats from higher HQ had already started, who were not interested in Mishra's reasons, they were more worried as to why information was not coming through signal channels.

Delay in passage of messages
The extremely long distances over which communications were required, all the way from Army HQ at Delhi to Dhola, on the Tri- junction of India China and Bhutan had its own problems. Engineered on different and mostly mismatched equipment, vagaries of atmospherics and the physics of ionosphere, the system was far from robust with little redundancy. Holdings and use of multiple cryptographic systems, Linex, Book and Machine at various levels from Battalions, Brigade, Division to Army HQ added their own share to the bottlenecks and delays at various levels in the passage of the messages.

Mobile communication
Split HQs, Commanders and Staff mostly away from their HQs, Signals uprooted time and again and mostly on move, it was a wonder that Communications did exist, if at all. Delays had to happen in the passage of messages. No doubt I had to bear the brunt, even though both my CO Lt Col Tewari and the Commander Brig Dalvi shielded me. However, Priority messages pending in the signal centre or on the wireless links, the only means of clearing traffic, did create their own share of stress in me, as would have been the case with any other signal officer.

Delay of Top Secret Messages
Senior Signals Officers had also to share the burden of pressures from top. Brig Dalvi has recorded in his book about the delay in a Top Secret message from Gen Kaul originated from 1/9 GR location, from where there was no provision or facility to clear such messages. The Signal elements of the Brigade including me were all this time on move, the Brigade had neither a functioning HQ nor any signal communication system.

Brigadier Dalvi writes
quote- A sturdy Sikh from the Punjabis would be detailed to 'run' with the vital message to Lumpu. From there, the second- in–command of the Punjabis would phone it through to Ziminthaung (A Top Secret message on an open line, to which a Chinese agent possibly could have te-ed in his telephone for transmission to Peking even before it reached Delhi.) where it would be enciphered and transmitted to Tezpur, Delhi and Lucknow. The first message reached Delhi after three days. Mr Menon was extremely annoyed and demanding the dismissal of the Chief Signal Officer of Eastern Command for inefficiency.-unquote

Brig Lakshman Singh (Retd)

Tawang was returned to the control of India. The valiant last stand of Mahavir Chakra awardee Jaswant Singh Rawat took place in Tawang. After the voluntary withdrawal of Chinese troops, Tawang was once again under Indian administration. In recent years, China has occasionally voiced its claims on Arunachal Pradesh, especially Tawang, and Chinese troop incursions continue to occur frequently. According to news reports, the state government was willing to swap territories with China in order to make border adjustments, but it firmly refused to lose out any major towns or monasteries to China. Today, Tawang serves as a center for tourist attractions, thanks to the preserved beauty of the Tawang monastery.

1962 Indo- China War

The scene now shifts to the October 20th morning when the Chinese launched a massive attack on the 7 Inf Brigade.

A soldiers version, Bhairon Singh narrates:

Chinese firing
I was part of a three men patrol which had gone out on the night of 19th and we had returned to our company location say at about 3 AM, we had made tea and were resting, it was still dark when the Chinese firing started.

Deployment
The company was deployed with the number one platoon well forward, right on the river line, number two on the left. The number three platoon alongwith the Company HQ was right at the back. Lt Ravi Sahib, who had taken over the command from Mangat Sahib at the time of the company taking defensive position and Subedar Phool Singh the Company JCO were located in the company HQ.

Do not fire at random
Heavy firing continued, after about one hour Ravi Sahib came down to the number one platoon location. We were deployed right on the river line with the Chinese on the other side, so near to us that a strong man like me could easily lob a grenade at them. We were still in bunkers. ‘Fire the moment you see the enemy, don’t fire at random’. Ravi Sahib told the jawans.

Loss of communications
At about 8 AM, I was called by Ravi Sahib. He ordered me to go to Bn HQ and bring verbal orders from the CO. The company was now cut- off from the Bn HQ and none of the communication links were working. The telephone line to the Battalion HQ had been cut earlier by the Chinese, the Radio was also not through. (The Signals bunker at the Bn HQ had already been destroyed due to Chinese fire) He also sent a young boy, Govind Singh to accompany me. Even before we could get out of the company defended locality, a mortar bomb landed directly on Govind Singh killing him on the spot. Now I was left alone and was on my own.

Protection Force
On reaching the Bn HQ I found all the men of his protection platoon had been killed Rikh Sahib had carried three LMG’s in side his bunker along with all the ammunition. Keeping his pistol aside he would, fill, load and fire the LMG’s himself. He should have been awarded the PVC; there is no justice in this world. If some one will ask me I will tell him all about Rikh Sahib. To this I (Author) responded by the question to him that the book written by Maj Gen Verma does not mention this. ‘Sir No one ever asked me. No JCO or Officer knows as much about Rikh Sahib as I do because I was on the ground and no one else had reached there till then those who wish can say anything they want’.

Commanding Officer
He continued, behind the CO’s Command Post there was a cutting and the Chinese were attacking from there from the rear. The attack did not come from the front, the riverside, but from the rear. He had turned the LMG around and was firing at the Chinese. There was fog and it had also started to snow the low visibility making it difficult for the Chinese to pinpoint from where the fire was coming. I was also finding it difficult to locate Rikh Sahib and reach near him. I had taken position. Now only one LMG was firing. Ultimately the Chinese fired a burst aiming at the muzzle flash of the LMG, smashing his right arm. Undaunted he continued to still fill the magazine with his left hand and also fire by the same hand. He had not fallen down and was still standing.

Chinese Capture
By that time a Chinese soldier had crawled up to the bunker and he lobed a grenade in the bunker. I had also reached near by this time. There was a hissing sound from the grenade, Rikh Sahib caught hold of the grenade and threw it out side. It needs courage to do what he did. As you know, you are a senior officer (author) one is scared of even touching a grenade. The grenade burst before hitting the ground and one splinter hit Rikh Sahib breaking his Jaw and he fell down. The Chinese now approached the bunker, angry that this particular man had inflicted the maximum damage to them they dragged him, he was not wearing the badges of rank, out of the bunker pulling him by his legs.

Chinese casualties
What I am telling is the reality, the facts no one knows as much about the incident as I do. Because of the casualties they had suffered at the hands of Rikh Sahib the Chinese were furious and tried to bayonet him. Luckily he escaped, as he was about to be bayoneted, I fired and the bullet went through the hand of the Chinese who fell ahead of Rikh Sahib with the bayonet missing him. By this time some of our men and Maj Gurdial Singh Sahib, the 2 IC, were also being escorted to the same place as prisoners.

Prisoners
Seeing him, I started shouting loudly ‘Commanding Officer ko mar rahain hain.’(They are killing the Commanding officer) Gurdial Singh Sahib came running others had not yet reached there, even though his hands were tied. He stood with his two feet astride Rick Sahib lying injured on the ground. ‘If you want to shoot, shoot me, he is already injured what is the purpose of shooting him’ said Gurdial Singh Sahib in an emotionally charged voice. By that time a senior Chinese officer had also arrived there. There was some discussion between him and Gurdial Singh in English, some heated words were also exchanged but ultimately the Chinese cooled down and asked "What do you want". Gurdial Singh "We want to carry him, he is our CO"

No order to withdraw
The Chinese officer acceded to the request. Gurdial Singh Sahib shouted towards me in a loud voice ‘You go back and tell your Company Commander to move to the location of the company (1/9 GR) deployed near the Bde HQ on the mountain side join them and fight along them’. I ran back to the company and conveyed the order from Gurdial Singh Sahib to Lt Ravi. I also told him that the CO was injured. Subedar Vasudev Sahib also joined in. At this Ravi Sahib reacted ‘One does not withdraw from battlefield, I cannot order withdrawal. ‘But, Sir where is the question of withdrawal, the order is to go to Brigade HQ, it is only a change of position’
‘No, I can’t give this order’ He did not give the order.

Heavy fighting
Anyway by now the company was also under attack by the Chinese. There was hand to hand and bayonet fighting in our company locality and one after another the Chinese fell. I forgot to mention that after the 9 Punjab action the 9th of October the Chinese kept on carrying away their dead, the casualties, resulting from the firing by ‘C’ Company, for three days and we kept on watching from the bridge. Heavy casualties had taken place in our company, ultimately at about 8 AM Ravi Sahib gave the order that surviving Jawans should move to the Brigade HQ. Ravi Sahib, few other Jawans and I rushed to the Brigade HQ.

Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)

Not a single man from B, C or D Companies was awarded any gallantry medal as there was no one left to write the citations because there was no officer or JCO who was not killed or seriously wounded and taken POW. When the CO, Lt Col MS Rikh was released from the POW camp, he wrote up the citations but GoI and MoD made lame excuses and did not pay any attention to them. There is a memorial erected to those who fought at Namka Chu, which is a ricktey tin shed with names still missing from it and names of persons who were not there have been put up. Major BK Pant's company of 112 men had 82 killed and wounded. What more does a country want from its brave sons and not honour them properly?

Orbat
7th Infantry Brigade at the Battle of the Namkachu 1962
Commander Brigadier John Dalvi
1/9th Gorkhas Lt Col BS Alhuwalia
2nd Rajputs Lt Col Maha Singh Rikh
4th Grenadiers Lt Col KS Harihar Singh
9th Punjab Lt Col RN Mishra

Commanding Officers: Due to up gradation the Battalions which were previously commanded by Lt Colonels are now commanded by full Colonels. Only future full scale wars will tell if the up gradation was a wise decision or a trap by bureaucracy to dilute the command and control structure of a Battalion. One wishes that in future the Battalions are not commanded by Brigadiers as ongoing process of up gradation!

Tsangdhar: Providing Communications 10 Oct 1962

The Thagla Ridge as seen from Tsangdhar
Responsibility
I had to provide the line communication irrespective of the fact that I had no dispenser packs hardly any cable and even the full contingent of linemen some of those still en route. Every one who was fit and some not so fit cook barber dhobi and available linemen were pressed into collecting the few drums of cable from the Dropping Zone and making coils of the cable for hand laying.

Maj Ram Singh
It was the first time that I saw the famous Assam Rifles post at
Dhola from where it all had started. I was not much impressed by the few huts for living and may be a few rifle and LMG posts surrounded by trees bushes and no view or field of fire. It is there that I met Maj Ram Singh who had been sent by the CO to contact Gen Kaul and had some how missed him. It was also the last time I saw him.

CO's Compassion
Having completed the task it was night time by now I wanted to return back to Tsangdhar but the Commander would have none of it he ordered me to stay put for the night. He was a worried man expecting a Chinese reaction to the clash earlier in the morning possibly the same night. However he still had time and compassion to worry about his young Signal officer's welfare and safety night had fallen and it would have been fool hardy of me to try moving up the trail back to the DZ at Tsangdhar.

Sharing Sleeping Bag
Interestingly there was no food or place for me to sleep. I shared the one- man sleeping bag that is how the bags are designed with Maj Kharbanda. A unique experience luckily both of us were on the thin side even then we had to synchronise between the two of us whenever we wanted to turn in the sleeping bag which was fairly frequent on the hard rocky ground. Turning and twisting both of us spent the night like this.

Escape to Bhutan
I came back to Tsangdhar leaving very early and reaching there by 9 am in the morning. I had no food now for about 24 hours. I have been talking about food all the time rather lack of it but it does give one an idea of our administrative back up during OP Leghorn as the operation was known. Missing meals which had become with us a rule rather than exception since we either had no time to eat or no meals were available due to administrative failure. Having got used to this helped us later when we had to be without food for days together on our escape via Bhutan to India.

Brig Lakshman Singh VSM (Retd)