Dear Veterans,
1. History has repeated itself again where the seniors have not put their foot down for the welfare of their junior officers. The point two percent of the senior officers have taken the booty of OROP home along with the hundred percent of the JCOs and other ranks leaving the rest of the junior block of officers in lurch. Selfish……? Self centered……!!
Then why to hit the time with an iron rod and bleed it to get the OROP? The high and the mighty are not pleased with the loyalty, sincerity and service of the juniors rendered for the reasons of their own. They have ignored the officers block by sitting the reason that the problem is very complex to decide the deal. Then why the same rule does not apply for the point two percent? why they did not deny the benefits for the sake of their junior officers? And why the punishment is matted out to those who are not guilty at any count?
2. The rotten rats sitting on the higher posts are stinking and lowering the prestige of the armed forces. Don’t blame the babus for their crafty tactics to deny the benefits coming to the soldiers but curse those who are sitting on the top of the pyramid and ruling the roost in their own favor. And there is no point to hit the wall hard and draw the blood out for the sake of OROP ! Don’t press the bubble to burst! Don’t ask any body to submit. Rather gently prey and gradually succumb! Tell them to see beyond the mentality of the babus and the bosses who have played the trick on the soldiers.
3. Who fights less or more in the battlefield is a totally guess work of those who have never seen the face of the battlefield and do not know that ‘fight’ is a totally team work. Also they do not know that soldiers don’t beg. Soldiers don’t care and crawl for the things like OROP. They game it like a war and face the consequences squarely. The time is the only factor and its a great healer! Let the time come the same babus and the same seniors would prey, pamper and please them with many more OROPs because the soldiers are supreme!!
Maj Gen Harbhajan Singh (Retd)
Showing posts with label AVSC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AVSC. Show all posts
Friday, July 22, 2011
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Colonel Commandants an archaic and parochial institution
I am attaching an article on the institution of Col Comdts. It is bound to generate a great deal of debate. The article can be accessed at Click here
You may consider its circulation please.
Warm regards,
Mrinal
Colonel Commandants: An Archaic and Parochial Institution
by Major General Mrinal Sumana, AVSM, VSM, PhD
The concept of Colonel Commandants (Col Comdts) dates back to the 17th century when Colonels (both in rank and appointment) were the original owners and field commanders of their units (regiments). With the evolution of the concept of field formations in the early 18th century, these units lost their independent entity and were grouped into various tactical formations. Gradually, the Colonel lost his executive powers and the units came to be commanded by the duly selected commanding officers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Subsequently, the Colonel became a mere figurehead with advisory functions only.
All regiments, which originated as a single tactical unit (infantry/cavalry), still have a ‘Colonel’ as head of the family, whatever be the size of that family now. Other corps/regiments, which originated as groups of tactical units, have Col Comdts. The number of Col Comdts is determined by the overall strength of the corps/regiment. Their selection is carried out by the respective regiments through secret ballot.
A Colonel Commandant is not involved in the operational affairs of his units. He is considered a ‘conscience keeper’ of the regiment and a guardian of regimental traditions. He is like a father figure whose basic duty is to foster esprit-de-corps and render mature advice when required. As he is expected to look after all aspects of welfare of his regimental troops, he must be of sufficient seniority to deliver. In case a regiment does not have any of its regimental officers in higher ranks, it can request a non-regimental officer to hold the mantle.
The aim of this article is to take a look at the relevance of this institution in the present day environment. With mushrooming of senior appointments, every regiment is well represented at higher ranks. Therefore, are the crutches of a Col Comdt necessary for a regiment to get its due? As the issue is of vital importance to the health and well-being of the army, an open and honest debate is warranted.
Read more- Click here
You may consider its circulation please.
Warm regards,
Mrinal
Colonel Commandants: An Archaic and Parochial Institution
by Major General Mrinal Sumana, AVSM, VSM, PhD
The concept of Colonel Commandants (Col Comdts) dates back to the 17th century when Colonels (both in rank and appointment) were the original owners and field commanders of their units (regiments). With the evolution of the concept of field formations in the early 18th century, these units lost their independent entity and were grouped into various tactical formations. Gradually, the Colonel lost his executive powers and the units came to be commanded by the duly selected commanding officers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Subsequently, the Colonel became a mere figurehead with advisory functions only.
All regiments, which originated as a single tactical unit (infantry/cavalry), still have a ‘Colonel’ as head of the family, whatever be the size of that family now. Other corps/regiments, which originated as groups of tactical units, have Col Comdts. The number of Col Comdts is determined by the overall strength of the corps/regiment. Their selection is carried out by the respective regiments through secret ballot.
A Colonel Commandant is not involved in the operational affairs of his units. He is considered a ‘conscience keeper’ of the regiment and a guardian of regimental traditions. He is like a father figure whose basic duty is to foster esprit-de-corps and render mature advice when required. As he is expected to look after all aspects of welfare of his regimental troops, he must be of sufficient seniority to deliver. In case a regiment does not have any of its regimental officers in higher ranks, it can request a non-regimental officer to hold the mantle.
The aim of this article is to take a look at the relevance of this institution in the present day environment. With mushrooming of senior appointments, every regiment is well represented at higher ranks. Therefore, are the crutches of a Col Comdt necessary for a regiment to get its due? As the issue is of vital importance to the health and well-being of the army, an open and honest debate is warranted.
Read more- Click here
Friday, March 11, 2011
Rank Pay anomaly meandering in the Court
Next date of hearing
Dear Sir,
Further to our mail on the status of rank pay case.
The next date of hearing will be 13 Apr 2011. Kindly put on RMS for info of all.
Thanking you
Secy RDOA
Visit Us At: RDOA and RDOA Blog
Degradation in rank status upto rank of Brigs vis a vis civilians
The earlier pay equation till the rank of Brig:
I. Lt/JTS
II. Capt/STS
III. Maj/JAG
IV. Lt Col/NFSG
V. DIG
VI. Col
VII. Brig
This has been changed by the 6th CPC and approved by the Cabinet
I. Lt (0) /JTS (0)
II. Capt (2)
III. Maj (6) / STS (4)
IV. Lt Col (13) / JAG (9)
V. Col (20) / NFSG (13)
VI. Brig (28) / DIG (14)
(JTS – Junior Time Scale, STS – Senior Time Scale, JAG – Junior Administrative Grade, NFSG – Non-Functional Selection Grade. The numbers in brackets are the requisite years of service to reach the rank)
How Military got cheated by MOD in connivance with Sycophants
Let us educate ourselves on the issue of Rank Pay, it is not given for the hardships faced by the armed forces, but for providing an edge to officers of armed forces over other civilian counterpart. As per govt of India letter, rank pay is an integral part of basic pay on which we get DA & pension also. Hence the justification of reflecting rank pay as integral to our pay. The court is resolving the 4th Pay Commission anomaly of reducing our Basic Pay to the extent of Rank Pay to be at par with civilians!... read more click here
Dear Sir,
Further to our mail on the status of rank pay case.
The next date of hearing will be 13 Apr 2011. Kindly put on RMS for info of all.
Thanking you
Secy RDOA
Visit Us At: RDOA and RDOA Blog
Degradation in rank status upto rank of Brigs vis a vis civilians
The earlier pay equation till the rank of Brig:
I. Lt/JTS
II. Capt/STS
III. Maj/JAG
IV. Lt Col/NFSG
V. DIG
VI. Col
VII. Brig
This has been changed by the 6th CPC and approved by the Cabinet
I. Lt (0) /JTS (0)
II. Capt (2)
III. Maj (6) / STS (4)
IV. Lt Col (13) / JAG (9)
V. Col (20) / NFSG (13)
VI. Brig (28) / DIG (14)
(JTS – Junior Time Scale, STS – Senior Time Scale, JAG – Junior Administrative Grade, NFSG – Non-Functional Selection Grade. The numbers in brackets are the requisite years of service to reach the rank)
How Military got cheated by MOD in connivance with Sycophants
Let us educate ourselves on the issue of Rank Pay, it is not given for the hardships faced by the armed forces, but for providing an edge to officers of armed forces over other civilian counterpart. As per govt of India letter, rank pay is an integral part of basic pay on which we get DA & pension also. Hence the justification of reflecting rank pay as integral to our pay. The court is resolving the 4th Pay Commission anomaly of reducing our Basic Pay to the extent of Rank Pay to be at par with civilians!... read more click here
Monday, November 8, 2010
Generals are making bucks exploiting heroism and sacrifices of its Soldiers?
The unspoken social contract
Express Buzz Vir Sanghvi First Published : 07 Nov 2010 12:21:00
At the heart of the relationship between the Indian Army and the people of India lies a mystery. It is a mystery so deep that even though the most brilliant scholars have spent decades trying to find a solution, none of their answers has been entirely convincing.
Here’s the mystery: the Indian Army, as we know it, was carved out of the army of pre-Partition, undivided India. Therefore, it has the same heritage and history (except for the last few decades) as the Pakistani and Bangladeshi armies, which were also set up by the British during the Raj. Until recently, officers in the Indian Army had even served with their counterparts in the Pakistani Army in the days before Partition.
But while the Pakistani and Bangladeshi armies have demonstrated a thirst for political power, the Indian Army has remained resolutely apolitical. Generals have run both Bangladesh and Pakistan. But no Indian General has ever come close to accessing political power.
What’s more, no Indian General has seemed remotely interested in becoming this country’s military dictator.
Why should this be so? Why should the Indian Army remain content to take orders from civilian politicians when its counterparts across the border are so eager to grab power for themselves?
It can’t be that our soldiers are merely following the British tradition. In that case, the Pakistani Army should never have left its barracks. It isn’t that our soldiers have enormous respect for their civilian masters. Give an army officer two pegs of a good whiskey, and he will tell you, in colourful language, how much contempt he has for the politicians who run our country.
Nor is it that we have kept the army out of domestic affairs. We use the army frequently to fight insurrections — in Nagaland, Mizoram, Punjab and Kashmir. Even when a riot rages out of control, the cry goes out: ‘Send in the army’.
It could be that Indian democracy is stronger than the kind of democracy practiced by our neighbours. But even when democratic rights have been suspended and an authoritarian regime has taken control of India — as happened with the Emergency — the Army has shown no interest in getting involved with the running of the country.
I have no solutions of my own to offer and the Army’s unwillingness to leave its barracks must remain a mystery. But what I know is this: there exists an unspoken social contract between the Indian Army and the people.
Basically, this consists of an agreement on our part to protect, indulge, admire, pamper and respect the Indian Army. In turn, the Army will do its own thing until we need it to save our bacon. Then, it will leave its barracks, clear out the Golden Temple, restore order to Bombay or Delhi, throw infiltrators and invaders out of Kargil, and guarantee the security and integrity of India.
Our part of the deal is that we will protect the Army from political interference. Except for a brief patch in the early ’60s, when Krishna Menon was defence minister, army promotions have not been unduly influenced by politicians. The chiefs are given free rein to do pretty much as they please. When the army forcefully expresses a demand (for pay revisions, better facilities etc) it usually gets its own way.
Also part of the deal is that Indians will hold the Army in the highest esteem. We will treat it as the one institution that has not been affected by the moral decline of Indian society. We may be prepared to criticise the paramilitary forces, and to accept that their men have committed human rights violations. But we will never accept that this could be true of the Indian Army.
Equally, we will never blame the Army for anything. In 1962, we were thrashed by the Chinese but the consensus was that politicians had lost the war while our brave soldiers had done their best. The 1965 war was at best a stalemate (the Pakistanis also claimed they had won) but we treated it as a glorious victory for the Indian Army. Operation Blue Star was a fiasco. But even today, it is Blue Star we remember favourably rather than Black Thunder (conducted by the paramilitary forces to clean up the mess left behind by Blue Star), a bona fide success.
By and large, the social contract has worked. The Army has nearly always got us out of jams when we need its services. Whether it was Delhi in 1984, Bombay in 1993, or Gujarat in 2002, we needed the Army to restore order. And during the Kargil War, young officers led from the front, sacrificed their lives and displayed astonishing bravery in the service of their country.
Consequently, the army sometimes appears to live in a state within a state. Visit a cantonment and you will be struck by the contrast with the civilian part of the town or city where it is located. The roads will be broad and well-maintained, the buildings will be freshly painted, the surroundings will be clean, and an air of good manners and civility will prevail. Visit an army town (Wellington, for instance) and the contrast will be even more striking. The order and cleanliness of the cantonments serves as a contrast to the chaos and filth of modern India.
There is, however, one important aspect of the social contract that now seems to be failing. As corruption has spread in modern India, we have reluctantly accepted that most parts of our society are tainted — civil servants, the schools and even the lower judiciary. But somehow, we have always believed that the army is different.
Oh yes, we hear the stories. We hear about Generals who take kickbacks on arms deals and about officers involved in canteen purchase scandals. But because this corruption appears to be restricted to the Army itself and because we believe that it is not widespread, we are happy to look the other way.
The problem with the Adarsh scandal and controversies over other land deals that have erupted recently is that they encroach into the civilian space. Senior army officers are seen to be conniving with politicians, bureaucrats and contractors to make millions.
Worse still, at least in the case of the Adarsh scandal, there is a cynical abuse of the social contract. When we say that we will respect and pamper the army, we do not expect senior officers to grab flats for themselves in the name of Kargil martyrs.
Earlier this week, the Army chief spoke about his resolve to cleanse his force. I am not sure he fully grasps how serious the situation is. The problem is not just that there are ‘a few bad apples’ in the army.
It is that Army corruption has now spilled out into the civilian space and that Generals are making big bucks by exploiting the regard we have for the heroism of the Army and the sacrifices made by its soldiers.
If more such instances come to light, then the press will begin looking critically at the Army. The politicians will have an excuse to delve deep into the workings of the officer corps. This will give them the opportunity they need to play favourites. And the public, regretfully recognising that the Army has breached the social contract itself, will reluctantly acquiesce in the muck-raking by the press and the interference by politicians.
Once this happens, the social contract will not survive. The image of the Army will not recover. And the perfect balance we have built between the Army and the Indian people will topple over.
So, the Army must urgently look at itself. It must crack down on corruption, identify the guilty men and act swiftly against them. It must do so now. Because too much is at stake. And tomorrow will be too late.
Exclusive to TNSE
The unspoken social contract
Express Buzz Vir Sanghvi First Published : 07 Nov 2010 12:21:00
At the heart of the relationship between the Indian Army and the people of India lies a mystery. It is a mystery so deep that even though the most brilliant scholars have spent decades trying to find a solution, none of their answers has been entirely convincing.
Here’s the mystery: the Indian Army, as we know it, was carved out of the army of pre-Partition, undivided India. Therefore, it has the same heritage and history (except for the last few decades) as the Pakistani and Bangladeshi armies, which were also set up by the British during the Raj. Until recently, officers in the Indian Army had even served with their counterparts in the Pakistani Army in the days before Partition.
But while the Pakistani and Bangladeshi armies have demonstrated a thirst for political power, the Indian Army has remained resolutely apolitical. Generals have run both Bangladesh and Pakistan. But no Indian General has ever come close to accessing political power.
What’s more, no Indian General has seemed remotely interested in becoming this country’s military dictator.
Why should this be so? Why should the Indian Army remain content to take orders from civilian politicians when its counterparts across the border are so eager to grab power for themselves?
It can’t be that our soldiers are merely following the British tradition. In that case, the Pakistani Army should never have left its barracks. It isn’t that our soldiers have enormous respect for their civilian masters. Give an army officer two pegs of a good whiskey, and he will tell you, in colourful language, how much contempt he has for the politicians who run our country.
Nor is it that we have kept the army out of domestic affairs. We use the army frequently to fight insurrections — in Nagaland, Mizoram, Punjab and Kashmir. Even when a riot rages out of control, the cry goes out: ‘Send in the army’.
It could be that Indian democracy is stronger than the kind of democracy practiced by our neighbours. But even when democratic rights have been suspended and an authoritarian regime has taken control of India — as happened with the Emergency — the Army has shown no interest in getting involved with the running of the country.
I have no solutions of my own to offer and the Army’s unwillingness to leave its barracks must remain a mystery. But what I know is this: there exists an unspoken social contract between the Indian Army and the people.
Basically, this consists of an agreement on our part to protect, indulge, admire, pamper and respect the Indian Army. In turn, the Army will do its own thing until we need it to save our bacon. Then, it will leave its barracks, clear out the Golden Temple, restore order to Bombay or Delhi, throw infiltrators and invaders out of Kargil, and guarantee the security and integrity of India.
Our part of the deal is that we will protect the Army from political interference. Except for a brief patch in the early ’60s, when Krishna Menon was defence minister, army promotions have not been unduly influenced by politicians. The chiefs are given free rein to do pretty much as they please. When the army forcefully expresses a demand (for pay revisions, better facilities etc) it usually gets its own way.
Also part of the deal is that Indians will hold the Army in the highest esteem. We will treat it as the one institution that has not been affected by the moral decline of Indian society. We may be prepared to criticise the paramilitary forces, and to accept that their men have committed human rights violations. But we will never accept that this could be true of the Indian Army.
Equally, we will never blame the Army for anything. In 1962, we were thrashed by the Chinese but the consensus was that politicians had lost the war while our brave soldiers had done their best. The 1965 war was at best a stalemate (the Pakistanis also claimed they had won) but we treated it as a glorious victory for the Indian Army. Operation Blue Star was a fiasco. But even today, it is Blue Star we remember favourably rather than Black Thunder (conducted by the paramilitary forces to clean up the mess left behind by Blue Star), a bona fide success.
By and large, the social contract has worked. The Army has nearly always got us out of jams when we need its services. Whether it was Delhi in 1984, Bombay in 1993, or Gujarat in 2002, we needed the Army to restore order. And during the Kargil War, young officers led from the front, sacrificed their lives and displayed astonishing bravery in the service of their country.
Consequently, the army sometimes appears to live in a state within a state. Visit a cantonment and you will be struck by the contrast with the civilian part of the town or city where it is located. The roads will be broad and well-maintained, the buildings will be freshly painted, the surroundings will be clean, and an air of good manners and civility will prevail. Visit an army town (Wellington, for instance) and the contrast will be even more striking. The order and cleanliness of the cantonments serves as a contrast to the chaos and filth of modern India.
There is, however, one important aspect of the social contract that now seems to be failing. As corruption has spread in modern India, we have reluctantly accepted that most parts of our society are tainted — civil servants, the schools and even the lower judiciary. But somehow, we have always believed that the army is different.
Oh yes, we hear the stories. We hear about Generals who take kickbacks on arms deals and about officers involved in canteen purchase scandals. But because this corruption appears to be restricted to the Army itself and because we believe that it is not widespread, we are happy to look the other way.
The problem with the Adarsh scandal and controversies over other land deals that have erupted recently is that they encroach into the civilian space. Senior army officers are seen to be conniving with politicians, bureaucrats and contractors to make millions.
Worse still, at least in the case of the Adarsh scandal, there is a cynical abuse of the social contract. When we say that we will respect and pamper the army, we do not expect senior officers to grab flats for themselves in the name of Kargil martyrs.
Earlier this week, the Army chief spoke about his resolve to cleanse his force. I am not sure he fully grasps how serious the situation is. The problem is not just that there are ‘a few bad apples’ in the army.
It is that Army corruption has now spilled out into the civilian space and that Generals are making big bucks by exploiting the regard we have for the heroism of the Army and the sacrifices made by its soldiers.
If more such instances come to light, then the press will begin looking critically at the Army. The politicians will have an excuse to delve deep into the workings of the officer corps. This will give them the opportunity they need to play favourites. And the public, regretfully recognising that the Army has breached the social contract itself, will reluctantly acquiesce in the muck-raking by the press and the interference by politicians.
Once this happens, the social contract will not survive. The image of the Army will not recover. And the perfect balance we have built between the Army and the Indian people will topple over.
So, the Army must urgently look at itself. It must crack down on corruption, identify the guilty men and act swiftly against them. It must do so now. Because too much is at stake. And tomorrow will be too late.
Exclusive to TNSE
The unspoken social contract
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Re- Employment for retired Brigadiers' in the Armed Forces
Retd Brigadiers’ to be reinducted
Express news service
Posted: Wed May 12 2010, 02:12 hrs
New Delhi:
With an aim to meet the shortage of officers in the army, the government has approved the re-employment of Brigadiers who have retired from service in staff and instructional posts. The re-employment scheme will now give Brigadier rank officers in the army an opportunity to seek an extra term of two years, taking up their retirement age to 58. At present, the Army is short of more than 200 officers of the rank of Brigadier.
Retd Brigadiers’ to be re inducted
Grant of Re-employment-Revised Procedure
Does this imply that the army is not short of Maj Gens and Lt Gens and stand no chance of re- employment after retirement? Is age the only criteria and not the possession of skill- sets?
Express news service
Posted: Wed May 12 2010, 02:12 hrs
New Delhi:
With an aim to meet the shortage of officers in the army, the government has approved the re-employment of Brigadiers who have retired from service in staff and instructional posts. The re-employment scheme will now give Brigadier rank officers in the army an opportunity to seek an extra term of two years, taking up their retirement age to 58. At present, the Army is short of more than 200 officers of the rank of Brigadier.
Retd Brigadiers’ to be re inducted
Grant of Re-employment-Revised Procedure
Does this imply that the army is not short of Maj Gens and Lt Gens and stand no chance of re- employment after retirement? Is age the only criteria and not the possession of skill- sets?
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
Strengthening Civil Military Relations
Civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others. Although some responsibilities for control may merge, they are not fused. The relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of principles, norms, rules, and expectations concerning civil-military relations. Although a Government may be stable for long periods, it can change as basic causal factors such as values, issues, interests, personalities, and threats change. Alterations of rules and decision-making procedures account for the dynamic nature of civil-military relations, while alterations of norms and principles account for conflict in civil-military relations. Differences between states in the sub continent account for the particular national character of civil-military relations, much as like-minded Governments account for cross-cultural similarities in civil-military relations.The first is that the military must reach out to the civilian world. Given the essentially universal agreement that civilians must control the military, the duty falls upon the military to find ways to talk to civilians, not the other way around. The second is that civilians must articulate a clear vision of what they expect in terms of the military mission. And the final suggestion is that the most practical and effective means of bringing about dialogue and understanding is to be bilateral education, in which both military and civilian elites would jointly attend specialized schools. Such schooling would emphasize military-strategic thinking, Indian history and political philosophy, military ethics, and the proper relationship between civil and military authority.
The increase in diversity among military personnel (all regions, multi lingual, all religions) has essentially strengthened ties between society and the military, especially those ties weakened by caste, language and religion in civil society. The results of wars China War of 1962, Indo Pak wars and JK & NE terrorism which had weakened our Civil Military Relationships now has further deteriorated with the advent of Naxal and Mao terror. This is obvious from news reports and analysis which led to massacre of CRPF Jawans.
Presently the advisers on military affairs to GoI are the IPS and IAS and randomly a few selected Military Strategists. The Military needs to do more to a healthy, sustainable and endurable CMR. The Military should be more Vocal especially now that we have an upgraded "Officer Cadre" after implementation of AVSC recommendations.
Friday, April 2, 2010
Supreme Court: Don't treat soldiers like beggars
Ref: Supreme Court: why this callousness towards brave jawans?
Veteran Voice
Supreme Court: Don't treat soldiers like beggars!
This is most unfair. First it was L K Advani who tried to create a wedge between me and my armed forces. Now, even the Supreme Court has joined him.
Don't worry. My crafty babus will certainly come out with a suitable weapon to blunt their attack and put these glorified chowkidars in their proper place.!!
Cdr KK Punchi, 7th JSW Course, Naval Aviation
Dear Veterans,
The comments passed by the honourable judges in the open Court will also be treated as part of their judgement. The Govt Counsel might have persuaded the Judges to tone down their written judgement to exclude the word 'Beggar', but this phrase may be quoted by many Veterans to support their struggle, in future.
Some Veterans have, to my mind have rightly accused the Organisation under which the Petitioner served, for the case being dragged to the level of Supreme Court. Brig Kamboj has requested for toning down our expression of anguish. He may have valid reason. But, unless such incidents are exposed, the Service HQ may not try & shake off its own culpability, in such matters. We have a number of examples like the cases of Nakra, Dhanabalan, Vains etc., where the Services HQ could have minimised the damage, by clearly & firmly telling the MOD of the mitigating factors in favour of the Petitioners or the affected lot of its own personnel, both serving & retired. Majors Pension is another classic example. Our long standing demand of OROP is also there.
I want to share my own experience in this regard. In 1970, a Major (Acting) from the EME Centre, Secuderabad, was hit by a Water Truck within the premises of the Centre. He was travelling on his scooter & was on duty. He was killed on the spot. A court of Inquiry was held which found the Driver of the Vehicle guilty. He was charged under Rash & Negligent Driving & sentenced. After the trial of the Driver & his punishment, the widow of the Officer claimed for adequate compensation to educate & bring up her two Children. The main plea was that her husband in normal circumstances would have retired at the age of 50, but died due to no fault of his at the age of just 28. She worked out a figure of Rs 1, 83,000. The MOD felt that the amount claimed was exorbitant. The lady went to Hyderabad High Court. The MOD then directed the Army to counter the case, to bring down the amount of compensation to 80,000 or in that region. Arty Centre, Hyderabad was given the task to pursue the Court Case. I was appointed as the Officer to assist the Govt Lawyer.
After going through the case, I was convinced that the lady's claim was legitimate. Later, when I had the opportunity to talk to the Centre Commandant, I expressed my opinion. He readily agreed, with a comment, "you do not have to blame on some others to cut your own hand. The AHQ will do it for you". I conveyed our feeling to the Lawyer, who himself was astonished at the lack of sensitivity to the plight of a brother officer's widow. He volunteered with additional information that such frivolous cases are proceeded only by the Armed Forces. "Have you ever seen such cases in the MOD itself?"
Let the bye gones be bye gones. At least from now onwards, let the Services HQ show some gumption in resisting the directions from the MOD, which are based purely on a matter of convention that no remedy should be given without a legal battle.
The pronouncement of the Honourable Judges that, "Do not treat the Soldiers like beggars" is equally applicable to the Services HQ also.
Veteran Raman
Col TN Raman (Retd)
Convener IESM, Chennai
Veteran Voice
Supreme Court: Don't treat soldiers like beggars!
This is most unfair. First it was L K Advani who tried to create a wedge between me and my armed forces. Now, even the Supreme Court has joined him.
Don't worry. My crafty babus will certainly come out with a suitable weapon to blunt their attack and put these glorified chowkidars in their proper place.!!
Cdr KK Punchi, 7th JSW Course, Naval Aviation
Dear Veterans,
The comments passed by the honourable judges in the open Court will also be treated as part of their judgement. The Govt Counsel might have persuaded the Judges to tone down their written judgement to exclude the word 'Beggar', but this phrase may be quoted by many Veterans to support their struggle, in future.
Some Veterans have, to my mind have rightly accused the Organisation under which the Petitioner served, for the case being dragged to the level of Supreme Court. Brig Kamboj has requested for toning down our expression of anguish. He may have valid reason. But, unless such incidents are exposed, the Service HQ may not try & shake off its own culpability, in such matters. We have a number of examples like the cases of Nakra, Dhanabalan, Vains etc., where the Services HQ could have minimised the damage, by clearly & firmly telling the MOD of the mitigating factors in favour of the Petitioners or the affected lot of its own personnel, both serving & retired. Majors Pension is another classic example. Our long standing demand of OROP is also there.
I want to share my own experience in this regard. In 1970, a Major (Acting) from the EME Centre, Secuderabad, was hit by a Water Truck within the premises of the Centre. He was travelling on his scooter & was on duty. He was killed on the spot. A court of Inquiry was held which found the Driver of the Vehicle guilty. He was charged under Rash & Negligent Driving & sentenced. After the trial of the Driver & his punishment, the widow of the Officer claimed for adequate compensation to educate & bring up her two Children. The main plea was that her husband in normal circumstances would have retired at the age of 50, but died due to no fault of his at the age of just 28. She worked out a figure of Rs 1, 83,000. The MOD felt that the amount claimed was exorbitant. The lady went to Hyderabad High Court. The MOD then directed the Army to counter the case, to bring down the amount of compensation to 80,000 or in that region. Arty Centre, Hyderabad was given the task to pursue the Court Case. I was appointed as the Officer to assist the Govt Lawyer.
After going through the case, I was convinced that the lady's claim was legitimate. Later, when I had the opportunity to talk to the Centre Commandant, I expressed my opinion. He readily agreed, with a comment, "you do not have to blame on some others to cut your own hand. The AHQ will do it for you". I conveyed our feeling to the Lawyer, who himself was astonished at the lack of sensitivity to the plight of a brother officer's widow. He volunteered with additional information that such frivolous cases are proceeded only by the Armed Forces. "Have you ever seen such cases in the MOD itself?"
Let the bye gones be bye gones. At least from now onwards, let the Services HQ show some gumption in resisting the directions from the MOD, which are based purely on a matter of convention that no remedy should be given without a legal battle.
The pronouncement of the Honourable Judges that, "Do not treat the Soldiers like beggars" is equally applicable to the Services HQ also.
Veteran Raman
Col TN Raman (Retd)
Convener IESM, Chennai
Friday, March 26, 2010
Shortage of Officers in the Armed Forces
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
RAJYA SABHA
There has been shortage of officers in the Armed Forces. The shortage of officers in the Army is around 11,500 and in the Navy, the shortage is 1606. The number of vacancies in Air Force is 1342.
The shortage is partly attributable to accretions in the Armed Forces from time to time, tough selection procedures, difficult service conditions coupled with perceived high degree of risk involved in service career.
A number of steps have been taken to attract the talented youth to join the Defence Forces. All officers including those in Short Service Commission (SSC) are now eligible to hold substantive rank of Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel after two, six and 13 years of reckonable service respectively. The tenure of SSC officers has been increased from 10 to 14 years. A total number of 750 posts of Lt. Col have been upgraded to Colonel towards implementation of AV Singh Committee Report (Phase-I). Further, 1896 additional posts in the ranks of Colonel, Brigadier, Major General and Lieutenant General and their equivalents in the other two Services have been upgraded towards implementation of AV Singh Committee Report (Phase-II). The implementation of the recommendations of the VI Central Pay Commission with substantial improvement in the pay structure of officers of Armed Forces, is expected to make the Services more attractive.
The Armed Forces have also undertaken sustained image projection and publicity campaign to create awareness among the youth on the advantages of taking up a challenging and satisfying career. Awareness campaigns, participation in career fairs and exhibitions, advertisements in print and electronic media, motivational lectures in schools, colleges are also some of the other measure in this direction.
This information was given by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony in written reply to Shri Tariq Anwar in Rajya Sabha today. PK / RAJ
Shortage of Officers in the Armed Forces: PIB
Lt Gen Vinay Shankar former Director General Artillery.
IDR Issue: Vol 25.1 Jan-Mar 2010
How has the Army fared in the last two decades in the discharge of its responsibilities? At considerable cost to itself it has barely managed to keep the lid on. Given the serious shortage of junior officers, and the indifferent and insufficient weaponry at its disposal, the Army it can be contended, has done exceedingly well. Regrettably the problems of the Army, and the stresses it is subjected to, are understood only by those who are in it. The MOD and the political leadership, or for that matter also the strategic community have a vague awareness, nowhere close to the ground realities. This explains the decades of inertia.
Army’s Capability Accretion: click here to read the full article
RAJYA SABHA
There has been shortage of officers in the Armed Forces. The shortage of officers in the Army is around 11,500 and in the Navy, the shortage is 1606. The number of vacancies in Air Force is 1342.
The shortage is partly attributable to accretions in the Armed Forces from time to time, tough selection procedures, difficult service conditions coupled with perceived high degree of risk involved in service career.
A number of steps have been taken to attract the talented youth to join the Defence Forces. All officers including those in Short Service Commission (SSC) are now eligible to hold substantive rank of Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel after two, six and 13 years of reckonable service respectively. The tenure of SSC officers has been increased from 10 to 14 years. A total number of 750 posts of Lt. Col have been upgraded to Colonel towards implementation of AV Singh Committee Report (Phase-I). Further, 1896 additional posts in the ranks of Colonel, Brigadier, Major General and Lieutenant General and their equivalents in the other two Services have been upgraded towards implementation of AV Singh Committee Report (Phase-II). The implementation of the recommendations of the VI Central Pay Commission with substantial improvement in the pay structure of officers of Armed Forces, is expected to make the Services more attractive.
The Armed Forces have also undertaken sustained image projection and publicity campaign to create awareness among the youth on the advantages of taking up a challenging and satisfying career. Awareness campaigns, participation in career fairs and exhibitions, advertisements in print and electronic media, motivational lectures in schools, colleges are also some of the other measure in this direction.
This information was given by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony in written reply to Shri Tariq Anwar in Rajya Sabha today. PK / RAJ
Shortage of Officers in the Armed Forces: PIB
Lt Gen Vinay Shankar former Director General Artillery.IDR Issue: Vol 25.1 Jan-Mar 2010
How has the Army fared in the last two decades in the discharge of its responsibilities? At considerable cost to itself it has barely managed to keep the lid on. Given the serious shortage of junior officers, and the indifferent and insufficient weaponry at its disposal, the Army it can be contended, has done exceedingly well. Regrettably the problems of the Army, and the stresses it is subjected to, are understood only by those who are in it. The MOD and the political leadership, or for that matter also the strategic community have a vague awareness, nowhere close to the ground realities. This explains the decades of inertia.
Army’s Capability Accretion: click here to read the full article
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Army’s officer intake hits new low
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
By Saurabh Joshi
The number of officers being commissioned by the Indian Army annually has fallen for the second consecutive year.
Figures revealed to StratPost indicate that the army commissioned 1374 officers in 2009. While in earlier years, the army has ordinarily commissioned some 1750 officers every year, which is also below par by 250, the intake fell sharply in 2008 to 1506 and has continued its slide in 2009.
Significantly, 2008 also saw a substantial deficit in the annual net intake of officers, with the number of officers being commissioned falling far lower than the number of officers leaving the service due to superannuation, premature retirement or resignation. While in 2004 and ‘05, the army saw a net gain of some 400 officers each year, this number dropped to a little less than 200 in 2006, to a figure of -22 in ‘07 and more steeply to -294 in ‘08.
This is the result of a steep drop in the number of officers commissioned in 2008 from previous years and a concurrent, gradual and continuing increase in the number of officers leaving the service. The number of officers leaving the service annually increased from a little over 1300 in 2004 to 1800 in 2008.
While 2009 did see a net gain of 83 officers, in actual terms, worryingly, the number of officers being commissioned in comparison to earlier years has continued its fall, in spite of the circumstances of the economic recession as well as the enticements of the implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations. The army has also taken measures in the past to increase recruitment, like easing benchmarks for recruitment and allowing a ten to fifteen per cent over-subscription of the capacity of the military academies in accordance with operational imperatives.
Also, although the number of applications for premature retirement and resignations fell in 2009, largely due to the recession and the recent pay hikes, the army has further tried to stem the flow of officers out of the army by curtailing approvals of such applications. While around 57 per cent of the applications for premature retirement were approved in 2006, the figure fell to around 36 per cent in 2009. Similarly, while almost 50 per cent of resignations were approved in 2006, only 18.6 per cent were permitted in 2009.
Although the second Officers Training Academy (OTA) coming up at Gaya with a likely capacity of around 700, may contribute to beefing up the army’s officer intake, sources in the army say it will take up to 2014 to be established and may be too late for urgent action to be implemented to bolster the strength of the officer intake, especially since existing academies are already running below capacity.
These figures are likely to worsen the shortage of some 11,500 officers in the 1.2 million-strong army that has a sanctioned officer-strength of over 46,000 officers
Army’s officer intake hits new low
By Saurabh Joshi
The number of officers being commissioned by the Indian Army annually has fallen for the second consecutive year.
Figures revealed to StratPost indicate that the army commissioned 1374 officers in 2009. While in earlier years, the army has ordinarily commissioned some 1750 officers every year, which is also below par by 250, the intake fell sharply in 2008 to 1506 and has continued its slide in 2009.
Significantly, 2008 also saw a substantial deficit in the annual net intake of officers, with the number of officers being commissioned falling far lower than the number of officers leaving the service due to superannuation, premature retirement or resignation. While in 2004 and ‘05, the army saw a net gain of some 400 officers each year, this number dropped to a little less than 200 in 2006, to a figure of -22 in ‘07 and more steeply to -294 in ‘08.
This is the result of a steep drop in the number of officers commissioned in 2008 from previous years and a concurrent, gradual and continuing increase in the number of officers leaving the service. The number of officers leaving the service annually increased from a little over 1300 in 2004 to 1800 in 2008.
While 2009 did see a net gain of 83 officers, in actual terms, worryingly, the number of officers being commissioned in comparison to earlier years has continued its fall, in spite of the circumstances of the economic recession as well as the enticements of the implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations. The army has also taken measures in the past to increase recruitment, like easing benchmarks for recruitment and allowing a ten to fifteen per cent over-subscription of the capacity of the military academies in accordance with operational imperatives.
Also, although the number of applications for premature retirement and resignations fell in 2009, largely due to the recession and the recent pay hikes, the army has further tried to stem the flow of officers out of the army by curtailing approvals of such applications. While around 57 per cent of the applications for premature retirement were approved in 2006, the figure fell to around 36 per cent in 2009. Similarly, while almost 50 per cent of resignations were approved in 2006, only 18.6 per cent were permitted in 2009.
Although the second Officers Training Academy (OTA) coming up at Gaya with a likely capacity of around 700, may contribute to beefing up the army’s officer intake, sources in the army say it will take up to 2014 to be established and may be too late for urgent action to be implemented to bolster the strength of the officer intake, especially since existing academies are already running below capacity.
These figures are likely to worsen the shortage of some 11,500 officers in the 1.2 million-strong army that has a sanctioned officer-strength of over 46,000 officers
Army’s officer intake hits new low
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Tainted by corruption, Army credibility nosedives
CORRUPTION WITHIN ARMY: Panelists discuss if Indian Army is losing its credibility in the eyes of civilians.Extract of Transcripts (page 4)... click here for the full version
CNN-IBN: Point taken about accountability but the point that Kanwar Sandhu was making was about credibility. Major General Satbir Singh, there have been cases of pilfering of ration, liquor being misused, now a land scam. Has the credibility of the Indian Army in the eyes of the citizens taken a knock?
Satbir Singh: Have you taken a look at so many other scams happening in the country today?
CNN-IBN: Sir the Army was supposed to be different. The respect for the Army came because it was not supposed to be like any other institute.
Satbir Singh: So that is why we need to take note of this at the national level - why is there a shortage of soldiers, why is the youth not coming to join the Armed Forces, why is the right material not coming to us, why are veterans protesting, why has one rank one pension not been granted? The nation is just sleeping over these issues. You know the academies of the Armed Forces are empty. I just want to besiege the conscience of this nation that let us make our security the best.
CNN-IBN: Sir point taken that these cases cannot be generalised, but Colonel Bhatt, is there a credibility crisis or not? Tehelka happened, defence deals came under scrutiny and now you have got a land scam.
Anil Bhatt: On Tehelka, I would like to say that it was a very selective sting operation. But they did not dare to try the same kind of sting with the politicians or the bureaucrats. The other thing is that as a platoon commander, a troop leader, a battery commander one feels like the king. It's like nothing on earth. But the day the Armed Forces officer lands up in New Delhi and when he functions between bureaucrats and politicians who are his leaders, then they see things. The babus and the netas set these examples.
CNN-IBN: So you are saying blame the babus and the netas but do not blame the generals.
Satbir Singh: I see a conspiracy to try and belittle the Armed Forces here. This is not the right thing for the nation. Let us look after these officers, give them equipment, train them well and let us defend this country.
Maj Gen Satbir Singh (Retd) is the Secretary of IESM. An ESM movement spearheading implementation of "One Rank One Pension", promised by successive Governments on paper only, but not implemented till date due to muddling campaign unleashed by the MOD Bureaucrats to confuse the Politicians.
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
SCPC: Majors Pension- pre 2006
Dear Brigadier Kamboj,
While I agree that the pre -2006 Majors have been meted out the worst deal among the officers, by the 6th Pay Commission, the fact is that the Government has wronged all the older lot of pensioners up to the rank of Major Generals. Just one example; is there justice in granting a person commanding a company & equivalent in post 2005 period, some Rs.5000 to 6000 more in pension than a pre 2006 retiree Major General who commanded a force about 150 times than that commanded by the new Majors (Lt col/ time scale Colonel).
The cases of old Havildars and Subedar Majors are also of the same category. In fact every old pensioner has been discriminated against. I am of the opinion that the IESM should not take cases piecemeal, as it will be detrimental to the over all struggle.
I feel that we should make a comprehensive case for OROP which if need be, can also be the basis for a court case, which in all probabilities will be the finale of our struggle.
With best wishes & regards,
Col MMP Kala
While I agree that the pre -2006 Majors have been meted out the worst deal among the officers, by the 6th Pay Commission, the fact is that the Government has wronged all the older lot of pensioners up to the rank of Major Generals. Just one example; is there justice in granting a person commanding a company & equivalent in post 2005 period, some Rs.5000 to 6000 more in pension than a pre 2006 retiree Major General who commanded a force about 150 times than that commanded by the new Majors (Lt col/ time scale Colonel).
The cases of old Havildars and Subedar Majors are also of the same category. In fact every old pensioner has been discriminated against. I am of the opinion that the IESM should not take cases piecemeal, as it will be detrimental to the over all struggle.
I feel that we should make a comprehensive case for OROP which if need be, can also be the basis for a court case, which in all probabilities will be the finale of our struggle.
With best wishes & regards,
Col MMP Kala
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Corruption in the Armed Forces- an open letter to COAS
Dear Colleagues,
Having spent 33 very fruitful and fulfilling years in the Army, I feel empty after reading the open letter by Col Rajinder Singh to COAS. Access the letter here along with comments of Air Cmde Raghubir Singh (Retd)
I have come across such officers but their number is minuscule. We were 20 odd COs in an infantry division, all open to 14000 soldiers. I recall only one CO who probably fits in the scenario as he escaped and became a Major General. My technical boss at the Corps HQ, who fitted in absolutely was court- martialed and sentenced severely. The latter also took some innocents along, one of whom was so honest that you could not find office stationery in his home but he signed some routine supply orders which got him in.
I am now 7 years in retirement. I do not think rot is as deep as the long letter says. Yes, it is getting worse and it needs to be arrested. And I think it will get arrested by the Internet era not by this or that COAS. They are products of the same system. There is no place left to hide now. If you think IAS etc are better, think again... If you think Corporate world is better, think Raju of Satyam. Every family owned business is a potential Raju Story...
Indian Armed Forces continue to be on the top of honesty charts in the public mind. I hope it continues.
Best Regards,
Brig KS Bhoon (Retd)
The Sukhna Land Scam: Corruption in army: Dent in the brass
Having spent 33 very fruitful and fulfilling years in the Army, I feel empty after reading the open letter by Col Rajinder Singh to COAS. Access the letter here along with comments of Air Cmde Raghubir Singh (Retd)
I have come across such officers but their number is minuscule. We were 20 odd COs in an infantry division, all open to 14000 soldiers. I recall only one CO who probably fits in the scenario as he escaped and became a Major General. My technical boss at the Corps HQ, who fitted in absolutely was court- martialed and sentenced severely. The latter also took some innocents along, one of whom was so honest that you could not find office stationery in his home but he signed some routine supply orders which got him in.
I am now 7 years in retirement. I do not think rot is as deep as the long letter says. Yes, it is getting worse and it needs to be arrested. And I think it will get arrested by the Internet era not by this or that COAS. They are products of the same system. There is no place left to hide now. If you think IAS etc are better, think again... If you think Corporate world is better, think Raju of Satyam. Every family owned business is a potential Raju Story...
Indian Armed Forces continue to be on the top of honesty charts in the public mind. I hope it continues.
Best Regards,
Brig KS Bhoon (Retd)
The Sukhna Land Scam: Corruption in army: Dent in the brass
Saturday, January 2, 2010
Army’s path of self-destruction by implementing Ajai Vikram Singh Committee recommendations
The original purpose of forming the Ajai Vikram singh Committee (or AVSC as it has come to be known), was to find a way to ensure that officers placed in command of the Indian Army’s basic combat units, were in a younger age bracket. Over the years, a number of factors had combined to push the age of Battalion and Brigade Commanders to an average which compared unfavourably with their counterparts in other armies ; and it was felt that as a result their physical and mental dexterity maybe severely tested under fire.
The Navy and IAF did not have a similar difficulty, and initially these two Services believed that the Army would be able to resolve its problem by making necessary changes in personnel management and promotion policies. However, a degree of unease began to be felt in NHQ and Vayu Bhavan, because the Army had, just a few years earlier, departed from a pre-Independence Indian Army tradition, and upgraded Battalion Commanders from the rank of Lieutenant colonel to full Colonel (which was till then not so much a rank, as an appointment). The simplest way of reducing the ages of Battalion and Brigade Commanders would have been to revert to the old rank structure, but it became evident that the favoured route was to seek more vacancies in the latter rank.
‘Selection and maintenance of aim’ is a cardinal principle of War, but somebody, somewhere seems to have lost the thread, and the aim got shifted from ‘reduction in age of Battalion Commanders’ to the more ambitious one of ‘improving upward mobility and career prospects of officers’ and this resulted in a wide-ranging quest for additional higher ranks, including the creation of a new rank to be known as ‘Colonel-General’!
Thus, Ajai Vikram Singh, an able and forthright Civil servant, when asked to consider a substantial increment in the number of senior ranks, posed a very pertinent question; what functions do two and three –star officers perform today, and when you have a 150 more of the species, how will they occupy themselves? Since the query remained unanswered, he held this issue in abeyance, and moved on to the more pressing problem that the AVSC had been convened for: how to bring down the age of Battalion Commanders?
Having partaken of the benefits offered by AVSC part I, the birds have now come home to roost for the services. The large number of officers promoted under its provisions are coming up for the next rank, and now many more vacancies are made available in higher ranks, (through AVSC Part II). By starting the rank inflation game, the Services have regrettably walked into a dangerous trap, and triggered off a vicious cycle which can only result in proliferation of ranks and their consequent devaluation; thus damaging the time honoured pyramidical command structure.
This is the extract of an article by the former Naval Chief, Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash. [HT- JaiSena.com]
Army’s path of self-destruction... by pressing for adoption of AVSC-2 report
Outcome of implementing AVSC phase 2 Report
Fued at the top
Admiral Suresh Mehta (Ex Chief of Navy) on how command and control structure has been disturbed
Staff and Command Stream for Maj Gens and Lt Gens
Army changes promotion policy for Maj Gens, Lt Gens
The Navy and IAF did not have a similar difficulty, and initially these two Services believed that the Army would be able to resolve its problem by making necessary changes in personnel management and promotion policies. However, a degree of unease began to be felt in NHQ and Vayu Bhavan, because the Army had, just a few years earlier, departed from a pre-Independence Indian Army tradition, and upgraded Battalion Commanders from the rank of Lieutenant colonel to full Colonel (which was till then not so much a rank, as an appointment). The simplest way of reducing the ages of Battalion and Brigade Commanders would have been to revert to the old rank structure, but it became evident that the favoured route was to seek more vacancies in the latter rank.
‘Selection and maintenance of aim’ is a cardinal principle of War, but somebody, somewhere seems to have lost the thread, and the aim got shifted from ‘reduction in age of Battalion Commanders’ to the more ambitious one of ‘improving upward mobility and career prospects of officers’ and this resulted in a wide-ranging quest for additional higher ranks, including the creation of a new rank to be known as ‘Colonel-General’!
Thus, Ajai Vikram Singh, an able and forthright Civil servant, when asked to consider a substantial increment in the number of senior ranks, posed a very pertinent question; what functions do two and three –star officers perform today, and when you have a 150 more of the species, how will they occupy themselves? Since the query remained unanswered, he held this issue in abeyance, and moved on to the more pressing problem that the AVSC had been convened for: how to bring down the age of Battalion Commanders?
Having partaken of the benefits offered by AVSC part I, the birds have now come home to roost for the services. The large number of officers promoted under its provisions are coming up for the next rank, and now many more vacancies are made available in higher ranks, (through AVSC Part II). By starting the rank inflation game, the Services have regrettably walked into a dangerous trap, and triggered off a vicious cycle which can only result in proliferation of ranks and their consequent devaluation; thus damaging the time honoured pyramidical command structure.
This is the extract of an article by the former Naval Chief, Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash. [HT- JaiSena.com]
Army’s path of self-destruction... by pressing for adoption of AVSC-2 report
Outcome of implementing AVSC phase 2 Report
Fued at the top
Admiral Suresh Mehta (Ex Chief of Navy) on how command and control structure has been disturbed
Staff and Command Stream for Maj Gens and Lt Gens
Army changes promotion policy for Maj Gens, Lt Gens
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