Showing posts with label Henderson Brookes Bagat Report. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Henderson Brookes Bagat Report. Show all posts

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Indian Army’s unpaid spy dies in oblivion

SPECIAL TO THE TRIBUNE Wednesday, May 30, 2012, Chandigarh, India
British-born Sydney Wignall discovered the secrets of China’s expansion across Tibet to the borders of India and Nepal

Sadly, New Delhi has ignored the death of Cheshire-born Sydney Wignall who died a few weeks ago in the UK at the age of 89. A British-born hero and unpaid spy of the Indian Army, he used both brains and brawn to discover the secrets of China’s expansion across Tibet to the borders of India and Nepal.
Wignall suffered frost bite, dysentery and regular beatings at the hands of Chinese army guards during his two-month incarceration in a rat-infested prison in Tibet. After his release, he received profuse thanks from his Indian Army contacts for the valuable data he obtained. But the only ‘reward’ he claimed and obtained was a supply of cricket bats and balls for the children of a Nepalese village school that he visited on his way to Tibet.
In 1955, seven years before the Indian Army’s disastrous rout at the hands of Chinese forces, Cheshire-born Sydney Wignall was inspired to lead a Welsh Himalayan Expedition to try and climb the 25,355-foot-high Gurla Mandhata peak in Western Tibet.
Sponsored by the Liverpool Daily Post newspaper and Life magazine, the ostensible objective of the team was to place the flags of Wales and the Chinese Republic on the Gurla Mandhata summit.
Unbeknown to his fellow climbers, however, Wignall had also agreed to gather information for the Indian Army intelligence worried about China’s secret military build up in what was then the autonomous region of Tibet.
Although he and his fellow climber John Harrop, together with their Nepalese liaison officer Damodar Narayan Suwal, were captured soon after they crossed the ill-defined Nepalese border, the information that Wignall collected was the equivalent of intelligence gold dust.
It was gratefully received and analysed by his Indian Army contact, Lieut-Col ‘Baij’ Mehta, who was later killed during the Chinese invasion of Arunachel Pradesh in 1962. It was passed on to an equally grateful Gen KS Thimayya, who later became India’s Chief of Army Staff. He tried and failed to persuade Jawaharlal Nehru of China’s aggressive intentions.
Tellingly, Wignall subsequently had little time for Indian politicians, especially Krishna Menon, who allowed their communist sympathies to blind them to Beijing’s aim of dominating South Asia.
Wignall had met Menon many years earlier in London in 1940, seven years before Independence, when India’s future defence minister and other fellow left-wing activists toed the Soviet Union’s then policy of avoiding confrontation with Adolph Hitler. Menon called 18-year-old Wignall ‘impertinent’ and Wignall formed the impression that Menon was ‘vain, arrogant and conceited.” He called him ‘A thoroughly detestable man.’
Wignall’s Indian heroes were the likes of Gen Thimayya, Col Mehta and Brig John Dalvi, who, in 1962, had only 2,700 soldiers under his command to resist a Chinese division of 12,000 that swept down on him from the Thagla Ridge in what was then known as the North East Frontier Agency or NEFA.
Brigadier Dalvi’s 7th Brigade, which ran out of ammunition, suffered 90 per cent casualties. Those who survived the immediate onslaught died overnight because they had not been supplied with adequate tents, sleeping bags or warm winter clothing. Brigadier Dalvi himself was captured and tortured. A broken man when he was released, he died a few years later much before his time.
It was while he was preparing for his Himalayan expedition in 1955 that Wignall made contact with a retired Indian Army officer, one Lieut-Col Toby Tobin, who was then the vice-president of the Himalayan Club and editor of the Himalayan Journal. Tobin told him, “You might be able to do some friends a favour” before introducing him to a contact called ‘Singh’ at the Indian High Commission in London.
What followed thereafter was like something out of a John Buchan novel. Singh briefed Wignall about the bellicose statements that some Chinese generals had been making about territorial claims to large parts of Northern India, Nepal, Sikkim and Burma. For that reason the Indian military authorities were interested in rumours of China’s intention of building a military highway in west Tibet, close to the sacred lake of Mansarowar.
“You happen to be the only one visiting what to us is the most sensitive area in the whole border region,” Singh explained. “From a vantage point on the north-west ridge of Gurla Mandhata you would be able to see, with a telescope, any sign of a military encampment in that area, and you could look for evidence of the building of that military highway to west Tibet.”
Supplied with maps provided by the British War office, Wignall and his team soon embarked on their 6,500-mile trip from London to the borders of India, Nepal and Tibet. Within days of crossing into Tibet from the Khatang Pass, however, the three lead members of the team were arrested for illegally crossing into Chinese territory.
For the next two months they were held in freezing, rat-infested rooms and interrogated by a team led by Gen Chang Kuo-hua, the military commander of Tibet. These were hard-line party supporters, very different from the likes of 21st century Chinese communist VIPS like millionaire Bo Xilai who had his son Bo Guagua educated at Harrow, Oxford and Harvard.
General Chang was made of much sterner stuff. His minions beat up and abused the British mountaineers, subjecting them to mock executions and telling them, “You intended disguising your illegal armed invasion of China so that the Tibetans would not know you are agents of a foreign power, Western Fascist Lackey Imperial Running Dogs.”
Wignall himself was told, “Sign the confession that you are a Western Fascist Lackey Imperialist Running Dog of the American CIA and we will be very good to you. Otherwise you will be severely punished.”
Although they were under close surveillance during their captivity, Wignall and his friends were able to extract vital information, both from their interrogators and from some of the more friendly guards.
In what was then the pre-satellite age, Wignall managed to accurately estimate the strength of the secret Chinese army base at Jitkot, 17 miles from Tklakot close to the Nepal border. More importantly he was able to gauge that China’s strategic highway from Lhasa would reach Tklakot within the next two years. And from General Chang he heard how Beijing laid claim to India’s Aksai Chin and NEFA regions, as well as parts of Nepal, Kashmir, all of Sikkim, all of Bhutan and parts of northern Burma.
Much of what Wignall discovered was confirmed and reconfirmed before, during and after the 1962 Chinese invasion of India. He himself neither asked for, nor was given any form of compensation by the authorities in India.
Wignall did brief members of the British Foreign Office about his adventures when he returned to London, but his main satisfaction was extracted from the belief that he had taken high risks for the right reasons. In later years he became an underwater archaeologist, uncovering wrecks in British, Portugese and Panamanian waters. A handful of Indians may still remember both his affection for the country and his perilous exploits in the Himalayas. For them he remains a much-loved friend of Mother India.
Indian Army’s unpaid spy dies in oblivion

Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Remembering 1962 debacle: Is the Military better prepared?

Ref: Can China repeat its 1962 military humiliation of India?
Comment
IAF101 • 28 minutes ago • parent −
What a "surprise" - a military officer blames the politicians and bureaucrats for failure! Guess we haven't heard that excuse from military officers before!
Who ever loses a conflict is a "Yes Man" general and whoever wins is a "skilled" general right? What convenient logic!
Dealing with the political authority is part and parcel of being a general in a democracy. Blaming X and Y is meaningless because it is not some politician or some bureaucrat whose fate is affected but the entire nation! Just as Nehru takes the ultimate blame for failure, the Indian Army also must accept blame that it was unprepared and over matched by the Chinese military. Individual heroism of a few brave officers means nothing if defeat is the outcome. Even the Nazi had heroic officers who fought for their side but today nobody remembers them because they LOST. It is a fact that some Indian commanders gave bad orders and the Indian military headquarters as a whole was struggling to resupply and move troops to the remote NE while the Chinese were crawling up and down Tibet with ease.
As long as the Indian military does not accept responsibility for defeat, it can never learn the lessons required.
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Sunday, October 24, 2010

Indo China war: The shock and awe of 1962

Dear Veterans,
One wonders if the situation is any better now and with multiplied force levels of the Chinese. Are we not waiting for another humiliation? Who will be blamed politicians, bureaucracy or the armed forces? The special article by A Bhatacharayya of Statesman is a pointer to political indifference to National Security in connivance with Bureaucratic incompetence.
Warm regards,
Brigadier PTGangadharan,Guards,
Veteran

The Statesman, 21 October 2010- Shock and awe of ’62, A War That Was Lost Before It Began By Abhijit Bhattacharyya
After 37 years, precisely on 7 October 2010, Israel relived, as it were, the declassified documents of the Yom Kippur war. The confidential discussions of Israel’s top leaders in the first days of the Arab-Israeli war are now in the open. However, no such declassification has taken place in India even 48 years after the war with China. The most devastating setback was suffered by the army at the battle of Namka Chu (Kechilang to the Chinese) at 5 am on Saturday, 20 October 1962. Namka Chu was a national shame, an unprecedented battering for the military, an unparalleled command failure on the part of spineless, non-professional Generals, an ignominy for the over-rated and conspiratorial bureaucracy and a case of rare political irresponsibility and foolishness. It was not a military conflict fought on the ground, but the outcome of a myopic political process which was tantamount to self-inflicted humiliation in a potential conflict zone.
The Indian politicians in the fifties and sixties were so out-of-depth that the Government still does not feel confident enough to declassify the 48-year-old documents. This only encourages speculation.
Indeed, India was done-in much before the hostility in the Namka Chu valley. The die was actually cast on Sunday, 9 September 1962. With both Prime Minister Nehru and Finance Minister Morarji Desai out of the country, and Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri nowhere in the loop, Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon took upon himself the role and responsibility to hold a meeting in his South Block office on a holiday. With the army chief and two army commanders and presumably one or two ministry officials in attendance, Menon “unilaterally” gave the “marching order” to the army to go forward, according to Brigadier John P. Dalvi, the fall guy of the 1962 defeat, in his military classic, Himalayan Blunder. Neville Maxwell in his authentic India’s China War corroborates Dalvi’s version with a blow-by-blow account, which he reportedly “managed” to access from Lt. General Henderson Brooks’ enquiry report on the disaster.
The government decided to “go forward” and set up a post at the trijunction of India-Bhutan-China at Dhola on the Thagla ridge on the Namka Chu river. Dalvi’s description of the confusion, ignorance of Delhi-based military generals and civilian babus make ironic, yet comical and hilarious, reading. A sketch map was the “only map” available as there “were no accurate survey maps of this area. The ¼-inch editions were very old and vaguely based on the details provided by the British officer who was deputed to visit the area and align the McMahon Line, as agreed at the Simla Conference of 1913-14. It showed the Namka Chu flowing from north to south, whereas it actually flowed from west to east”.
It was another bigger river, named Nyamjang Chu, which flowed from north to south from the Thagla watershed. This appears to have led to the conclusion that the flow of Namka Chu too must be following the same north-south axis. Dalvi wrote: “I have often wondered if this map misled our planners into thinking that 9 Punjab were facing east instead of north”. The strategy, therefore, exposed a deficit in the planners’ knowledge of history and geography, ignorance of the terrain, non-application of mind and a political compulsion that was thrust upon the army’s field commanders. The end-result of India’s adventure in the face of the obdurate Chinese was a foregone conclusion.
The order issued by the Army chief’s office in mid-September 1962 stated: “9 Punjab will capture Thagla, contain Yumtsola and Karpola-II by September 19.” It was “issued while the Prime Minister and Finance Minister were abroad and the Defence Minister was having his western clothes dry-cleaned for New York. The Chief of General Staff of the Army was enjoying the salubrious climate of Kashmir. All the key desks in Delhi were empty”.
The Prime Minister made an uncharacteristically aggressive statement at Colombo airport on 12 October 1962: “The Army has been told to drive away the Chinese from our territory in NEFA”. This worsened the situation. It served as the clarion call for war by India’s Head of Government, and one that was made on foreign soil. It was a humiliating assault on the pride and ego of any nation, not to speak of China alone. It once again brought into sharp and contrasting focus the issue of war preparedness and the psyche thereof. The Indian military was simply in no position to fight because the 600 ragtag men had nothing to fight with and did not know where to fight and when and how to begin in the face of a mighty enemy of 40000 men coming from across the Namka Chu. The war was over in three hours, to be precise.
Nemesis caught up with Namka Chu because the operational “Brigade Headquarters was at Towang, some five days’ march from the intrusion at Thagla Ridge. Towang is a field posting and a hardship station. The Division was at Tezpur, 200 miles away. Although Tezpur is considered to be a field area, life is more or less normal, with planters’ clubs, golf courses and cinemas. Corps HQ was at Shillong, another 200 miles away. Shillong is a salubrious hill station and a ‘peace posting’. Command HQ was at Lucknow some 600 miles from Shillong ... The last tier is the holy of holies at Delhi where we have Army HQ and ‘Government’. Delhi is the most peaceful of the world’s capitals and so far removed from military realities that political factors perforce dominate the formulation of national strategy”.
This was the ground reality for the demoralized soldiers in the frontline during September-October 1962. It was a “lost war” even before the war had begun as the “peace stations” of Shillong (Corps HQ); Lucknow (Command HQ) and Delhi gave China a “head start” in the October 1962 war with India.
How were the Chinese placed in contrast to India’s plight at the Namka Chu/Thagla axis? How did they inflict one of the most spectacular and stunning defeats on an enemy in the field? The Chinese followed the doctrines of their ancient scholar-soldier Sun Tzu, enshrined in the Art of War. War, being a “matter of life and death for the state”, must not be neglected. “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”. This is the doctrine that was followed in Namka Chu.
The Indian resistance simply ended in three hours on Saturday, 20 October 1962 “without fighting”. The soldiers fought as hard as they could from 5 am to 8 am, thereby writing a fresh, humiliating chapter in the country’s history.
Let India not forget that 48-year-old chapter written with the blood, toil, tears and death of some of the crack units of her fighting machine. Let India not allow Sun Tzu’s success to be repeated at its expense in the Namka Chu valley. Let India declassify the official documents and the full text of Lt.- Gen Henderson Brooks if the government is inclined to “prove” that 1962 was actually “China’s India war” and not “India’s China war” as Neville Maxwell would have us believe.

The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College of India and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Indo- China war: The shock and awe of 1962

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