OP LEGHORN: A Planners Nightmare
Driving and road conditions
The nearest Road head and administrative base was at Tawang, 100 Kms away from the location of our forward troops. Only a one-ton one way fair weather road connected Tawang from the foothills. This road followed a circuitous path with steep gradients requiring great skill on the part of the drivers and the vehicles to be in first class mechanical condition. Even the slightest miscalculation on part of the driver while negotiating bends could land the vehicle in the ravines often three to four thousand feet deep. Quite often there were delays due to the road being cut off by avalanches and extensive damage caused during the monsoons.
Stocking and maintenance
Further stocking and maintenance beyond Tawang was carried out by animal transport and porters.7 Infantry Brigade had been allotted only two Animal Transport (AT) Companies which were inadequate. At places, even the mules were found to be of little use due to the weak log bridges, which could not take the weight of laden animals. Besides, the maintenance of the AT companies itself further added to the problems. The shortage of ponies and porters was so great that units were moved without their full complement of even first line ammunition, thus severely restricting the availability of fire power to the troops.
Air Maintenance
Our troops had, therefore, to depend largely on air maintenance. It was estimated that the total requirement of airlift for both 2 and 4 Infantry Divisions was 260 Tons daily where as the airlift available amounted to not more than 80 Tons daily due to non availability of aircraft. There was also an acute shortage of supply dropping equipment, which was required to be salvaged and returned. Even the quality of supply dropping equipment was poor. In one case, vitally needed guns airdropped at Tsangdhar were damaged beyond repair when the parachutes failed to open.
Improvised Dropping Zones
For the maintenance of the troops at Dhola area, two improvised dropping zones were commissioned at Tsangdhar and Lumpu. Both these dropping zones were above 4500M with inadequate flat space. Approaches to these were hazardous and the pilots had to be careful not to over fly, as otherwise they would be above Chinese posts. With these constraints, the air supply proved to be extremely costly and ineffective. Quite often the supplies fell into inaccessible ravines and were irretrievable Supply of stores from the dropping zones to the forward troops involved a number of days turnaround. In the case of Lumpu, It meant going along the Namka Chu with a turn round of seven days.
(Extract from History of the Army Service Corps)
Brig Lakshman Singh, VSM (Retd)
Chinese troops launch a massive attack on Indian positions in NEFA on 20 Oct 1962. Over the next 31 days, the numerically superior People's Liberation Army overruns poorly equipped Indian troops. The Chinese almost reach the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire. Over 2400 Indian officers and soldiers died in the conflict. The plain fact is: a psychologically ill prepared and physically unacclimatized Indian Army was thoroughly defeated by the Chinese. So what has changed in the 45 years since then?
1962 war zone, revisited
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