Organisations for counter terrorism

Is raising new NSG- like units the solution?

The ineffectiveness of the police will soon help them to gain more high rank appointments for the IPS. The plan to raise more NSG type units to place them at four metros would relieve the state police of all responsibility.

Though Mumbai Police has an ATS we are told this is only for investigation after strikes. Yet we are told there are many encounter specialists in the org. For what? When the terrorists struck where were these encounter specialists, other than those killed in an ambush? Not even one came forward to battle the terrorists. There was not a single casualty of the ATS in any encounter or battle. Great!! Must be due to tricks picked up from Bollywood! Only catch is that they did not neutralise even a single terrorist and just waited for help.

Next we have the Marcos. Sad to say but their performance was no better than the Police. And if they are not trained for such jobs why did they deploy? To exhibit their ineffectiveness? Not being familiar with the Taj is no excuse. Were the NSG cdos familiar with Taj or Nariman House?

It is time introspect critically and increase the level of training and professionalism once we have decided to raise a force.

It must be realised that NSG or any other Cdo force can only react. The ideal organisation is where the Intelligence and Ops are integrated under one cdr. Since only four metros are not going to be threatened (See history of terrorist strikes) what will be the arrangement for the remaining country? Terrorist strike planners take time to identify weaknesses and strike only when they realise the protective measures are cosmetic and the reactions likely to be lethargic. There is no record of terrorist strikes on alert troops, in India, so far. In this I do not include strikes for assassination of specific targets. In the West, of course, there have been suicide attacks but again they were confident of getting through the protective perimeter to drive their explosive loaded trucks to the desired point. While it is true that determined terrorists can strike any target, the fact is why should they strike alert targets when there are plenty of unprotected ones? In India every other place is vulnerable barring a few VIPs.

Also it is important to note that presence of NSG cannot prevent terrorist attacks. Delhi has been hit any number of times with the complete NSG nearby. What is important is Intelligence and prevention. Had the NSG reached in, say two hrs what would have been the number of casualties? In all attacks maximum casualties take place in the first half hour.

Terrorists always strike the undefended, weakest targets killing unarmed innocent, civilians whereas the Insurgents strike the strength of the state such as police stations, Army posts, convoys etc and protect the unarmed civilians. We must understand the difference. The terrorists would never have opened fire on the ATS car in Mumbai if there was the slightest chance of retaliation.

What is the answer?

States must remain responsible to deal with terrorism. What is the difficulty in training existing police offrs and men to form (NSG like) units in their states? The Police have their Intelligence. In addition each district, each Police station must be responsible to gain its own Intelligence in its area of responsibility. If need be another police offr can be posted to each district, under the SSP for this task. The existing Intelligence setups may continue to please the political masters, as hither to fore.

The high level training needs to be given to only about a company worth of commandos in each state to be increased, if required. But it can be called a commando unit of the police. Though 200 NSG personnel came to Mumbai, we saw that very few were actually used. Even with 500% reserve we don't need too many commandos. These must be the elite not used for protection of VIPs. Black colour uniformed personnel must never be used for VIP protection. They must only be used to deal with terrorists.

The Army can help in imparting training. We also have enough reserves of personnel who have served in NSG and returned to units. Some can be absorbed in state police forces, if the Army agrees to release them.

I do wish, in the interest of our countrymen, that the authorities analyse the problem before taking the usual Home Ministry action of raising a new force after every crisis. Unfortunately their advisors are the DGs of CPOs who have no experience of handling any crisis. If any of you can do something about it, do it.

Lt Gen KK Khanna
Former Commandant IMA